

Discourses of Collective Identity in Central and Southeast Europe (1770–1945)

Texts and Commentaries



Volume Four:

Anti-modernism—
Radical Revisions
of Collective
Identity



Edited by Diana Mishkova, Marius Turda
and Balázs Trencsényi

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(1770–1945)**

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—
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VOLUME IV

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ANTI-MODERNISM

—

RADICAL REVISIONS OF COLLECTIVE IDENTITY

Edited by

Diana Mishkova, Marius Turda and
Balázs Trencsényi



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The Editorial Board of the Series

INTRODUCTION

Approaching Anti-modernism

Sorin Antohi and Balázs Trencsényi

The present volume is the last in the series entitled *Discourses of Collective Identity in Central and Southeast Europe (1770–1945): Texts and Commentaries*. The history of this venture goes back to a meeting of young scholars at the Balkan Summer University in Plovdiv in 1999. Step by step, a research project, hosted by the Centre for Advanced Study Sofia, was formed with the intention of bringing together and making accessible basic texts of the region's national traditions. The ensuing Reader was envisioned as a challenge to the self-centered and isolationist historical narratives and educational canons prevalent in the region. On the whole, the anthologies of the series are expected to fill in the lacunae concerning the knowledge of Central and Southeast European intellectual history pertinent to the very core of the schooling process and academic socialization both within this region and also globally. It is hoped that our work will thus substantially broaden the field of possible comparisons and make researchers look at the process of nation building in Central and Southeast Europe from a transnational perspective.

The grouping of the texts follows neither national provenience, nor *sensu stricto* chronological order. It is determined more by thematic similarities and resonances. The four “meta-themes” around which the four volumes are organized are the following: Late Enlightenment (the emergence of the modern “national idea”); National Romanticism (the formation of national movements); Modernism (the full development of national movements and often the creation of national states); and Anti-modernism.

Within these thematic units, various aspects of identity formation are analyzed, such as “symbolic geography,” the competing representations of the national community, images of the past and the production of cultural markers (i.e., national language or national character), as well as the images of the other and the “construction” of identity in religious and socio-cultural contexts—domains that themselves exhibit revealing similarities.

Towards a heuristic model of anti-modernism

The topic of this volume, “anti-modernism,” is arguably the least self-explanatory of the four meta-categories that structure the volumes of our series. While the other three notions (Enlightenment, National Romanticism, Modernism) are fairly conventional and are employed as analytical categories by historians of different generations and ideological persuasions, anti-modernism is decidedly more contested and requires explanation.

To start with, it is important to stress that our use of this notion does not imply a complete rift between the modernist and anti-modernist frameworks. As we will try to argue in what follows, what we identify heuristically as anti-modernism is in a very complex and entangled relationship with modernism. Analyzing anti-modernism in an aesthetic context, Benedict Anderson pointed to this inherent ambiguity: “On one side, the hunt was on for ‘authenticity,’ ‘roots,’ ‘originality,’ and ‘history,’ as nationalism’s historically new consciousness created a radical break with the past. On the other side, nations were everywhere understood as ‘gliding into a limitless future,’ developing in perfect synchrony with the breakneck speed of Progress.”¹

A systematic treatment of anti-modernism is a major theoretical and empirical challenge. In a huge, fast-growing bibliography, the use of this concept (or figure?), seems to be rather chaotic and context-specific (even author-specific).² For us, this is a sobering reminder to refrain in these pages from attempting to formulate any ambitious normative “anti-modernist minimum,” “ideal-type,” “paradigm,” “synopsis,” “synthesis,” etc. Nonetheless, as this is the introduction to a massive sample of very diverse texts that, in our opinion, belong under the rubric “anti-modernism,” and as they are individually contextualized and explicated, we will still try to use suggestions from various disciplines—from lexicography and historical semantics to the history of ideas and

¹ Benedict Anderson, “Staging Antimodernism in the Age of High Capitalist Nationalism,” in Linda Jessup, ed., *Antimodernism and Artistic Experience: Policing the Boundaries of Modernity* (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 2001), p. 98.

² For some of the most paradigmatic approaches see Jeffrey Herf, *Reactionary Modernism: Technology, Culture, and Politics in Weimar and the Third Reich* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984); Zygmunt Bauman, *Modernity and the Holocaust* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1995); Emilio Gentile, *The Struggle for Modernity: Nationalism, Futurism, and Fascism* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2003); David D. Roberts, *The Totalitarian Experiment in Twentieth-Century Europe: Understanding the Poverty of Great Politics* (New York: Routledge, 2005); Antoine Compagnon, *Les Antimodernes: de Joseph de Maistre à Roland Barthes* (Paris: Gallimard, 2005).

conceptual history (Koselleckian or otherwise)—as well as inspiration from a long list of authors, some of whom we greatly appreciate even when we more or less disagree with their contributions, in order to first sketch a working heuristic model, then make comments upon it, and raise questions leading to further work on a truly transnational (i.e., beyond the Western tradition of “asymmetric comparisons”), intercultural, multidisciplinary level.

Anti-modernism could be defined as (a) the negative double of modernism and (b) the critique of modernism *within* modernism, not *outside of* or *separated from* it. Both parts of this definition need to be kept in mind: (a), more comprehensive, accounts for the many fundamental structural, substantive, and functional similarities between the two, as well as for anti-modernism’s (ambivalent) negativity, which ranges from cosmology to self-identity; this part also indicates that anti-modernism, like modernism, is a radical critique of modernization and modernity (so anti-modernism should not be construed as conservatism or an heir to it, similarities and synergies notwithstanding); (b), which suggests that modernism comes first (logically, chronologically) but (inevitably, already) includes anti-modernism, accounts for their entanglements as well as for the peculiar reactivity and self-reflexivity of the latter (which is not downright reactionary, but reacts against most elements of both modernity and modernism).

All these considered, anti-modernism is (like modernism, but to various degrees and in specific ways), a neo-palingenetic, revolutionary, transfigurative, future-oriented alternative spirituality that pervades and shapes every realm of the human experience, from belief systems to aesthetics, from ideology to politics, from individual and collective (speculative) anthropology to cosmology and metaphysics. Modernism and anti-modernism differ more significantly—but not to the point of becoming absolutely distinct in all instances—in their historical deployment, especially due to the latter’s negativity, authoritarianism, (cult of) violence and (self-)victimization, cultural pessimism, organicism, and biopolitical exclusion (culminating in genocide—the absolute degree of the eugenic dystopia), although they always co-evolve and eventually blend with each other as well as with other theories and practices.

Comments and questions

After outlining this compact working heuristic model, some “unpacking” is necessary before moving on to the sections of this volume which introduce, describe, interpret, and sample the phenomenology and history of Central and South-Eastern European anti-modernism.

Anti- is itself a problematic prefix, like most others. Etymologically, it indicates opposition, but historically/contextually it may also suggest (limited, unstable, ambivalent) commonality beyond difference. While *anti-* literally means “against” in most instances, it is misleading in others. Antimatter, still a contested term in physics, was originally called “negative matter,” but has lost its conceptual negativity after Paul Dirac, and has come basically to mean another form of matter. This discussion is also familiar to students of Utopianism, for whom anti-utopia (or counter-utopia) is a negative subcategory of utopia, albeit a critique, a (sometimes carnivalesque) subversion thereof. Closer to our discussion, Antoine Compagnon has convincingly argued that the French *antimodernes* were not anti-modern, but rather *counter-modern*. His interpretative framework was built on a triangular relationship of modernism, anti-modernism and radical conservatism. He asserted that, in contrast to the radical conservatives, such as Charles Maurras, who rejected dialogue with modernity altogether, anti-modernists in many ways shared in the values of modernity, albeit from a critical perspective. An anti-revolution is opposed to (the very idea of) revolution, whereas a counter-revolution presupposes a theory of revolution; similarly, the anti-moderns need to be distinguished from the reactionary.³ Finally, Compagnon chose *antimoderne* over *contre-moderne* for formal reasons (the second term is considered infelicitous on p. 24). With this in mind, let us consider his definition of the anti-moderns: “Les antimodernes [...] ne seraient autres que les modernes, les vrais modernes, non dupes du moderne, les modernes déniaisés.”⁴ While this argument is relatively undecided between a paradox (the anti-modern are the true modern and/because they are self-reflexive to the point of self-hatred, like Péguy in Compagnon’s view) and a tautology (the anti-modern are modern), the difficulty of coming up with a clear-cut concept is symptomatic and instructive.

Anti-modernism’s negativity, its most salient trope (or distinctive “emplotment,” as Hayden White would put it) is most frequently “apophatic.” It says what it means negatively, or (to stick to this quasi-theological vocabulary) through the *via negativa*. Correspondingly, modernism is “cataphatic”—it expresses itself positively. In other words, anti-modernism negates while modernism affirms, but their respective messages share the same discursive space, their practices share the same world of meaning, and frequently their actors. Consequently, it is difficult to disentangle them in many cases, and it is mistaken to construe them as the opposite terms of a dualism.

³ Compagnon, *Les Antimodernes*, pp. 22–28.

⁴ Compagnon, *Les Antimodernes*, p. 8.

One additional argument against any such epistemological, political or moral Manichaeism is what appears to be the impossibility of going beyond the entanglement of modernism and anti-modernism, as has become obvious in the last decades of discussions on post-modernism.⁵ This is another reason why anti-modernism remains topical after the collapse of grand narratives, both in our meso-region, where it came back in strikingly familiar forms—more dramatically after 1989—and around the world. Modernism and (especially) anti-modernism could not be transcended, sublated/*aufgehoben*, most likely because they cannot be separated into “pure” forms and dealt with according to a Hegelian philosophy (of history). Also, they cannot be arranged in chronological succession; they do not lead neatly (teleologically) to a synthesis. They want to build a new world both with and for new men, under a new “sacred canopy”—to quote Peter Berger’s apt formula, while remembering his failure to predict or understand from the beginning the *Wiedenzauberung der Welt* (this metapolitical, almost metahistorical, reaction to the real or imaginary *anomie*, *Angst*, malaise, meaninglessness, chaos, rootlessness, inauthenticity, and the like). But while modernism insists on light and hope, progress and emancipation, freedom and even (creative) chaos, anti-modernism privileges darkness and apocalypse, (creative) destruction, (self-) violence and nihilism, determinism and (new) order—both at individual and collective levels (group, *ethnie*, race, elite, state).

On many occasions, modernism and anti-modernism were almost identical or at least fraternal (to echo the simplest typology of twins, oblivious of the more arcane aspects of zygosity), which of course does not preclude (sibling) rivalry and conflict, much along the lines of a Girardian “mimetic competition.” Due to their deep linkages, common roots and contexts, similarities and ambivalences (metaphysical, epistemological, ideological, political, aesthetic), anti-modernism and modernism have been frequently amalgamated, conflated, or opposed, be it by their champions or by their critical analysts, by their friends or by their foes. This entanglement also means that in contrast with the previous volumes, in which the chronological framework was usually rather obvious, here we can speak of the parallel existence of modernist and anti-modernist paradigms. Thus, for instance, the shift from the

⁵ On p. 9 of his book, Compagnon has aptly noted that, before post-modernism, “la tentation antimoderne oscillait [...] déjà entre le prémodernisme et l’ultramodernisme [...]”; this observation applies to France, but could be used transnationally. Cf. Habermas’ view of post-modernity as a particularly sophisticated form of anti-modernity, and more recently Hayden White’s assessment of American post-modernism.

Enlightened to the Romantic episteme was rather linear, even though our previous volumes tried to cast some doubt on the all too convenient historiographical practice of trying to date this shift exactly, suggesting instead a more osmotic relationship. In the case of modernism and anti-modernism, this relationship is even more complicated: not only are there authors whose oeuvres contain elements from both ideological paradigms, but the very same texts can be read both as modernist and anti-modernist, depending on the framework of interpretation we choose.

As a matter of fact, the history of ideas is replete with such examples of close connectedness, blurred structural and/or functional distinctions, co-evolution of positivity and negativity. A similar pattern of “negative dialectics” has been associated with the Enlightenment itself, especially in its German version (see, for instance, Max Horkheimer, Theodor W. Adorno, *Dialektik der Aufklärung*, and Adorno’s *Negative Dialektik*). Although we do not share the authors’ view, central to the genealogy of classical Critical Theory and of its current avatars, that the “Enlightenment project” has failed on its own terms, we believe that its internal negativity (a somber, nocturnal, irrational or at least self-critical, ambivalent *basso continuo* of the primarily solar, rational Enlightenment at all times, present even in Kant and in Hegel) was to bloom in Romanticism and, far from being resolved by the contact with Positivism and the other paradigms emerging up to World War I, was to be re-launched due to the *fin-de-siècle* proclivity for syncretism and fixation on decadence and imminent doom (however joyous for some), and ultimately to re-emerge more radically in the interwar period.

This dialectical advancement of modernism and anti-modernism can also be identified in the trajectory of the various related evolutions. In aesthetics this ranged from Flaubert and ever more forcefully from Baudelaire’s passage through negativity as a solution to the challenges of modernity’s beginnings. In theology and philosophy it meant the emergence of a new challenge: having survived almost two millennia of “renovations” of the Primitive Church, reforms, counter-reforms, and *aggiornamentos*, the quest for entirely new religions after Friedrich Schlegel, Nietzsche’s announcement of the death of God, the churches faced ever greater threats, perhaps greater than secularization—Pope Pius X had to impose in 1910 an oath against modernism, the trend in the Roman Catholic Church towards pantheism. All this became manifest in religious life as well (moving away from established religions and closer to alternative belief systems). By the end of the 19th century, Nietzsche’s version of negative Romanticism, his attempt at an apoca-

lyptic-cum-palingenetic *Umwertung aller Werte*, as well as other forms of negativity, ranging from the revolt against Positivism to every fad of creative (self-)destruction, and from cultural pessimism to nihilism seemed on their way to becoming the very mainstream of European civilization, together with the complementary calls for reawakening, regeneration, rebirth, a new beginning.⁶

Let us now briefly turn to the other traits of anti-modernism as singled out in our heuristic model. Most of them can be identified, to various degrees and in various ratios, in virtually all forms of anti-modernism. In what follows we can only mention some of their aspects, especially those specific to or particularly salient in our meso-region.

The anti-modernist vision of collective regeneration

In his seminal and sophisticated treatment of modernism and fascism, culminating in his 2007 *magnum opus*, *Modernism and Fascism: The Sense of a Beginning under Mussolini and Hitler*, Roger Griffin has critically analyzed and synthesized everything worth considering from entire libraries with the slightest connection to the topic, and has even advanced an ideal type of modernism.⁷ Griffin distinguishes “high modernity”—a specific configuration giving birth to totalitarian ideologies as a reaction to the process of modernization, which for some contemporaries seemed to equal degeneration.⁸ Modernism, in this rendering, is a response to the crisis allegedly caused by modernity. For Griffin, the modernist palingenetic ideologies seeking to offer a way out of this crisis fused eugenics and ultra-nationalism into a highly destructive mixture. In his model, there is no conceptual space for anti-modernism, although the contrast between modernity and modernism suggests a similar duality.

Our own analysis of modernism and anti-modernism has greatly benefited from our reading of Griffin’s work, our reflection on it, and long years of correspondence, conferences (including one on modernism and anti-

⁶ See in this context Shane Weller, *Modernism and Nihilism* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).

⁷ Roger Griffin, *Modernism and Fascism: The Sense of a Beginning under Mussolini and Hitler* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), pp. 54–55, with comments extending to p. 58.

⁸ Roger Griffin, “Tunnel Visions and Mysterious Trees: Modernist Projects of National and Racial Regeneration, 1880–1939,” in Marius Turda and Paul Weindling, eds., *Blood and Homeland* (Budapest: CEU Press, 2007), pp. 417–456; and Griffin, *Modernism and Fascism*.

modernism in Bucharest, September 2008), and other common projects. As we said earlier, in Griffin's model there is no or hardly any conceptual space for anti-modernism. Nonetheless, we think we could add anti-modernism to his ideal type, in view of our treatment of negativity. Thus, Griffin's ideal type could cover even more ground, and could be expanded so as to include what we define as anti-modernism.

While we agree with Griffin that the discourses in question cannot be understood outside of the ideological storm of modernity, we nevertheless seek to make a heuristic distinction between modernism and anti-modernism, *pace* Compagnon, in order to accentuate the parallel existence and competition of different political modernities. Equating the modernist political discourse and practice with some form of totalitarianism would disregard the other tentative answers to the crisis of modernity that also abounded in this region, ranging from attempts to reinvigorate liberalism and social democracy, through agrarian populism, technocratism and anti-totalitarian conservatism. Thus, in our terminology, the "anti-modernist" aspects of these texts should not be merged conceptually either with *modernity*, or with *a-modernity*. The anti-modernist projects were posing an internal critique of modernity, offering an at times extremely ruthless criticism of parliamentary democracy, rationalism, individualism, and the vision of linear progress, often also rejecting legal equality. What they offered instead was various formulas of collective regeneration, and restoration of the socio-cultural harmony undermined by the very process of modernization.

One central notion in Griffin's ideal type is palingenesis, which had been overlooked by most authors dealing with generic fascism (in short, fascism). We fully share this view, but we would like to remind our readers that fascist palingenesis was not the first of its kind. As Griffin himself has written, post-*Risorgimento* Italy routinely used the notion. In our meso-region, the first large-scale palingenetic movements were the 1848 revolutions, inspired by Western Europe but also developing specific local, ethno-national (this could also mean transborder, as many ethnic nations were included in at least one empire), and transnational agendas. In our opinion, this was a first, luminous palingenesis. Thus, interwar anti-modernism can be seen as a second, dark palingenesis. This we call neo-palingenesis. It shares with the first its revolutionary, religious (even mystical) enthusiasm, as well as its calls for rebirth. Moreover, both palingeneses (paradoxically) ask for and herald endless regeneration without death, the rebirth of the unborn and/or of the perennial—the ideal ethnic nation, which was yet to be built, rather than reawakened or reborn. But in 1848, the emphasis was mostly on a French-inspired *Peuple*

(so it was closer to Michelet than to Herder), a rather “constructive,” largely imitative, mostly secular, cosmopolitan ideal, however qualified by prophetic, eschatological, ethno-national undertones and claims. In the 1930s, the emphasis was essentially (in more than one sense) on the German-inspired *Volk*, a model that had moved from the second Herder all the way to *Völkerpsychologie*, and on to ethnic ontologies and biopolitics—the latter ensuring that ethnic nations would be “born again,” i.e., cleansed and otherwise engineered in order to correspond to an ideal of autochthony, homogeneity, spirituality, and (racial) superiority. The last two notions, spirituality (which will be addressed below) and (racial) superiority, while familiar from the “Western core,” where they were already far-fetched (not to mention unfounded and ultimately criminal), had an added note of delirious self-aggrandizing when used by ethnic nations with rather modest historical records.

Much has been written on the concept of *Konservative Revolution*, and we can definitely use it as an introduction to the revolutionary nature of anti-modernism. Nonetheless, our meso-region had not experienced anything close to the French Revolution beyond the realm of ideas and ideals, with the complex exception of the Hungarian and Polish Jacobins and of various (other) circles of Freemasons; its 1848 revolutions had largely failed, never producing two clear-cut camps (Liberals and Conservatives, although occasionally waging ruthless political wars, remained blurred competing factions, due to their similar backgrounds and to their participation in numerous forms of fraternalism, especially Freemasonry); the Bolshevik revolution also offered itself as an alternative (Hungary provides a paradigmatic case here, as the clash of the rightist and leftist revolutionary visions effectively dismantled the edifice of the country’s political modernity).

As we have already indicated, most of these European revolutions were part of a backlog of “unfinished business” on Europe’s peripheries. Consequently, our meso-regional anti-modernisms had a more porous and flexible “table of contents,” and eventually resulted in a quasi-chiliastic form of ethno-national revolution directed against Western-styled modernity. In Romania, the “primacy of the spiritual,” advocated by philosopher and generational guru Nae Ionescu (whose most important disciple was Mircea Eliade), was supposed to solve the local double bind (the “forms without substance”) by means of a revolution that was to isolate Romania from the West (individualistic, secular, artificial, Protestant—in a quasi-Weberian sense), create a peasant totalitarian state, and overcome “the economic” by “the spiritual.” As to the exact meaning of the word “spiritual,” which could eventually exclude

the notion of culture, this is yet another local particularity which we consider under the rubric “alternative spirituality,” as local established Churches were not deemed sufficiently spiritual in the new way that both modernism and anti-modernism were seeking.

In his *Jeremiad*, *Schimbarea la față a României* (“The Transfiguration of Romania,” 1934), possibly the most complex piece of anti-modernist writing from our meso-region, Cioran was simultaneously calling Romanians to a radical transformation of their country, a *metamorphosis* in a quasi-theological sense, and telling them that they were utterly incapable of it. “Romania is the fruit of a modernist passion,” and “what was revolution in the West was modernism in our country,” Cioran claimed, adding that his country was artificial, superficial, devoid of historical experience, populated by worthless people, vegetating out of time, resistant to change, and having every other (un)imaginable shortcomings and sins, not to mention despicable neighbors, vicious external and internal enemies.⁹

What could be done under the circumstances? Cioran’s answer was a Kierkegaardian leap from one stage to another, however paradoxical, unlikely, and maybe ultimately impossible. A desperate revolution, in a way, however mimetic (Western-oriented), since the autochthonous tradition was hopeless. Even better, a sudden transfiguration, a total metamorphosis, one cathartic, redemptive, ontological leap into Being (not just History or Time). This specific figure of anti-modernism (Matei Călinescu has written about Cioran’s “anti-modern modernism”), transfiguration, could be seen as an apocalyptic and eschatological variation on an endemic fantasy in many parts of our meso-region, the short-cutting of History’s meanders and stages. In its luminous form, this call for the acceleration of history had haunted the meso-region since the Enlightenment, and more forcefully since the “positive Messianics” (G. Călinescu’s apt phrase for the Romanian revolutionaries of 1848). In the entire meso-region, the “negative Messianics” returned in the first decade of the 20th century, and were overwhelming in the interwar period.

⁹ Commentators who deplore Cioran’s characterization of the Hungarians or of the Roma do not seem to have read his treatment of the Romanians. Cioran’s apophatic nationalism is too sophisticated to be examined here; in any case, he has produced the most virulent form of Romanian self-hate, a unique chapter in the transnational history of ethnic stigma. See Sorin Antohi, “Cioran și stigmatul românesc. Mecanisme identitare și definiții radicale ale etnicității,” in *Civitas imaginalis. Istorie și utopie în cultura română* (Bucharest: Litera, 1994, pp. 208–285; second, revised edition, Iasi: Polirom, 1999, pp. 235–324; French version by Claude Karnoouh and Mona Antohi, *Imaginaire culturel et réalité politique dans la Roumanie moderne. Le stigmat et l’utopie*, Paris: L’Harmattan, 1999, pp. 177–265).

While the literature on radical conservative ideologies often used the anti-modernist label as the equivalent of some sort of *passéisme* focusing on pre-modern life-forms, anti-modernism has a strong future-oriented component. This is another element of our heuristic model that doesn't need much "unpacking," as it was amply analyzed and convincingly argued by Roger Griffin in his work on modernism and fascism. Anti-modernism's futural visions are obviously more counterintuitive than those of "mainstream" or "regular" modernism. Some authoritarian/totalitarian anti-modernisms share with modernism a passion for science and technology (in this respect, Heidegger's position is both unique and exemplary), and indeed its resolute orientation toward the future. Other modernist modalities are rather ambivalent, even antagonistic in relation to futural projections, and envision a regressive, nostalgic, pristine "future in the past." Nonetheless, all anti-modernisms struggle to bring about a future of some sort, albeit outside history and historical temporality (for instance, when advocating, like Evola, a revival of—not a return to—"Tradition"). To put this in other words: working in and on the present, whatever their use or evaluation of the (real or imagined) past is, anti-modernisms prepare (for) the future.

As to the exact regime of historicity, nature, and substance of that future, almost anything goes. What matters is to avoid going back and staying there, technologically and spiritually. This is exactly what Mussolini said when launching the *Fasci di Combattimento*, on March 23, 1919: "Combatteremo il retrogradismo tecnico e spirituale."¹⁰ Fascism, Nazism, and Communism, in their own specific ways, were looking towards a (radiant) future even when they were simultaneously modernizing technology and de-modernizing society. This is also the meaning of Jeffrey Herf's apt formula for Nazi Germany's transformation: "reactionary modernism." Even the most blatant forms of regressive utopianism, which imagined a technology-free, agrarian/Castalian/Arcadian ideal world, however based on an ethno-national historical mythology or mystique, were predicated on the future.

As we have briefly stated above, like modernism (both epiphanic and programmatic, to use Griffin's terms), anti-modernism's primary impulse was to produce a new, alternative spirituality. From the 1880s to the 1940s, and especially during the interwar period, traditional religions and their institutions had come under renewed attacks from all directions, as—due to the per-

¹⁰ Quoted by Renzo De Felice, *Autobiografia del fascismo. Antologia di testi fascisti 1919–1945* (Turin: Einaudi, 2004), p. 15.

ceived failure of all things European, ancient and modern—alternative belief systems could be built on all kinds of foundations, ranging from the ever-changing sciences to Gnostic principles, from magical, esoteric and occult “Traditions” to every variation on the Abrahamic religions, let alone the Oriental ones. It was an epoch of limitless syncretism that viewed itself as a new axial age. This had happened before: the Renaissance was probably the most fascinating period of spiritual innovation and experimentation (Reformation, Counter-Reformation, Christian Kabbalah, etc.); the Enlightenment, especially German Idealism, had re-launched the process on a more massive scale; the Eastern European intelligentsias, most spectacularly the Russian, were also engaged in these speculations, albeit belatedly. But the phenomenon acquired a more radical dimension after Nietzsche, as a new spirituality was taken to be the answer to all social and political challenges, and between the World Wars, as *la Grande Guerre* had shattered the very foundations of civilization. In a part of the world like our meso-region, where Utopianism had very weak traditions, while revolutions (as mentioned before) had been short-lived and defeated, and the “normal” course or speed of history was always problematic, alternative spiritualities seemed to be the ultimate panacea.

Where evolution and revolution had failed, only spiritual solutions, from transfiguration to transubstantiation, appeared to be worth trying. Political religions, the most complete such products of interwar anti-modernism, are probably the best studied (Eric Voegelin published his *Die politische Religionen* as early as 1938), but they are only a part of the story, however prominent. Overall, we take alternative spirituality to be the most significant provider of *Weltanschauungen* and consequently of identities, both individual and collective. This is why these forms deserve a kind of systematic treatment that exceeds the scope of this introduction. Here we have only been able to sketch them, counting on a number of texts collected in this volume and on future opportunities to discuss them properly.

The series, modernization-modernity-modernism, needs a short terminological reminder at the end of our conceptual mapping. A reluctant consensus seems to have emerged over the past two decades or so in order to streamline the vast and vastly uneven ocean of secondary literature. Thus, modernization stands for the process, modernity is the result of the process, whereas modernism is the attitude towards and reflection on both. Variations on this consensual view that could help position our approach, despite their limitations and idiosyncrasies, include the understanding of modernism as: (a) a sociological and ideological fact (an epoch’s self-consciousness), modernity

being a society's reflection, a concept;¹¹ (b) more broadly, as the (negative, largely aesthetic) state of mind or culture of modernity, in opposition to tradition; (c) more narrowly, as a reaction against technological modernity (note a possible confusion between modernity and modernization); (d) "two distinct and bitterly conflicting modernities" (note the difficulty of distinguishing between "modernity" and "modernism," which could be better seen as, respectively, "modernism" and "anti-modernism"¹²). Maria Todorova, in her Introduction to the previous volume of this project, *Modernism*, offered a detailed and thoroughly referenced critical synthesis of these debates.¹³ While in this paragraph we have used some of Maria Todorova's suggestions, we consider her text familiar to our readers, in order to concentrate on what we (conceptually) define and (empirically) identify as anti-modernism.

The spatiality of anti-modernism

While the vast, if confusing, secondary literature on anti-modernism deals mainly with Western Europe and the United States (the latter being, almost like Latin America, both similar to and different from Western and Eastern Europe), its usefulness for the analysis of Europe's peripheries is beyond doubt. First of all, the historical life of anti-modernism spans a period of intense contacts and transfers between these regions.

Beyond the Western core, where anti-modernism has been better studied, we find it everywhere on the European peripheries, from the Iberian Peninsula to Scandinavia, from Russia to the whole of East Central Europe and Southeast Europe. Our volume focuses on the last two meso-regions, but our understanding of anti-modernism has benefited from the study of the phenomenon in all its European ramifications. While "canonical" references to "Western" (in fact, mainly Central and Southern) European anti-modernisms have become standard to the point of becoming the empirical foundation and

¹¹ See Henri Lefebvre, *Introduction à la modernité* (Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1962; translated into English by John Moore as *Introduction to Modernity: Twelve Preludes, September 1959–May 1961*, London and New York: Verso, 1995); note the terminological inversion, by which "modernism" becomes what is usually understood as "modernity."

¹² See Matei Calinescu, *Five Faces of Modernity: Modernism, Avant-Garde, Decadence, Kitsch, Postmodernism* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1987).

¹³ Maria Todorova, "Modernism," in *Discourses of Collective Identity in Central and Southeast Europe 1770–1945: Texts and Commentaries*, vol. III/1, *Modernism: The Creation of Nation-States*, ed. by Ahmet Ersoy, Maciej Górny, and Vangelis Kechriotis (Budapest: CEU Press, 2010), pp. 4–22.

evidence for most normative or “ideal-typical” definitions of modernism and anti-modernism, a more complex symbolic geography and a richer phenomenology of “multiple anti-modernisms” emerges as soon as we consider our continent’s outskirts.

Like modernism, anti-modernism has thrived, and according to some has even appeared on the peripheries of the Western core. Starting from authors such as Timothy Mitchell and Perry Anderson, Maria Todorova has reminded us (in her already-mentioned Introduction) that, while modernity appeared in the West, modernism emerged on the periphery, adding that “[s]ome authors even posit that modernism is not in the core, but always in the periphery, and they speak of the modernism of underdevelopment, where culture is one form through which one can belong if one is excluded from modernity. This certainly is very relevant to Eastern Europe, the first and closest periphery to the core of modernity.”¹⁴

We would like to go one step further, and suggest that exactly the entanglement of modernism and anti-modernism may well be among the most authentic (i.e., the least mimetic, especially as they coincide with the relative or radical disenchantment with Western ideas and models at the end of a long cycle of transfers—the 18th and the 19th centuries) Eastern European responses to modernization and modernity (i.e., the “West”), entangled as the two were with all the preceding paradigms, regimes of historicity, cultural fashions, all haunting the meso-region in various forms of “unfinished business,” and their legacies: Enlightenment, Romanticism, Positivism, etc. The main reasons for this authenticity were the emerging disenchantment with Western ideas and models after a long cycle of transfers and the relative success of modernization in Eastern Europe from the second half of the 19th century onwards, which resulted, among other things, in a rapidly expanding educational, intellectual, academic, political, literary milieu, ahead of the time of its surrounding society, and definitely ahead of the full-fledged development of those nations. This elite-society desynchronization, an endemic problem in our meso-region, would warrant a separate discussion, as it aggravates the alienation of most intellectuals—a *freischwebende Intelligenz* in any case, like elsewhere, frequently drifting towards dandyism, ethnic stigma, soul searching, etc. When this elite milieu reached its critical mass (local chronologies, as we have indicated above, differ greatly from country to country, even from province to province), high culture acquired a dynamics and a content of its own, usually in close connection with the West. As a

¹⁴ Todorova, “Modernism,” p. 6.

result, one could be a modernist or an anti-modernist in an underdeveloped country or in the backward areas of a relatively modernized nation. Eastern European modernisms and anti-modernisms acquired a sense of urgency that was far more intense than in the “Western core.”

As some Eastern Europeans have argued for almost two centuries, Western chronologies and typologies cannot be automatically extended to the East (cf. the Romanian debate on “forms without substance,” setting normative limits to imitation and calling for indigenous authenticity while engaging the Western model), especially in those areas where the “new” or the “modern” arrives with significant delays, and sometimes from unexpected directions. Not everything Western has traveled straight from the West to the East, since Eastern Europe has its own internal symbolic geography, its internal temporalities, and its own trajectories of the “civilizing process.” Like the “West” itself, only more so, Eastern Europe has its own “archetypal” treasure of ideas and forms, including those coming from the “West” and undergoing significant changes when “going native.”

Romanian American scholar Virgil Nemoianu pointed out that literature had a secondary cultural importance in our postmodern times (while philosophy, jurisprudence, economics, politics have a principal position).¹⁵ We should remember that the secondary and the principal, although preserving their relative positions, change their contents over time. Thus, what used to be located in the field of the principal may now be in the realm of the secondary—a vast repository where everything is kept in a way for further use, whence it may one day come back to the fore and become principal again. We believe that many ideas, ideologies, paradigms (not “just” disciplines and discourses) follow a similar dynamics, from the principal to the secondary, and/or the other way around. All this is complicated further by the multi-layered interaction between the numerous transnational and transcontinental transfers, receptions, imitations, entanglements, co-evolutions, etc. The geography and the history of these interactions are yet to be written in full, especially of those between “metropolitan” cultures on third-party grounds (for instance, the interactions between the French and the German models of the nation in Romania), and of those between (semi-)peripheral cultures that have essentially been shaped by their interactions with the “Western core,” but have also interacted between themselves. For example, the impact (directly or via the “Western core,” where some managed to achieve canonical

¹⁵ Virgil Nemoianu, *A Theory of the Secondary: Literature, Progress, and Reaction* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989).

status) of such authors as Julius Evola or José Ortega y Gasset, of many Russian authors, on both the core and the (semi-)peripheries. While those authors were profoundly influenced by French and especially by German academic, cultural and ideological debates (many studied in France or/and Germany), they had something original to say that appealed to and resonated with authors outside the “Western core.” All these interactions qualify and indeed debunk the simplistic and Orientalist West-East “civilizational slope,” still present in too many transfer studies.

With this in mind, the Iberian case is worth looking at. In Portugal, Fernando Pessoa’s towering figure sums up the passage of that culture from high modernism to anti-Nietzschean and anti-fascist anti-modernism. Pessoa’s numerous heteronyms, active for less than two decades, have contributed to post-symbolism, futurism, paganism, occultism, Hermetic mysticism, historical mythology and national metaphysics. Unlike his Romanian counterparts, for instance, whose ethnic ontologies were a way of “boycotting” a rather obscure history, he was a “mystical nationalist” (according to one of his self-descriptions) in a country whose historical record was solid and included a real “Golden Age.” Nonetheless, Pessoa’s manifestoes on Sebastianism and on the Fifth Empire, to mention but two examples, could have easily been written, *mutatis mutandis*, in the Balkans.

Spain is perhaps the single most illuminating comparative reference for a discussion of our meso-region’s modernist-cum-anti-modernist entanglement. As we have mentioned above, at least two Spanish authors of the ‘98 Generation have become canonical in our meso-region (Ortega and Miguel de Unamuno), whereas a third (Ramiro de Maeztu) has come close to this status. Moreover, the history of Spanish debates on modernization, modernity, and modernism/anti-modernism includes virtually all the ideas and paradigms one can find in this very anthology, from the problematic modernity of the country (and the entire peninsula) to the calls for a break with the past; from the difficulty of positioning and defining Spain in relation to Europe (cf. Unamuno’s plea for the Hispanization of Europe rather than the Europeanization of Spain) to the sense of an acceleration of time; from the idea that modernism itself was doomed to that of a conservative modernism (Maurism) and of a “corporative regeneration” (Franco); from the emphasis on the spiritual and the return to religious values, guilds, corporations (cf. Maeztu) to a peculiar form of what students of Romania call “protochronism” (many Spaniards were saluting the renewed spiritual preoccupations in 20th-century Europe as a vindication of Spain’s unabated Catholic tradition); from the conservative rhetoric of degeneration (“*contaminación moderna*”)

and regeneration to the more general application of biological terms to society, with profuse references to Comte, Spencer, Nordau, Salisbury, etc.¹⁶

In the Russian Empire, where modernization began earlier than in most parts of the meso-region under discussion (especially in those under Ottoman authority or influence until the late 19th century), modernity remained protracted, superficial, and paradoxical, while modernism and anti-modernism emerged together in the complex development leading up to the 1905 Revolution. Both were later to be deployed in specific forms against the background of the 1917 Revolution, of the related Bolshevik Utopia, of Leninism, and of early Stalinism—a topic we cannot deal with here, however decisive these momentous changes were for Europe and the world. Suffice it to say that, as the authoritarian Soviet modernization project included a top-down, ultimately counter-productive modernization of the economy alongside a brutal de-modernization of society, the Soviet chapter in the history of Europe's transnational dynamics resulting in modernism and anti-modernism helps us refine our understanding of such interactive constellations as Revolution and Utopia, modernism and nihilism, nationalism and imperialism, communism and fascism/Nazism, progress and reaction.

While usually the anti-modernist temptation is associated with the Eastern and Southern peripheries of Europe, where the European social and mental structures were allegedly less organically assimilated, similar ideological references can also be found in interwar Scandinavia, which is usually construed as a positive *Sonderweg*, with the emergence of the welfare state under the tutelage of the patriotically inclined social democrats. However, one might also point to comparable phenomena both on the right and the left, which once again indicates the entanglement of political modernity and anti-modernism. The geopolitical discourse becoming extremely influential in the 1910s had a key ideologue in Sweden in the person of Rudolf Kjellén, who not only shaped the German discussion on the linkage between *Volk* and *Raum*, but also attempted to create a Swedish neo-conservative political project, including both a more expansive "*Ostpolitik*" (towards the Baltic) and the reinvigoration of the Right along the lines of a national-corporatist ideol-

¹⁶ For a synthesis of the Spanish case, see Santos Juliá, *Historias de las dos Españas* (Madrid: Taurus, 2004), and Javier Fernández Sebastián, "Debating the Concept of Modernity in Twentieth-Century Spain," unpublished paper based on the author's work in Spanish, including his entry on "Modernidad," in Javier Fernández Sebastián and Juan Francisco Fuentes, eds., *Diccionario político y social del siglo XX español* (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 2008), pp. 775–791. See also the entry on "Regeneración," by Rafael Núñez Florencio, *ibid.*, p. 1041.

ogy. Interestingly, it was not the Conservative Party that eventually came to turn this ideological framework into a systemic ideology, but precisely the social democrats, who, inspired by Kjellén, worked out the ideology of *Folkshem* (Folk Home), fusing social protectionism, corporatism, a discourse on national character stressing the “Nordic” egalitarian democratic features of the Swedish folk, and also a use of eugenic measures to enhance the hygiene and homogeneity of the society. One can also find similar ideological references in the other Northern European contexts, such as Denmark, Norway and Finland. Especially in the last two there was also an upsurge of radical conservatism, manifested in the literary works of Knut Hamsun for example. Finland also featured a radical right-wing paramilitary movement in many ways comparable to the East Central European radical right, and also typologically similar extreme right-wing intellectual-politicians, inspired by Italian corporatism, such as the statistician Vilho Annala.

Meso-regional canons and interpretations

A meso-regional canon in the study of modernism and anti-modernism is still re-emerging. After promising transnational comparative projects spearheaded by literary theorists of the Eastern Bloc in the 1970s and the early 1980s (when a peculiar post-Stalinist, pro-Western neo-modernism was flourishing alongside a mutant anti-modernism, both using mostly covert or coded references to their interwar antecedents, frequently recuperated by Party-controlled re-ethnicization policies), a period of mutual indifference followed, while Western funding after 1989 has privileged the new or reborn social sciences, which were devastated by decades of censorship. Fortunately, discussion of the key relevant concepts and discourses has long been an integral part of all the national cultural canons in the area, albeit mainly in essentially literary and high-cultural milieus. Moreover, the pendulum of research agendas and paradigms is currently swinging back towards literary and cultural studies after roughly two decades of hegemony of the social sciences—which haven’t really delivered on their promise, despite significant emotional and financial investments. Even historical studies are trying to keep up with this trend, though some multidisciplinary, transnational frameworks and discourses are being put forward, mostly by younger scholars.

A number of meso-regional predecessors ought to be remembered and commended for their pioneering work, based on both timely Western transfers and local theoretical creativity—one of the region’s luminous interwar traditions. Many of them have published in Western languages and have eventually

settled in the West, some contributing to the ongoing global academic conversations. Andrzej Walicki's ground-breaking work both explored the paradigmatic Russian identity debates of the 19th century, which in many ways served as a blueprint for Eastern European critiques of political modernity, and also offered a complex image of the evolution of Polish political thought throughout the 19th and 20th centuries.¹⁷ Similarly, Jerzy Jedlicki analyzed the outburst of debate on political modernity in the second half of the 19th century, and also offered a synthetic overview of European discourses criticizing political modernity in the interwar period.¹⁸ The intersection of Czech identity debates and the controversy over political modernity has been analyzed in a paradigmatic way by Robert B. Pynsent,¹⁹ while Miloš Havelka provided a comprehensive interpretation of the "debate on the meaning of Czech history."²⁰ In Hungary, Miklós Lackó's studies on the interwar debates over national identity and modernity,²¹ as well as the essays and posthumously published monograph by Miklós Szabó on the emergence of anti-liberal nationalism in Hungary, must be mentioned. In Bulgarian historiography, Ivan Elenkov has studied the ideological developments of the right-wing ethno-nationalist political milieu in interwar Bulgaria,²² while Roumen Daskalov analyzed the debate of autochthonists and Westernizers in the 19th and 20th centuries.²³ In Romania, due also to the extremely rich source material, a number of literary theorists and comparativists, with a major interest in ideas, ideologies, philosophies and politics,

¹⁷ See Andrzej Walicki, *The Slavophile Controversy: History of a Conservative Utopia in Nineteenth-Century Russian Thought* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1989); *Philosophy and Romantic Nationalism. The Case of Poland* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1989); and *Poland Between East and West* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1994).

¹⁸ Jerzy Jedlicki, *A Suburb of Europe* (Budapest: CEU Press, 1999); *Świat zwyrodniał. Lęki i wyroki krytyków nowoczesności* (Warsaw: Sic!, 2000).

¹⁹ Robert B. Pynsent, *Questions of Identity: Czech and Slovak Ideas of Nationality and Personality* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1994).

²⁰ Miloš Havelka, *Dějiny a smysl. Obsahy, akcenty a posuny "české otázky" 1895–1989* (Prague: Lidové noviny, 2001).

²¹ Miklós Lackó, *Válságok—választások* (Budapest: Gondolat, 1975); *Korszellem és tudomány, 1910–1945* (Budapest: Gondolat, 1988); and *Sziget és külvilág* (Budapest: MTA Történettudományi Intézet, 1996).

²² Ivan Elenkov, *Родно и дясно. Принос към историята на несбъднатия десен проект в България от времето между двете световни войни* (Sofia: Лик, 1998).

²³ Roumen Daskalov, *Между изтока и запада. Български културни дилеми* (Sofia: Лик, 1998); and "Populists and Westerners in Bulgarian History and Present," in *Central European History Department Yearbook* (Budapest: CEU, 2002), pp. 113–142.

sought to decipher the enigma of the fascination of the most interesting intellectuals of the interwar period with anti-modernist visions. Adrian Marino, among his many contributions, published in 1969 a seminal study on ideas of the modern, modernism and modernity; Sorin Alexandrescu has worked on Romania's ambiguous stance to modernity over the last four decades, both in Romania and the Netherlands; Matei Călinescu has applied the theoretical perspectives of his *Five Faces of Modernity* to the cultural reactions against modernity and modernization, thus closing a circle he had opened in some of his works written before emigrating to the United States in 1973; Virgil Nemoianu has covered a wide range of topics, from Romanticism and *Biedermeier* to post-modernism, in both meso-regional and Western/global frameworks; and Zigu Ornea, a literary historian who also sought to map political ideologies, has also contributed to these debates, although he largely reproduced a misleading dichotomy between "traditionalism" and "modernity" that fails to see the internal complexities of modernity and especially the ambivalences of modernism.²⁴ Last but not least, the collective volume edited by Ivo Banac and Katherine Verdery, *National Character and National Ideology in Interwar Eastern Europe*,²⁵ also offered an innovative sampling of case studies mostly written by scholars from the region on the reconfiguration of political imagination in the interwar period.

²⁴ For the Romanian contribution, both theoretical and analytical, see Adrian Marino, especially *Modern, modernism, modernitate* (Bucharest: Editura pentru Literatură, 1969); Sorin Alexandrescu, especially *Paradoxul român* (Bucharest: Univers, 1998), *Privind înapoi, modernitatea* (Bucharest: Univers, 1999) and, most recently and closer to Comagnon's, Griffin's, and our approach, "Interwar Romanian Pluralism: How Could We Approach It?," *Images, Imagini, images. Journal of Visual and Cultural Studies*, 2011. Besides other books and articles, Matei Călinescu has offered a synthesis from a perspective that comes close to our approach in his essay "Reacții culturale împotriva modernității și modernizării în România, 1900–1940," serialized by the Cluj-Napoca-based journal *Apostrof* in 2004. Of Virgil Nemoianu's many relevant books, see *Imperfection and Defeat: The Role of Aesthetic Imagination in Human Society* (Budapest and New York: CEU Press, 2006), and *Postmodernism & Cultural Identities: Conflict and Coexistence*, Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2010). Of Zigu Ornea's many works, see *Tradiționalism și modernitate în deceniul al treilea* (Bucharest: Editura Eminescu, 1980); and *Anii treizeci. Extrema dreaptă românească* (Bucharest: Editura Fundației Culturale Române, 1995; translated by E.M. Popescu as *The Romanian Extreme Right: The 1930s*, Boulder, Colorado: East European Monographs, 1999).

²⁵ Ivo Banac and Katherine Verdery, eds., *National Character and National Ideology in Interwar Eastern Europe* (New Haven: Yale Center for International and Area Studies, 1995).

The structure of the volume

The 46 texts included in this anthology thus offer multiple possible lines of comparison and contextualization. This also means that many of the texts presented here could be placed under different headings, or even into different volumes. We chose to structure the material according to a combination of thematic, regional and chronological principles. The individual chapters thus reflect different “faces” of the phenomenon, grouping together texts that sought to respond to the same aspect of the crisis of political modernity, even though they stemmed from different national contexts. By selecting texts in each chapter from different historical moments (from the *fin-de-siècle* to the Second World War), we also sought to signal the possible directions of these debates, which often implied radicalization but in some cases also the appearance of new motifs and ideological references.

As for the chronology of the texts, we focused on the period between 1880–1945. This means roughly two historical generations, one emerging at the turn of the century and one in the interwar period, but within this broad framework there were also many smaller cohorts who construed themselves as separate generational projects, which is of course also related to the strong emphasis on the generational trope. Thus, for instance, in the interwar period one can find at least three different groups with markedly divergent experiences and horizons of expectations: those maturing during and immediately after the Great War, often opting for some sort of ethnic nationalism; the anti-political generation of the late-1920s, which became politicized in the 1930s; and the last group, emerging in the context of the two extreme ideologies, Stalinism and Nazism, in the late-1930s.

Along these lines, the first chapter contains texts that are characteristic of the early phase of anti-modernist discourse, usually linked to the rise of radical ethno-nationalism and the nationalist turn of conservatism in the region. While most of the texts in this chapter stem from before 1918, we also intend to signal important lines of continuity and thus included a number of texts from the interwar period that sought to reconsider these paradigms in the new geopolitical and ideological context.

The second chapter focuses on the post-WWI period, which was marked by a feeling of disorientation and profound discontinuity with the pre-war decades. This created space for such modalities of political mobilization as the generational ideologies, setting the faith and sweeping radicalism of youth against the skepticism, incapacity and senility of the older generation. All this reached its climax in the context of the world economic crisis, when

the utter collapse of the belief in linear development undermined the two central elements of political modernity as constructed at the turn of the century: a political system based on representative democracy and economic liberalism.

The third chapter presents texts that sought to offer a way out of this spiritual and institutional crisis by offering a characteristically anti-modernist solution, that of redefining the national character, a notion already central to the romantic and positivist-modernist ideological frameworks, in new, metaphysical terms. In line with the collapse of linear historicity, most authors of this trend focused on certain archaic features (collectivism, ritualism, cult of physical force) that also acquired supra-historical qualities, contrasted to the traits linked to modern political institutions and sociability (such as individualism, legalism, mercantile spirit), which came to be summarily rejected as symptoms of decadence.

In the fourth chapter we have included a set of texts that sought to reposition conservatism in the interwar context, when it became obvious that the previous reflexes of preserving organic continuity with the past were dysfunctional. Most of these authors and texts were critical of modernism, although in many ways they also drew on modern intellectual references, such as the tools of critical historiography used for deconstructing romantic national narratives. Importantly, this search for a new meaning of conservatism also implied a complex relationship with the totalitarian ideological constructions of the 1930s. While some of the conservative revolutionaries eventually embraced the totalitarian creed, many others actually made a distinction between the organicist-corporatist-elitist model they propagated, which still retained a certain distinction of private and public, and fully-fledged fascist ideology, which they tended to depreciate as vulgar demagoguery targeting the "*Lumpenproletariat*."

Finally, we present a set of texts that extolled exactly such a fascist revolution as a solution to the pressing political and identity crisis of their national community. There is a relatively wide pool of such texts, as most countries in the region gave birth both to some sort of indigenous fascist or para-fascist movement, and during the Second World War also to collaborationist regimes that legitimized themselves by coining a new discourse of collective identity, alongside a reinterpreted historical narrative. While it would not have been possible to present texts stemming from all these national contexts and political-ideological sub-cultures, we decided to "showcase" a number of them, which can stand for the main types of prototalitarian thinking in the region and are also less conventional in their

ideological agenda than the usually rather blunt and imitative mainstream extreme right-wing pamphlets.

Due to the eventual collapse of these regimes and movements in the last phase of the Second World War, many of the authors associated with them were erased from their respective national canons after 1945, while in the case of others, the anti-modernist aspects of their work were downplayed. Nevertheless, we consider it impossible to understand these cultures without taking these discourses seriously, all the more so because it was exactly the interwar period when most of the East Central and Southeast European cultures achieved a critical density of cultural institutions and media (journals, associations, radio, etc.) and also a synchronicity with Western European intellectual developments, even if this also implied the rejection of measuring the local culture and society against the Western models. It is precisely due to this paradoxical Europeanization, which coincided with the rejection of the normativity of Europe, that the heritage of these discourses continues to be present in the political cultures in the region.

In order to create a common basis for the analysis of the collected texts, each entry has a similar structure. The first section refers to the bibliographical data containing the language in which the text was written, its author and the publishing house; this is complemented by brief information about the author, such as his or her place of birth and death, a concise biography, and main works. The second section contains a short contextualization of the text, describing its political and social background and the intellectual environment in which it originated. Then, a textual analysis, a description of its ideological tendencies and historical influence and its function in the respective canon follow. All this is followed by the translated texts. When possible, we have published them in their entirety, but in many cases their length exceeded the dimensions of the volume, and thus we strove to present the most characteristic excerpts.

The early phase—radical conservatism and integral nationalism

In most of the Central and Southeast European historiographical canons, with the partial exception of Austria, the rise of political discourses and movements critical of “Western modernity” is usually linked to the after-effects of the seismic geopolitical shift of 1918. Consequently, the turn of the century is usually depicted as a period of fervent modernization and Westernization, and in some cases historical memory even turned this period into some sort of “lost golden age.”

Nevertheless, seen from a more *longue durée* perspective, it is possible to identify a certain pre-history to the interwar boom of anti-modernist visions. In the European context, the main point of departure is usually taken to be the conservative reaction to the French Revolution. Doubtlessly, in East Central and Southeast Europe one can hardly find a consistent counter-revolutionary conservative tradition comparable to de Maistre, de Bonald or Donoso Cortés (although there were individual cases that can be placed into this context, such as the “apology of Orthodoxy” by the Romanian Alexandru Sturduza). At the same time, it is possible to discover certain elements in the local Romantic and post-Romantic ideological traditions that were highly critical of the heedless import of Western institutional practices promoted by mainstream liberal nationalists. Furthermore, the emergence of a new radical discourse of identity at the turn of the century was intimately connected to the intersection of aesthetic and political discourses of the second half of the 19th century, which linked the problem of decadence to the emergence of mass society and searched for a new formula of collective regeneration.

It is important to stress that one of the most significant catalysts of anti-modernist political discourse in the region was the breakthrough of mass political participation in societies lacking consolidated democratic frameworks strong enough to accommodate the pressures and amplitude of mass politics. This led to a twofold disaffection—the rise of an elitist anti-democratic mood blaming the political and cultural dysfunctions of modern society on the “import” of democratic institutions, and also the emergence of populist political movements seeking to stir up support among the unprivileged strata with an anti-elitist and anti-institutionalist rhetoric. While these two ideological positions were in many ways opposed to each other on the surface, they coincided in declaring political modernity “alien” to the national soul, thus integrating anti-modernist elements.

Another key factor was the endemic over-agitation around the “unresolved” national question all over the region. While nationalism in its mid-19th century liberal version was a modernist ideology par excellence, the rise of integral nationalism in the late 19th century, which perceived the relationship of national communities to each other in terms of a “zero-sum game,” also posed the dilemma of having to choose between democratic practices and fulfilling the national agenda. Early, transitional instances of this sort of new nationalism can be found in the region already during the late 19th century. A paradigmatic example of radical ethno-cultural nationalism is the discourse of the Serbian politician Nikola Pašić, who managed to reorient the

ideological tradition of Serbian radicalism—originally a leftist criticism of national liberalism—towards ethno-protectionism, creating one of the first modern mass parties in the region, which came to dominate the political field especially after the murder of King Alexander and the return of the Karađorđević dynasty to the throne in 1903.²⁶

One can link here also the rise of modern ethnic nationalism in the Austrian context, memorably described by Carl Schorske in terms of a “politics in a new key.”²⁷ A case in point is the political discourse of the key figure of the Austrian pan-German movement, Georg von Schönerer, who started as a radical liberal, and eventually became the spokesperson of a racially based ethno-nationalist political ideology, which can also be considered one of the most important precursors of national socialism.

Along these lines, a new form of nationalism, stressing the unique, innate characteristics of the national communities, emerged at the beginning of the 20th century all over Europe, and had particular salience in East Central and Southeast Europe, where the ethno-linguistic and state frameworks rarely overlapped.²⁸ Importantly, integral nationalism at the turn of the century had strong modernist components, as can be seen in the case of pre-1918 Yugoslavism, which combined elements of a palingenetic collectivist ideology with a supra-ethnic vision of the national community and cultural modernism. This can be seen in the writings of Jovan Skerlić, a key figure of modern Serbian literary criticism and cultural-political thought. But in some of the works stemming from this milieu we can see the emergence of a much more radical modality, where the supra-ethnic aspect (negating the difference between the various South-Slavic peoples) turns into some sort of racial unitarism, and the modernist cultural vision is replaced by a strong anti-urban sentiment, blaming the city alien to the projected national specificity. This can

²⁶ On the ideological framework of Serbian radicalism see Alex N. Dragnich, “Populism in Serbia,” in Joseph Held, ed., *Populism in Eastern Europe: Racism, Nationalism and Society* (Boulder, Co.: East European Monographs, 1996), pp. 219–244.

²⁷ Carl Schorske, “Politics in a new key,” in *Fin-de-siècle Vienna: Politics and Culture* (New York: Vintage Books, 1981), 116–180.

²⁸ On the transformation of nationalism in Western European contexts see Fritz Stern, *The Politics of Cultural Despair: A Study in the Rise of the Germanic Ideology* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974, c1961); Michel Winock, *Nationalism, Anti-Semitism, and Fascism in France* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1998); Geoff Eley, *Reshaping the German Right: Radical Nationalism and Political Change After Bismarck* (Ann Arbor, 1980); Kevin Repp, *Reformers, Critics, and the Paths of German Modernity: Anti-politics and the Search for Alternatives, 1890–1914* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000).

be seen in the passionate essay by the Croat Vladimir Čerina, who envisioned a Yugoslav national palingenesis on the basis of idealized archaic features, while totally rejecting the actual face of Croatian urban culture. Similar elements can also be found in the writings of the Hungarian populist writer Dezső Szabó, who contrasted the “uncorrupted village” to the “decadent city” and envisioned a national and also East Central European regional regeneration on the basis of the shift of political and cultural emphasis to the peasantry.

While before 1918, in certain contexts, integral nationalism could still be linked to some elements of liberalism or even leftism, the tendency was obviously towards the fusion of conservatism and nationalism, giving birth to a new type of “national conservatism.” In this context, the conservative critiques of cultural uniformity and political emancipation entailed by liberal modernity at the turn of the century are essential to an understanding of the intellectual sources of the myth of national rebirth or regeneration that Central and East European intellectuals positioned at the centre of their revolutionary projects of reshaping the national community in the interwar period.²⁹

As is the case with earlier forms of nationalism as well, integral nationalism was also an eminently transnational phenomenon. The dissemination of this form of nationalism in the early 20th century can be traced to a variety of European sources. An important point of reference was the racial theory that became extremely popular all over Europe at the turn of the century, most prominently represented by Houston Stewart Chamberlain.³⁰ Another important source of inspiration was the Action Française, which also combined certain modernist stylistic features with an ethnicist political discourse and a stress on Catholicism not so much as a religious creed but more as a hierarchical social institution.³¹ There were also other, less omnipresent intellectual sources, such as Italian radical nationalism (Enrico Corradini), the emerging geo-political paradigm (Halford Mackinder, Rudolf Kjellén), or in the Orthodox cultures also the outgrowth of Russian Slavophile thought fusing ethno-cultural essentialism with a stress on Eastern Orthodoxy.

²⁹ See Roger Griffin, “The Palingenetic Political Community: Rethinking the Legitimation of Totalitarian Regimes in Inter-War Europe,” *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 3, 3 (2002), 24–43.

³⁰ See Geoffrey G. Field, *Evangelist of Race: The Germanic Vision of Houston Stewart Chamberlain* (New York, 1981).

³¹ See Michael Sutton, *Nationalism, Positivism, and Catholicism: The Politics of Charles Maurras and French Catholics, 1890–1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 46–76.

Prominent political writers of the period, such as the Romanian Aurel C. Popovici and Nicolae Iorga, the Greek Ion Dragoumis, or the Pole Roman Dmowski, linked their nationalist agenda to the question of racial regeneration. They devised an ideological matrix for the radical nationalist ideologies that came to dominate Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe after the First World War. Their contribution was also crucial in turning radical nationalism from a marginal subculture into an ideological framework capable of galvanizing a mass movement. It is not completely accidental that both Dmowski and Iorga used “national democracy” as a key concept: it implied an attempt to take over certain aspects of the mobilizing techniques of mass politics, while at the same time rejecting the supra-national frameworks of the other ideological contenders of mass politics, i.e., “internationalist” socialism and “plutocratic” liberalism.³²

The rise of integral nationalism also coincided with a shift in the relationship of nationalism and religion. While the second half of the 19th century was marked by the clash of nationalism and the Church hierarchies, which both in the Vatican and in Constantinople tried to defy national mobilization, the turn of the century witnessed the nationalization of religion, opening the way to the political Catholicism and Orthodoxy that came to dominate the interwar period. Elements of this nationalization can be found in Austrian Christian-Social political rhetoric, but also in Pašić’s references to Orthodoxy as a central aspect of the Serbian political project.

The thrust of this discourse was so strong that even the religiously indifferent Dmowski, whose vision was determined by positivism, incorporated references to Polish Catholicism when working out his program of political mobilization. This led to a gradual merger between the national democratic ideological camp and a considerable part of the clergy, giving birth to a “national Christian” ideology, based on the fusion of religious and nationalist symbolism, spiced with vigorous anti-Semitism.³³ This discourse effectively swept away the earlier generation of Catholic and Orthodox conservatives, who were suspicious of nationalism as a secular ideology with strong links to ungodly liberalism. The dilemma of the relationship between religion and nationalism can be found in the Late Ottoman context as well. The text in-

³² On Iorga's political thought see William O. Oldson, *The Historical and Nationalistic Thought of Nicolae Iorga* (Boulder [Colo.]: East European Quarterly, 1973).

³³ On the interplay of Catholicism and Nationalism in the Polish context see Brian Porter, *When Nationalism Began to Hate: Imagining Modern Politics in Nineteenth-Century Poland* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); *Faith and Fatherland: Catholicism, Modernity, and Poland* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

cluded in our anthology, by Babanzâde Ahmed Naim, is a powerful argument in favor of rejecting pan-Turkic nationalism and sticking to Islamic political theology as the normative framework of identification. Other thinkers, however, such as Mehmed Akif, opted for a more integrative position, seeking to convert Islam into a key component of Turkish national identity.

Moving into the interwar period, we have chosen a number of ethno-nationalist discourses that exemplify the continuity with the pre-1918 ideological atmosphere. Significantly, the obvious links notwithstanding, one should distinguish the integral nationalism of the turn of the century and the more radical homogenizing nationalism that came to dominate the region in the 1930s. Most of the ethno-protectionist ideas before 1918 were formulated in the context of multiethnic states: thus, for instance, Popovici's racial discourse was still linked to the plan of a federal reorganization of the Habsburg monarchy.³⁴ In cases where the polity emerging after 1918 remained programmatically multi-ethnic (the SHS Kingdom and Czechoslovakia) this link of ethno-protectionism and (con)federalism or autonomism as a counter-project to the new centralized state still remained a possibility. This is attested by the discourse of Jozef Tiso, the new leader of the Slovak People's Party, who sought to readjust the pre-existing patterns of Slovak national mobilization rooted in ethno-linguistic and religious identity discourses to the new political situation after the creation of Czechoslovakia.³⁵

Crises of orientation

Both for the winners and the losers, 1918 meant a profound line of demarcation, calling into question the relevance of most of the ideological traditions and political movements that dominated the region before the Great War. Consequently, the discourses expressing a criticism of political modernity also incorporated a number of new elements. Importantly, there was also a European canon of "crisis literature," comprising such otherwise politically rather divergent authors as Miguel de Unamuno, José Ortega y Gasset, Oswald Spengler, Johann Huizinga, and Julien Benda. A paradigmatic text expressing the violent and cataclysmic demise of the old world order, not so

³⁴ On the intellectual context of Popovici see Marius Turda, *The Idea of National Superiority in Central Europe, 1880–1918* (Lewiston, N.Y.: Edwin Mellen Press, 2004), pp. 37–66.

³⁵ On the Slovak nationalist movement in the interwar period see James R. Felak, *"At the Price of the Republic": Hlinka's Slovak People's Party, 1929–1938* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1994).

long before perceived to be quasi-eternal, is *The Last Days of Mankind* by Karl Kraus, which turned the collapse of the author's local world, i.e., the Habsburg monarchy, into an apocalyptic event. Kraus is extremely hard to classify politically: his feuilletons fused liberal and conservative elements and he was too individualistic to adhere to any party ideology. While his intellectual style was rooted in the modernist trends of *fin-de-siècle* Vienna, this work can also be read as the announcement of the collapse of bourgeois modernity and an intimation of the coming of a new era of radical destruction.

While for the Viennese Kraus the collapse of the multinational monarchy had apocalyptic dimensions, for some of the elites in the region the establishment of national states after the war entailed the fulfillment of centuries-long national aspirations. This optimistic mood, however, did not last long. A paradigmatic text in this vein is by the Polish thinker and artist, Witkacy (Stanisław Ignacy Witkiewicz), who offered a ruthless deconstruction of the Polish national tradition and envisioned a complete collapse of modern bourgeois civilization. His apocalyptic tone clearly resonated with that of Kraus. Witkacy's text is also indicative of the profound ambiguity of avant-gardism in the interwar period—while avant-gardist authors are usually taken to be arch-modernist, their discourse had powerful anti-modernist implications in terms of declaring a radical break with historical continuity and violently rejecting the bourgeois liberal tradition in favor of a new collectivity.

Given the traumatic experiences of the region during and after the Great War, it is not surprising that, in the interwar period, the genre of “crisis literature” became one of the most characteristic venues of self-expression for Central and Southeast European intellectuals. The loss of self-confidence and the increasing feeling of crisis present in the Western European core, which these intellectual elites had been so eager to follow throughout the “long 19th century,” thus catalyzed a specific local discourse about the agony of Western civilization as a “chance” for non-Westerners to subvert their subordinate position. All this was eloquently expressed in a number of articles in the 1930s by the key ideologist of the Romanian “young generation,” Mircea Eliade, who interpreted the European crisis as a shift from a historicist culture based on a linear vision of development and a particular emphasis on the Middle Ages and the Renaissance towards an anti-historicist configuration valorizing pre-historic archaism and atemporal peasant culture.³⁶

³⁶ On Eliade's political and philosophical ideas before 1945 see MacLinscott Ricketts, *Mircea Eliade: The Romanian roots, 1907–1945* (Boulder: East European

The search for alternative modalities also led to the re-evaluation of the Orient in many contexts (both as a spiritual space, in the case of political Orthodoxy, or in a geopolitical sense, as with pan-Turkism and Turanism). While the texts by the Turkish Republican intellectual, Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar, were far from rejecting the West in favor of a mystical East, the shift away from the normativity of the Western model is also visible in his case, as in his later texts he sought to create a new synthesis of the modernity of the Turkish state project and the Ottoman past with its Islamic spiritual contents.

Interestingly, the crisis of modernity could also imply a turn towards two models that were genealogically linked to the Western tradition but came to be perceived as transcending it: the United States and the Soviet Union. This also indicates that the “crisis discourse” did not necessarily have radical right-wing implications—and that other options, such as an anti-political technocracy or a pro-communist ideological option, were also present (and in some cases, especially before 1933, there was also a certain permeability between the rightist and the leftist positions, sharing a common repugnance of institutional politics). This is evidenced by the texts of the Bulgarian sociologist Ivan Hadzhiyski, whose leftist reading of the crisis of bourgeois modernity also incorporated a number of elements that can be interpreted as anti-modernist. The main factor here is the particular ideological context, as he competed with the dominant rightist national ontologies, which sought to catalyze a national revival by returning to archaic communal traditions. In Hadzhiyski’s model, progress towards socialism could also be narrated as a return to organic collectivism “on a higher level.” Furthermore, he also drew on the highly ambiguous Leninist doctrine of a revolutionary elite that can effectuate political transformation, representing the objective interests of the majority even if it subjectively does not identify itself with the revolutionary aims.

What is more, as the case of the Hungarian Mihály Babits indicates, the anti-modernist crisis discourse could also take on anti-totalitarian overtones, describing fascism and communism as phenomena based on—national or class-based—particularism, characteristic of mass society and thus forming part of political modernity. Against this totalitarian threat, certain authors tried to revert to earlier stages of European development marked by universalism (in the case of Babits this implied a Christian humanist paradigm and a supra-ethnic pre-modern national consciousness, which he deemed more hu-

Monographs, 1988); Florin Țurcanu, *Mircea Eliade. Le prisonnier de l'histoire* (Paris: La Découverte, 2003).

man and more incorporative than the exclusivist ideologies of “high modernity”). One can find similar considerations in the dialogue penned by Leopold Andrian, a supporter of the Austrian Christian corporatist project and an opponent of the *Anschluss* to Nazi Germany. Contrasting the more technologically oriented pro-totalitarian position of the “*Heimwehr* officer” and the more traditionalist conservative vision of the “Poet,” he seems to lean towards the latter and thus adhere to an Austrian identity rooted in pre-modern spiritual traditions rather than in modern ethno-nationalism.

Another face of this crisis discourse, present also in Andrian’s dialogue, was the impasse of inter-generational transmission that was accentuated in view of the fundamental differences between the pre-war, war and postwar generations, which also catalyzed the rise of generational ideologies as part of political mobilization. Of course the trope itself was not new at all; National Romanticism and the turn of the century also witnessed important movements based on accentuating youth as a basis of political identification. To mention but a few, *Giovine Europa* and its local versions, the liberal nationalist Young Czechs and Young Slovenians as well as the Serbian *Om-ladina*, the moderate conservative *Junimea* in Romania, the various modernist trends such as Young Poland, or the modernist nationalism of the Young Turks can all be cited as ideological frameworks in which political mobilization was linked to the instrumentalization of youth; even so, the interwar period in this sense can still be considered a particular historical moment in view of the politicization of generational conflict.

Far from being a regional phenomenon, the whole of Europe witnessed the rise of such “generational ideologies” in the interwar period, focusing on the *Weltanschauung* of the “young generation.” This indicated a deep crisis of identity after the war and the subsequent political and economic upheavals, challenging the traditional patterns of social interaction. The protagonists of generational ideologies sought to create a discursive place for a potential “new elite,” rejecting the normativity of classical traditions and hierarchies, often turning this into the basis of political mobilization. While, as a rule, these ideologists rejected the liberal nationalist heritage of the 19th century, they often returned to the more radical constructions of identity rooted in Romanticism, contrasting the “insensitive” masses to the “creative minority” preserving the national spirit. A case in point is the discourse of the Romanian “young generation” as it was articulated by its protagonists, such as Eliade, Constantin Noica or Mircea Vulcănescu.

Anti-historicism and the ontologization of the nation

The general atmosphere of political, economic and cultural crisis undermined the evolutionist-progressive narrative of history characteristic of the 19th century, and led to the emergence of new, cyclical-organicist models, also re-valORIZING the historical role of the creative genius and irrational forces. This went together with a stress on the inherent qualities of the nation. While modernist social theories usually stressed that the chief character traits of the nation were historically constituted as reactions to particular collective experiences, the anti-modernist characterologies tended to emphasize certain “original” features that predated and to a certain extent even determined historical development. The political context of these characterological constructions was the quest for defining the mission of the respective nation-state. Authors of this genre were busy identifying specific mental and psychic characteristics of the nation to legitimize the national project, reinforcing the symbolic hierarchy in which the given nation was described as being destined to rule the envisioned national space, which as a rule contained considerable groups of ethnic others.

While similar legitimizing discourses in the 19th century stressed historical continuity, the anti-modernist perspective tended towards metaphysical constructions, linking the existence of the given nation to the very essence of Being. While the radicalism of these claims and the idiosyncratic language was new, the genre of national metaphysics to some extent was going back to earlier attempts to indigenize philosophy. While ideas of “national thinking patterns” were identified by romantic folklorists as well, the joint reception of various trends of ethno-psychology (*Völkerpsychologie*) and cultural morphology (*Kulturmorphologie*) at the turn of the century changed the entire discursive space.

The national characterologies emerging from this configuration first had a strong inductive drive—collecting empirical evidence from different disciplines and seeking to map out how the nation actually thinks. However, the interwar period was dominated by a more deductive approach: instead of registering the historical, ethnographical and socio-cultural manifestations of the national spirit, these authors sought to nationalize the very categories of thinking—space, time, destiny, community. A transitional case is the work of Ion Dragoumis on *Hellenic civilization* (1914), which sought to redefine the relationship of the Greek national project to the entire tradition of Hellenism and project into the future a new Hellenic civilization, a kind of national religion, emancipating the Greeks from the tutelage of European Great Powers. A simi-

lar claim of national civilization was at the core of Anton Wildgans' *Speech about Austria*, which in the context of the debate on the viability of an Austrian state project asserted the specific character of the *homo austriacus*, stemming from German roots but developing a peculiar socio-cultural type.

On the whole, the interwar period witnessed a considerable radicalization of this discourse. Perhaps the two most paradigmatic ideological constructions in this vein are by the Romanian Lucian Blaga and the Bulgarian Nayden Sheytanov. Not only did they devise an unconventional picture linking archaic traits and the actual national community; they both also developed a highly idiosyncratic poetic language. Blaga drew on Expressionist aesthetics, neo-Kantianism and *Geistesgeschichte*, Sheytanov on symbolism, folklore and the Romantic linguistic tradition. Both of them used this to legitimize the geo-political project of their respective nation-state: Blaga's construction of undulating space featured Transylvania as the core of Romanian existence, while the "Balkano-Bulgarian Titanism" of Sheytanov was meant to reinforce Bulgarian territorial claims against the other Southeast European countries.

The radicalization of this characterological discourse in certain cases led to the rejection of historical development altogether. Blaga contrasted the ahistorical existence of the Romanian peasant to the historicity of Western civilization, while Sheytanov sought to create a national mythology that would incorporate historical events into a framework that linked past, present and future through symbolic analogies. However, not every culture opted for such an ahistorical modality, for instance the Hungarian populist writer and political thinker László Németh still formulated a historical vision, although it was a sort of counter-history, rejecting the common narrative of the emergence of modern national culture and state and constructing an "alternative tradition" of national authenticity, which in his opinion was abandoned by the 19th-century nation-builders who were blindly following Western models.³⁷

A particular trend in the interwar period linked an essentialist national discourse to particular religious traditions. The effort to create a fusion between these two spheres could come from two directions: the clergy, who

³⁷ For an overview of discourses on national character in the regions see Banac and Verdery, *National Character*. For a comparison of Romanian, Bulgarian, and Hungarian national characterologies in the interwar period, see Balázs Trencsényi, *The Politics of National Character* (London: Routledge, 2011). For the concept of ethnic ontology and its application to Romania, see Sorin Antohi, "Romania and the Balkans: From Geocultural Bovarism to Ethnic Ontology," *Tr@nsit online*, 21, 2002.

sought to nationalize the religious tradition and institutional system, and neo-traditionalist intellectuals seeking to “sacralize” the nation. One of the most interesting cases was the fusion of nationalism and Orthodoxism in the work of the Serbian Bishop Nikolaj Velimirović. While influenced by modernist theological trends in Western Europe at the turn of the century, after 1918 he emerged as a key figure of the neo-traditionalist ideological camp, re-launching such pre-modern ideological topoi as the “elect nationhood” to reinforce the relationship between the national and the Church communities.

Coming from a different religious and political tradition, the Czech Catholic intellectual Jaroslav Durych also developed a peculiar identity discourse. He was a staunch opponent of the Masarykian liberal-democratic project, and at times he even praised the Communists for opposing the dominant ideological line of the regime. In his writings he tried to create an alternative cultural canon, stressing Catholic spirituality, medieval heroism, Baroque splendor and irrationalism against the cult of Hussitism, rationalism and modernism that characterized the ideological mainstream of the Republic.³⁸

In contrast to these discourses focusing on the majority cults of their respective nation, some of the interwar national characterologies looked for alternative spiritual traditions. Thus, both Blaga and Sheytanov stressed the role of unorthodox religious movements in the spiritual constitution of the nation. In fact, both of them extolled Bogomilism as a spiritual tradition shaping the character of their respective nations.

Creating a national characterology was particularly complicated in the context of supra-ethnic state-building projects, such as interwar Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. As we can see, Velimirović and Durych downplayed the importance of the new state ideologies and continued to focus on the Serbian and Czech identities respectively. Other authors, however, entered into a more complex dialogue with these supra-ethnic projects. In the case of the Slovenian France Veber, the agrarian political agenda is sustained by a highly abstract philosophical argument about the Slavic metaphysical character, while the Croat philosopher Vladimir Dvorniković tried to turn the cultural morphological discourse about the Dinaric man as the central element of the South-Slavic cultural and political framework, originally devised by Jovan Cvijić, in a philosophical direction. He inserted this into the European

³⁸ On the broader context of Czech political Catholicism see Miloš Trapl, *Political Catholicism and the Czechoslovak People's Party, 1918–1939* (New York: Social Science Monographs, 1995).

crisis literature of the 1920s, announcing the decline of the West and the regenerative potential of the Southeast European peasant cultures.³⁹

Rethinking conservatism

The transformation of the European ideological landscape at the turn of the century also had a profound impact on conservatism. The 19th-century conflict of national liberalism *versus* supra-ethnic conservatism was overwritten by a new polarization, on the one hand pitting socialism against all the “bourgeois” ideologies (thus obliterating the difference between conservatives and liberals), and on the other giving birth to an anti-liberal nationalism that rejected “cosmopolitan” trends (thus erasing the difference between liberalism and socialism). The First World War changed the ideological framework once again, repositioning conservatism as an ideology not so much defending the existing order but questioning the legitimacy of the political systems that emerged after 1918. Conservative ideologues thus ceased to extol gradual organic development and began to stress the need for a complete transformation, a conservative palingenesis, as it were. The Central and Southeast European variants of this ideology structurally resembled and to a large extent also drew on the ideology of the German *Konservative Revolution* as formulated by Max H. Boehm, Ernst Jünger, Oswald Spengler or Hans Freyer.⁴⁰

The notion of conservative revolution was actually launched by one of the protagonists of this anthology, Hugo von Hofmannsthal. In its original version, which was concerned more with intellectual paradigms than with direct political action, it referred to the rise of idealism-irrationalism-organicism as a counter-reaction to the reductionist rationalism of the Enlightenment. One can find a similar argument, applied to local ideological traditions, in the

³⁹ On the Yugoslavist national discourse see Andrew Baruch Wachtel, *Making a Nation, Breaking a Nation: Literature and Cultural Politics in Yugoslavia* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), pp. 67–127.

⁴⁰ See especially Louis Dupeux, ed., *La révolution conservatrice allemande sous la République du Weimar* (Paris: Kimé, 1992); Stefan Breuer, *Anatomie der konservativen Revolution* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche. Buchgesellschaft, 1993); Rolf Peter Sieferle, *Die konservative Revolution: fünf biographische Skizzen* (Paul Lensch, Werner Sombart, Oswald Spengler, Ernst Jünger, Hans Freyer) (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer-Taschenbuch-Verlag, 1995); Roger Woods, *The Conservative Revolution in the Weimar Republic* (London: Macmillan, 1996); Martin Travers, *Critics of Modernity: The Literature of the Conservative Revolution in Germany, 1890–1933* (New York: Peter Lang, 2001).

conservative criticism of the liberal nationalist historiographical canons formulated by East Central European intellectuals, such as the Hungarian historian Gyula Szekfű, whose *Three generations*, written after the shock of the lost war and the ensuing failure of both democratic and Communist governments to stabilize the country, was a passionate criticism of the 19th-century liberal nationalist mainstream in the name of a hidden romantic conservative alternative. Importantly, this also coincided with the criticism of the Hungarian independentist ideological tradition rooted in the Protestant Transylvania-centered perspective: Szekfű favored instead the pro-Habsburg “Greater-Hungarian” narrative.

A similar neo-conservative historical construction that retrospectively incorporated the imperial tradition was offered by the leading Austrian historian of the period, Heinrich von Srbik, who sought to relink the Habsburg framework to the post-WWI Austrian state project. We can also find a certain overlap with the work of the highly influential Turkish historian, Ömer Lütfi Barkan, who modified the referential framework of the Kemalist historical narrative by reintegrating the Ottoman past with the legitimization of Turkish etatism, also stressing the superiority of the social and legal framework of the Ottomans over the feudal West. In a way, these “post-imperial” narratives reflected the orientation of 19th-century conservatives committed to an anti-nationalist universalism, but in the new context this did not actually mean the rejection of nationalism, only the preference of one sort of nationalism over another. In fact, all historians in question developed a strong ethno-centric narrative targeting “internal aliens,” representing other ethnic groups.

Other neo-conservative historians of the region, such as the Bulgarian Petar Mutafovich or the Croatian Milan Šufflay, also grappled with the question of the contrast between national and imperial frameworks of integration. Mutafovich depicted the relationship of medieval Byzantium and the Bulgarians in terms of a tragic conflict, which undermined the pagan spirituality of his nation without turning them entirely into Christians. Šufflay, whose career started within the framework of the supra-ethnic Habsburg historical culture, rejected the Yugoslavist nation-building project after 1918 and also the Balkan federalism promoted by the agrarians and the socialists. In contrast, he drew his inspiration from a vision of the Croatian medieval state as a composite polity, extending to a much larger territory than modern Croatia and functioning as a bastion of Western civilization.

While the mainstream of Czech conservatism was far from praising the Habsburg empire (as one of the key points of its doctrine was exactly an anti-

German sentiment), the search for a supranational framework was also present here. In the political discourse of Karel Kramář, this took the form of the idea of Slavic solidarity. The most problematic part of this ideology was the status of Russia—a conservative thinker could hardly sympathize with the Soviet state on an ethno-linguistic basis. The way out was to envision the collapse of the Bolshevik regime and the re-emergence of a conservative but not expansive Russian state. Eventually, however, this conception proved to be an illusion.

The conservative discourse was also eager to redefine the relationship of politics and religion. A paradigmatic case is the work of the Romanian Nichifor Crainic, who was a central figure of the main neo-traditionalist intellectual circle of his country, which was grouped around the review *Gândirea*. In his texts he sought to reconceptualize tradition as central to political identity, also linking Romanian medieval tradition and the Byzantine *oikumene*. A comparable case is that of the Slovak Ladislav Hanus, who sought to link Catholicism to political neo-traditionalism and nationalism. He was also a protagonist of the discussion about the mission and state ideology of independent Slovakia during the war years. In contrast to the pro-Nazi radicals, Hanus was more inclined towards some sort of national organicism based on Catholic social thought. The *Manifesto of the Slovenian National Defence Corps*, written during the last phase of the war, has a similar harmonizing agenda, trying to reject a fully-fledged totalitarian orientation but at the same time legitimize cooperation with the Axis powers in the name of serving the Slovenian national interest.

Representing a different ideological subculture, the Serbian Živojin Perić started out at the turn of the century as an elitist critic of the populist political culture of his country, rejecting the fervent nationalist rhetoric of the ruling Radicals. After 1918, however, he also adopted certain anti-modernist elements in his political writings, seeking to link his constitutional ideas to the Serbian Orthodox spiritual tradition. That said, he retained a suspicion of populist nationalism, and continued to argue that the Serbs could not pursue their national aims without taking into account the broader European geopolitical realities. Paradoxically, exactly this anti-nationalist attitude made him prone to accept the collapse of Yugoslavia in 1941 and collaborate with the German occupiers.

These examples also confirm that one cannot simply equate conservative anti-modernism with some sort of radical nationalism or totalitarian propensities. While the interwar attempts at reviving conservatism started out from the criticism of the preceding liberal epoch and of political modernity as

such, it could also be critical of the Nazi and Fascist models, both from a religious ideological position and from the perspective of the abhorrence of radical nationalism and a preference for supra-national (imperial) frameworks. A possible ideological outcome of all this was conservative anti-totalitarianism as mentioned above—the rejection of totalitarianism exactly as a manifestation of modernity.

Totalitarian revolutions

The 1930s saw the emergence of authoritarian regimes all over East Central and Southeastern Europe.⁴¹ By 1936, in the entire region only Czechoslovakia retained parliamentary democracy as its political system; after 1938 even this last bastion of democracy collapsed. At the same time, a number of radical right-wing political movements rose to prominence, from the Romanian Iron Guard, through the Croatian *Ustaša*, the Hungarian Arrow Cross, the Bulgarian *Kubrat* and Legionary movements, the Serbian *Zbor*, to the Polish Camp of Great Poland and *Falanga*. They all developed various identity discourses, including often rather idiosyncratic interpretations of the past. While the contextual factors played a considerable role in the formation of their ideology, they also had certain trans-cultural traits in common, such as the rejection of parliamentary democracy, economic and cultural anti-liberalism, mobilization against the communist danger, a biological definition of the nation, anti-Semitism and, in most cases (in contrast to the more secular Western European movements), an attempt to bring together religious and political references.

The European intellectual sources of these groups reach back to the turn of the century: one of the key elements was the anti-democratic elitism-voluntarism of Sorel or Le Bon. While these ideas were usually identified with the fascist pole, they were also present in the discourse of the radical left, as can be seen in the writings of Lenin and, to a certain extent, of Gramsci as well. This also underscores the fact that the two radicalisms can be typologically linked, though in the leftist version anti-modernism is arguably only one component of the ideological package, while in the case of fascism it was at the very core.

⁴¹ A general introduction to the period is Ivan T. Berend, *Decades of Crisis: Central and Eastern Europe before World War II* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1998). For an overview of the breakthrough of authoritarianism in Southeast Europe see John R. Lampe “Illiberal directions,” in *Balkans into Southeastern Europe* (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), pp. 105–140.

While there was a circulation of intellectual references (Mussolini, Gentile, Evola, Rosenberg, Moeller van der Bruck, Knut Hamsun) right-wing totalitarianism in the region was not merely imitative. An example of the interplay of local and trans-national concerns is the political philosophy of the Bulgarian Janko Janev. Here the revolt against modernity was still more metaphysical, and the connection to the rise of authoritarianism in Bulgaria was more implicit, but it was clear that Janev sought to develop a new matrix of collective identity that would make it possible to go beyond the ailing liberal democratic order and recreate a heroic *Weltanschauung*. In fact, his works written at the turn of the 1940s for the German audience were much more straightforward, as they sought to link the Balkans to the Nazi geopolitical order.

The turn towards the archaic past as a normative model in the radical right-wing project did not actually mean the rejection of modern technologies. In fact, for some of the intellectuals in the region, fascism offered a model of modernization—we can see this in the writings of the Turkish Hüseyin Nihal Atsız, who sought to link the Turkist ideology of the regime to a racial project; the Greek dictator Metaxas, who declared the creation of the “Third Greek Civilization”; the Albanian political writer, Lazër Radi, who campaigned for collaboration with the Italians; and even the idiosyncratic Romanian philosopher, Emil Cioran, who dreamt of the “transfiguration of Romania” as an apocalyptical outburst of violence and creative energies.⁴² At the same time, the local contexts made these discourses rather different: in the Turkish case, the totalitarian references were used to redirect Kemalism towards fascism. In contrast, Metaxas stressed “consolidation” after the crisis rather than fascist dynamism, and adopted certain elements of totalitarianism—unitary mass organizations, *Führerprinzip*—more as tools of legitimization than as the core of his political agenda.⁴³ This was in a way rather typical of East Central European authoritarian regimes, which tended to portray themselves as forms of preventive dictatorship, pacifying the society ravaged by the conflicts of political extremes. In the case of Radi, anti-modernist and modernist arguments were merged in a discourse sustaining collaborationism: he advocated accepting subordination to fascist Italy as a way out of pre-modernity for Albanian society—but the mod-

⁴² On the ideological profile of Cioran in the 1930s, sympathizing both with Hitlerism and Stalinism, see Marta Petreu, *An Infamous Past: E.M. Cioran and the Rise of Fascism in Romania* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2005).

⁴³ On the Metaxas regime see Jon V. Kofas, *Authoritarianism in Greece: The Metaxas Regime* (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1983).

ernity he envisioned was not the political modernity of the late 19th century, with representative institutions and individual rights, but rather the totalitarian dynamism advocated by the fascist ideologists. In this case, the anti-modernist option also meant abandoning the revivalist national project of the late 19th century.

An even more striking version of the anti-modernist deconstruction of the mainstream national narrative while turning towards a more supra-national European framework, in the sense of the German-led New Europe, was put forward by the Czech collaborationist ideologue, Emanuel Vajtauer. It was not accidental that he started his political career as a communist in the early 1920s, and thus was rather immune to the liberal democratic ideological mainstream of the Masarykian republic. The most interesting aspect of his doctrine was the sharp polemic against the national romantic substrate of modern Czech national consciousness, rejecting it in the name of a more multi-ethnic perspective focusing on the entanglement of the historical destiny of Czechs and Germans. There were also other politicians and thinkers, like the Slovak philosopher Štefan Polakovič, or the Serbian Svetislav Stefanović, who envisioned the regeneration of the nation within the rising Nazi European Empire. Exalting the creation of the Slovak Republic under the presidency of Jozef Tiso in 1939, Polakovič sought to harmonize the clerical radical conservatism that was the mainstream ideology of the new state with the Nazi ideological inspiration, creating some sort of a “native” fascist doctrine. Stefanović chose another possible combination, more suited to Serbian political culture, namely that of linking national socialism to the agrarian populist tradition.

Last but not least, as in the previous chapters, we have also included a leftist text in this section, namely the war diaries of the Slovenian Christian Socialist poet and political thinker, Edvard Kocbek, whose work exemplifies the complex entanglement of leftist and rightist components in the anti-modernist paradigm. He came from an intellectual tradition closely linked to French personalism and the “neither right nor left” radicalism of the 1930s. Similar to some of his French peers, when he had to decide at the outburst of the war which side he would choose, he opted for the anti-fascist partisans, and emerged as one of the important figures extending the ideological basis of the movement beyond the communist tradition. His self-reflective notes document his fascination with the new kind of collective experience of the partisan movement and also the possible interferences between different types of palingenetic ideologies (Christian and secular-communist). Furthermore, his text also indicates the lines of ideological reconfiguration after

WWII, and the ambiguous relationship of modernism and anti-modernism characterizing the communist movements and also the postwar regimes.

Conclusion

Given the complexity of the intellectual history of the region and the multiplicity of national and sub-national canons, it would have been possible to include many more texts containing certain anti-modernist implications. Among the contexts which could be added, one might mention the rise of neo-traditionalism in European Islam in the interwar period, the radical nationalist variant of the women's movement, or a number of radical ethnic discourses that sought to undermine the post-WWI order—such as the pro-fascist wing of the Macedonian VMRO or the pro-Nazi ideological subculture of the Sudeten Germans. If finally we did not include them, it is partly for lack of space and also because many of these issues have already been touched upon in the previous volumes. While the anthology could be naturally extended, we are confident that the final selection provides a rich texture and an ample basis for comparison both within the region and also beyond.

We also suggest that reading these texts together sheds a new light on the intellectual history of Central and Southeast Europe in the first half of the 20th century. Looking at the texts presented here from a greater distance, one can identify a set of common features that define the political discourse of anti-modernism in this region. In terms of the notion of the past, most of these texts imply the rejection of a linear vision of modernization and instead offer alternative models of temporality, such as the cyclical one. This was closely connected to the rejection of liberal democratic institutionalism, and the preference for organicist models of social existence, downplaying the role of civic engagement in favor of the fulfillment of duties and an emphasis on the role of the elites (and charismatic leaders) giving a direction to the whole body politic. Along these lines, these projects are often characterized by an emphasis on violence as a principal factor of historical change and the cult of the strong-handed leader who enforces this transformation. The next recurrent motif of various anti-modernist projects is the merger of anti-liberalism and anti-socialism, rooted in the conviction that these ideological streams are two faces of the same enemy. Last, but not least, anti-modernist projects also developed alternative visions of symbolic geography: rejecting the symbolic hierarchies focusing on the normativity of Western European models, they stressed the cultural and

political autarchy of their own national community, which in some cases was also coupled with the reevaluation of the Orient.

One can also establish certain common patterns with regard to the memory and *longue durée* integration of these traditions into the political cultures of the region. In most cases we can identify a post-war phase of *damnatio memoriae*, linked to the geopolitical and systemic reconfiguration of the region. (Although the political contexts were markedly different, this is also the case in Austria, Greece and Turkey, where there was no turn towards state socialism after 1946-47.) From the late 1950s onwards, however, one can also identify a selective re-integration of some of these ideological tropes and discourses, usually mediated by the national communist legitimizing projects. This can be seen in such organs and institutions as the Romanian periodical targeting the exile community, *Glasul patriei*, in which many of the former extreme rightists, imprisoned during Stalinism, were invited to cooperate; or the Polish pro-regime Catholic organization, PAX, led by Bolesław Piasecki, a key ideologist of the pre-1945 extreme right. Obviously, in this case the dynamism of countries outside of the Eastern bloc was somewhat different: the authoritarian regimes and political movements in Greece and Turkey also reincorporated certain elements from the interwar radical nationalist canon, albeit very selectively, i.e., adjusting them to the bipolar geopolitical framework of the Cold War and thus toning down their anti-Westernism.

This ambiguous integration also prepared the way for what on the surface seemed to be a radical change after 1989, namely the return of the interwar tropes and discursive patterns to the center of the public sphere. This reintegration was often facilitated by fellow traveler intellectuals searching for an alternative legitimization of the regime in the 1970-80s, as Marxism-Leninism proved increasingly unable to rally any kind of popular support around the leadership. Interwar cultural references had an aura of being an uncontaminated cultural heritage, which thus was fervently reproduced, re-edited and re-canonized after the regime change. The intensity of this revival, however, was different in different contexts. Romania, where the discussion of the interwar canon, and eminently of the work of the “young generation” of Eliade, Cioran, Noica, and many other fascinating intellectuals, became central to the cultural life of the 1990s, is perhaps an extreme case, but even in the other countries there were important efforts to engage with the intellectual heritage of interwar conservatism, national metaphysics, and the crisis literature.

This process of incorporation also makes it obvious that the story we sought to tell in the four volumes of our project, covering the history of identity discourses from the Late Enlightenment until 1945, is not of merely anti-

quarian interest, but part and parcel of the intellectual and political cultures of the region to this very day. Questions about the place of one's respective culture in Europe, the clash of "Westernism" and "autochthonism", how to cope with the multiethnic composition of the region and the divergence of ethno-linguistic and state borders, the relationship of national and supra-national (imperial, federal, etc.) frameworks of allegiance, the clash of organic-cumulative versus revolutionary models of development, the link of national and religious identity, or the entanglement of aesthetic and political spheres through devising a "national style" have been with us since the inception of political modernity in the region.

While we were aware of the complexity of our task when we started the project in 2001, accomplishing a venture lasting more than a decade brought new challenges and new insights, and, what is more, the face of the region also changed considerably. To mention but a few key developments, many of the countries represented in the volume (though far from all of them) became part of the European Union, and in the early 2000s the expectation of a gradual harmonization with a common European cultural and political framework was shared by many internal and external observers. The economic and institutional crisis of the late 2000s, however, raised new doubts and importantly also rearranged the symbolic geographical framework of the region, for instance bringing Greece much "closer" to its Southeast European neighbors than it had been perceived to be in the 1990s. In this context the pro-European consensus that seemed to pervade the region also evaporated, and new ideological modalities emerged, which began to reassert national autarchy as a legitimate political and also cultural strategy to fence off the negative consequences of the global crisis. These developments also indicate that the battles over collective identity that have been so central to these national cultures remain relevant, and the cultural references contained by our anthology are indispensable for the understanding of the current conflicts. Along these lines, we hope that the volumes of the series will be used together, as they tell a story of how this region has struggled with the problems of identification and representation. Similarly, they may also provide hints as to how these discursive legacies might shape the political culture of the region, and with it the whole of Europe, in the future.⁴⁴

⁴⁴ To facilitate this, in addition to the usual "files" with biographies, contextualizations and excerpts, we have also included at the end of this volume a glossary of key terms occurring in all volumes of the series, as well as a selected bibliography of fundamental studies pertaining to various aspects of identity discourses in East Central and Southeast Europe.

NIKOLA PAŠIĆ: THE AGREEMENT OF SERBS AND CROATS

Title: *Sloga Srbo-Hrvata* (The agreement of Serbs and Croats)

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About the author

Nikola Pašić [1845, Zaječar (Eastern Serbia) – 1926, Belgrade]: one of the most important Serbian politicians of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. He studied technical sciences in Belgrade and Zurich (1868–1872). While residing in Switzerland, Pašić was greatly influenced by the populist ideologue, **Svetozar Marković**. It was also there that he met and became close to a group of young Serbian radicals, including **Pera Todorović**, Pera Velimirović, Lazar Paču, Jovan Žujović. In 1881, this group established the Serbian Radical Party. This was the first modern political party in Serbia. It created a system of party branches throughout the country aiming to reach out to the entire population. The Radicals claimed that their ideology originated from Svetozar Marković. In their view, Serbian nationalism, populism and social conservatism supplanted Marković's original leftist revolutionary approach. As such, the Radicals clashed with the Progressives, whose leading ideologue was Milan Piroćanac and who harshly criticized the Radicals' anti-Western and anti-European attitude. From the onset of his political career Pašić was confrontational. As one of the leaders and instigators of the failed Timok uprising against the government and King Milan Obrenović in 1883, Pašić had to leave the country to avoid arrest and trial; he spent 6 years in exile in Bulgaria and returned to Serbia only after King Milan's abdication in 1889. After his return, and especially after the May 1903 coup d'état, Pašić became, for almost two decades, the most important political figure in the country, while the Radicals were the dominant political party in Parliament. Throughout this period of intense parliamentary competition, Pašić claimed to understand and defend the interests of the Serbian nation better than any of his political rivals. During the Great War, he contemplated the possibility of the creation of a "Greater Serbia." When it became clear that the Entente did not favor the plan, however, Pašić joined his Croatian colleagues Ante Trumbić and Frano Supilo in signing, in 1917, the famous Corfu declaration, which envisaged the creation of a South Slav

state: the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, later known as Yugoslavia. Pašić's idea for a common state differed significantly from the Croats' vision, though, and the document signed on Corfu left many issues unresolved, most importantly the degree of centralization and federalization in the future state.

Main works: *Moja politička ispovest: beleške za brošuru* [My political confession: Notes for a brochure] (1902); *Pisma, članci, govori, 1872–1891* [Letters, articles, speeches, 1872–1891] (1995); *Sloga Srbo-Hrvata* [The agreement of Serbs and Croats] (1995); *Nikola Pašić u narodnoj skupštini* [Nikola Pašić in the National Assembly], vols. 1–4. (1997–1998).

Context

Sloga Srbo-Hrvata was written by Pašić most probably in the early 1890s, after his return to Serbia. This lengthy essay summarizes Pašić's political concern with Serbian national identity, its main components and future trajectory. This is discussed through a comparison between the Serbs and the Croats. Although it appears in the title, Pašić was skeptical about the prospect of an "agreement" between these two nations. In his view the Serbs had an advantage over the Croats in terms of their regional leadership and role in the future unification of the South Slavs.

The East-West divide is presented as fundamental, as the inevitable clash between them is based on civilizational differences. This aspect of Pašić's thought reveals the impact of the Russian religious philosopher Nikolai Danilevskiy. In his 1871 book "Russia and Europe" Danilevskiy presented a vision of Europe divided in civilizational-cultural types, with the Slavic type as the most able. Pašić sees Serbian national history as part of the history of a confrontation between East and West, which started with the division of Christendom into Eastern (Byzantine) and Western parts. The Serbs had always fought on the Eastern side with a temporary break during the period of Ottoman domination. Although Pašić acknowledges that in the anti-Ottoman struggle the Serbs sided with other Christian nations, he makes the point that once they got to know their allies better they became disillusioned. The only permanent and true ally of the Serbs was Russia.

Christian rhetoric also occupies a central place in Pašić's thought. Although he is not interested in the doctrinal differences between Eastern Orthodox and Western Christianity, he assumes that the split between the two is unbridgeable. Pašić contrasts the Orthodox Church to the Roman Catholic one, and identifies a number of differences between them, of which the most important is the conciliar character of the Orthodox Church, as opposed to

the pyramidal, absolutist structure of the Catholic Church. In Slavonic languages this feature of the Eastern Christian Church is usually described by the concept of *sobornost*, which alludes to the fact that the supreme administrative authority lays not with one individual, but with a community—the *sobor/sabor*, or the council.

Pašić most probably borrowed this notion from the Russian Slavophile religious philosopher Alexei Khomiakov, but he transformed it into a secular one. Khomiakov connected the idea of spiritual church community to the Russian peasant commune, but within a theological framework. He used the concept in order to analyze and criticize the relationship between church and state in the Romanov Empire after the Petrine reforms. Pašić used *sobornost* to underline the significance of the traditional Serbian peasant commune (*zadruga*), and above all the importance of its democratic spirit to Serbian political and social life. Unlike Khomiakov, Pašić left the theological connotations aside and focused exclusively on the application of the term to politics. His main implication was that just as the *zadruga* and Serbian society in general were prone to democracy, in the same way *sobornost* protected the Orthodox Churches from the usurpation of power by one person. The use of religious language allowed Pašić to derive even more legitimacy for his political cause on the basis of the proclaimed “Orthodox” character of Serbian culture.

Orthodoxy, in Pašić’s interpretation, is dynamic and capable of following the progressive development of humanity. The Orthodox Church is close to the people and its structures are derived from the people. This last point allows Pašić to argue for the national character of the Serbian Church. *Sobornost* is thus inseparable from the true spirit of the peasant commune, be it the Serbian *zadruga* or the Russian *mir*. It is symptomatic that Pašić refers here to Leo Tolstoy, one of the original theorists of Christian anarchism. His reference to Tolstoy is also indicative of his understanding of Slavdom, identifying the shared oikoumene of Eastern Christianity and the democratic self-regulated peasant communes as its fundamental characteristics.

Preoccupation with traditional peasant social structures is one of the fundamental aspects of Pašić’s thought. Throughout his political career, Pašić argued for the preservation of the existing societal arrangement and against its modernization, i.e., capitalism and industrialization. The inherent traditional mentality of the Serbian peasant is for Pašić the best possible guarantee for the harmonious social and political development of the country. A non-organic change, according to him, will necessarily lead to the negation of the national essence. This fusion of leftist radicalism with populist conser-

vatism was essential to many Serbian Radicals and ultimately the main reason for the split of the party, as the group that came to form the Independent Radical Party did not accept Pašić's strong nationalist emphasis and insisted on social modernization instead.

In the present text, the harsh criticism of Western culture is addressed primarily against the Croats, who, in Pašić's view, had betrayed their original Slavic tradition. This is the prime reason for Pašić's disbelief in the sincerity of his Croatian colleagues. But his outspoken Pan-Slavic attitude should not be misleading. Pašić's true Slavdom was meant as a cultural program, not a political one, and did not go far beyond Russia and Serbia, and possibly Bulgaria.

For a long time scholars considered Pašić to be a man of action, a charismatic leader rather than a thinker. His unusually long political career passed through various phases, and the last one, in which he acted as one of the founding fathers of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, outshone earlier periods, when his political thinking took form. It was only when his writings were carefully studied and published in the 1990s that the evaluation of his political work became more critical. The strict party organization and Serb dominance in the Yugoslav parliament were now presented as quasi-authoritarian features. Pašić's ethno-populism was perceived as a fundamental ideological thread in Serbian political culture, shaping also the social imaginary under Milošević. In fact, Pašić's thought combined leftist and national-populist ideas from the very beginning, but what was associated with the leftist ideology in the 1880s came to be perceived as conservative in the early 20th century. This made it possible for later interpreters and followers to evaluate his thought and personality selectively, and emphasize the democratic spirit or conversely the authoritarian tendencies and his fervent Serbian nationalism, which for Pašić were hardly separable.

MF

The agreement of Serbs and Croats

Western and Eastern Europe are two separate worlds. They have never agreed, and it is even more difficult for them to agree now, as apart from faith there is also the question about the formation of nations, and when next to the first and second questions there emerges a third one, which at this time is equally important for the destiny of peoples and states and which concerns the moral view on the economic and political organization of the nations.

The West and the East of Europe are, as we have said, two worlds that have been in constant struggle: cultural, religious, national and economic. The Byzantine Empire fought with the Roman Empire, later on the Western Christian church struggled against the Eastern, so that the oppositions underlying the nature of those peoples came to divide Christ's teaching that otherwise teaches brotherly tolerance, agreement and love. Islam fought with the West and when it was greatly weakened and dislodged by Russia, then it [Russia] began fighting with the West so that the [Eastern] heritage could remain with the Eastern Orthodox peoples.

In this conflict of the Eastern and the Western worlds, the Serbian people have always been, ever since they settled in the lands where they now live, on the side of the East, with a few exceptions such as when they fought Islam for the liberation of the Christian peoples, but even then the masses of the people turned away from the West with disgust, once they got to know it better. And in all struggles that Russia started, from the times of Peter the Great, against the Turkish Empire, the Serbian people have always been an ally of Russia, to a greater or lesser extent, within the limits of the possible. But in those conflicts of the Eastern and the Western worlds, the Croatian people have always been, admittedly after a prolonged period of hesitation, on the side of the West, and have never risen up as an ally of Russia in its fight against Islam. [...]

But our enemies will say: "Christ's teaching is one. His teaching is accepted by the Eastern and the Western churches alike; for a time they professed the same teaching together, and separated only later on the question of the dogma about the procession of Christ, the son of God, but not of the Holy Spirit, as is the teaching of the Eastern Church."¹ In our opinion the split in the Church, the divergence of the Eastern and the Western clergy in dogma, is nothing but the embodiment of the contrast between the Western and the Eastern worlds. This contrast is just demonstrated in differences in accepting the teaching of Christ, which stem from the character, temperament, views of the world and society of the Western part of Europe [in comparison] to the same in the East.

Hence, the difference which existed and still exists between the peoples of the Eastern and the Western [parts], and which appeared with the acceptance and application of Christ's teaching, divided the Church and the peoples in

¹ Here the original text confuses two religious terms and historical disputes between Eastern and Western Christian churches: on the procession of Christ and on the dogma of the procession of the Holy Spirit.

such a way, that there are enormous differences between them in the application of religion, although they drew from the same source.

The Orthodox Church remained a conciliar church,² while the Latin Church became the church of the infallible Pope. These are the two juxtaposed principles. One [church] is based on the convictions and wisdom of all its believers, and the other on the convictions and wisdom of one person. One is democratic, the other is absolutist. The Orthodox Church stands on a solid foundation, on which the church of brotherly love can develop and keep pace with the progress of science, education, the human mind; and the other [church] limited itself, closed up and proclaimed the single mind of an old and weak man to be supreme, infallible, and with that it cut itself off from the way of development, improvement and adjustment to innovations and the progress of science.

The former, conciliar [church], decides on its hierarchical arrangements in consent and agreement with its believers, with the members of the conciliar church; this church is the people because it professes Christ's faith of love and equality. The latter [church] makes decisions and establishes rules in a way the Pope infallibly orders, and is detached from the people, from its believers.

The former has priests who stand in agreement with the natural development and improvement of man, because to them marriage and family are not forbidden. These link them to their brothers and people. And the latter has forbidden this [marriage and family] to its priests, and has turned them into a caste, which develops under completely different influences and with different moral views. The first ones are people who live naturally, and the others—unnaturally. And the way science evaluates the workings of the psyche of people [put] into unnatural conditions is known to anybody who has glanced into the science of medical hygiene.

These facts are from where I drew the conclusion that the Orthodox Church is more harmonious with the human mind and with its needs and development than the Roman Catholic Church.

It is therefore clear why the Orthodox Church is a national church; why it is tied to and cleaves to the soul of the people who profess it to a greater extent than the Roman Catholic Church can do. And when the Church is merged with the nation, when it breathes and feels in the same way as the nation does, then the Church is the nation's consolation, its defender. That is

² "Saborna crkva" in the original.

why the Serbian Church, the Bulgarian Church, the Greek Church, the Russian Church [have their names]. This is Christ's teaching as it is understood by the Serbian, Bulgarian, et al. peoples.

[...]

When we take all of this into consideration, we see that the Slavic Orthodox Church, merged from the very beginning with the Slavic peoples, which remained faithful to it, has preserved for those peoples Slavic features, characteristic traits and essence, which are only now capable to receive the results of today's progress and to take them to new heights which the humanity can barely imagine.

[...]

We have said that the difference between the Eastern and the Western churches came from the difference in understanding Christ's teaching; this difference in interpretation is closely linked to differences that exist between Western and Eastern nations, in this particular case, between the Latins and the Slavs.

Slavdom multiplied by means of communes, which in Russian were also called "mir," which means both "world" and "peace"³ in our current sense. Unions of communes gradually formed different small clan states, which only later, and due to the foreign "invasion," were organized into a one large state.

Thus, a commune is the soul of the Slavic world. It is the beginning [of everything], and today the social sciences regard it as the last level of the organization of present European society. It is, thus, both the beginning of Slavic society, and the end of European social development. But a Slavic commune, as a starting unit, is capable of further development, more complex social and state organization; on the contrary, the commune of the Western European world means the end. And indeed, it will be the end of culture, to which today's bourgeois Western state of affairs will inevitably lead.

West European states were created by sword and brute force, and they have developed on the basis of struggle and competition, which have led to a society of such structure and division that the commune is perceived as the only exit from this colossal mechanism and pressure. It is thought that this is where peace, prosperity and progress can be found. A Slavic country, espe-

³ In Serbian "mir." The linguistic argument is not entirely correct. According to Russian pre-reform orthography, these were two different words: "миръ" meaning peace, and "мip" meaning world, the latter also used for peasant communes.

cially Russia, which is the purest representative of Slavdom, has started its development with communes, with a new unit, a new foundation on the basis of which it will be possible to construct a building of a new Slavic culture, which will envelop Humanity; which will be the realization of the true and pure teaching of Christ, that all people are brothers, that all nations are brothers; which brings peace both to states and to the world.

When this will happen, and whether it is really possible for these ideas, contained in Slavdom's view of the society and the world, to come true is another question, which I cannot answer, and in which I am not versed enough to be able to say anything more substantial. This is a Slavic ideal, and how it will be achieved depends on many, very many factors and obstacles, and about that, as I have mentioned, I am not going to say anything. I only wanted to present a Slavic philosophic feature, which is different from the Western philosophic view on the world. This feature is, or so it seems to us, closely related to the essence of Christ's teaching and is a peculiarity of the Slavic spirit. It manifested itself through the understanding and application of Christ's teaching, in the organization of communes, and in the ideals of the greatest Russian writers.

"God is Love," says L.N. Tolstoy, and adds that the world is preserved by "love and work." When one thinks about these words longer and from a different perspective, one sees that these are "the soul and the reason" of the Slavic heart, the Slavic philosophy, the essence of Christianity, the ideals which light-headed Western philosophy grasped only through the ruptures of immense struggles, darkness and opposition.

The Serbian *zadruga* is the social institution closest to the Russian commune, to Russian "mir," both in the Slavdom and in the world. And behind that Serbian *zadruga* stands the Serbian commune, which neither let go of, nor abandoned its right to a "communal self-government," and which still has enough communal land that belongs to the entire commune, to all its members.

Thus, the Serbian *zadruga* and Serbian commune are closest to Russian "mir." If it differs to a certain extent from Russian "mir," that is because the Serbian spirit and Serbian philosophy have diverted from the Russian, or all-Slavic [spirit and philosophy]. However, these and some other traits that are characteristic only of the Serbian nation, are sufficient for the Serbian nation to be able to join in the great task of the Slavic-Russian society. They are sufficient to protect the Serbian nation from the pressure of the West, they are sufficient to give it a new life and new enthusiasm, hardly imaginable now, because barely anyone is concerned with these ideas. Of course, all this

applies only when the value of these institutions is understood correctly; when they are protected as the greatest national sacred objects, which have saved the nation from economic slavery and which will save it in the future if they are protected and properly developed.

Translated by Marija Petrović

GEORG VON SCHÖNERER: THE PAN-GERMANS' PROGRAM FOR THE FUTURE

Title: *Das Zukunftsprogramm der Alldeutschen* (The Pan-Germans' program for the future)

Originally published: *Alldeutsches Tagblatt* 12 (1906), p. 1.

Language: German.

The excerpts used are from the original edition.

About the author

Georg Ritter von Schönerer [1842, Vienna – 1921, Zwettl, Lower Austria]: political activist and anti-Catholic campaigner. He inherited his railroad-pioneer, ennobled father's title after the latter's death in 1881. Schönerer became a political activist of liberal views, chiming with the mood of the 1870s, and gained entry to Austria's Parliament (*Reichsrat*) in 1873. His politics then took a radical, right-wing turn, founded on antagonism towards Slavs, Jews, and Catholicism. This culminated in his establishment of the Pan-German Party in 1879 and the subsequent "Los-von-Rom" [Away from Rome] movement seeking mass conversion of Austrian Catholics to Lutheranism, echoing Bismarck's *Kulturkampf* in Germany. Schönerer became notorious for his pioneering use of physical and verbal violence. In 1888 he was imprisoned, losing his title and (temporarily) all parliamentary privileges after ransacking the offices of a Jewish-owned newspaper. In 1898 he orchestrated mob protests that expedited the dismissal of Austrian Prime Minister Count Badeni (1846–1909), one year after Schönerer's own reelection to the *Reichsrat*. This was in protest against Badeni's language ordinances obliging civil servants in Austrian Bohemia to speak Czech, excluding Germanophones, and it helped his party reach a high watermark of 21 delegates in 1901. Schönerer helped create an entirely new political form and climate, described as being in a "new key": sharper, violent, demagogic. Elements of Schönerer's political philosophy became prototypical for the Austrian Right in subsequent years, influencing Vienna's popular anti-Semitic mayor, Karl Lueger, and, most notoriously, Adolf Hitler.

Main works: *12 Reden. Nebst einem Anhang enthaltend: Das Programm der Deutschnationalen* [Twelve speeches. Including an Appendix: The program of the German Nationals] (1886); *§ 14 und nationale Politik* [Article 14 and national politics] (1907); *10 Reden aus den Jahren 1882 bis 1888* [Ten speeches from the years 1882 to 1888] (1914)

Context

The rise of a unified German state under the leadership of Chancellor Otto von Bismarck (1815–1898) in 1871, which excluded Habsburg Austria, created a political system whereby large populations of indigenous Germans belonged to different states. This solution was the outcome of a power struggle between the emerging northern German power of Prussia and Austria, whose monarchs had supplied the rulers of the collapsed Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation. The latter entity had held sway over the patchwork of Germanic principalities until 1806; and likewise Austria claimed leadership of its successor, the German Confederation, which emerged from Napoleon's defeat and the 1815 Congress of Vienna that followed. However, Prussian military skill, combined with the ambition of Chancellor Bismarck and the ruling Hohenzollern dynasty, led to direct rivalry and conflict with Austria for leadership of the German territories. The rivalry culminated in the decisive defeat of Austria at Sadowa (Königgrätz) in 1866. Together with Bismarck's successful war with France in 1870, the victory paved the way for what was known as the "kleindeutsch" (Small-German) solution to the question of how to unify the German-speaking peoples, which crowned as monarch the Hohenzollern Wilhelm I (first German Emperor, ruled 1871–1888) instead of a Habsburg. "Klein," in this context, obviously referred to the exclusion of indigenous Germans located primarily in the Western parts of the Habsburg Monarchy.

Pan-Germanism had been a fractured creed agitating for various forms of unification since the early 1800s, whether large ("gross"), i.e., including Austria, or small. The events of 1871, however, helped spur the development of a new, specifically Austrian variant of Pan-Germanism, propounded by those who advocated the inclusion of Austria's German-speaking population and territories in the newly created German Reich. The implications of such thinking were manifold, and clearly radical. To effect such a move would most likely entail the break-up of the Habsburg Monarchy, to whom the majority of its German-speakers remained loyal, if only passively so; not to mention willingness on the part of Bismarck's Germany; and the pressing question of what to do with Austria's Slavic population and large Jewish minority. As with previous forms of Pan-Germanism, the Austrian variant that eventually came to be expounded by the radical demagogue Georg von Schönerer in fact had hybrid origins, embracing aspects of popular socialism, democracy, and a defensive attitude towards the ruling status of the German population. The latter tenet in particular informed the famous Linz Program

of 1882, formulated by what would later appear to have been an unlikely alliance: two Austrian Social Democratic pathbreakers, the party founder, Jewish-born Victor Adler (1852–1918) and Engelbert Pernerstorfer (1850–1918), together with historian Heinrich Friedjung (1851–1920), who also had Jewish origins, and Schönerer. The program, which urged that the German language be made the official language of state and its institutions, and also called for closer relations with Germany (e.g., a customs union), was a reaction to the perceived threat of Slavic ascendancy. It came fifteen years after the Monarchy had been forced into a political compromise with the Hungarians, the *Ausgleich* of 1867, on which point the program demanded purely dynastic, rather than political ties.

However, the political course subsequently followed by Schönerer was shaped by a more direct, verbally aggressive and sometimes physically violent response to these perceived threats. Beginning around 1880, he abandoned earlier, more liberal views and developed a more insistent form of anti-Slavic tendencies and, most notoriously, a toxic and virulent anti-Semitism. This development to some extent coincided with wider manifestations of pan-German sentiment outside, but sometimes overlapping with, his own Pan-German Party, founded in 1879. These included the various newly-founded sports and gymnastics associations (*Turnvereine*), and the student fraternities (*Burschenschaften*) that in the same period implemented anti-Semitic entry policies for the first time.

As a politician, Schönerer was controversial, and his successes in the short term were arguably patchy. He gained notoriety for his methods as much as for any policy, for example hectoring opponents or obstructing parliamentary debate, on one occasion in 1888. Schönerer's popularity was boosted in the short term, and he gained significant electoral successes again in 1901 (21 deputies); but his party, which depended on his personal and autocratic leadership, ultimately lost momentum and membership to the emerging Christian Social movement, leading Schönerer himself to concede defeat in a 1913 speech. As the architect of another anti-Habsburg, or at least anti-Austrian initiative, "Away From Rome" (*Los-von-Rom*), designed to convert Austrians to Lutheranism, he was—in contrast to the Christian Socials—at odds with the Catholic majority and failed to mobilize more than a small minority to his cause. But on other causes, and on other important figures, Schönerer's influence was long-lasting, indeed devastating. His anti-Semitic sloganeering, which to some extent played on Catholic prejudice, together with democratic and popular socialism that nevertheless repudiated the class politics of the left, directly informed the politics of Vienna's mayor from 1897, the

popular figurehead and founder of the Christian Social movement, Karl Lueger (1844–1910). Schönerer and Lueger in turn were direct, cited influences on Hitler, who lived in Vienna during the period 1905–13. Hitler, an Austrian-born citizen, would translate Schönerer's specifically Austrian cocktail of pan-Germanism into a yet more radical form. To be sure, this involved achieving the fusion of German-speaking Austria with Germany. It also meant reaching the zenith of successful demagoguery, with a founding ideology that repudiated Marxism as such, but accepting the fusion of some elements of socialism with ethnic nationalism. Most devastatingly of all, of course, it saw the continuation of political violence and autocratic authoritarianism as guiding principles of rule, while reaching the exploitative limits of anti-Slavism, and the murderous end-point of anti-Semitism.

RP

The Pan-Germans' program for the future

It is already a fact that, due to the decisive help of numerous representatives from German electoral districts, an electoral reform will become law, by which, not considering the justified German-national demand for the special situation of Galicia and the Bukovina, and for Dalmatia's reincorporation into the lands of the Hungarian crown, the Germans in Austria will be stripped of their rights and—facing a large Slavic-Romanian majority—permanently be forced into a minority.

This stance taken by German representatives falls far short even of the declaration insisting on privileging the Germans given by the certainly not German-friendly Minister-President Count Badeni on 22 October 1895, in which he says: "that the historically traditional role of German culture that has illuminated the path for all other nations in Austria must always be given the consideration it deserves."

Due to this anti-German electoral reform, the Germans' key national demands, which are included in the Linz Program, will no longer be sustainable, and especially so with regard to the legal protection of German as the state's official language.

In parliament the Germans, from a national point of view, will be unable to wrest beneficial advantages, and the only thing left to do is to programmatically prescribe the following:

The Pan-Germans deem the enactment of the tabled electoral reform as the basis for determined and ongoing Slavicization policies.

The Pan-Germans continue to insist on their founding program from 1901 that proclaims:

We strive towards such a federative relationship of the German-Austrian lands (former German *Bundesländer*) with the German Reich that will continuously safeguard our national character.

We, therefore, battle any government that works counter to our goals, and cannot participate in rallies proclaiming loyalty to them so long as such a government policy is in place.

We consider keeping our national character pure of any foreign, and hence also from every Jewish, influences, and freeing ourselves from Rome, as our natural duty.

This founding program is now expanded by the following proclamations:

“The relationship to Hungary is to be replaced by a personal union and will surely expect that Hungary can push through the re-integration of Dalmatia—as well as the acquisition of Bosnia and Herzegovina—with Croatia and Slavonia.”

The creation of the federative relationship with the German Reich: everything and by any means must be done within and outside of the legislative and self-governed bodies to prevent anything designed or suited to the advancing Slavicization and de-Germanization of German-Austria. This must be particularly valid with regard to the creation of any non-German universities.

Educating the German nation in Austria to embrace the insight that German-Austria’s economic and political unification with the German Reich is a national necessity, that shall be the main task of the Pan-Germans’ educational work.

In closing, may Bismarck’s well known words be applied to our future:

“It is a difficult task to bring us together,
But it will be more difficult still to separate us again!”

Hail Greater Germany!
Schönerer

Translated by Tudor Georgescu

ROMAN DMOWSKI: THOUGHTS OF A MODERN POLE

Title: *Myśli nowoczesnego Polaka* (Thoughts of a modern Pole)

Originally published: Under the pseudonym R. Skrzycki, in *Przegląd Wszechpolski*, 1902, no. 2, 3, 5, 6–9, 11.

Language: Polish

The excerpts used are from the 8th edition of *Myśli nowoczesnego Polaka* (Warsaw: Społeczne Wydawnictwo “Grunwald,” 1989), pp. 68–87.

About the author

Roman Dmowski [1864, Kamionek (present-day part of Warsaw) – 1939, Drozdowo near Łomża]: politician. Born in an impoverished gentry family in Russian Poland, Dmowski studied biology at Warsaw University. In 1889, after completing his studies, he became a member of the conservative *Liga Polska* (Polish League). In 1893, he founded *Liga Narodowa* (National League), a subversive organization of Polish nationalists. From 1895 until 1905, Dmowski was the publisher of *Przegląd Wszechpolski* (All-Polish review) based first in Lwów (Ger., *Yid.*, Lemberg, Ukr. Lviv) and then in Cracow. In 1897, he created a legal political party, *Stronnictwo Narodowo-Demokratyczne* (National-Democratic Party). Already in his early texts published in *Przegląd Wszechpolski* and the radical *Głos* (Voice), Dmowski introduced the Polish public to European racial discourses and social Darwinism. In the first decade of the 20th century, he changed his previous radical-democratic views in favor of the idea of Polish-Russian cooperation. His book *Myśli nowoczesnego Polaka* (Thoughts of a modern Pole) was published in 1902 and marked the beginning of a new phase in Polish nationalism. During the Russian-Japanese war (1904–1905) he thwarted **Józef Piłsudski**’s plans for Polish armed irredenta. In 1907, he was even elected to the Russian *Duma* and became the leader of the Circle of Polish Deputies. During the First World War, Dmowski represented Polish political organizations in Paris. He also participated in the Paris Peace Conference, where he demanded the incorporation of Pomerania and Upper Silesia into the new Polish state. After he returned to Poland, Dmowski became the main political enemy of Piłsudski. After Piłsudski’s *coup d’état* in 1926, Dmowski created a semi-fascist nationalist movement *Obóz Wielkiej Polski* (Great Poland Camp). After OWP was outlawed in 1933, he concentrated on political writings. Post-1945 Polish political debates portrayed Dmowski’s legacy as a radical nationalist alternative to socialism, one condemned by official Marxist authors. At the same time, his ideas gained popularity in various circles of the anti-communist opposition. Interestingly, Dmowski was not only the

main reference point for Polish anti-Semitic and radical nationalist discourse but also a point of reference for the liberal opponents of the regime, who saw in his early phase a model for organizing civil society in the context of foreign occupation. After 1989, as co-founder of a democratic Polish state, he enjoyed official recognition, in spite of recurrent controversies over his anti-Semitic and chauvinist ideas.

Main works: *Myśli nowoczesnego Polaka* [Thoughts of a modern Pole] (1902); *Niemcy, Rosja a sprawa polska* [Germany, Russia and the Polish Cause] (1908, French translation: *La question polonaise*, 1909); *Separatyzm Żydów i jego źródła* [Separatism of Jews and its Sources] (1909); *Upadek myśli konserwatywnej w Polsce* [The decline of conservative thought in Poland] (1914); *Polityka polska i odbudowanie państwa* [Polish politics and reconstruction of the state] (1925); *Zagadnienie rządu* [On government] (1927); *Kościół, naród i państwo* [Church, nation and state] (1927); *Świat powojenny i Polska* [The post-war world and Poland] (1931)

Context

Roman Dmowski's text was acknowledged immediately upon its publication as one of the most important contributions to Polish nationalism. Dmowski drew on social Darwinism and openly criticized both "romantic" patriotism and the liberal adherents of "organic" work, the so-called positivists, even though he used elements of the positivist ideology for devising his own doctrine (see **Aleksander Świętochowski**, *Political directives*). In the early 20th century, the National-Democratic Party was trying to gather all social classes, attracting, at first, support from the former liberal and democratic middle-class. One of the important integrative elements in its program was political anti-Semitism. The rise of Polish national democracy (often referred to as *Endecja*), paralleling such movements as the Action Française or Lueger's Christian Socialism, reflected the reconfiguration of the social bases of politics at the turn of the century, shifting the emphasis from the traditional elites towards the urban masses.

It is Dmowski who introduced the term "national egoism" in Poland, indicating the changing focus of politics from society to the nation as a main moral principle and source of ethical values. His 1902 "Thoughts of the modern Pole" is perceived as a "nationalist catechism" in Poland. It influenced members of the nationalist movement and the general public alike. It is often said that Dmowski's impact on Polish political life was so important that almost from the moment the book was published the old, romantic Polish patriotism vanished. Imported modern Western nationalist theories replaced the old Polish national discourse, based on the idea of unity between the inhabitants of the pre-partition Polish territories. No slogans of

spiritual union between Poles, Ukrainians, Belarusians, and Lithuanians were needed to legitimize the new political agenda. Dmowski advocated a Polish national struggle not only against the Russian or German empires, but against other oppressed nationalities as well. That also meant a radical reformulation of the old national program, as it stood in clear conflict with socialism in all its versions (see **Józef Piłsudski**, *On patriotism*). Both internationalists like Zamość-born Róża Luksemburg (Rosa Luxemburg) and Polish socialists advocated close cooperation of nationalities on the former Polish territories.

Dmowski's ideas were criticized (especially by conservatives and socialists), but they finally seem to have succeeded in shaping the cultural and political views of many politicians in interwar Poland, including Józef Piłsudski's political heirs. His impact on the practical understanding of such basic terms as "nation" or "state" was especially significant. Also his "scientific" anti-Semitism replaced the "outdated" Christian anti-Judaism. Moreover, Dmowski's idea of the national state influenced Polish communist leaders in the post-1945 period. The identification of the nation with the state and the idea of an ethnically homogenous Poland provided the basis for a nationalist legitimization of communist rule. Finally, it was the radical change in the ethnic composition of Poland that partly led, after 1945, to the fulfillment of Dmowski's ideas.

Among his ideological achievements, one should mention Dmowski's successful attempt to fuse Polish nationality with Catholicism (in the form of an offer addressed to the Church to abandon its former indifference and to become more "national"). Its traces are still visible in the popular expression "Polish-Catholic," as well as in the nationalist, instead of traditionalist, stance of most of the Polish clergy. According to Dmowski, the real enemies of the national idea were international radicalism and anticlericalism, crafted and conducted by Jews and Masons. This is why the Church should not be indifferent, but should engage with the national problem.

An important element of practical politics, on the other hand, was Dmowski's reinterpretation of the geopolitical situation in East Central Europe. To him, Tsarist Russia—despite all attempts at Russification and political oppression—was not the main enemy of the Polish national movement. Tsarist assimilatory abilities were, according to Dmowski, insufficient to complete the denationalization of any of the nationalities of pre-partition Poland. Thus the Poles should rather cooperate with Russia to win her support in the vital struggle against the much more dangerous—in cultural and economic terms—Germans. Dmowski achieved this program in the short

period of democratization of the Russian Empire after the 1905 Revolution and during the First World War. Interestingly, his limited reverence for the assimilatory capacities of Tsarist Russia, paired with a belief in the Polish assimilatory potential, were also shared by the leaders of Ukrainian and Lithuanian nationalist movements.

Dmowski continues to enjoy constant popularity among radical nationalists, as well as other right-wing parties. In the immediate postwar period, his geopolitical idea of Polish-Russian peaceful coexistence and immanent hostility between Poles and Germans neatly corresponded to the official communist propaganda, especially concerning the newly included western areas of Poland that belonged to Germany before 1939. From the late 1940s and early 1950s onwards, however, Dmowski and his intellectual heirs came under severe criticism. Although the communist leadership borrowed significantly from their political agenda, it condemned the authors of modern Polish nationalism. Since 1989 and especially in the last decade, Dmowski has been officially recognized as the founding father of Polish modern right-wing politics. Yet certain aspects of his legacy, like his strong racist anti-Semitism and his hostility toward the Ukrainian national movement, are not publicly discussed. One of the striking characteristics of the recent past remains the astonishing symbolic redefinition of the two leading personalities of early 20th-century Polish politics: Dmowski and Piłsudski. Despite elementary differences in ideological and political practice, both are sources of inspiration for the current Polish radical right, which borrows intellectually from Dmowski but honors the strong, authoritarian personality of Piłsudski.

MG

Thoughts of a modern Pole

As the source of the state's legislative power is transferred from the monarch to the nation that rules through its representatives, as, in the course of educational progress, all members of society become participants in the country's cultural and political life, and as the organic unity and interdependence between social groups and individuals who form the nation is strengthened in the process of economic and social development, the entirety of public interest finds its locus in the nation: this independent social organization which is the source of political and civilizational institutions, the origin of lifestyles, the decisive voice in matters of the material and moral well-being of individuals. Hence, the idea of patriotism which used to rely on pseudo-

philosophical affection for the land, its natural environment, and on loyalty towards the king and state organization, in its modern form denotes one's attachment to his society, culture, spirit and tradition, one's involvement in society's affairs regardless of political orientation, or even of territory. [...]

The subject of this patriotism, or, to be precise, of this nationalism is not some set of liberties, referred to in the past as the homeland, but the nation itself, that is, a living social organism whose spiritual distinctiveness and culture are built on historical and racial grounds, and whose insistence on national language, culture, and tradition finds its source in the urge to be one and united as a nation. The role of the nation does not end with the moment of its independence—this moment is only a stage in the ongoing process of labor and battle, which all the time requires new tools and new weapons. The role of an individual is not limited to fighting for freedom—his main objective becomes to widen the domain of national life, multiply its material and spiritual assets, and win for it the highest possible place in the ranks of nations. [...]

Modern patriotism not only obliges one to adopt a definite standpoint against annexing governments, against the nation's oppressors, but also imposes the duty of protecting national welfare from those who assault it. This patriotism stands in strong opposition to all Russian or Lithuanian claims, resists the Jews' de-centralization attempts, [and] remains hostile towards all trends which privilege class, caste, or religious interests above those of the nation. At the same time, this patriotism must find its expression in creative work, which will increase the value of the nation in all spheres of life. Especially, it must be expressed in the work which, by engaging the previous politically uninvolved groups in active participation in the nation's life, is aimed at gaining new national powers; in the work which focuses on raising the economic and cultural value and productivity of the nation, on enhancing the nation's intellectual potential, advancing its moral level, etc. As such, patriotism introduces a new ethic, the ethic of citizenship, and it nips in the bud all pseudo-ethical tendencies that negate the evil without producing any good, that excel in idleness, and that practice lax morality against distant, foreign nations while acting immorally towards their own, etc.

As this modern form of patriotism, or rather, nationalism is gaining in strength, more and more voices of protest against it can be heard from various sides.

The patriots and the democrats—attached to the idea that a national struggle is a struggle for freedom and that the Polish cause is a cause of the oppressed, or even, of all nations—admit the necessity of struggle with the foreign, annexing governments, but cannot accept that a national cause may in-

volve using physical force against foreign nations, or forcing them to act against their will. [...]

Our society, even in its most noble, enlightened part, hosts more cosmopolitans that we would have thought. This is a result of the low level of our society's socialization, which, due to certain social changes, has only recently gained momentum, yet only in its lowest parts; this is a result of society's atomization, where the sense of citizenship has deteriorated in the leading social groups due to the lack of political life in the country's major districts under Russian rule, and the absence of the national idea from the political thought of the remaining two districts. Finally, it is a result of massive corruption of our intellectual life by alien elements, especially Jewish, and of their influence on the cities' intellectual circles. Many of the cosmopolitans call themselves patriots, thinking that to become a patriot, one only needs to feel oppressed and hostile towards any forms of imprisonment. [...] To all cosmopolitans, whatever their name and orientation, nationalism is a deplorable idea. Their survival instinct, which has nothing to do with the instinct of national survival, rebels against an ideology that imposes obligations, not towards an abstract entity, but towards a living organism. [...]

Nationalism finds an organized and active opponent in the socialist movement. One is a socialist when one opposes injustice and enslavement, and cherishes aspirations for an independent political state, especially in a form of a "people's republic." However, he cannot go any further than this—he is not allowed to accept the cultural, economic and political antagonisms between nations, to speak of the spiritual distinctiveness and internal integrity of a nation, or of its joint efforts—for what would such declarations mean for the doctrine of international proletarian solidarity or for the superiority of class antagonisms versus all others? [...] Therefore, among all tendencies of social thought, socialists find modern nationalism the most detestable of all; they are worried by its development, and try to present it as a deviation from the route of progress, as a standpoint that is morally reactionary. [...]

The progress of a society is achieved as a result of constant, change-generating efforts, while the progress of humanity is encouraged by competition between nations, their constant battle being interrupted only for new weapons to be delivered. As the ancients used to say, war is the foundation of life. Nations that have stopped fighting undergo moral decay and disintegrate.

Here emerge, therefore, two opposing mentalities, and two mutually exclusive social ideals, which stem from them: on the one hand, the passive mentality; on the other, the active one. On the one hand, the dream of a blissful society, where one will be able to experience freedom and various earthly

goods, while on the other hand, a struggle to achieve the widest possible field for action and conditions which will enable the nation to develop its powers and potentials, to utilize its resources in labor towards progress, towards enriching the collective individuality, and in fighting against all who stand in its way. The first option gives birth to programs that are static, and focus only on what can be possessed, the second option produces dynamic ones, concentrating on what can be done.

This call for action, this lack of fear or disgust for constant efforts and battling, as well as this programmatic dynamism are the main traits of today's national movement. [...] The entire political course of Polish democracy up to this day was faulty; its liberal politics was partly a result of foreign influence, hardly dictated by the country's needs, and partly a heritage of political deviations that plagued this country's history.

We need not have adopted the European democratic perspective on the ideas of the nation and state, because our country's location and social character are entirely different. [...] Our political atypicality manifested itself in: 1) the absence of elemental forces capable of participating in political life outside the gentry; 2) the specific status of the gentry, who used to have an exclusive right to power, and unchallenged by political competition, has rotten politically and lost the sense of national interest. While the elemental forces elsewhere, being the apprentices of the absolutist school, learned to elevate matters of the state above their own, our gentry was extremely liberal in its politics, opposed itself to the state, guarded its liberties, and defended (eventually without obstacles) their interests against those of the state. Since there was no national elemental force, which could counterbalance the liberalism of the gentry, and which could protect the state from it, Poland began to suffer from the lack of political equilibrium, so indispensable for the country's proper development, and was eventually led into collapse.

The programs of those who wanted to rebuild the Republic should have been based on knowledge about the causes of its collapse. Hence, the morally healthy and intellectually independent generation—brought up in the atmosphere of national renaissance of the second half of the 18th century and still remembering the last moments of the Polish state, focusing their minds on the land and not letting them be lost in the mist of abstract doctrines—instantly chose the right direction. The May Constitution¹ was an expression

¹ The "Constitution of 3 May" was adopted by the Polish Parliament (*Sejm*) in 1791. It introduced liberal ideas to the feudal political system of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (i.e., it equalized the rights of townsmen with those of

of two fundamental tendencies of a truly Polish patriotic reformatory camp. The first was to extend political rights and call into being new forces, and therefore to change the camp's character into a democratic one. The second was to increase every citizen's duties towards the state, to strengthen the government, appoint a dynasty—in other words, to react to the spreading political liberalism of the gentry—and therefore to give the camp the status of a state organization, or, as we would say today, a national organization.

At the same time, there was Targowica,² a protest against the democratization of society, issued—in the name of strengthening the privileges and against strengthening of the state—in the name of civil liberties. The described antagonism was historically justified, shaped in the natural course of events; on the one hand, conservatism, expressed in the aristocracy's and gentry's political liberalism of Targowica, while on the other hand, the progressive reform movement, spirited by democracy and national feelings, and recorded in a supreme monument of the Polish legal system—the documents of the May Constitution.

It would seem therefore that this antagonism should have provided a background for the evolution of political trends in 19th-century Poland. It would seem that the national spirit, which inspired the patriots in the Great Diet, should have become stronger in the 19th-century democratic patriots, facing the total collapse of the Republic and the need to rebuild it, or actually, to build it anew. It all could have worked if our democratically patriotic movements had a sovereign and realistic program created with consideration for the needs and weaknesses of the country. Instead, however, our 19th-century democracy has become a mere department of the European democratic system, which by definition needed to strongly advocate political liberalism, in order to fight the tradition of absolutism. And so, although reality presented our democrats with the task of battling the tradition of anarchy, and the liberalism of the gentry, and of inducing in citizens the ability to surrender their needs, plans and interests to the national cause—without which it is impossible to create a self-sustaining state organization, especially in conditions as severe as those in Poland—they chose the opposite direction and, while fighting for the country's sovereignty, carried in their hearts anti-state ideals, fed on the liberalism of European democracy. [...]

gentry). Due to the war against Russia in 1792 and the subsequent partitions (1793 and again in 1795), it was never put into practice. Nevertheless, the Constitution remained a symbolic asset of the Polish national movement throughout the 19th century.

² See vol. 1, pp. 286–289.

In this context, the appearance on our social stage of a new political movement today—which forms a democratic-national party, works to raise the educational level of the masses and to bring about in the nation's soul elements necessary for the rebirth of the Polish state—this appearance should be considered as especially significant; it returns us to the tradition of the May Constitution and throws the country back on the track of proper evolution of political thought. The rapid development of this political movement should be seen as a consequence of more profound transformations within the society, the rise of new social forces, which are morally fit and instinctively sense the deepest needs of the nation.

This is the political spirit of the new movement, a movement powered by the awakening sense of strong national ties in the Poland of today, supported by the emerging active element in Polish mentality. [...]

Translated by Zuzanna Ładyga

NICOLAE IORGA: ON NATIONAL CULTURE

Title: *O nouă epocă de cultură* (A new epoch of culture) and *Cultura națională și surogatele ei* (National culture and its surrogates)

Originally published: in the journal *Sămănătorul* 2 (1903), 20, pp. 309–312 and *Sămănătorul* 2 (1903), 22, pp.337–339.

Language: Romanian

The excerpts used are from Nicolae Iorga, *O luptă literară* (Bucharest: Minerva, 1978), pp. 7–10, 12–14.

About the author

Nicolae Iorga [1871, Botoșani – 1940, near Ploiești]: historian, politician, and university professor. The son of a lawyer, Iorga began his education in his native town of Botoșani. In 1878, he enrolled in primary school, followed by the Lycée Laurian in 1881. In September 1888, Iorga entered the University of Iași, proving to be a prodigious student (he completed his studies in one year). In 1890, he became a professor of Latin at a high school in Ploiești. In the same year, he traveled to Western Europe (Italy and France). In Paris, Iorga began working on his doctorate in classical philology, and although he won a fellowship, he decided to study history instead. In 1892, Iorga received the title of *certified scholar*, but not his doctorate. Meanwhile, he also registered as a doctoral student at the University of Berlin and at the University of Leipzig. At the latter, Iorga studied with Adolf Birch-Hirschfeld and Karl Lamprecht, obtaining his doctorate in 1893. In 1894, Iorga returned to Romania and occupied the chair of world history at the University of Bucharest. Early in the 1900s, he began to contribute to conservative and nationalist publications. After a very short period, however, he came into conflict with the Conservative Party's ideologues and moved to the newly founded journal *Sămănătorul* (The Sower). In 1906, Iorga founded his own journal, *Neamul Românesc* (Romanian People), where he published most of his nationalist articles. In 1910, Iorga and the anti-Semitic politician A.C. Cuza co-founded the Nationalist Democratic Party, an anti-Semitic organization with an ethno-protectionist ideology. He was also President of the Chamber of Deputies (1919 and 1920), President of the Romanian Cabinet (1931–1932) and senator and member of the Council of the Crown. In addition, Iorga devoted much of his time to teaching, both at the University of Bucharest and at his summer residence in Vălenii-de-Munte, where he organized courses on social and historical topics. In 1911, he was elected a member of the Romanian Academy. In 1913, he co-founded (with Gh. Murgoci and V. Pârvan) the Institute for Southeast European Studies and in 1937 the Institute for World History. He was an extremely prolific

scholar, publishing historical syntheses, source editions, popularizing literature as well political articles and pamphlets. He received honorary doctorates from numerous universities, such as Iași, Geneva, Lyon, Oxford, Strasbourg, and Paris. Having fallen out with the extreme right-wing Legionary movement, in 1940 supporters of the Iron Guard murdered him. Iorga's contribution to debates on Romanian national identity is a crucial one, with many of his views on Romanian culture and history serving as central points of reference.

Main works: *Opinions pernicieuses d'un mauvais patriot* (1899); *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches*, 5 vols. [The history of the Ottoman Empire] (1906–1913); *Neamul românesc în Ardeal și Țara Ungurească*, 2 vols. [The Romanian Nation in Transylvania and Hungary] (1906); *O luptă literară* [A literary fight] (1916); *La musique roumaine* (1925); *Istoria învățămîntului românesc* [The history of Romanian education] (1928); *Istoria armatei românești*, I–II [The history of the Romanian army] (1929); *Istoria literaturii contemporane*, I–II [The history of contemporary literature] (1934); *Istoria românilor*, I–X [The history of Romanians] (1936–1939).

Context

At the beginning of the 20th century, intense debates occurred in Romania between those authors who insisted on the preservation of traditional national values and those who, following a 19th-century pattern of liberal reformism, argued in favor of adopting Western cultural and political trends (see **Aurel C. Popovici**, *At the crossroads of two worlds*). **Titu Maiorescu**, the chief ideologue of the *Junimist* movement, characterized the latter tendency as producing cultural “forms without substance” (see *Against the contemporary direction in Romanian culture*). Similarly, Nicolae Iorga took a very active stance in defending national tradition against what he perceived as the devastating effects of modernity. In a series of public appearances, including organizing the boycott of foreign plays on the stage of the National Theatre in Bucharest in 1906, Iorga called for a return to traditional values, based on the cultural and political promotion of rural life. Over the next two decades, Iorga gained a wide nationalist prestige enjoyed by few other Romanian intellectuals at the time.

With encyclopedic curiosity, Iorga searched widely in the Romanian past, creating and cultivating origin narratives from which generations of nationalists extracted new ideas of national belonging and affiliation. More importantly, prior to 1918, Iorga produced an ethno-political and historical vision of territories like Transylvania, which, he argued, had to be united with Romania. The theory of historical rights and historical continuity he endorsed so persistently eventually became a dominant historiographic narrative in Romanian culture, and remained so to this day. Moreover, he endorsed the idea

of a strong monarchy as the most appropriate form of government for the Romanians. Not surprisingly, he was a supporter of King Carol II's royal dictatorship (1938–1940).

By the turn of the 20th century, Iorga also became a respectable historian, but with the foundation of the weekly review *Sămănătorul*, both his nationalist doctrine and his audience expanded. This journal was instrumental not only in lobbying for Romania's entrance into the First World War against the Central Powers, but also in shaping traditionalist ideological foundations during the interwar period. Indiscriminate imitation of foreign cultural trends and models of development, Iorga argued, ruined the Romanian national spirit. To revive Romanian cultural and political life, he advocated eliminating foreign modernity and returning to traditional cultural values. Since a nation's existence depended on the originality of its culture, the protection of this quality took on great importance, Iorga believed. In order to preserve the originality of their culture, Romanians should, he further claimed, unanimously defend those characteristics that preserved their ethnic creativity and historical permanence. In this struggle for the preservation of the national culture, Iorga imposed himself as the guardian of the Romanian nation and her traditional values.

Iorga's nationalism was intrinsically connected to a reading of the nation and culture centering on the notion that the peasant was the main bearer and transmitter of Romanian culture. Iorga believed that the regeneration of the Romanian political community could be attained through an infusion of pre-modern traditions, which were free from the corroding effects of liberal modernity and democracy. One implication of this view was that any cultural transformation of society could be judged only according to the criterion of whether it benefited or corrupted the Romanian peasantry. Another was Iorga's call for a new moral and spiritual culture that revived the nationalist ethos of the 19th century. In his distinctive way, Iorga reacted against the indiscriminate importation of Western ideas, arguing for cultural and political regeneration, while at the same time remaining a traditionalist and avoiding radical political movements. He was not an autarkist, however, and believed in the European mission of the Romanian nation.

The intellectual program outlined in "A new cultural epoch" and "National culture" challenged the cultural and political practices of an allegedly "corrupt" National Liberal establishment. In some respects, these texts also signified Iorga's departure from *Junimism* (seen as a pro-Western ideology) and the beginning of a new ethno-pedagogical project based on the return to tradition and religion. According to Iorga, the Romanian culture managed to

preserve its traditional character because it was based on a few unalterable principles: Christianity, peasantry and a shared territory. As such, traditional Romanian culture was the source, as well as the expression, of the nation's ideals regarding the past, present and future. Modern states, Iorga believed, should serve national ideals. A powerful example was provided in this sense by neighboring Hungary, which Iorga described as a patriotic nation without a national culture. Similarly, in order to have a national state, Romanians, too, needed a national culture, one devoted, essentially, to the education of the people. The themes outlined here by Iorga, including spiritual purification based on Orthodoxy, the political union of all Romanians and the establishment of a national culture, were to have an important influence on the development of Romanian nationalism during the 20th century.

During the 1930s and 1940s, Romanian nationalists were ambivalent toward Iorga's traditionalist and ethno-populist message. Highly respected for his role in the creation of Greater Romania and as a historian, he was increasingly attacked for his support of Carol II's regime and reluctance to accept the fascist transformation of Romania. Although still widely read during the interwar period, Iorga offered the new generation of nationalists neither a new ideology nor the model of a leader for which they were searching. His reputation among them, initially high, steadily declined during the 1930s. Iorga also became the target of criticism in the historical field, as members of the new generation of historians, trained in new methodologies and often also linked to the extreme right, increasingly distanced themselves from his *oeuvre*, which they described as extensive but superficial. His assassination in 1940 reflected the increased antagonism between his ideals and those of the Romanian fascists. During communism, Iorga's status as Romania's foremost historian was restored and consistently maintained, although his anti-Semitism was rarely mentioned. Recently, new scholarship has attempted to re-assess his role in shaping the emergence of Romanian nationalism during the 20th century.

MT

A new epoch of culture

Either the people are confined by the boundaries of an accomplished national state, or the state that bears its name is for them a fortress—like the Kingdom of Romania is to the Romanians—or, as it happens with the poor Polish people, the state is absent altogether, and everything has passed into the greedy hands of one or a few conquerors. In our free Romania, in the

Kingdom, we have carriages, walks, races, balls, gazettes, and symbolist poets, societies and clubs for what is called "politics"; we have magazines, many laws and model prisons. Other peoples have them, too. But they also have an ultimate ideal, a greater goal. Do we have one? Did we discover it on the horizon, and have we not lost sight of it since? Or do we not feel its absence? [...]

If you had asked someone in 1830, what was the Romanian people's goal, one that could be achieved and one which draws together all resources, they would have answered: brotherly work [...]. Let it be genuine craving for work [and] the creation of a national literature, in a clear language, easily understood by all, toward the revival of the nation. Then, the country's leaders strove toward that goal, and they were followed, because they spoke wisely and unselfishly, without thinking of fame and their transient interests—and they succeeded.

The same question would have received a different answer after ten, twenty years: we need to get rid of the yoke of foreign domination [...]; we need to create, through the work of devoted and talented masters, through many workers doing honest hard work, a great, united Romania [...]

Some proposed as a goal the extension of public liberties, and thus let passions, interests and vanities turn into total anarchy. Others thought it appropriate, in our country too, to realize the ideals of contemporary industrial socialism, whose doctrine presents the aspirations of the unjustly treated working class in towns and mines, which we do not have. On the contrary, a third category saw our happiness in the evolution of some parties that are embarrassed to work, but instead spy, clatter, sling mud at each other, marring in the mind of onlookers the fundamental ideas of morality, and holding back the powers of the people instead of letting them unfold more fully. There were yet others who stated that our calling was to achieve wealth, a lot of wealth, American, Carthaginian, modern-Jewish, Babylonian wealth for the boyars of all kinds, and for all the windbags on earth craving for profits: "foreign capital," please. There finally came the idealists, who believed they could get Transylvania—something big, abstract, the place where "our brothers from across" are [...]*—that they could pin Transylvania on the top of a tricolor parade flag, during a noisy march down the streets crowded with curious onlookers shouting because they do not understand what is going on...*

Misguided opinions, baits, whims and trifle! We have enough liberties: all we need to do is to transform them into traditions. In our case, socialism needs to be replaced by just politics, by penitence and good support of the

elderly in the village without resources and without culture, who carry [on their shoulders] the burden of our laziness and proud futility. [...]

This is how things are, and they cannot last like this because if they do all we have will be scattered in the wind. We need culture for everybody, from the bottom to the top, from one frontier of the Romanian nation to the other; a culture that is ours; we need books that can make both the rich lady and the village woman weep, books snatched by impatient hands in all the corners of the land where this language is spoken. May the nonsensical foreign babbling of the cosmopolitan salons stop, for the maintenance of which bloody sweat flows in the fields cultivated with hard work! Away with the books of feigned feelings and corruption that the West uses to poison ignorant countries! Away with unfounded emulation!

A new epoch of culture must begin for us. It must, or we will die! And it is a pity—for long rows of honest ancestors are behind us, and we do not have the right to estrange our children!

National culture and its surrogates

The words “national culture” have the power to frighten many people. Some see in them some sort of personal offence, an unpleasant memory of a recent trans-Danubian or extra-European origin, and out of a feeling of piety toward their parents and other ancestors, rebel against a formula that, for a while, had been completely out of use. Of course these interesting neophytes of festive and budgetary Romanianism will not be able to trace their ancestors down to Cleon the Athenian,¹ or Asparukh the Bulgarian,² or the patriarchs of the twelve tribes, but they will mention, with the seriousness that so befits young and old alike, the axiom established a long time ago, by superior people in the country and abroad, that literature (whether poetry, novel, or short story: this is literature for the sublime lovers of the Beautiful, with capital letters), that literature is therefore art, that art is international, intersecular, one removed from the despicable notions of the relative, that is the concrete and the real, into which however the penetrating roots of life continue to dig, the deeper, the better and more enduring. [...]

But there are people who [...] look with enmity and worry at any attempt to create a Romanian literature, art and culture. [...] For them, national literature is connected with the patriotism of a Herod, who is dying in front of our

¹ Cleon (d. 422 BC): Athenian statesman during the Peloponnesian war.

² Bulgarian ruler of the 7th century, founder of the First Bulgarian Empire.

eyes in his patched clothes of a charlatan, uttering melodramatic curses. You know: the historical drama in which important figures of the past are played by actors who have neither culture nor an understanding thereof, who sing or shout in spells of fake passion, the expression of light thought; the national paintings, in which the same figures are represented in the warrior's posture of wooden soldiers when noble feelings are borne in their rounded chests, painted in dark blue; the patriotic conferences in which the apostles, with love for the nation, scratch and fry their vocal cords [...]

Royal defilers, painting denigrators, [and] yelling dervishes in conferences—they represent something else, a phenomenon that can be more genuine, more moderate, which can bring light and beautiful works. It is the *patriotic* movement, which produces patriotic literature and culture.

There is a nation in Europe who possesses a rich patriotic literature, by comparison the richest: the Hungarian people. For over half a century, the Hungarians have lived a feverish life under the spell of patriotic monomania, and all they write, all they do, aims, first of all, to show that on the territory of the Kingdom called “Magyarország” there live people who love their country of origin above all else. But the Hungarians do not have, for that matter, a national culture: all they have written, painted, sung and sculpted to this day echoes German art and literature, or European literature and art in general. The words are national; the foundation is borrowed: sentimentality remains, despite all the changes of apparel and foreign names. This is a culture that can be established very rapidly; and among its champions, any person who can buy his place from the Hungarian rulers, any denier of his blood can find his place. It is a utilitarian culture, a political weapon. [...]

However, when a people realizes that life throbs in millions of hearts, what enlightens millions of minds does not look like the life of other nations, and it is worth keeping for the perfection and harmony of the world, for it requires particular forms to be stable, be recognized and admired—when, after a lot of patient research and powerful impulses, these forms are identified, and when the undefended individuality of each writer or artist unfolds from this deep and broad fundament of his race, aware of his features—then *national culture* comes to life. This mirror of the complete nature of our nation we have not yet had, and, in the present times, its establishment would provide the *legitimization* of our existence, the right to live differently from other, larger states and more powerful nations.

Translated by Mária Kovács

AUREL C. POPOVICI: AT THE CROSSROADS OF TWO WORLDS

Title: *La răscrucea a două lumi* (At the crossroads of two worlds)

Originally published: In the journal *Sămănătorul* (1908), subsequently republished in Aurel C. Popovici's *Naționalism sau democrație. O critică a civilizațiunii moderne* (Bucharest: Minerva, 1910)

Language: Romanian

The excerpts used are from Aurel C. Popovici, *Naționalism sau democrație. O critică a civilizațiunii moderne* (Bucharest: Albatros, 1997), pp. 165–168, 170.

About the author

Aurel Constantin Popovici [1863, Lugoj (*Hun.* Lugos), Banat region – 1917, Geneva]: politician and political theorist. He was the son of an artisan. After completing his primary and secondary education, he studied at the Hungarian Gymnasium (1873–1880) in Lugoj, and then at the Romanian Lyceum in Beiuș (*Hun.* Belényes) (1880–1884). In 1885, he enrolled at the University of Vienna to study medicine and philosophy, but later transferred to the University of Graz. In 1891, he became one of the leaders of the Romanian National Party in Hungary and one of the editors of the most important Romanian journal in Transylvania, *Tribuna*. In 1893, after the publication of *Replika* (Rejoinder), which criticized the Hungarian government for its repressive stance towards the national demands of the Romanians living in the country, Popovici moved to Austria, then to Italy and, finally, to Romania. In 1899, Popovici founded the journal *Romania Jună* (Young Romania) in Bucharest. In 1906, he published his most important book, *Die Vereinigten Staaten von Groß-Österreich* (The United States of Greater Austria), a book that was associated with the “Greater Austria” movement and with the political circle cultivated by the heir to the throne, Francis Ferdinand (1863–1914). Between 1908 and 1909, he was the editor-in-chief, and director, of one of the most important Romanian journals in Bucharest, *Sămănătorul* (The Sower), and gravitated politically around the Conservative Party. During this period he published conservative and nationalist articles in which he criticized European modernity, democracy and cosmopolitanism. Popovici also taught at the military school “Mănăstirea Dealu”—a place described by Corneliu Zelea Codreanu (one of the pupils between 1912 and 1916) as essential in his formation as a Romanian nationalist. In 1912, Popovici settled in Vienna. In 1916, after Romania’s entry into the First World War, he moved to Geneva, where he died in 1917. His last contribution to the history of Transylvanian Romanian nationalism, *Le question Roumaine en Transylvanie et en Hongrie*, appeared posthumously. Pop-

ovici's 1906 book on federalism was first translated into Romanian during the inter-war period by the Romanian legal theorist Petre Pandrea (1908–1968), who also attempted to integrate his ideas within the general Central European context. At the same time, Popovici's nationalist ideas were revived by radical conservative and legionary ideologues. However, it was only in the 1980s that Popovici was subjected to scholarly analysis, followed by new historiographic assessments during the 1990s.

Main works: *Principiul de naționalitate* [The principle of nationality] (1894); *Cestiunea naționalităților și modurile soluțiunii sale în Ungaria* [The nationalities question and its solution in Hungary] (1894); *Die Vereinigten Staaten von Groß-Österreich. Politischen Studien zur Lösung der nationalen Fragen und Staatsrechtlichen Krisen in Österreich-Ungarn* [The United States of Greater Austria. Political studies on the solution of the national questions and legal crises in Austria-Hungary] (1906); *Naționalism sau democrație. O critică a civilizațiunii moderne* [Nationalism or democracy. A critique of modern civilization] (1910); *Le Question Roumaine en Transylvanie et en Hongrie* (1918).

Context

Debates on a shared national identity for all Romanians increased around 1900, mostly due to a series of political and cultural activities, including the establishment of the *League for the Cultural Unity of all Romanians* in Bucharest in 1891, and the so-called “Memorandum” trial of the Transylvanian Romanian leaders in Kolozsvár (Cluj) in 1894. Politicians in the Kingdom of Romania often used the difficult cultural conditions under which Romanians from the neighboring Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires lived to increase popular awareness and mobilize public support for nationalist and irredentist activities. Moreover, in Hungary the government increased its political control over the national minorities’ political organizations—as illustrated by the Minister of the Interior, Károly Hieronymi’s decision to dissolve the Romanian National Party in 1894. This political climate prompted a number of prominent Transylvanian Romanian intellectuals to emigrate to Romania, where they became actively involved in Bucharest’s cultural and political life. Most of these Transylvanian émigrés fully engaged with the Romanian political culture, which at the beginning of the 20th century was characterized by debates on the meanings of national culture and what and who constituted the Romanian nation (see **Nicolae Iorga**, *On national culture* and *National culture and its surrogates*).

These arguments informed another, more wide-ranging discussion, namely the impact of modernity on Romanian society. Authors identifying themselves as supporters of “true” Romanian ethnic values opposed liberal ideas of modernization, urbanization and progress, arguing that the Romanian na-

tional community must be saved from the corroding effects of Western modernity. National culture thus perceived was linked to rural communities, indigenous traditions and Orthodoxy.

Such debates were not confined to Romania, as references to the regenerative power of the village and to national leaders “sowing” new values among the young generations are typical examples of a Europe-wide phenomenon that extolled the countryside as a source of ethnic renewal. At the onset of the 20th century, the conviction that urban and modern democracy constituted a danger to Romanian political and national survival was one that its supporters were able to convey to a broad public. Aurel C. Popovici was one such author. He popularized his ideas through articles published in conservative and nationalist journals in Bucharest, including *România Jună*, *Epoca* and *Sămănătorul*, and which he re-published in 1910 in a volume entitled *Naționalism și democrație*. According to Popovici, “democracy” and “cosmopolitanism” had their origins in the post-1789 attempt to create a new, modern world. He saw both movements as undermining the efforts to create a unified Romanian culture. Popovici combined **Mihai Eminescu**’s ideas of an organic Romanian society with A.C. Cuza’s anti-Semitism and H.S. Chamberlain’s racial Darwinism in order to advance his own nationalist critique of modernity. He defined it as a reaction against the anarchy and cultural decay allegedly resulting from the radical transformation of traditional Romanian institutions, social structures, and belief systems under the impact of Western cosmopolitan liberalism.

This insistence on organic values, peasant ethnic purity and the antinomy between rural (ethnically Romanian) and urban (foreign) elites was combined with rejection of the heritage of the Enlightenment tradition. Popovici described Romanian peasant culture in terms of its ability to preserve national traditions and, following Edmund Burke, argued that the French Revolution had destroyed the cultural traditions and organic linkages between people—those relations that represented the real sense of duty and responsibility through which individuals created and maintained their national community. On the other hand, the French Revolution favored the emergence of modern democracy, and Popovici revolted against the idea that the nation should be subservient to rationalism and universalism, promoted by civic liberalism and egalitarianism. Instead, he offered a new nationalist framework that integrated elements from religion, rural tradition, racism and Social Darwinism.

Echoing Ferdinand Tönnies, Popovici also exalted the national community as the fundamentally organic form of social life, providing “natural links” among its members. By contrast, modern society was composed of individuals joined

together by what he called “superficial relationships.” Like other Romanian conservatives and nationalists at the time, Popovici positioned himself against the liberal generation of the 1848 Revolution, a generation generally described as pro-Western. Popovici—and others animated by “reactionary political conceptions,” including Joseph de Maistre, Bismarck, Cavour, Burke, H.S. Chamberlain, Wilhelm II and Eminescu—militated against the achievements of the 1848 Revolution, especially the involvement of the masses in politics.

What was needed, Popovici argued, was to maintain the racial homogeneity of the Romanian national community, but also an enlarged Romanian state. At the beginning of the 20th century, Romanian nationalists were engaged in a process of territorial expansion, one that culminated in the creation of Greater Romania in 1918. Within this political process, the ethnic Romanian nation was defined in opposition to other nations and states, especially those ruling the so-called “unredeemed territories.” Popovici’s ethnic theories of national identity reflected the historical importance of territorial expansion, advocating a system of national identification within which the nexus between race and nation was paramount. He endowed the nation with a noble genealogy (Romanians as descendants of the Roman legionaries brought to Dacia by Emperor Trajan), and assigned it a natural territory and a specific racial history. Racial miscegenation, particularly between Romanians and Jews, which according to Popovici was widespread in urban areas, was viewed as a source of national degeneration.

Popovici had a significant role in shaping nationalist discourses during the interwar period, as illustrated by the importance given to his racial theories and conservative critiques of European modernity in the 1930s. In addition to providing new interpretations of his federalist plan and his role in the Romanian national movement in Austria-Hungary, recent scholarship has also attempted to contextualize his ideas of race, ethnicity and nationalism within the wider crisis of liberal democracy in Romania during the first decades of the twentieth century and the ascendance of the Romanian legionary movement after the First World War.

MT

At the crossroads of two worlds

There are many countries in which the word “*nation*” has long become ridiculous; in which serious people do not even say it anymore. Can there be anything more unnatural? But what has made it ridiculous? First, and almost exclusively, *radical democracy*. It ridiculed it because it falsified its mean-

ing; it exploited it in order to cover up and justify vulgar individualist-materialistic pretensions, [and] politico-fantastic conceptions—with the supreme ideal of a people; it has thus reduced truly sacred aspirations to a corrupt and corrupting “politicking.” But nationalism is, in fact, identical to truly patriotic and wise politics. This is the reason why statesmen who combat not only democracy, but sometimes even nationalism (in fact, only nationalist bravado), happen to be more nationalist in politics than their noisy and worthless adversaries, than many marketplace nationalists who frequently are the misfortune of a country, of a nation.

In ethnically homogeneous states, nationalism is at war with radical democracy, because true nationalism does not sacrifice, as democracy would like it to, *the ideal part of politics* for the sake of ephemeral materialistic interests. Nationalism demands respect for a specific individuality, for personal morality, for the character of the country and, therefore, implicitly of the people, as it has been handed down to us for centuries. To this end, nationalism requires conservation and an orderly freedom for the people to develop. I say *freedom*, and not anarchy. [...] National or patriotic politics guards itself from abstract theories, from general and symmetric doctrines. It does not model itself upon the “evolutions” of democracy in “mankind,” but follows the *real* needs of the people, because they do not compromise its future. National politics does not use universal remedies, at one time “liberalism,” at another “democratism” or “collectivism,” but *practical means*, demanded by the condition of the people, and not by the rigors of fantastic deductions.

In certain countries and circumstances, national politics applies certain liberties, to a certain extent sober liberties: “*that sober freedom*,” as Tennyson¹ called it, but not “the rights of man,” “*innate rights*” or “*integral theories*.” The proof that it is so is that in many countries liberalism has been forced to add the adjective “national” [to its name]. Unfortunately, however, a simple adjective is not sufficient to grant a country national freedom: I mean the *freedom correlated to the country’s history until the present day, her current degree of culture*. From this point of view, each country needs a liberal-national party alongside a conservative one, which is implicitly either profoundly national—more national than the liberal one—or otherwise pointless. And, in fact, this is the way these parties developed until democratic radicalism interfered and altered them, dragging them increasingly *from homeland to “mankind,” and to cosmopolitanism and anarchy*.

¹ Alfred Tennyson (1809–1892): Victorian poet and playwright.

Lately, democratism has also been displaying a tricolor label, here and there. But it serves no good. It only shows that such democrats have national feelings, but they are not aware of the use and danger of their doctrine. A national liberalism, in other words, adapted to the specific realities of a country, transformed into a special doctrine, accepted in a certain country, is a necessity, and therefore a fecund doctrine. It is perfectly compatible with the *monarchy* and *the aristocracy of the country*, with the entirety of its historical development. It can live in perfect harmony with conservative political elements, with the conservative party in the country. Radical democracy cannot be national, because it is egalitarian and interventionist. [...]

Nationalism does not require, and it is in no way compelled to require, that “the people should govern itself.” It asks for an organization of the state, for a form of government through which the people can participate in politics, but only those of them who can participate in a *nationalist* politics.

Nationalism demands reforms. Indeed, but in permanent compliance with the *national* past, not with the “evolutionary needs of mankind.” Reforms related to national growth, with current *national* needs. I keep repeating *national*, because only lunatics can imagine that they could be doing “*national*” politics blindly imitating—like enslaved souls—nonsensical things from all over the world, everything that shines in “*mankind*.” They are mesmerized by “planetary progress,” as the Negroes of Congo get drunk on European vitriol, as the uncultivated indigenous peoples of America were mesmerized by the colored glass beads given by Portuguese and Spanish *conquistadors*, paying for them with gold and the wealth of their country, even with their life. Nationalism is natural politics because it is a politics corresponding to the nature of the nation. [...]

Natural, national politics is the only one that is beneficial for the nation. It gives the state what the state needs, and it gives the nation what the nation needs, according to *place*, *time* and *conditions*. [National politics] does not follow integral doctrines. It allows the citizens the possibility of progress—under a crafty, fair and honest rule—encouraging them to compete among themselves (not chained to the carriage of egalitarianism and utopian individualism); it gives a people the possibility to become (always under the guidance of its most revered sons) *a nation*; it [then] gives that nation the possibility to measure itself against other races, peoples and nations in terms of culture and power.

Translated by Mária Kovács

VLADIMIR ČERINA: IN THE CITY OF CYNICS

Title: *U gradu cinika* (In the city of cynics)

Originally published: *Vihor* 1, 1 (March 1914), pp. 1–4.

Language: Croatian

The excerpt used is from the original.

About the author

Vladimir Čerina [1891, Split – 1932, Šibenik]: writer and political activist. He received his secondary education in Split, Zagreb and Rijeka (Fiume), but never graduated. In the 1910s, Čerina worked as a free-lance journalist and writer, and became one of the founders of *Nacionalistička omladina* [Nationalist Youth], a group of young Croatian and Serbian intellectuals, advocating an anti-liberal, revolutionary strategy for the creation of an integral Yugoslav nation. In 1912, he was one of the organizers of an assassination attempt on the Croatian ban (governor), Slavko Cuvaj. During the Balkan Wars, he worked as a newspaper correspondent in Belgrade. After the outbreak of First World War, Čerina escaped to Italy, where he established close connections with Italian avant-garde artists, especially the futurists. By the end of the war, he became mentally ill, and did not play any role in the postwar political and cultural life of the newly established South Slav state. He died in 1932 in a lunatic asylum in Šibenik. In the Croatian national canon, Vladimir Čerina is rather marginalized. In a literary sense, he is considered a minor representative of the turn-of-the-century Croatian literary avant-garde, whose leaders were Tin Ujević (1891–1955) and **Miroslav Krleža** (1893–1982). Politically, however, he is regarded as the most vehement supporter of Yugoslav integral nationalism, generally considered to be the earliest manifestation of fascist ideology in Croatia.

Main works: *Raspeće* [Crucifixion] (1912); *Beograd bez maske* [Belgrade unmasked] (1912); *Janko Polić Kamov* (1913); *Pjesme, proza, članci, eseji i zapisi* [Poems, prose, articles, essays, and notes] (1977).

Context

The German *Drang nach Osten*, the Hungarian political and economic expansion, and the accession to the Serbian throne of the pro-Yugoslav and pro-Russian Karađorđević dynasty following the downfall of the pro-

Austrian Obrenović house (1903) have all impacted early 20th-century Croatian politics. While the previous decades had been dominated by the anti-dualist and anti-Yugoslav project for Croatian political autonomy advocated by the *Stranka prava* [Party of the State Right], the emergence of the so-called *Napredna Omladina* [Progressive Youth], a turn-of-the-century group of Croatian and Serbian students in Prague who, inspired by **Tomáš Masaryk**, launched the idea of a Croat-Serbian unity, which changed the political situation. The Youth became the backbone of the subsequent *Hrvatsko-Srpska koalicija* (HSK) [Croat-Serbian Coalition], founded in 1906, which opposed official Austro-Hungarian dualist politics. However, by the early 1910s, the HSK ended up forming a coalition with the Hungarian government (see **Franjo Supilo**, *The Memorandum to Sir Edward Grey, January 7, 1915*). The new generation of young intellectuals revolted against the HSK and established their own *Nacionalistička omladina* [Nationalist Youth].

Disappointed with HSK's parliamentary politics and inspired by turn-of-the-century ideas of racial nationalism, the Nationalist Youth offered a revolutionary discourse of integral Yugoslavism. The Youth found inspiration in **Jovan Skerlić**'s political theory of Serbian and Croatian ethnic similarity as well as in his literary theory, which stressed the socio-national function of literature as the expression of the "authentic needs of the folk." Moreover, the Youth's idea of Yugoslavism reflected **Jovan Cvijić**'s anthropogeographical theory of the psychological types of the inhabitants of the Balkan Peninsula. In his theory, Cvijić described heroism and national idealism as dominant characteristics of the South Slavs, most of whom were Serbs (hence the expression "racial Dinarism," named after the central Dinaric mountain area). The predominantly Croat population of the Pannonian plains was labeled decadent due to lasting foreign (German-Hungarian) rule. Against this backdrop, the Youth developed the notion of purging the Austro-Hungarian South Slavs (mostly Croats but also Slovenes) of decadent alien influences—Hungarian, Italian, and German—and creating a Yugoslav nation based on the alleged Serbian heroic mentality. Serbian "racial Dinarism" found its aesthetic expression in the sculptures of the famous Croatian sculptor Ivan Meštrović, which represented mythical characters of the Serb folk heritage, especially the Kosovo myth (see **Iliarion Ruvarac**, *On Prince Lazar*). Inspired by Italian radical intellectuals searching for national regeneration, the Youth envisioned an integral national revolution by way of "nationalizing the masses," which meant two things: the elimination of foreign, mostly Western, corrupting influences, and a more inclusive national politics through democratization of the political system. Both actions had to be un-

dertaken by the nationally conscious elite (they called themselves “civilized barbarians”) as representatives of the future Yugoslav society. However, the Nationalist Youth had no consistent political program: while the group around Čerina emphasized the aesthetic cult of the nation, the left wing, led by **August Cesarec**, gave priority to the social emancipation of the masses. On the eve of the First World War, the Nationalist Youth included a number of intellectuals and politicians who subsequently became famous, such as Tin Ujević (1891–1955) and Ivo Andrić (1892–1975), and prominent communists such as Cesarec. After 1920, some Youth members joined the socialist or the fascist movements, while others retreated from politics and devoted themselves to artistic work.

The article “In the city of cynics” represents one of the most radical expressions of the Youth ideology. It was published on the eve of the First World War, when the popularity of the Serbian anti-Austro-Hungarian and pro-Yugoslav politics reached its peak. Written as a radical protest against Croatia’s alleged “bourgeois decadency” as embodied in its capital, Zagreb, the article tried to challenge the HSK’s politics. Čerina considered the prevalence of German and Hungarian culture in contemporary Croatia, and especially the servility of the Croatian political class towards the ruling Hungarians, as expressions of a decaying national spirit—a long-standing political trope in Croatian literature since the mid-19th century. Similarly, the opposition between the “decadent” city and the “healthy” countryside was also developed in late 19th-century Croatian literature, especially by the young writers connected to *Stranka prava*.

In a radical way, the text associates eradicating Croatian decadence with the mass slaughter of Zagreb’s inhabitants and the destruction of the city’s architecture. This attitude originates with futurism and its concept of erecting an entirely new national community, based on the worship of progress and disdain for bourgeois society, which strongly influenced Čerina. The remark about the national health of the Croatian sea coast region of Dalmatia, in opposition to central Croatia and its capital Zagreb, reflects Cvijić’s theory that depicted much of the Dalmatian population as embodying the characteristics of “racial Dinarism”—characteristics that were historically expressed in the tradition of *hajduci* [popular brigands] and *uskoci* [medieval maritime pirates]. Moreover, since Dalmatia (where most of the Youth leaders came from), similar to other parts of the Croatian seaside, became part of the Habsburg monarchy only in the early 19th century, it was perceived to be less corrupted by German and Hungarian influences than central Croatia. Finally, Čerina’s emphasis on the ethnic similarity between Croats and Serbs echoed

similar ideas put forward by Skerlić and Milan Marjanović (see **Antun Gustav Matoš**, *Art and nationalism*). To this end, Skerlić and Marjanović re-interpreted Vuk Karadžić's Greater-Serbian and Ante Starčević's Greater-Croatian national projects as having pursued South Slav unity, followed by the argument that both Karadžić and Starčević had proposed a single South Slav political unit. For Čerina, the symbolic turning point that had triggered the process of South Slav unification was the first Balkan War in 1912, when Serbia seized Kosovo, the mythical cradle of Serb nationhood and statehood (that is why Čerina uses expressions such as "pre-Kosovar, Kosovar and post-Kosovar nationalist workers"). On the nature of this new state, however, the Youth expressed a certain ambiguity, which becomes visible at the end of Čerina's text. It was not always clear whether the unitary Yugoslav nation was to be created by melding the Croats and the Serbs in one nation with a new identity, or whether the creation of a unitary Yugoslavism was premised on the imposition of Serbian identity and culture on other South Slavs. Since in inter-war Yugoslavia the idea of unitary Yugoslavism was used as a tool of the Great-Serbian political idea, Croatian nationalists tended to put an equal sign between the two.

After the First World War and especially after his death, Čerina was marginalized both as a writer and as a "worker for the nation." His ideas were discussed by his contemporary fellow-writer, Miroslav Krleža, who regarded Čerina and the Nationalistic Youth as direct predecessors of various fascist movements in interwar Yugoslavia. During socialist Yugoslavia, "In the city of cynics" was not included in Čerina's complete works, probably due to its integral Yugoslav radicalism that did not fit the project of a socialist, federalist Yugoslavia.

SD

In the city of cynics

If there are eighty thousand citizens in Zagreb, fifty thousand of them should be taken to the slaughterhouse, five thousand should be drowned in Sava,¹ another five thousand should be flooded by some imaginary violent rain shower, and the great majority of the remaining twenty thousands should be sent to some moral and national purgatory. What is there, in this city, in this capital of Croatia that can enthrall us and make us happy in a manly

¹ The river that crosses the city of Zagreb.

manner? It is not the emasculated men and decorative women, but people with heart and soul, with brains, people who are willing, who are active, who fight and work, people with light-hearted and deeply positive enthusiasm, that can generally be enraptured only by a life which goes forward, forward and forward, a life which goes upward, upward and upward, and a life which grows, grows, and grows, and not by some sickly and crippled crawling and dragging along in an eternal absurdity of all colors, types and directions. Hence, we are not enthralled by the German-Hungarian culture of the beautifully arranged and decorated Zrinjevac,² nor are we happy about the pompous architecture and rich decorations of the theatre. We are not enthralled by the national art of the ruffian Baron Trenk³ and his servants. We do not rejoice under the dissenting and complaisant sword of Ban Jelačić,⁴ and we do not drink out of joy after numerous parliamentary masquerades. We are not pleased with modernist and pro-European coquetry and zigzagging of our future Croatian women from Ilica,⁵ nor are we enchanted by the dazzling bazaar-like shop windows of the fancy brands of Kraus, Weiss, Kühn, Esenthal, Schweinhorn, Kiringa, Neumann. We are not keen on blasé voices of coarse cosmopolitans and flamboyant dandies—this almost perversely perfumed and boudoir-like flower of our ambitious, self-conscious and mature youth of Zagreb. We do not bow to charlatans, we do not prostrate ourselves at the feet of the most eminent cabaret artists, nor do we get serious thoughts, much passion for or taste of a better life in greasy pastry shops. Those elegant petty trams do not make our blood rush through our veins; we are not thrilled by regular and holy pilgrimages to St Beer, and we are not enlightened by banking and stock exchange intelligentsia. We do not care for all this glamour and charm, for all this beauty of neat, clean and regular streets, squares, gardens, houses and palaces; we stamp on these soft, comfortable, velvet armchairs, armchairs, omniscient armchairs; we smack those slanted top hats off their

² Park in Zagreb's city centre.

³ Baron Franjo Trenk (Franz von der Trenck, 1711–1749). Commander of Croatian troops, which as a part of the Habsburg military took part in various wars in Europe undertaken by Maria Theresia. In the Croatian national identity-building process Trenk was canonized as a symbol of Croatian military heroism and loyalty to the dynasty.

⁴ Josip Jelačić (1801–1859). Austrian general and governor of Croatia, commander of Croatian troops who participated in cracking down on the Hungarian revolution in 1848. In the Croatian national canon, Jelačić is depicted as one of the most important 19th-century fighters for Croatian national emancipation, especially against Hungarians.

⁵ Main street in the centre of Zagreb.

heads and hit their pressed monocles; we spit at those tight white gloves and holy American or English shoes; we tear this thin, richly colored silk and smoking jackets and salon shoes, and ironed suits of the latest design, and we beat their spines with a club, those bodies that twist, swing and bow in a serpent-like manner and more obediently than the very embodiment of the grace of trendy sycophants. Let all that is too insignificant, in other words, totally irrelevant to become cultural and all that is worthless to become national in Zagreb die a dire death once and for all! In Zagreb, what is regarded as culture is only most remotely, and not principally, connected to the true culture most proximately and in a complementary manner, and what is regarded as national is, again, deemed disgraceful for humanity, human dignity, pride and honor. Because what is apparent about the honest citizens of Zagreb, is that in Zagreb unlike anywhere else, the stomach is more important than the soul, and here Mr Rabus⁶ is more popular than Tolstoy, and a promoted fool and servant of all national usurers is superior to the overwhelming fury of an oppressed and despised serf!

That our provinces, even according to *Hrvatski pokret*⁷ from 1912, are nationally superior to our capital possibly means only that our provinces have not passed through, arrived to or lived longer in Zagreb, and that the provinces have kept their distance from Zagreb, thus preserving their virgin-like purity from the tainted world. However, pursuant to the iron laws of unhindered evolution, the provinces may perish sooner or later unless the City of Cynics, owing to some unrestrained force and elements of a good and blessed accelerated and enhanced counter-revolution, becomes renovated, revived, transformed, or resurrects morally, humanely, culturally, socially and nationally. Almost everyone comes to Zagreb and everyone leaves Zagreb and there are quite a few of Uskoković's disillusioned Milan Krečić-type of people and Rolland's Jean-Christophe⁸ in our contemporary national and cultural life in general. For a number of years, many a young, fresh, optimistic and ideal provincial has come to Zagreb to get educated, with many most positive dreams in their souls; and they have left Zagreb as outcasts and

⁶ Karlo Rabus, the owner of the first factory of smoked and cured meat in Zagreb.

⁷ [Croatian Movement], the main journal of the Croatian Progressive Party (member of HSK).

⁸ Milan Krečić is the main character of a short story by Serbian writer Milutin Uskoković (1884–1915), a symbol of a talented man from the province, broken by the moral and intellectual decadence of life in Belgrade. Jean-Christophe is the main character of Romain Rolland's voluminous *Bildungsroman* (1904–1912), depicting the clash of a talented individual and a restrictive bourgeois society.

fragments of a destroyed army without Kosovo, almost always transformed, morally gone astray, racially drained, numb, tepid, feeble, with sacks of unpaid bills of exchange in portfolio, with a heart that is contaminated and dead, bringing back home to the provinces a breath of beer smoke, and a lack of interest in any walk in life, sexually and intellectually perverted, with a bon-vivant attitude, physically and psychologically impotent for anything which goes beyond tavern and saloon politics, which goes beyond temporary and meaningless pleasures of the most vulgar kind, with no higher spirit or even slightly elevated soul. We don't know how it is elsewhere, but if it were not for the sun, that beautiful, almost always clear and blue southern sky, that endless and never ever still, perpetually and continuously playful rhapsodic sea, those bora winds and karst stones, and fresh, trading, brigandish, turbulent traditions, Dalmatia, as well as Kvarner, the Croatian seaside and Rijeka, would undoubtedly be showing many more signs of this lethal infection than they are currently. But Zagreb is seriously infected and, what is more horrific, it infects everything that is not above the average or strong enough to offer resistance.

When it is necessary to stick one's chest out as a man, Zagreb crouches like a dog.

When it is necessary to revolt against everything, Zagreb does not stop complaining.

When it is necessary to thunder and thud like hundreds of whirlwinds of thousands of mutineers, Zagreb keeps quiet, feebly and senselessly, deadly and treacherously.

When it is necessary to cry in pain, hide one's face in shame, Zagreb dances, rejoices and parties shamelessly.

When it is necessary to have a nervous breakdown, to tear one's heart out and to have one's brain burst in effort and work, Zagreb completely melts away and stretches out yawning greasily and stretching sluggishly.

When it is necessary to be healthy as a horse, strong as a bull and bright as a sunny spring day, Zagreb staggers in a haze, and drinks, drinks, drinks...

Let all high positioned philistines pop their eyes out and let the very heart of the almighty hypocritical bureaucracy of Zagreb be turned upside-down and become mixed up: Zagreb is in the third stage of the national, social and cultural syphilis... This rotten town and this un-national capital of Croatia has already started to disintegrate and rot, and its worms, stench and plague are reaching the nationalist provinces, entering into our villages and affecting our people.

One nation that might have been created by Satan and not by God; one nation where pigs are fattened, bacon is made and peppers are grown; one

nation that dances to callous *csárdás*⁹ and listens to the debauched and grotesque music of musicians who are almost always drunk; one nation that speaks a language of circus accordions and automatic buffoons; one nation with very few honest Jewish people but plenty of loan sharks and parasites; one nation with banking aristocracy and capitalist nobility with bigoted national chauvinist-boors: Extra nos non est vita et si est vita non est ita¹⁰; one nation that presented itself noisily in Paris last year with a cultural performance of its fat, obese and naked female dancer, and in Rome in 1911 at the International Exhibition, with nationalism of an international industrial and commercial art; one nation that has so far contributed to culture and humankind: 0, to politics: 00, to literature: 000; one nation... the Hungarian nation, the oddest of all backward nations, uncultivated enough, not influenced by civilization, still basely carnal, salacious and voracious, prone to beer and wine, physically insatiable and morally reckless, this nation has had a centuries-long unimaginable and by all means defamatory influence on the Slavic soul of our serfs! It takes just five hours, from midnight to five in the morning, just five hours of not sleeping and being awake in Budapest to come to a devastating conclusion that certain very important moments of the life of our parliament are almost no different from the work of some beloved late midnight *éjjeli kávéház*,¹¹ and that an ever greater part of our national intelligentsia is filled with the basest of instincts of this pernicious Mongolian race and its bureaucratic-feudal-militaristic-deceitful culture and civilization! After twenty years of Khuen's¹² rule and two years of commissariat, some of the honest people and plenty of half humans that Croatia had were decimated, and now we have reached a deadlock from which we are staring into the fog and darkness, desperately seeking the peace of the fed and the blessed, so is it any wonder that Croatia exists only in dreams and idealism since it has not existed in reality for a long time?! In this city—in this city of cynics—didn't the people who lead the nation and lead the struggle for its national rights, in other words, the highest ranking men of the nation, representatives of the nation and our so-called national culture, did not these

⁹ Hungarian national dance.

¹⁰ "There is no life beyond us and even if there is, it is not like this," a saying commonly attributed to the Hungarian gentry of the early modern period.

¹¹ Night bar [in Hungarian].

¹² Károly Khuen-Héderváry (1849–1918), Hungarian pro-dualist politician, Croatian ban (governor) between 1883 and 1903. In the official Croatian historiography, his governance is interpreted as the period of the harshest Magyarization of Croatia.

men recently welcome and see off the oppressor of our people, Count Tisza,¹³ with more glamour, politeness and dignity than they did in the case of our national hero, Ivan Meštrović, two or three years before that?!

If Zagreb were what it should be: the exemplary and guiding centre for our total public national and cultural life and efforts for a better future, we would be completely redundant. However, since Zagreb, due to its unhealthy and pitiful national intelligentsia of all sorts, is a rotten, infested and distraught heart of our Serbian and Croatian people, an infested, semi-Hungarian and semi-German and not at all Serbian, i.e., Croatian place where even healthy souls die and bright brains darken, and life-giving powers wane, a place which is supposed to lead the way in performing national-cultural duties, but rather lags behind the very provinces, we, thence, feel an insatiable desire in ourselves and zest, not in breach of anything, to climb a thousand meters above this cynical city and from Sljeme¹⁴ to throw the shrapnel of our zestful Croatian souls and restless Serbian brains on the roofs of its buildings! Advance, dear friends and comrades, wherever you are and all of you, loyal, good and persistent ones, advance, brothers, in order to dispel this darkness and dissipate this suffocating fog which has enwrapped our misfortunately lost, spiritually Hungarianized, bureaucratized, charlatanic, denationalized and demoralized Zagreb! This city of cynics should appropriate the soul and brains of the City of Heroes known as Belgrade, and our nation should not be Serbianized just nominally, or even peacefully, but rather it should receive the diligence, energy, sobriety, valor, self-sacrifice, zest and dedication of the pre-Kosovar, Kosovar and post-Kosovar workers, and it should appropriate the notion of Nation not as a no-party but an all-party concept, not as being exclusive but unitary, not as being chauvinist but humane, not as being aristocratic and class-bound but democratic and racial; love for a fulfilling and comprehensive life, for a life free of all chains should be preached here more than anywhere else, where the intelligentsia is in the process of going totally bankrupt! The cultural unification of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes into a single Nation, that we shall be frequently referring to, is not some handy formula for the program of some party, nor is it a parliamentary campaign for a month or a year in order to prolong our life of perpetual demise, but rather a necessary precondition for free life, the same life in terms of culture as that of all other free Nations, a faith which moti-

¹³ István Tisza (1861–1918), Hungarian prime minister (1910–1918).

¹⁴ A hill near Zagreb, today a recreation area.

vates us even in this defunct present to move on and forces us to work for the future, an expression of self-respect before mankind and a retrieval of honor for mankind!

Translated by Iva Polak

BABANZÂDE AHMED NAİM: THE QUESTION OF NATIONALISM IN ISLAM

Title: *İslamda dava-yı kavmiyet* (The question of nationalism in Islam)

Originally published: As an article in *Sebilü'r-Reşad*, no. 293 (23 April 1914), pp. 114–128; published the same year as a book by Tevsi-i Tıbaat Matbaası, Istanbul.

Language: Ottoman Turkish

The excerpts used are from the volume *Modern Türkiye’de siyasi düşünce*, vol. 6: *İslamcılık* (Istanbul: İletişim, 2004), pp. 1081–1083.

About the author

Babanzâde Ahmed Naim [1873, Baghdad – 1934, Istanbul]: writer, teacher and translator. Born into a prominent Kurdish family from Suleimaniyyah (Northern Iraq), Babanzâde completed his primary and secondary education in Baghdad, and then moved to Istanbul to study at the prestigious Galatasaray High School. In 1894, after graduating from the *Mekteb-i Mülkiye-i Şahane* (Imperial Civil Service School), he embarked on a bureaucratic career and started working at the Translation Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He translated many works from Arabic (especially on *hadith*—the prophetic tradition) and French (works on psychology and philosophy) into Turkish, playing a significant role in formulating Ottoman Turkish terminology in modern science and philosophy. Between 1911 and 1912 he worked in the Ministry of Education, in charge of elementary and high school curricula. After working as a teacher of Arabic at the Galatasaray High School (1912–1914), he started teaching at the newly established Istanbul University (then the *Darülfünun*). He taught courses on philosophy, psychology, logic, ethics, and metaphysics, and remained in his post until 1933, when the Republican “university reform” purged the institutions of higher learning of those who were deemed to be representatives of the old regime’s educational system. He was a leading member of the conservative Islamist current during the second constitutional period, inaugurated in 1908 with the restoration of the Ottoman constitution. Moreover, he contributed regularly to the revisionist Islamist journal *Sırat-ı mustakim* (The straight path), publishing articles on a variety of topics such as Islamic law, the status of women, westernization, and nationalism. He continued publishing after 1911, when the journal, with its name changed into *Sebilü'r-Reşad* (The right way), assumed a more radical conservative tone. Highly critical of the wholesale adoption of western values and norms, Babanzâde contributed significantly to debates on the compatibility of Islam with modernity and nationalism. He is one of the founders of Islamism as a modern cultural and political movement in the Ottoman Empire. Although he was discarded

from the academic establishment by the Republican regime in the final stages of his life, Babanzâde was commissioned in 1928 by the Turkish state's Office of Religious Affairs to translate into Turkish the most trusted *hadith* collection in Sunni Islam, the *Sahih* of al-Bukhari from the eighth century. He continues to be revered by Islamist circles in Turkey, especially for his scholarly work and translations regarding the topic of the prophetic tradition.

Main works: *Sarf-ı Arabî'ye mahsus temrinat* [Exercises on Arabic grammar] (1900); *Hikmet dersleri* [Lectures on wisdom] (1912); *İslamda dava-yı kavmiyet* [The question of nationalism in Islam] (1914); *Tevfik Fikret'e dair* [On Tevfik Fikret] (1920); *Ahlak-ı İslamiyye esasları* [The fundamentals of Islamic morality] (1924); *Sahih-i Buhari muhtasarı tecrid-i sarîh tercemesi ve şerhi* [The *Sahih* of al-Bukhari—Translation and commentary] (1928).

Context

The reign of Abdülhamid II (1876–1909) had witnessed an increasing emphasis on the role of the Ottoman ruler as the caliph of all Muslims, a claim that the sultan hoped to utilize as a subtle threat against Western and Russian imperialist infringements. Thus, in the years of relative freedom and fervent public debate that followed the 1908 revolution and the reinstatement of Parliament, Islamism emerged as one of the main currents of thought. Islamism was an entirely modern phenomenon, fundamentally different from earlier forms of Islamic conservatism or revisionism, and was founded upon a concern for the reassessment of Islamic thought and life within a changing modern environment. Babanzâde and many other representatives of the Islamist opinion received their education in westernized institutions of learning, but were also versed in traditional fields of knowledge. Many Islamists came from the Arab lands under Ottoman rule, which became increasingly alienated from the Ottoman Empire after the Young Turks, dominated by secularist military officers, seized power with a coup d'état in 1912. The Islamist current was further reinforced after the Balkan Wars (1912–1913), when the Ottoman Empire lost most of its non-Muslim populated lands in Europe, becoming an empire of ethnically diverse but predominantly Muslim peoples, in a world where there were fewer and fewer independent Muslim states.

The Balkan defeat also occasioned the sudden rise of nationalist sentiment within the shrunken empire, and immediately after the war a new sense of ethnic Turkish collectivity started dominating public opinion. Largely under the influence of Turkic intellectuals from Tsarist Russia, Turkism emerged at this period as a defensive alternative against the prospect of a final fragmentation in an old-fashioned multi-ethnic empire (see **Yusuf Akçura**, *Three*

types of policy). Thus, the period between the Balkan Wars and the end of the First World War witnessed a growing debate, and in some cases, open hostility between the ethnic nationalist and Islamist currents of thought. Some issues that were seemingly harmless, such as education or women's rights, became battlegrounds for these severe political ideologies that entertained radically different visions of the future of the Ottoman Empire and the Middle East. The traditionalist Islamist group was represented by people like Babanzâde, who rejected any form of nationalism that carried ethnic associations and envisioned an ideal universe where all Islamic populations collaborated under some form of "Islamic union." Although Islamism was espoused by this group as a potent defensive strategy against imperialist pressure, it should be noted that it was never developed into an imperialist vision in and of itself. In political terms, the agenda of Islamism was mainly shaped by a concern to avoid territorial loss and to draw together the Muslim populations of the Ottoman Empire. Though quite popular until the outbreak of the World War, purist Islamists such as Babanzâde were largely discredited after the leaders of the Arabic speaking lands allied with the British during the war.

Written on the eve of the Great War, and published in the traditionalist *Sebilü'r-Reşad* (after the "reformists" abandoned the journal), Babanzâde's text became a landmark essay that epitomized the position of the conservative Islamists vis-à-vis nationalism. The article emerged out of a polemic between the extreme Islamist authors of the *Sebilü'r-Reşad* and nationalist "Turkists" such as **Yusuf Akçura**, Ahmed Ağaoğlu, and **Ziya Gökalp**, grouped around the journal *Türk yurdu* [Turkish homeland]. Here, the author critically investigates nationalism as an imported ideology and contends that this "Frankish illness" is fundamentally inimical to the basic precepts of Islam. For Babanzâde, race or ethnicity (*asabiyyet*) is never the basis of allegiance in Islam, which mainly judges people according to their devotion and level of submission to God. He argues, therefore, that Muslim culture frowns upon people who bring forward their racial or ethnic identity, and that nationalism, a menace just like westernism and secularism, contradicts and imperils the Islamic way of life. Babanzâde uses the term *kavmiyet* for nationalism, a word with negative connotations closely associated with racism, while he employs *milliyet*, the standard word for nationalism in Ottoman Turkish, in a more traditional sense, denoting the entire Islamic community.

Targeting the Turkish nationalists of his time, he claims that "Turkishness" is a myth invented by Tatar Turkists from Russia, and that Turkish nationalism is a folly that should be considered as treason by the Islamic community. For Babanzâde, conceiving a separate Turkish history apart from the

history of Islam jeopardizes the idea of a common Islamic identity (as a form of cultural affiliation that connects all Muslims in the world) and seriously imperils the security and sustenance of the Ottoman state, as it sows the seeds of discrimination between Muslims of different ethnic origins within the empire. Apart from the Turkists, with whom Babanzâde sees no prospect for dialogue or reconciliation, the essay also addresses those whom the author calls “Turkist-Islamists,” that is intellectuals with strong Islamist predilections, such as **Mehmed Akif**, who are drawn to nationalism as a potent instrument of struggle against western imperialist encroachment. He reminds the latter group that any form or degree of nationalism is poison to one’s faith, and warns them that their agenda should always be informed by the overall needs and characteristics of the Islamic society, and not specifically the Turkish nation.

The text was reprinted several times in modernized Turkish after the 1960s, parallel to the rise of Islamism in the Turkish political scene. Yet, although Babanzâde’s romantic visions of “Muslim unity” and solidarity had a lasting impact on the collective imaginary of the Islamist movement, mainstream political discourses of the Islamist community continued to carry strong nationalist overtones, entertaining visions of “Turkish-Islamic synthesis.”

AE-FS

The question of nationalism in Islam

Although the rise of nationalism and racism among the Muslims, that is the rise of discrimination based on nation or race, dates back about 15–20 years, its visible manifestation as a matter of life and death starts only with the second constitutional period. Nationalism is an innovation of foreign origin, imported out of sheer ignorance from Europe. It is detrimental to Islam, like a lethal illness that corrupts the body. [...]

It is our claim that the question of nationalism [...] is condemned and rejected by the *sharia*. Nationalism is an endeavor that is characteristic of the dark ages prior to the rise of Islam. It is a most dreadful assault to the nature and sustainability of Islam, and to the welfare and peace of Muslims. Today, while almost the entirety of the land of Islam has turned into a land of infidelity, it is ludicrous for a handful of Muslims to rip apart their mutual ties of fidelity and love with claims to “being a Turk, an Arab, a Kurd, a Laz,¹ or a

¹ An ethnic group populating the eastern Black Sea coast of Anatolia, speaking a south-Caucasian language distantly related to Georgian.

Circassian,” especially at a time when the aggressive feet of the ferocious enemy step on our very hearts; even according to the standards of those who cherish the cause of ethnic nationalism, such ambitions must be considered unpatriotic. The great calamity that has befallen our Albanian brothers, who have pursued the deceptive mirage of national fulfillment, should serve as a horrific lesson to all. In accordance with the commonsensical maxim: “same causes breed the same results,” we should admit that this is the kind of misfortune that awaits us if we continue along the same lines. Should the nationalist cause prevail, this land that is the last vestige of Islam might turn, God forbid, into an abode of sacrilege, just like Albania.

Our prolonged argument and debate with the Turkists, despite five years of hard work, has revealed that they still have not been able to come to an agreement on a solid and common cause of action [...] We see that the defenders, the preachers and leaders of the Turkist cause are divided into two groups: One group comprises the pure “Turkists,” while the other comprises the “Turkist-Islamists.”

The pure Turkists endeavor to establish a new “ideal”; they strive to promote novel traditions by partly severing their ties with the ancient ones, and hope to create a new “faith,” and a new “nation” [...] Those on the Turkist-Islamist front, on the other hand, wish to have their cake and eat it too. They wish neither to forgo the Islamic ideal nor the national one. We believe that it is useless to engage in prolonged arguments with the first group. What they wish to propound is, to put it openly, the ideal of atheism. This essay is not the proper space to argue with those who cannot understand that it is impossible to remove a people’s faith and substitute something else in its place, that a person who does not lift a finger for the sake of God will never grab a gun to save people of his race living all the way in Kamchatka, and that a person who even abandons his fellow Muslims (whom he has deemed to be his brothers for a thousand years, with whom he had shared joys and sorrows, and for whom he had even sacrificed his life) will never embrace his Yakut² brother, with uncertain Shaman or Christian faith, who lives in the distant Siberian steppes [...] We can only communicate with the Turkist-Islamists. Because I believe that it is possible to connect to them within the framework of Islam, and that it is more likely to convey them the truth in the name of religion.

² A Turkic ethnic group in Northeast Asia, living in what is now the Sakha Republic (Yakutia) in the Russian Federation. The Yakuts are mainly Orthodox Christians, with religious practices that are heavily laden with traditional animist elements.

Our discussions with the “Turkist-Islamist” leaders reveal that they have far more common sense than the other comrades. They essentially talk about the weakness of the Turkish element, and its desperate need for support. Yet they also have no intention of destabilizing the Islamic community. They deem this community essential for maintaining the solidarity of all Islamic populations [within the empire], and for the edification and improvement of the Turks. However, they are entirely wrong to assume that Turkish society would reinforce the Islamic community, and that the cause of ethnicity is compatible with Islam [...] They hope to counterweigh “religious faith” with a sense of “national faith.” I have even encountered those, about whose faith and devotion I carry no doubts, who claim that priding oneself on one’s nationality does no harm to Islamic sentiments. [...]

It is impossible to deny that the Turk needs your guidance and help ... To elevate his social standing, to increase his productive capacity, to enhance his morale, to improve his virtues, and to diminish his sense of inferiority are really good, agreeable, and favorable deeds at the side of God and humanity. It is truly a venerable task to serve the Turk’s language, to elevate his literature to a degree that it nourishes the soul, and to improve his knowledge and practical capacities. Moreover, it is a religious obligation for other Muslim brothers who are not Turkish but speak the Turkish language to hasten to your help in this endeavor. In fact, this is exactly what we have been doing all along. But these social services should never lead you to pursue the causes of the pre-Islamic dark eras, and to take pride in ancestors and lineage. Language and vocabulary are nothing but a means of communication; use them well, but do not abuse them for detrimental purposes. Familiarize the Turk with a plain and advanced language through which he can comprehend the entire range of sacred and worldly knowledge. Make his library the richest one in the world. But always, and never be unwary about this, always appeal to him as a “Muslim,” and never as a “Turk.” Always talk to him about his Muslim identity, and never about his Turkishness. If you wish to motivate him, do it in the name of Islam, but not of Turkishness. Never separate the Turk’s history from the history of Islam. [...]

For the sake of God, avoid turning the face of the Turks towards Turan and away from Mecca. Do not preach anyone to look both ways, as these spaces are in diametrically opposite directions; it is not possible to see both of them at the same time. The Turks will either turn to Mecca, as they did for a thousand years, and leave behind Turan, or they will turn to Turan and disregard Mecca [...] The bait of nationalism is a poisonous one [...] If the ones who take the bait are pious, surely they will never be able to recover. You

should recognize that you cannot reconcile Islam with things that it vehemently forbids. Racial favoritism is forbidden by the *sharia* in order to attain the utmost aim: Muslim unity.

Translated by Ahmet Ersoy

JOZEF TISO: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE SLOVAK PEOPLE'S PARTY

Title: *Ideológia slovenskej ľudovej strany* (The ideology of the Slovak People's Party)

Originally published: Prague: Tiskový odbor Ústředního svazu československého studentstva, 1930

Language: Slovak

The excerpts are from Rudolf Chmel, ed., *Slovenská otázka v 20. storočí* (Bratislava: Kalligram, 1997), pp. 82–97.

About the author

Jozef Tiso [1887, Bytča (*Hun.* Nagybecse), near Žilina (*Hun.* Zsolna) – 1947, Bratislava]: priest, politician, and president of the Slovak state during the Second World War. He studied theology at the University of Vienna and later served as priest in different places in Upper Hungary, trying to spread the teaching of Christian Socialism. After the establishment of Czechoslovakia in 1918, he started to climb up the Church hierarchy and, more importantly, became involved in politics. Between 1921 and 1923, he was episcopal secretary in Nitra, and in 1934 the headmaster of the teachers' seminary he founded in his parish Bánovce nad Bebravou. His influence in the autonomist Hlinka's Slovak People's Party (popularly called the *ľudáks*) had also been rising since the mid-1920s. He was a parliamentary deputy for the Party between 1925 and 1939, and served as Minister of Public Health and Physical Education on the only occasion when the Slovak *ľudáks* took part in the Czechoslovak government (1927–1929). He was appointed Prime Minister of the Slovak autonomous government after the Munich Agreement of September 1938 and, one year later, President of the Slovak Republic. In this capacity he was responsible, among other things, for the “Aryanization” of Jewish property, as well as for the so-called *Codex Judaicum* adopted in September 1941—an anti-Jewish legislation similar to the Nuremberg Laws. During the six years of his presidency, he was a promoter of the “moderate” branch in the Party, maneuvering between German pressure and the party radicals, led by Vojtech Tuka, who sought to introduce a full-fledged Nazi regime in Slovakia. After the war, he escaped to Austria, where he was detained by the American military and eventually extradited to Czechoslovakia. He was put on trial in Bratislava, found guilty of treason, sentenced to death and executed, which in the long run negatively influenced Slovak-Czech relations, since many understood it as a political process organized on behalf of Prague's interests. In today's Slovakia, Tiso—undoubtedly one of the most controversial political figures in modern Slovak history—is an object of both admiration and criticism.

Main works: *Prejavy a články (1913–1938)* [Speeches and articles, 1913–1938] (2002); *Prejavy a články (1938–1944)* [Speeches and articles, 1938–1944] (2007).

Context

After 1918, Slovak political life within the Czechoslovak republic underwent a process of ideological differentiation. With the exception of the first parliamentary elections in 1920, won by the Social Democrats, it was Hlinka's Slovak People's Party (HSPP), or the *ľudáks*, that dominated the political scene, vying for support mainly among the Roman Catholic population. In contrast to the other two major camps in Slovak politics at the time, the agrarians and the social democrats, which both supported the Czechoslovak idea, the *ľudáks* became the main mouthpiece of the autonomist Slovak movement. They opposed the centralism of the political establishment in Prague, invoking the May 1918 Pittsburgh Agreement, preceding the declaration of independent Czechoslovakia, that envisaged a Slovak political autonomy with separate administration, diet and courts. The *ľudáks* saw autonomy as a fundamental precondition for solving the Slovak-Czech national and political relationship and as crucial for the existence of a common state. The critics of the autonomist movement, on the other hand, argued that the autonomy of Slovakia stood for separatism and potentially weakened both the internal cohesion and the international position of Czechoslovakia.

Their staunch autonomist position was the main reason the *ľudáks* remained an opposition party for most of the time in interwar Czechoslovakia. In January 1922, the party submitted to the National Assembly its first official proposal to introduce autonomy for Slovakia; it was not adopted. As a concession to their claims, however, a territorial system was accepted in 1927 as one of the preconditions for the first and only engagement of the HSPP in a coalition led by the agrarian Antonín Švehla between 1927 and 1929. Yet this political arrangement did not change the centralist character of the state. The activist political line was by no means supported by all intra-party streams, and criticism arose when it turned out that participation in the Czechoslovak government did not lead to enforcement of the HSPP's political and economic requests. In 1929, following the Tuka-affair, the *ľudáks* left the coalition. Due to his political attacks on the legality of the Czechoslovak state, Vojtech Tuka—the most outspoken radical within the HSPP—was tried and found guilty of treason and espionage for Hungary. He was sentenced to 15 years in prison. The affair not only terminated the short activist period of the HSPP, it also signified its deepest internal crisis in interwar

Czechoslovakia, as the idea of Slovak autonomy became associated with separatism.

At that time, the unquestionable leader of the Party was the Roman Catholic priest Andrej Hlinka (1864–1938), whose special position was reflected in the name of the Party. However, Hlinka—a skillful speaker and charismatic individual—was not interested in ideology, so the elaboration of the ideological line of the Party was left to Hlinka's most gifted disciples: Karol Sidor (1901–1953) and, above all, the “philosopher of the *ľudák* party,” father Jozef Tiso. Historically and ideologically, the HSPP was rooted in the popular Christian socialist movement that began to spread in Hungary at the turn of the century and was based on the social doctrine of the Catholic Church, elaborated after the 1891 *Rerum novarum* encyclical of Pope Leo XIII. Critical of both economic and political liberalism and the secular radical left, it sought to reconcile the traditional Christian moral and religious value system with a sensitive social policy adapted to modern mass society. Similar to many other Christian socialist parties in interwar Europe, HSPP gradually abandoned its support for parliamentary democracy, considered as inefficient, in favor of concepts of authoritarian, nationally centered politics. HSPP's specific situation lay in that it was the almost exclusive representative of the Slovak autonomist program. Therefore, despite the fact that it only once, in 1925, gained 30 percent of the Slovak votes, the HSPP portrayed itself as the true defender of Slovak national interests in Czechoslovakia, repeatedly downplaying the national credentials of other Slovak parties.

Tiso's programmatic political treatise, “The Ideology of the Slovak People's Party,” was published in 1930 as a sequel to his lectures on the topic delivered to university students in Prague. It presented the autonomist program of the Party, stressing Slovakia's territorial, not national, autonomy, while clearly upholding the preservation of the republic. Its concept of politics was “for God and Nation” in the name of traditional morality and national unity. On the other hand, it exhibited the authoritarian tendencies underlying *ľudák* politics, which would fully mature after 1938. Importantly, the fusion of Catholic and Slovak nationalist references implied a conservative social and political vision which was contrasted to the much more secular Czech national discourse, especially in view of the Masarykian state ideology focusing on the Hussite and Protestant tradition as the basis of Czech identity.

Contrary to its authoritarian ambitions and harsh criticism of official Czechoslovak politics and the domestic pro-Czechoslovak political orientation, HSPP, with Jozef Tiso as its vice-president, acted within the frame of

parliamentary politics, using exclusively legal and non-violent means in pursuing its goals. Until the end of Czechoslovakia in March 1939, HSPP did not officially question the existence of the republic and insisted that Slovak autonomy—which came into effect after the Munich Agreement in September 1938—was to serve the internal consolidation of the common state. It was above all German Nazi politics in the region that in the end led to a reformulation of this position and to the creation of the Slovak independent state that was *ex post facto* proclaimed to have been the HSPP's true goal since its very inception [see Štefan Polakovič, *Slovak National Socialism*]. This state-centered perspective once again came to be relevant after 1989 and also provided the context for the revival of the cult of Tiso. Nevertheless, in contrast to the less "problematic" Hlinka, who died early enough not to be implicated in war-time collaboration, Tiso's symbolic position remained highly contested, and the use of topoi stemming from the *ľudák* tradition does not necessarily imply an explicit reference to Tiso's writings.

MK

The ideology of the Slovak People's Party

Politics is a public service entertaining, first of all, general interests, and at best protecting and justifying the interests of individuals and classes. This public service is conditioned more by the quality of people than by material prerequisites. It is easier to achieve it with capable people and a lack of material funds, than to act with an abundance of material prerequisites and people not devoted to the public. However, people may only be educated to be capable of providing public service by an idea strong enough to raise an individual above his/her personal interests, of course not once or twice, but permanently and steadily. The idea, if natural, has to be supplemented and its freshness maintained through the power found in higher, supernatural, religious sources. This understanding of politics is a public service expressed in the motto "for God and Nation." Also, according to an opponent's confirmation, Slovak autonomy is a renewed Slovak nationalism; it is a service to the Slovak national idea inspired by the highest of ideas: the idea of God. Nationalism, as national self-interest, is not only the necessary driving force on behalf of a nation, but also the natural measure of each nation's duties towards other nations, just as love for oneself is the driving force of one's own elation and the measure of one's connection with neighbors. However, for self-love and nationalism not to become rather destructive forces, they need

the nobleness expressed in the well-known commandment: "Thou shalt love your neighbor as yourself."

Self-love, love of one's own nation, is a natural imperative for advancement. Just as love for oneself does not represent selfishness, nationalism does not mean chauvinism. Just as love for oneself has to be a living power, but may not degenerate into selfishness, nationalism has to be alive and active without degenerating into chauvinism. Man stripped of individuality, without love for himself, is a monster. Man without love for his nation is also an unnatural appearance. Internationalism and chauvinism are the sick phenomena of an unregulated force. The regulation of love for oneself offers moral order supported by a religious motive, and offers the nation religion by gently connecting particular individualism with collective internationalism in the supernatural spheres. This enables politics to avoid national aridity leading to national backwardness and genteelness, sowing seeds of lasting international clashes. Nationalism influenced by religion—the motto "for God and Nation"—best provides for the most intense implementation of love of one's own nation by using positive moral commitments to inspire vigorous national love without rousing jealousy in other nations, as it may not clash with others' interests, nor compromise the rights of other nations. Pacifist nationalism is as much nationalism guided by religion; it is a political line for God—for the nation.

Too often we are confronted with the opinion that religion does not belong in politics. This opinion is a total misunderstanding of the roles of religion and politics in public life. If we do not regard religion only as a rite and do not exclude from the scope of political activities anything related to the national life, we cannot agree with this opinion. Religion is the normative framework of human activities. Politics, as one of them, may not be isolated from the influence of religion. On the other hand, religion is part of national culture and politics should be interested in this part. [...] Materialism, as a worldview, will not withstand scientific questioning, and is also relegated to the background in politics. This is proved by the current re-orientation of social democracy from the socialism of historical materialism to the socialism of Man's spiritual style. Today, spiritual forces find more esteem in political life. Therefore, it is to a certain extent an anachronism to talk about the incompatibility of religion with politics. The norm of political activities is general well-being; it strives to adopt acts, issue edicts, to establish institutions to provide dignified, human life to as many citizens as possible. However,

dignified human life is only life improved by culture and morality. This means that along with material interests, politics cannot forget about the nurturing and strengthening of spiritual and moral human characteristics, without which neither a higher cultural life nor a primitive social order is possible. The limited material orientation of politics bears the bitter fruit of economic and social disorganization. Religion may be implemented in politics only as far as politics does not make religion its slave, respects its autonomy and accepts its orders as decisive. It must not be a tool and slave of politics. It is not subordinate, but superior to politics. The light placed on a candlestick is religion in politics, and therefore it should be positioned above politics and kept there. [...] Therefore, the state and politics will not find support in a subjugated religion in the most critical situations, when they most need its laws of binding sanctions. Religion may be either the sun of politics, or a worthless ornament irritating subversive emotions. Politics should not strive to control religion, but to accept it and follow its principles. Religion does not need politics, politics needs religion. The air does not need the bird, the bird needs the air to fly. There is water without fish, sun without flowers, but not the other way around.[...]

In line with these set opinions so flattering for Catholicism, it could claim for itself, as a religious factor, to be respected in politics. However, with respect to its rich content, including a large portion more or less elevated above the level of political questions—well, Catholicism is not only for this world—it does not enforce its unique right. It preaches and accentuates the acceptability of religion as such, because principles relevant for politics form the common basis of all Christian confessions. Catholicism is not applied in politics with its teachings on mercy, or extraordinary paths of the chosen ones, it does not teach its dogmas in this field of its application, because, in order to manage life subjected to politics, the principles of common human sense are enough. It mirrors all necessary conditions of human life and the social system. Therefore, there is no basis for the fear that church supremacy over state will be renewed, the medieval state subordination to church re-established, the principle of papal infallibility in political questions introduced and that bishops and priests will become responsible for state functions. Religion applies to the political field a dogma of love and justice; it defines the general direction, leaving the detailed implementation in individual cases to politicians brought up in faith. [...] Religion in politics does not pursue power goals. It is interested in the beneficial influence on politics to avoid its slipping from the level of service to the general well-being and interest. It does not apply in politics dogmas of a higher character that are

meant to guide the life of higher spheres, but it cannot renounce the dogma of love and justice, just as politics itself cannot renounce its elementary principles equal to dogmas. This justice is manifested in the principle "*suum cuique*," "to each his own." It should be exercised towards each individual in the nation, just as towards the nation as a whole. Catholicism, in its international stratification, does not regard any nation scrupulously and jealously; it respects the rights of all nations. It does not see its role to limit or repress any nation's rights. Therefore, this point opens up the perspective for the current political life of the Slovak nation, whereby it fully respects the natural right for individual, autonomous national life claimed by the Slovak nation itself. The connection of the question of Slovak autonomy within the Catholic worldview is supported by the fact that Slovak Catholics are that majority which adopts Slovak autonomy as its political program.

Politics guided by the two utmost ideas—God and the nation—clearly communicates its preference for the interests of the whole, rather than those of individuals or larger-smaller groups, because it is convinced that through saving the whole it is easier to protect and help the self-realization of an individual than vice versa. The whole lives and is maintained on individual sacrifices, without which the whole cannot be upheld. However, an individual cannot assert him/herself without a healthy and well-functioning whole. This aspect forms the basis for pan-national politics, politics as a whole, rather than class politics. Every class is precious, as it contributes to the normal life of the whole; however, no class surpasses the whole. The absence or disorder of one class result in a breakdown of the whole, just as the palsy of one organ means the certain degeneration of the entire organism. [...] Even though the functions of these various social classes may differ in importance, all are necessary and irreplaceable just like the respective limbs of a human body. Politics built up on this basis should strive to protect the interests of the whole, not those of individual classes at the expense of the whole. The state cannot be the special interest group of any class. The class state represents violence for other classes. This makes it a constant threat for peaceful life in the state, as any violence inspires and calls for a reaction according to the situation and character of tyrannized classes, whether manifested quickly or slowly. However, a reaction will surely appear even in conditions of class domination through armed terror. Be it capitalists or the proletariat, bureaucrats or political leaders—any class dictatorship leads to permanent malfunctions and finally to the stagnation of the functions of the state organism. Only that politics which considers its supreme role to be the leveling of individual class interests by providing each one of them with a certain living standard

may provide for a normal way of life. This, however, cannot be reached through emphasizing the respective interests of each class individually within the well-marked organizations of each individual class. This bears the seeds of class self-salvation, and so it inadvertently nurtures the awareness of class domination. It has to bring together individual classes as members of one family within one all-class-embracing organization, which not only teaches mutual acknowledgement, but also cultivates readiness for mutual compromises in favor of harmonious coexistence. Pan-national politics takes into account the entire nation with all its classes and parts, the highest and lowest tiers; there is nothing in the nation that politics would not notice. It only needs to be related to the life and culture of the nation. Its care for all national parts is applied according to the significance and needs of each one of them, to enable the entire nation to live and progress.

Politics is an anthropocentric activity. The state is not the target, just as capital, work and culture are not. They are only means for the reaching of one goal: the welfare of man. Neither God nor religion are targets, because when positioning God as the supreme idea of political activities, we do not want to present God as a certain idol in the center of political activities, to whom we should bring sacrifices, including human sacrifices, like to a juggernaut. We position at the center of political activities divine standards and principles pursuing human well-being. Catholic ethics considers human nature to be the last, highest standard of morality; that which pleases common human sense and is adequate for human nature is also moral according to divine standards, because God, as the Maker of the human brain and nature, embedded it into humans. The service of man—this is politics. [...]

Translated by Pavol Lukáč

DEZSŐ SZABÓ: TOMORROW'S NATIONALISM

Title: *A holnap nacionalizmusa* (Tomorrow's nationalism).

Originally published: *Az egész látóhatár* (The entire horizon), vol. I. (Budapest: Magyar Élet, 1939), 19–81.

Language: Hungarian

The excerpts used are from the original edition, pp. 75–81.

About the author

Dezső Szabó [1879, Kolozsvár (*Rom.* Cluj-Napoca, present-day Romania) – 1945, Budapest]: writer. He was the descendant of a family of lower gentry and small functionaries. During his university years, he specialized in linguistics and French culture. His French tutor at Eötvös College in Budapest introduced him to the ideas of Charles Maurras. After obtaining a diploma, Szabó occupied various teaching positions in the countryside. From 1910 onwards, he contributed regularly to modernist journals, like *Nyugat* [West] and *Huszedik Század* [Twentieth century], first as a critic and later as an author of *belles lettres*. He moved to Budapest during the Revolution of 1918. At first, he welcomed the revolutionary government, but soon turned against it. In this period, he began to write his best known novel, *Az elsodort falu* (The village swept away), about the tragedy of the ethnic Hungarian middle-class and the rise of “aliens” (Germans and Jews) to positions of cultural leadership. In 1919, he supported the counter-revolutionary government, which he considered an opportunity for the social emancipation of the peasantry—something that the left-wing governments had failed to achieve. In the early-twenties, however, he turned against Horthy's regime as well, criticizing it for its authoritarianism and social conservatism. In the mid-1920s, he became the main source of literary and political populism, creating a highly individual and idiosyncratic style. In the 1930s, he strongly opposed Nazism and its Hungarian followers and advocated a sort of agrarian socialism combined with corporatist elements. He died of hunger during the siege of Budapest. His intellectual heritage was contested, as both left-wing and right-wing groups laid claims on it. Between 1945 and 1956, his writings were banned. Nevertheless, he remained an inspiration for some under-currents of the intelligentsia, and his ideas resurfaced in the “ethnic revivalism” of the 1970–1980s.

Main works: *Az elsodort falu* [The village swept away] (1919); *Egyenes úton* [On a straight way], (1920); *Panasz* [Complaint] (1923); *Segítség!* [Help!] (1925); *Feltámadás Makucskán* [Resurrection at Makucska] (1932); *Az egész látóhatár* [The entire horizon], (1939).

Context

Dezső Szabó was a crucial figure in the post-1918 history of Hungarian nationalism. In contrast to 19th-century nationalism, which was based on an assimilatory discourse within a multi-ethnic state, Szabó advocated the idea of an ethnically homogeneous Hungarian nation-state. This program had two sides: it implied the ethnic “purification” of the country, a shift towards the ethnicization of politics; and, at the same time, it entailed the abandonment of the traditional imperial-assimilatory dream-world of “historic Hungary.” Either way, the implications of this program contradicted the claims of those political camps that posited the territorial reconstruction of the Kingdom of Saint Stephen as the panacea for all the problems of post-First World War Hungary. Szabó’s social radicalism advocated the cause of the peasantry fused with an ethnic terminology, which meant a double challenge to the traditional conservative discourse stressing the multi-ethnic Hungarian “political nation.” Most importantly, Szabó created a characteristically flamboyant “idiom” for talking about politics—fusing archaism and modernism, *belles lettres* and social sciences, ideological speculation and personal polemic in a very specific way.

While the essay, “Tomorrow’s nationalism,” was written relatively late, in 1938, as an introduction to Szabó’s collected political writings, it is in a way the most coherent summary of his intellectual agenda, which goes back to the early 1920s. In aesthetic and discursive terms, his work can be read as both a continuation and fundamental revision of *fin-de-siècle* Hungarian modernism, as expressed especially by **Endre Ady**. Despite the fact that Ady’s discourse contained strong national symbolism, the political agenda of the modernists was Westernization and embourgeoisement; in contrast, Szabó turned this rhetoric in an organicist ethno-cultural direction.

Devising a new semantic universe focusing on the notions of statehood and nationhood, in his essays from the 1920s and 1930s Szabó redefined the crucial terms of Hungarian political discourse. Significantly, he contrasted the “prey-nationalism” of the previous era, built on the conquering of ethnically heterogeneous territories, with the constructive “new nationalism” of the future, based on ethnic solidarity, democracy, and cultural self-sufficiency. In Szabó’s vision, “tomorrow’s nationalism” repudiates the idea of multiethnic empires, which also implied the rejection of the Habsburg Monarchy. Along these lines, Szabó urged his audience to abandon traditional claims of Hungarian historical mission of leadership over other nations in the Carpathian basin. Furthermore, he turned the traditional consensus,

which considered Hungarian political culture as superior to that of its South-east European neighbors, upside down, suggesting that the new-fangled “homogeneous peasant nation-states of Eastern Europe and the Balkans” were the models to follow. He also envisioned a federation based on the principles of “new democracy” and “new nationalism”—creative forces able to unify these peoples in a regional cooperation against external imperialist pressures, especially those of Germany.

Certain elements of Szabó’s discourse, such as anti-liberalism and anti-Semitism, clearly echoed the semi-totalitarian attempts to destroy the framework of the “counter-revolutionary” consolidation after 1920, but many of his ideas, such as his focus on the peasantry, the critique of the middle class and his anti-Nazism, also resonated with those of the more left-leaning populist movement (see **László Németh**, *In minority*, and also **István Bibó**, *On European balance and peace*). Accordingly, the political impact of Szabó’s ideas was also ambiguous: the “new generation,” emerging in the late-1920s, which shared his conceptual framework, consisted of members who, in the 1940s, ended up in the extreme right-wing camp, but there were also others who became radical democrats, or even communists.

BT

Tomorrow’s nationalism

8. Tomorrow’s nationalism and the other nations

Just as the new nationalism sees in the inner life of the Nation—in the individual and the community—two faces of a single living reality, and just as it seeks to ensure the identity of the interests of these two aspects through the liberty of human production and through the historical determination of the individual’s spiritual mechanism: likewise it professes the creative unity of mankind, and regards every Nation as various, peculiarly characteristic aspects of mankind unified in its fundamental features. These aspects mean the human content of national and racial differences accumulated through millennia, the richest soil of individual creation. The destruction of any such timeless ancient aspect is an irrecoverable loss for mankind.

The new nationalism holds that the main cause of wars between nations lies in the peculiar nationalism of historical parasitism dividing up Nations into producing and produced ones. The producing elements, with their perennial prey-hunting instincts, could easily risk bloody experiments on the produced masses, which could only serve as the means and never as the end

in their nationalism and concept of State and Nation. In this respect, the modern shareholder-states following the monstrous interests of State-business have acted in an even more immeasurably merciless manner than the former states of prey-nationalism.

In the democracy of the new nationalism, the “totality of men” is the nation, the “totality of men” is the State, the “totality of men” is the historical end: the “everyone” of national work, the fertile human tree. *The essence of this nationalism, the inner law of its whole historical development, the natural compulsion of its specific goals is the rejection of war.* It organizes every material and spiritual resource of the Nation into a factor prepared to act at every moment in order to make this rejection of war a really effective force in international life. The universal co-operative form of economic life in the new democracies will by itself reduce significantly the opportunities for war and the development of warlike temperaments. The extermination of inner historical parasitism in every single State—this is the first decisive step in the organization of the nations into a peaceful co-operation.

The new nationalism sees in the peculiar national character not just the richest source of individual production and the boundlessness of human culture extending to every individual, but also the chief guarantee of the nations' mutual rapprochement and the peaceful harmonization of their interests in contrast with the so-called internationalist theories. Standardizing internationalism not only castrates the individual of the richest forces of human production and the vast accumulated wealth of the past, the community and the milieu: it also kills in him that organic, thousand-eyed concern—springing, as it were, from his own vital instincts—for the masses of national work, for their ever enriching, more and more characteristic human production that is the most powerful guarantee against war. In a mankind standardized and castrated of its most ancient, deepest and richest sustaining instincts, the life-struggle of the interests would be more dismally merciless than ever before. For the profoundest driving force within Nations towards the organization of a peaceful co-operation will be this very goal: to ensure their peculiar and individual development within the framework of the other nations' interests, and to draw forth the richest possible yield from this individual character in a peaceful historical life.

And for the very reason that the new nationalism sees the value of nations in their individual character and not in their numbers or power, it will do everything in the international sphere to eliminate, with all its outgrowths, the concept of *great powers*, a term by any means offensive, absurd and smelling of prey-nationalism. Likewise, the richness and liberty of individual produc-

tion will be further protected by its historical intent to *organize the smaller nations into a powerful alliance protecting them and ensuring each other's individual development against any possible emergencies in the future*. But this alliance will never mean a cultural Babel, a spiritual standardization, a castration into the same form: on the contrary, it will mean the ensuring of a freer and richer yield of the national character manifesting itself in the unity of language, the peculiar culture and the separate historical workshop.

The democracies of the new nationalism will naturally strive to set up a powerful international body with a sanctioning competence in order to integrate the interests of the nations and to resolve every possible conflict. They may either develop the—now a bit too syndicate-like—institution in Geneva into a representative body of all nations perfectly equal in all respects; or they may create on the basis of new principles and old experiences a new institution inclusive of all nations.

9. *The destiny of the human tree*

For the natural imperialism of these institutionally secured democracies molding the universal mass of national work into a State, the thirst for life of the active and creative forces functioning amidst more and more favorable conditions, having more and more freedom of movement and demanding an ever increasing scope for action—these forces will first and above all be focused inwards, toward the inner life of their own Nations. To build the man, to make him more and more human, more of a spirit: to help him to an ever wider spiritual horizon, a deeper and more instinctive discernment, to more morality designating solidarity, to an ever fuller manifestation of the historical community! To draw forth from all human beings the entire yield of their full capacities through every active force of political, economic, social, and cultural life! To expand and secure the life-system of the Nation for the organization, development and protection of more and more life-germs, more and more human values: this is the boundless space, the perennially triumphant life-struggle in which the natural and organic imperialism of the new democracies will emerge.

But this life force undulating towards ever growing attainments will also have a life-will radiating outwards. An extroverted imperialism whose organic pre-condition is peace. Each of the nations regenerated by the new nationalism will strive to introduce their individual countenance, reaching an increasing perfection in its more and more hued, more and more richly resounding cultural works, the ancient secrets of its spirit's life-attainment, the

peculiar beauties of its sorrows and joys, the organic legitimacy of its life-will—to implant all this into the lives of the other nations, so that such a world molded by its own individuality may leave its mark there in mankind's process of building up life; so that its life-will may find an instinctive, organic echo in souls thirsting for more humaneness, more justice and more beauty.

10. The new nationalism and the Hungarian people

This new nationalism is: the Hungarians' only path towards life. Today the great historical justification of life for the Hungarians is the very fact that for them this new nationalism to be attained in the new democracy is an organic compulsion; it is, as it were, the single vital instinctive movement of their individuality. This inner compulsion deciding upon life and death means a great historical mission and an exaltation of the Hungarians among the nations.

1. For the outwardly and inwardly produced Hungarian nation, the great dupe of Europe, this new nationalism and new democracy are the only ways to obtain the fruits of its own yield.
2. This is the only way of life that can restore to the Hungarian nation, languishing under the exploitation of historical parasitism manifested chiefly in our aliens, the control of its own destiny, and can render a reconquest of the Hungarian homeland possible.
3. Doped to forget its natural solidarity under the pressure of foreign interests and life forms, hindered from recognizing its own interests and organic goals, the Hungarian nation can only in this life-system get the historical education to provide these missing spiritual elements and to enable it for a new historical construction realizing its own life-will.
4. The Hungarian nation is in the produced layers of the national work. The new life form will integrate these layers hampered in their life-processes into the potentials of a boundless development.
5. By removing foreign parasitism, the new democracy renders it possible for the Hungarian nation to realize its ancient countenance with ever richer forces, with more and more features in the unity of its historical workshop, in all aspects of life, in its whole historical construction, in every product of its culture.
6. A small Nation that joins forces with a great conquering nation and renders itself the instrument of the latter's imperialism is working on its own inevitable destruction. In the case of a defeat in the war it will

pay the price with a Trianon, while in case of victory it will be swallowed up by the “*allied*” Great Power triumphing with the small nation’s blood. In the view of the new democracy, the safeguard of the small Nations lies in the small Nations. The Hungarian nation may get at the vanguard of the historical furrow if it undertakes the historical mission of organizing the Eastern European and Balkan nations into a protective union and proclaims to these young nations the message of the new democracy and a new culture revived through their peasants.

The prophets of panting, huddling midnight plots, of cloak-romanticism calling the faithful into murderous hordes, the agents of a foreign power hired to murder the nation, the “social” saviors hobnobbing with counts, the civilian gendarmes of the ruling syndicates face-lifted and masked as patriots, and the spiritual eunuchs of the middle-class will call this development plan sketched up here in its broadest outlines Utopian, daydreaming or impossible. But the sad and the humiliated, the exploited and the plundered, the hindered and the disowned—the fathomless dissolute host of righteous dissatisfaction, the whole tragic, exploited Hungarian nation regards the present situation as mortally impossible, a raging vision of a crazy imagination. And they see with all their disrupted wounds, all their suffering and the eyes of their children that the path I point to is the only *Realpolitik*, the only path towards life, the only guaranty of the Hungarian nation’s survival, its renewal and its re-conquest of the homeland. And as for its impossibility: nothing is impossible that is rooted in the ineluctable vision of the mind, the love of our dear ones and the resoluteness of the will. And the present historic days are turning such *impossibilities* overnight into the prevailing, creative realities of the future.

Translated by Dávid Oláh

KARL KRAUS: THE LAST DAYS OF MANKIND

Title: *Die Letzten Tage der Menschheit* (The last days of mankind)

Originally published: excerpts and in serial form in *Die Fackel* from 1919; epilogue published in December 1918 as a special issue

Language: German

The excerpts used are from Karl Kraus, *The Last Days of Mankind*, edited by Frederick Ungar (New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., 1974), pp. 60–67, 153–155, 160.

About the author

Karl Kraus [1874, Jičín (*Ger.* Jitschin), Bohemia – 1936, Vienna]: writer and journalist, playwright, poet, essayist, aphorist and noted satirist. Born into a wealthy Jewish family in Bohemia that moved to Vienna in 1877, he began law studies there in 1892, later switching to (and not completing) German literature and philosophy. Throughout his career, Kraus was an outspoken individualist, mainly preoccupied with fighting what he perceived to be the degraded relationship between language and morality. Having joined **Leopold Andrian**, Peter Altenberg (1859–1919), Hermann Bahr (1863–1934) and others of the Young Vienna (*Jung-Wien*) group in 1896, he broke with them a year later and thereafter maintained an independent position on culture and politics. In 1898 he published an anti-Zionist polemic attacking Theodor Herzl's (1860–1904) *Eine Krone für Zion* [A crown for Zion], and the following year he left the Jewish faith altogether. After early experiences at the *Wiener Literaturzeitung* [Viennese literary journal] and *Breslauer Zeitung* [Breslau journal], in 1899 Kraus founded, and by 1911 eventually became sole contributor to, his own satirical journal *Die Fackel* [The torch]. Together with his celebrated one-man public readings from famous works of literature, the journal became his main public platform and sealed his reputation. Editorial independence allowed Kraus to address a wide range of topics, including psychoanalysis, the moribund state of the Empire, and all forms of corruption, political and linguistic, especially as practiced by the Viennese press in collusion with other forms of political power. Although he was reported to have said “nothing occurs to me” (i.e., that he does not have an opinion) about Hitler, he penned an anti-Nazi polemic *Die Dritte Walpurgisnacht* (The Third Walpurgisnacht). Kraus's rediscovery after the Second World War began in Germany and Switzerland rather than Austria, but by the late 1980s his reputation and place in the Austrian literary and cultural canon had been restored.

Main works: *Sittlichkeit und Kriminalität* [Morality and Criminality] (1902); *Sprüche und Widersprüche* [Sayings and gainsayings] (1909); *Die letzten Tage der Menschheit* [The last days of Mankind] (1918–19); *Weltgericht* [World court of justice] (1919); *Literatur oder Man wird doch da sehn* [Literature or You ain't seen nothing yet] (1920); *Die Unüberwindlichen* [The insurmountables] (1928); *Die Dritte Walpurgisnacht* [The Third Walpurgisnacht] (1952).

Context

The First World War, as Kraus the astringent satirist saw it, represented an unholy alliance of curious bedfellows: technology and death; the raucous press and the military machine; and not least, a vigorous Germany with a moribund Habsburg Austria. In the War, Kraus saw a magnification of the corruption that had debased Austria's public sphere before 1914, upon which he had commented publicly in his Viennese journal *Die Fackel*, but that had now reached a new apogee. In the face of blanket wartime propaganda and omnipresent death, his usual targets gained special piquancy: in particular, the debasement of humanity and moral stricture through the careless and corrupt use of language. The sprawling, apocalyptic drama *Die letzten Tage der Menschheit*, a work considered by many to be his (flawed) masterpiece, written between 1915 and 1918, provides a vast laboratory of sorts. In it, Kraus lays out a conspectus of society and in particular unmasks the corruption of its unthinking, uniformed officials. The sheer length of the drama makes it unsuitable for actual performance (although the epilogue has been staged in standalone form); rather, the dialogue form allows Kraus to deploy his skills as a satirist, on the one hand trading in contrasts to expose the false consciousness of his characters. On the other hand, the form resembles a syllogistic call and response, especially between his two recurring interlocutors, the Optimist and the Grumbler, whose discussions offer a form of commentary on the action and a coda for Kraus's moral purpose, as in the extracts presented here.

In the first section, the Grumbler's comments expose the gulf between the noble and lofty rhetoric of the warmongers and the base materialism at the core of the war effort: for instance, in the mismatch between the soldiers feted as heroes by those who would not like to change places with them; and in the uniquely German claim to possess a noble, elevating *Kultur* as a means of justifying war. An intertext here is the propagandistic tract by German sociologist Werner Sombart (1863–1941), *Händler und Helden* [Merchants and heroes] (1915), to which the Optimist and Grumbler refer directly: in Som-

bart's terms, the mercantile British lack true culture because of their trade-focused society, while Germans are those with a heroic *Kultur* that thereby justifies their expansionist war aims. The cultural garb in which war aims are cloaked is, however, mercilessly unmasked as the *de facto* opposite of cultural progress. The theme continues at the start of the second extract. Here, the Grumbler (the figure most closely associated with Kraus's own position) makes it clear that Austria is equally culpable in waging war, and answers the Optimist's clichéd statements on her role in strictly universal-humanitarian, non-patriotic terms. The Habsburg self-justification of Austria being a "historical necessity" derives from Austrian Chancellor Clemens Metternich's careful power brokering after the Congress of Vienna (1814–1815). It is quoted here as the dying regime's rhetorical last stand against the ethnic clamor for self-determination that ultimately tore it apart. Unsurprisingly, the Grumbler states this point with merciless precision, and proceeds to deconstruct the "saintly" image of long-reigning monarch Francis Joseph I. He repeatedly quotes and twists the sovereign's widely known statement, which had been printed on posters at start of the war as a justification: "I considered everything carefully." The effect is deliberately trivializing and ironic, undercutting the cozy Austrian self-regard voiced by the Optimist.

To describe Kraus as "anti-Austrian" or an "anti-modernist" in the strict sense is to sidestep his wider concerns with fighting dehumanization and corruption more generally. Rather, he was an individualist, a contrarian thinker preoccupied with perhaps unfashionable (then as now) themes like linguistic corruption and sloppiness as an index of moral degradation; and with unmasking hypocrisies in public life. He shunned group activity, and on the pages of *Die Fackel*, by 1911, had become practically the sole author. He attacked psychoanalysis on its pages, but respected Freud. In politics his views were to some extent mobile, from conservative to republican. He came out in support of the Austrian Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss (1892–1934) as a lesser evil than the Nazis, which lost him the favor of some supporters. However, his last work was a careful polemic against Nazism, *Die Dritte Walpurgisnacht*, extracts of which were published in *Die Fackel* under the banner of "Why the *Fackel* is not appearing." His support for Dollfuss suggests an allegiance to Austria that because of his death in 1936, two years before the *Anschluss* with Germany, was not tested.

Although politically conservative, his satire and literary methods were radical, as in the open-formed *Die letzten Tage der Menschheit*, whose closing scene represents a striking form of non-literary anti-modernism: the power of technology such as poison gas to annihilate all humanity. One

might also describe Kraus as “conservative” from the point of view of his belief in linguistic precision, albeit not for its own sake, but to prevent lazy sloganeering of the kind indulged by some of his contemporaries in the late, lamented Habsburg Empire; by the military machine seeking to justify its base, material war aims in the First World War; and by any uniformed agent of society seeking to hide corruption before or since. Thus, while Kraus defended Dollfuss’s Austria against an outside threat, as these extracts show, its officials and inhabitants did not escape his merciless, forensic satirical gaze.

Given his uncompromising stance, cultural politicians of the early Second Austrian Republic (which included many re-appointees from before 1945) shunned Kraus in favor of a new patriotism by consensus. The rediscovery of this particular work, as with the rest of Kraus’s oeuvre, therefore began outside Austria, as part of a wider interest in German-language Jewish writing taken up by the generation of ’68. However, since the late 1980s, Kraus’s oeuvre at large has re-entered the mainstream of academic and wider cultural discussion, spurred by the work of scholars like Edward Timms, who published two definitive studies in 1989 and 2005. *Die letzten Tage der Menschheit* in particular has since achieved universalizing status as a warning against unjust war, falsehood and brainwashing by those in power through a number of important and prominent stagings in continental Europe, including Austria.

RP

The last days of mankind

OPTIMIST: Thus you are obviously of the opinion that it was not central Europe but rather the allies that acted in self-defense. What if, however, as may happen, they are not capable of successfully carrying through this self-defense of a surprise attack?

GRUMBLER: Then this traders’ war will be decided for the present in favor of those who had less religion, in order to change after a hundred years into an outright religious war.

OPTIMIST: How do you mean that?

GRUMBLER: I mean that then the Judaized Christianity of Europe will surrender to the command of the Asiatic spirit.

OPTIMIST: And how would the Asiatic spirit force it to that?

GRUMBLER: With massive quantity and a developed technology by which alone the infernal spirit of central Europe can be gotten the better of. The quantity China already has, the other weapon she will procure for herself

in good time. And in time China will see to it that she is Japanized. She will proceed as England, on a smaller scale, is proceeding today, in that she will have to become militaristic in order to take the teeth out of militarism.

OPTIMIST: But England is not keeping militarism within bounds.

GRUMBLER: I hope she does. And that she will not be done in herself, if she succumbs to militarism; and that she will not purchase material victory at the cost of spiritual impoverishment. Otherwise Europe will be Germanized. Militarism is perhaps a system by which a European people is conquered after it has conquered through it. The Germans had to be the first to give up their better selves in order to be the most powerful military nation on earth. Let's hope that the same doesn't happen to others, especially the English, who until now have been saved from compulsory military service by a nobler drive for self-preservation. The present self-defense, which demands general conscription, is only a desperate measure of dubious success. England could defeat itself in the process of defeating Germany. The only race strong enough to survive the technological life does not live in Europe. That's the way I see it at times. May the Christian God grant that it be otherwise!

OPTIMIST: Aha, your Chinese, the race most unfit for war!

GRUMBLER: Certainly, today they lack all the achievements of modern times, for perhaps in a remote era unknown to us they already lived through them and have managed to preserve their inner lives. They will easily attain these achievements again as soon as they need them in order to disabuse Europeans of them. They will also deal in military tom-foolery, but to a moral purpose. That's what I call my kind of religious war that has character.

OPTIMIST: What idea will it help triumph?

GRUMBLER: The idea that God created man not as consumer or producer but rather as human being. That the means of life should not be the goal of life. That the stomach should not outgrow the head. That life is not exclusively based upon the profit motive. That the human being is allotted time in order to have time and not to arrive somewhere faster with his legs than with his heart. What is alive in the instinct of even the most enslaved mankind, is its longing to protect the freedom of the spirit against the dictatorship of money, to protect human dignity against the autocracy of acquisitiveness.

OPTIMIST: The Germans are after all also the people of poets and thinkers. Does German education not contradict materialism that you allege?

GRUMBLER: German education has no content, but is merely a house decoration with which the people of judges and hangmen ornament their emptiness.

OPTIMIST: The people of judges and hangmen? You call them that? The people of Goethe and Schopenhauer?

GRUMBLER: Goethe and Schopenhauer would, with more justice and severity than *Le Matin* does, reproach today's Germans with everything that they had in their hearts against their own German contemporaries. Today they would be lucky if, as undesirable nonaliens, they were fortunate enough to escape over the border. Goethe was able to derive nothing but the feeling of emptiness from the emotionally exalted state of his people during the wars of liberation. We would be fortunate if colloquial and journalistic German were still at the level at which Schopenhauer found it contemptible. No people lives further from its language, thus from the source of its life, than the Germans. What Neapolitan beggar is not closer to his language than the German professor to his! Yes, but this people is more educated than any other, and since without exception its Ph.D.s—unless they've managed to get into the press corps—know how to handle gas bombs, it rushes to give its field commanders Ph.D.s. What would Schopenhauer have said to a faculty of philosophy that awards its highest honor to an organizer of mechanical death? Educated they are; British envy has got to concede that to them, and they know everything there is to know about everything. Their language is merely good enough to meet primitive needs. Today people write the stunted artificial pidgin language of sales jargon and abandon their classics to the pitiless barbarism of the hucksters. At a time when no human being divines and feels the soul of words any more, the German people find compensation in deluxe printings, bibliophily, and similar obscenities of an aestheticism that is as genuine a stigma of barbarism as is the bombardment of a cathedral.

OPTIMIST: But I don't quite understand what you are saying about the German language. After all, you're the one who acts as if you were betrothed to the German language, and in your treatise against Heine you claimed its superiority over the Romance languages. Now you evidently think differently.

GRUMBLER: Only a German would find that I think differently now. It is precisely because I am betrothed to her that I think this way. I am also faithful to her. And I know that a victory, which God may spare us, would be the most complete betrayal of man's spiritual nature.

OPTIMIST: But you do see the German language as the more deeply profound?

GRUMBLER: Yes, but far beneath its level are those who speak it.

OPTIMIST: And in your opinion don't the other languages rank far below the German language?

GRUMBLER: Yes, but those who speak them rank far above.

OPTIMIST: Are you then in a position to establish a tangible connection between language and the war?

GRUMBLER: Yes: those who speak a language that is the most congealed into set phrases and stock terminology have the tendency and the readiness to find, in accents of conviction, blameless in themselves everything that they find blameworthy in others.

OPTIMIST: And is this supposed to be a quality of the German language?

GRUMBLER: For the most part yes. The language itself is now a manufactured product like other products whose sale absorbs the lives of those who speak German today.

OPTIMIST: And aren't the others also out for business?

GRUMBLER: But their lives aren't swallowed up by it.

OPTIMIST: The English make a business of war and have always had only mercenaries to do their fighting for them.

GRUMBLER: That's because the English are not idealists; they don't want to stake their lives on their business.

OPTIMIST: But our soldiers are fighting for the fatherland.

GRUMBLER: Yes, they really are, and luckily, they're doing it with willing enthusiasm, because otherwise they would be forced to do it. The English are no idealists. They are so honest that, if they want to do business, they don't call it fatherland; they are said not even to have a word for it in their language; they don't drag in ideals when the export market is in danger.

OPTIMIST: They are traders.

GRUMBLER: And we are heroes. They don't want to be forced by any cut-throat competitors to work longer than six hours because they want to reserve the rest of the day for those interests for which God created the British—God or sport. The interest in God is a turning away from the world of commerce even if only hypocritically, because at any rate it's an idea that leads far away from daily labor. And that is the important thing. In contrast to this, the German works twenty-four hours a day. By applying to his daily work—as an ornament, as a trademark, as packaging—aspects of his spiritual, intellectual, artistic, and other concerns, he fulfills all those obligations that he would neglect if he had to attend to each separately. He

doesn't want to pass anything up. And this mixture of inner things with the necessities of life—this is the unfortunate element in which German genius flowers and fades.

OPTIMIST: The cause of the war, as everybody knows, is that Germany wanted to have her place in the sun.

GRUMBLER: That is well known, but people don't yet know that, if this place is indeed won, the sun will go down. As a grumbler, I am obliged to look at the dark side of everything and to fear that that nation will be victorious that has preserved the least individuality—in other words, the Germans. However, mostly I'm an optimist, but of a kind quite different from you. And when I am, I hope with confidence that it will come out well, and I realize that all these victories are nothing but a wanton loss of time and blood for the sake of postponing the inevitable defeat. I fear our victory and hope for our defeat. In the past, war was a tournament of the few, and now it involves the multitude. It used to be a contest between the strong, now it is a battle of machines.

OPTIMIST: The development of weapons cannot possibly lag behind the technical achievements of modern times.

GRUMBLER: No, but the imagination of modern times has lagged behind the technical achievements of mankind.

OPTIMIST: Yes, but does one wage war by imagination?

GRUMBLER: No, for if we still had imagination, we would no longer wage war.

[...]

OPTIMIST: The Austro-Hungarian monarchy is an historical necessity.

GRUMBLER: Maybe, because this whole rubbishy conglomeration of ethnic strife that has brought us to cultural ignominy and economic misery has to be preserved in some accursed corner of the earth. But all the revolutions and wars aiming at getting rid of it will diminish this necessity. And if they don't succeed this time, if the Austrian monarchical idea proves itself to be ineradicable for the time being, then there will be new wars. Just for reasons of prestige, this monarchy should have committed suicide a long time ago.

OPTIMIST: If Emperor Franz Josef had been granted a longer life, unity—

GRUMBLER: A reverential shudder makes me shrink in the face of the consequences of this thought before you finished thinking it. You fail to see, as a matter of fact, that a rather long life has been granted him and that nevertheless—

OPTIMIST: But the Emperor died last year—

GRUMBLER: How do you know?

OPTIMIST: I don't understand you—he lived up to—

GRUMBLER: How do you know?

OPTIMIST: Are you alluding perhaps to the joke so popular among the Allies, that in Austria-Hungary a breed of emperors is maintained that always look alike?

GRUMBLER: There may be something to it. You know, even if I could decide to believe in the death of Franz Josef, never could I believe that he ever lived.

OPTIMIST: You can't say that. Can you deny those seventy years?

GRUMBLER: Not at all. They are a nightmare of an evil spirit which, in return for extracting all our life juices, and then our life and property also, let us have as a happy gift the opportunity to become completely idiotic by worshipping an emperor's beard as an idol. Never before in world history has a stronger non-personality impressed his stamp on all things and forms. A demon of mediocrity has determined our fate. Only he insisted on Austria's right to trouble the world with our murderous nationality brawls, a right grounded in the God-ordained bureaucratic muddle under the Habsburg scepter, the mission of which, it appears, has been to hover above world peace like Damocles' sword.

OPTIMIST: What? The Emperor of peace, in the truest sense, who, in his proverbial affability, has done everything for children, the knightly monarch, the kind-hearted old gentlemen in Schönbrunn, who was spared nothing—is this the way you talk about him, and to top it off, now that he is dead?

GRUMBLER: Oh, he's dead? Well, aside from the fact that, even if I knew it, I wouldn't believe it, I must tell you plainly: that at the Last Judgment there are absolutely no special privileges, for once there is no political pull and, for that matter, no piety; one can definitely not fix things there, above all, there death is not an exemption from punishment but rather a prerequisite for sentencing. I would also believe that it is more pleasing to God to show veneration for the majesty of death at the graves of ten million youths and men, and hundreds of thousands of women and infants who had to die of hunger, than to bow down before that casket in the Capuchins' Crypt, that very casket that entombs the old man who considered everything carefully and, with a single scratch of the pen, brought it all about. One day this cipher who was spared nothing, and just for this reason didn't want to spare the world anything—just to spite them, one day decided on the death of the world.

OPTIMIST: But surely you don't believe that the Emperor wanted the war? He is even said to have stated that he was tricked into it! [...]

GRUMBLER: He simply knew that since time immemorial his hangmen have represented the ultimate, the only authentic bastion of central power.

OPTIMIST: He, as a knightly monarch—

GRUMBLER: —had already in his youth turned away the delegation of mothers, wives, and daughters from Mantua who had come, like pilgrims in their mourning clothes, to beg reprieve from the gallows tree for their sons, husbands, and fathers, but afterward had to pay the hangman's fee. To this day that region remembers Austria. Austria itself will have to pay its last hangman's fee.

OPTIMIST: How so? When?

GRUMBLER: After its own execution!

Translated by Alexander Gode and Sue Ellen Wright

MIRCEA ELIADE: SPIRITUAL ITINERARY

Title: *Itinerariu spiritual* (Spiritual itinerary)

Originally published: Serialized in the newspaper *Cuvântul* 3 (6 September – 16 November 1927)

Language: Romanian

The present excerpts are from Mircea Eliade, *Profetism românesc*, vol. 1 (Bucharest: Roza Vînturilor, 1990), pp. 19–23.

About the author

Mircea Eliade [1907, Bucharest – 1986, Chicago]: writer, philosopher and historian of religion. His father was an officer. He studied philosophy at the University of Bucharest and graduated with a thesis on the Renaissance in 1928. Eliade emerged as one of the most gifted intellectuals of his generation as early as the 1920s. Between 1928 and 1931, he lived and studied in India (Calcutta), an experience that not only marked Eliade's personal life (he converted, if only for a short period, to Hinduism), but also his academic interests. He remained fascinated by Oriental religions for the remaining of his life. He completed his doctorate at the University of Bucharest in 1933, with a thesis on the philosophy of yoga. Between 1933 and 1938, Eliade taught the philosophy and history of religion at the University of Bucharest, as the teaching assistant of one of the most charismatic intellectuals and professors of the period, Nae Ionescu (1890–1940). It was during this period that Eliade's most controversial association with the Legionary movement began. Between 1940 and 1941, Eliade was the cultural attaché at the Romanian Embassy in London and, then, from 1941 to 1945, in Lisbon. Like **Emil Cioran**, he went into exile after the Second World War and lived in Paris for several years. He also taught the history of religion at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes (until 1948) and at the Sorbonne (until 1956). Between 1956 and 1957, he was a visiting professor at the University of Chicago. Eventually, he settled in the USA and taught at the Divinity School of the University of Chicago until 1986. In the 1960s, his interest in oriental religions resonated with the spiritual orientation of the emerging counter-cultural movements. The Mircea Eliade Chair in the History of Religions was established at the University of Chicago in his honor. Although indexed by the communist regime after 1945, Eliade was progressively reintroduced to the Romanian public in the 1980s, especially through the publication of his works on the history of religions. After 1989, he became one of the most celebrated Romanian authors of all times, acquiring a cult status both as scholar and

writer. It was, therefore, initially difficult for Romanian scholarship to come to terms with Eliade's political activities, especially his involvement in the Legionary movement.

Main works: *Isabel și apelele diavolului* [Isabel and Devil's waters] (1931); *Mai-treyi* (1933); *Oceanografie* [Oceanography] (1934); *Domnișoara Christina* [Miss Christina] (1936); *Yoga. Essai sur les origines de la mystique indienne* (1936); *Fragmentarium* (1939); *Techniques du Yoga* (1948); *Le mythe de éternel retour* (1949); *Images et symbols* (1952); *Das Heilige und das Profane* (1957); *The Quest: History and Meaning in Religion* (1969); *Histoire des croyances et des idées religieuses*, 3 vols. (1976–1983).

Context

During the 1920s and 1930s, a group of young Romanian intellectuals, including **Emil Cioran**, Mircea Vulcănescu, Petre Pandrea, Petru Comarnescu, Petre Țuțea, Constantin Noica, Mihail Sebastian and Eugen Ionescu, formulated one of the most radical programs of social and cultural change in the history of modern Romania. Contrary to the 1848 generation—whose Romantic patriotism and rhetoric infused the creation of modern Romania with an ethnic and national metaphysics that allowed for the realization of grand political programs, such as the union of Transylvania with Romania—this so-called “Young Generation” assumed a different cultural agenda. As the national ideal—the union of all Romanians—had been fulfilled, the new mission was to create a universally recognized Romanian culture. The cultural manifestations of this generation in the early 1930s, as evidenced by their books and the articles published in various journals such as *Criterion*, *Cuvântul* (The Word) and *Gândirea* (The Thought) were remarkably pluralistic.

Mircea Eliade was one of the most active members of the “Young Generation.” Initially, his call for national rejuvenation had a pronounced anti-political character. Romania had a messianic mandate that was mainly spiritual, Eliade asserted. As such, Romanians must refute the “boycott of history” (which was a central and positive element in the “national ontology” of **Lucian Blaga**, but which Eliade deemed a constant and unfortunate trait) and return to the “cosmic Christianity”—a form of pagan religiosity that was best illustrated by the Romanian peasant's “theological and political” worldview. However, the “Young Generation” was not apolitical, and many of its members, including Eliade, eventually drifted towards the Legionary movement (established by Corneliu Zelea Codreanu in 1927). In this context, the philosopher and university professor, Nae Ionescu played a special role in shaping Eliade's intellectual agenda, and to some extent also determined his

political allegiances. But contrary to his mentor, Eliade did not completely oppose European Enlightenment and Western liberalism. Eliade agreed, however, that the West was in spiritual decline and that its influence was waning. By contrast, Eliade believed in the creativity of the Romanian peasant culture with its formative myths and particular rituals. Eliade's cultural program also resonated with that of the traditionalist writers (such as **Nichi-for Crainic**, Dumitru Stăniloae, Radu Dragnea and others), who insisted that Romania must undergo "transfiguration" (a theme advocated, if from a different perspective, by Cioran as well), thus inaugurating a new, post-historical order, Romanian "ethnocracy."

Eliade's "Spiritual itinerary" was aimed at directing the new generation toward a revived Romanian culture. It encouraged young Romanians to be forward-looking and embrace their role as the creators of a new cultural identity. As a generation that did not fight in the Great War, Eliade's was entrusted with an intellectual mission, one to be achieved at both individual and collective levels. Using their own experience ('*trăire*') as the guiding principle, this generation found in Eliade's editorials in the newspaper *Cuvântul* the necessary arguments for a journey of self-discovery and a new historical mission. Romanians, Eliade argued, had repeatedly sunk to a nadir of toxic historical envelopment in order to emerge, phoenix-like, from the fatal wasteland of history as a purged and strong people. After centuries of suffering and misfortune, the time had finally come for Romania's spiritual rebirth. Eliade hoped that Romania could achieve a prestigious cultural position in Europe.

This cultural and generational agenda became highly political during the 1930s, paralleling the growing popularity experienced by the Legionary movement. Eliade, like many Romanian intellectuals at the time, turned to political activism and supported the new movement. He considered the mystical Christian spirit and the cult of death and salvation promoted by the Legionaries as the very essence of the true national spirit that would revolutionize and redeem the Romanian destiny. Like others in his generation, ultimately, Eliade deemed the democratic state as having failed to sustain Romania's political unity, suggesting a national revolution instead. However, he did not endorse communism or Nazism. Eliade's sympathies lay instead with the political models offered by Mussolini's Italy, which was arguably less totalitarian and allowed more space for intellectuals, and especially Salazar's Portugal (he even published a eulogy of Salazar in 1942).

After 1989, Eliade's political articles were re-published together with his scientific and literary oeuvre. They throw a new light on Eliade's involve-

ment in politics, challenging some of the assumptions that his “guidelines for the new generation” were merely expressions of a cultural program. The darker shades of his 1930s political involvement notwithstanding, Eliade’s “spiritual itinerary” is one of the most significant cultural and intellectual programs developed during the interwar period, and one which Romanian intellectuals after 1989 tried to emulate, albeit unsuccessfully.

MT

Spiritual itinerary

In these pages, I set out to publish a few notes, observations, reflections and the monologues of our generation. My decision is neither presumptuous nor unfeasible. One might say that a generation, as long as it exists, is a flowing continuum throbbing with life and, therefore, contradictions. It is, to say the least, unscientific to attempt to describe it, to isolate it, to render it in words. A generation’s soul is hard to rebuild, even with the help of time and history. Because a generation—and, of course, by this I understand the generation’s elite—does not stand out unless it is marked by a catastrophic crisis. Such as, for instance, the war. Generations that are exposed to minor crises—a philosophy, a religion, a political doctrine, or an artistic experience—preserve their extreme mobility. At the same time, there are parallel or underground reactions, currents, competitions, and anticipations.

Nevertheless, each generation has its own needs, tortuous moments and ambitions; elements that constitute an organism. They must make up an organism—even if that includes the pain of restraining some impulses and extirpating others. Contradictions are fecund; they are indispensable, and lethal as long as they remain individual experiences. Contradictions are paths to recognition, to integration in the life and conscience of a generation. However, they can by no means constitute a guide for the thousands of souls gravitating, fatally, on the same orbit and searching for the light.

Therefore, we shall succeed if we try to find the configuration of each generation, the sensitive point of collective conscience, the imperative and its means of creation. We must not fear confusions and exaggerations. This is the only way, and many contemporary minds have applied it with surprising results. Since in the present writing we are only interested in the upcoming generation, let us make a last remark on this special case. Do we have the right to question, to analyze and to draw conclusions on our inner life? Can we do this?

The answer must be unequivocal and standing: it is OUR exclusive right, and only WE shall reach concrete and fecund results. What can others know about our souls, our pains and hopes? How could we expect others, older generations, to guide us with their advice and experiences that no longer satisfy us? How can we be ignorant of our own possibilities, allowing ourselves to be pushed around, creating at random, without being aware of one another, without searching for one another, without understanding each other, without being together? We, the young generation, have the duty to strive to penetrate souls as deeply as possible. Thus we shall find our own creative seed. From our restlessness and desires and concerns we shall learn the representative values that we have the obligation to defend and impose. Therefore, the anticipation is neither dangerous, nor presumptuous. It will clarify our intuitions. It will force us to cultivate, develop and promote in our conscience the creative and specific seeds. It will force us to be ourselves. It will enlighten us. And we will fight to become what we know we have to become. "A generation's conscience" is an abstraction. But it will exist in each of us. It will be a living, concrete and fruitful force. Spring is an abstraction, a concept. But we can make it concrete, we can experience it, we get drunk on its sap, we live it, we feel it, real and vigorous. The concept of Spring can be in our conscience at any time. The real spring is only with us for a quarter of a year. But in a soul that can be enthusiastic at any time, spring can be conjured up from its hiding place in the heart of winter. This is what happens with the "conscience of a generation" that must descend from the plane of half-concepts (not in the Crocean sense) and turn into light, life, vital energy, organizing force, coherence, sympathy, and creation.

Therefore – WE.

For those who understand, we are the most blessed generation, the most promising of all that have existed in this country. We must only take into account the elite. We are the ones that in childhood had different tragic experiences, those who knew the life reflected in our parents' faces. Some have endured more, some less. But we have all *asked* ourselves, and this has not been done before. The religious crisis was much more powerful for us than for past generations. [...] The mistake that was made before us—and that is still made by some university professors—we have not made. Because we have known a more complete life. We have had experiences that have led us to reason, arts, and mysticism. We are the first to distinguish between these planes of reality, and we understand that each of us has his own life and laws. Striking us painfully and precociously, life has brought us closer to realities unknown to others.

This is the reason inner life is so cruel to us, so diverse, so protean, so painful. Within us, the *Spirit* wins. We have understood that life is worth the pains it takes to make the Spirit concrete, alive, and actual. The Spirit—as we understand it—is not the Hegelian one. Nor is it the ideal of sentimental youths. It is the conscience of a life that has to be lived, absorbed, and educated carefully; the obsession with spiritual values that must be singled out, analyzed and disseminated.

Do not believe that we only mumble this word—*Spirit*—like helpless children, after having read it in books and encountered it in Western polemics. Later on, we shall demonstrate that we understand it and live it. We are not intimidated by the self-sufficient sarcasm of intelligent elders, nor by the reprimands of grown-ups, nor by the jokes of imbeciles of both sexes, or by the indifference of those who pretend to be our spiritual leaders today, or by the barren indifference of university professors. We shall demonstrate that we know our power well enough to look them in the eye with heads held high, and to weigh their assaults. And as we know that we will come up against opposition, we shall not wait, but strike first.

We shall conquer the values that do not spring from political economy, or from technology, or parliamentarianism. The pure, spiritual, absurdly spiritual values; the values of Christianity. This shall be understood later on, when we look into the need for mysticism. Therefore, one of the features of the rising generation will be the critique of sufficient reason, opposition to all the post-positivist ideas that still survive in these regions. We feel and explain the need for functional pluralism of the conscience. By distinguishing among certain levels, we understand that the most thorough logician can, at the same time, be a mystic, as well as an avant-garde artist. [...]

Consequently, we are the first generation to be tortured by the imperative of synthesis. It can be understood only by pondering the multiple preoccupations that torment and delight us. And especially the manner in which we valorize and transport elements of culture that we assimilate. We do not stay neutral, mere onlookers, or compellers. We give life and synthesize, organically, with force and intuition springing from our authentic inner being. It is a sign of the times, the tendency to synthesize. But we, the youth, will manage to accomplish the most complete synthesis, becoming one with the personality itself. This is because we know and endure the mystic experience, with all its ferments, forces, cohesion, and lights that descend it into the soul. [...]

We do not wish to be told that what is proposed in this “Itinerary” does not correspond to reality. That youth, even those belonging to the elite, are not always like the ones depicted here. The survey that we carried out among

friends and foes justifies all the statements. And if, by any chance, the *Itinerary* surpasses reality, much better for it. Our generation shall surpass itself too. Thus, the *Itinerary* shall not be content to just note down [things]; it shall be a guide.

Translated by Mária Kovács

AHMET HAMDİ TANPINAR: ON EAST AND WEST

Title: *Şark ve Garp* (East and West); and *Asıl kaynak* (The real source)
Originally published: *Şark ve Garp* in *Yeni adam*, no. 17 (April 23, 1934), pp. 8–9; and no. 18 (April 30, 1934), p. 8. *Asıl kaynak* in *Ülkü*, 38 (April 16, 1943), pp. 13–14.

Language: Turkish

The excerpts used are from *Şark ve Garp* is included in *Mücevherlerin sırrı* (Istanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2002), pp. 31–37; and *Asıl kaynak* can be found in *Yaşadığım gibi* (Istanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 1996), pp. 40–43.

About the author

Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar [1901 (Istanbul) – 1962 (Istanbul)]: novelist, poet, and essayist. The son of a judge of Islamic law, Tanpınar spent his youth in different parts of Anatolia, due to his father's peripatetic career. In 1918, he returned to Istanbul and enrolled in the Faculty of Letters in the School of Sciences (*Darülfünun*—later Istanbul University). After his graduation in 1923 (the year the Turkish Republic was officially declared), he worked as a high school teacher in different Anatolian towns. In 1933, he returned to Istanbul and started teaching at the Academy of Fine Arts. In 1939, he was appointed to the newly founded chair of modern Turkish literature in Istanbul University. Between 1942 and 1946, during the single party regime, he represented the Republican People's Party in Parliament. In 1949, he returned to his chair in Istanbul University and taught there until his death in 1962. Tanpınar was well versed in Ottoman as well as European literature. His poetry developed under the influence of the French symbolists as well as of traditional Ottoman (and neo-traditional Republican) masters. In his novels, he portrays the dilemmas and inner struggles of the Turkish individual within the social context of the Republican period. His main characters feature the perplexed victims of a profound cultural crisis that goes back to the westernizing reforms of the *Tanzimat* period. They inhabit an atmosphere dominated by an acute sense of loss and rootlessness, and are characterized by their common failure to cope with the past, to face the present and to produce coherent values and novel meanings connected to the local realities of the Turkish cultural setting. One of the most complex intellectual figures of the Republican period, Tanpınar was largely neglected during his lifetime. After his death, his works were reprinted by a conservative publishing house. His popularity, however, grew in

the 1990s, as his elaborate and highly nuanced approach to art and culture was rediscovered by a new generation of intellectuals more attuned to postmodern theories.

Main works: *Abdullah Efendi'nin rüyaları* [Abdullah Efendi's dreams] (1942); *Mahur beste* [Composition in the *mahur* mode] (orig. 1944, as installments in a newspaper—first published as a book in 1975); *Beş şehir* [Five cities] (1946); *Huzur* [Peace of mind] (1949); *19. Asır Türk edebiyatı tarihi* [History of 19th-century Turkish literature] (1949); *Sahnenin dışındakiler* [The ones offstage] (orig. 1950, as installments in a newspaper—first published as a book in 1973); *Yaz yağmuru* [Summer rain] (1956); *Şiirler* [Poems] (1961); *Saatleri ayarlama enstitüsü* [The time regulation institute] (1962).

Context

In these two essays, Tanpınar addresses a question that constitutes the fulcrum of his literary and intellectual outlook, developing a constellation of arguments around dichotomous concepts such as East and West, tradition and progress, and past and present. He diagnoses the unresolved cultural/civilizational crisis that haunted Turkish society after a hundred years of avid progress towards the West. The problem, according to Tanpınar, is that the East and the West constitute separate and incompatible cultural universes; they employ entirely different epistemological tools for the production of meaning and provide distinctive mental patterns for the construction and interpretation of reality. Tanpınar contends that the genuine and coherent sense of “reality” that presided over the Ottoman world, with the unique life patterns, values, mores, and tastes that it prescribed, was irremediably disturbed by the westernizing reforms of the *Tanzimat* in the 19th century. He believed that because the *Tanzimat* lacked a solid intellectual groundwork, it strove to engraft the western mentality onto the innately dissimilar fabric of Ottoman culture in a most superfluous fashion. The unlikely cultural amalgam, which cost Ottoman culture its harmony and creative originality, is characterized by Tanpınar as displaying “the gaudy spectacle of a colonial city.”

But Tanpınar does not share the reductionist and simplistic anti-western attitude endemic to many Republican conservatives such as Peyami Safa, nor does he entertain an abstract and exalted Muslim/Eastern identity embedded in its mystical cocoon of tradition. The West is in no way inferior to the East. It stands upon a rich and harmonious sense of reality that proffers an immense creative potential. Neither does Tanpınar embrace the stock contrast between the “material” West and the “spiritual” East, the former being morally decadent and hence harmful for its “unsullied” counterpart. In fact,

Tanpınar posits a more subtle contrast between the “real” and the “contrived;” between the genuinely meaningful products of a cultural universe and the superficial appropriations culled of other cultures (that is, shallow and feigned “representations” of what is deemed to be European in the Ottoman context).

The first article included here represents the earlier stage of Tanpınar’s intellectual career, when he was, in his own words, an “inveterate westernist,” defying all aspects of Eastern culture. Putting forth the East and the West as two separate and irreconcilable entities, he assumes the more categorical position of the Republican mainstream and defends the wholesale adoption of western civilization, at the expense of dismissing all ambivalent and “defunct” forms of the late Ottoman past. His enthusiastic pro-westernizing stance is coupled with an ironic but characteristically Early Republican anti-imperialist sentiment. Tanpınar defines Turkish modernization as a victory gained against restrictive Orientalist categories imposed by the colonizing West. Nevertheless, he does not embrace the top-down modernizing agenda of the state, but claims that it is on the level of ordinary people and their everyday practices that western forms will be thoroughly digested and appropriated. As novel meanings are created by “life itself” in Turkey, the East/West quandary will be resolved conclusively in a collective fashion.

In the 1940s, Tanpınar develops his conception of “life,” as the essential source of cultural change and regeneration, into a more coherent and systematic argument. Influenced, like many other early Republican intellectuals, by the spiritualist-intuitionist philosophy of Henri Bergson, Tanpınar defines life as a collective and impulsive energy that creates myriad but consanguine cultural meanings. But his central concept of “life forms” (*hayat şekilleri*) entails a more aesthetically charged rendition of culture, whereby common values and meanings are directly informed by the distinctive artistic sensitivities and cultivated lifestyles of a certain society. Culture and civilization are regarded, above all, as matters of taste. And it is the overarching and uniform order of taste (which must be understood, in its broadest sense, as an aesthetically loaded conception of mentality) that ensures the harmony, authenticity and creative potential of a distinct culture. Hence, for Tanpınar, Ottoman/Turkish Islam stands apart from the rest of the Muslim world as a unique cultural sphere due to its embeddedness in the specific life forms (that is, artistic traditions, customs, patterns of everyday life, etc.) of its particular setting.

In the second essay, rather than advocating the dismissal of traditional life forms, Tanpınar places emphasis on the need to establish a sense of continu-

ity between the past and present, and acclaims the growing effort in Turkish society to renegotiate the accumulated heritage of the Ottoman past (which, in his case, comprises not only the folk tradition extolled by the Republican cultural elite, but more specifically the inheritance of Ottoman urban culture). The past is important in so far as it informs and regenerates the evolving life forms of a particular culture, and as long as it serves as a basis for re-creating the society.

Turkish culture is portrayed by Tanpınar as a highly unique and complex entity that stands on a fault line between the East and the West, carrying, in its mental universe, aspects of both worlds. A unique and genuine cultural synthesis, which will transcend these divergent categories, can only be achieved by understanding and mobilizing the creative impulses and the pulsating rhythms of life in Turkey. Thus, the author claims that Turkey's "real source," its "true heritage," is located neither in the past nor in the West. It exists in the fluctuating realities of life itself, which "stands before us as a massively entangled skein." Tanpınar's highly complex and nuanced conservatism harks back to the 19th-century organicist intellectual tradition. Rejecting the mechanistic culture/civilization dichotomy proposed by **Ziya Gökalp**, as well as the uncompromising progressivism of the Kemalist cultural revolution, Tanpınar's call for re-establishing a sense of continuity with the Ottoman past is indicative of a period of relative restoration in Republican culture, starting with the 1940s, when many intellectuals (from within or beyond the conservative circles) addressed the question of "cultural crisis" and rupture caused by the process of intense westernization.

AE

East and West

The author of these lines is aware that a single East is non-existent, and that words such as "the East" or "Eastern civilization" do not carry specific meanings on their own. In spite of all this, the author's persistent usage of these terms from the title onwards is due to his perception of the word "East" as being tantamount to a mentality and a collection of civilizations that stand as Europe's primary and irrevocable other.

Perhaps it would have been more appropriate if he used the word "Asia." But then one would have to use "Europe" as a counterpart, while "the West" is something larger than Europe. In any case, this author does not have the right to be too scrupulous about this issue, as the terms of the East/West pair-

ing have long been employed by those who embarked upon such a comparison. However, it should be noted that the majority of the opinions afforded in this little essay were conceived mainly with the Muslim East in mind. That we remind the reader of such an emphasis, however, should not be taken as a reluctance on our part to extend these ideas to other civilizations of the East—as there are not many reasons to justify such a reluctance.

While the East/West quandary is an issue that has been resolved by life itself in Turkey, it continues to be an area of intense debate within intellectual circles. This is one of the essential weaknesses of ideology; when it fails to keep up with life, ideology creates its own ethereal universe and remains embedded in its own illusions. A fine pastime indeed, for those who want to sharpen their skills in debate. We poets frequently engage in such games, but only in relation to impenetrable artistic problems.

Unquestionably, there is something irresolvable about the East/West question when it is tackled on an intellectual level—the distance between the fundamentals of these two civilizations is too broad to suggest a possibility of union. [...]

The basic error of the *Tanzimat* was its ambition to unite the two universes, namely the East and the West. This uncanny desire was voiced by the intellectual Şinasi¹ in the form of the following motto: “Uniting the pristine ideas of Europe with the ancient wisdom of Asia.” Acceptable as a dream, this eloquent phrase was, nevertheless, too deficient as a life program. The *Tanzimat* did not lack ambitious and idealist devotees; what was flawed was the very ideal upon which it was founded. Impulsively and without much forethought, Ottoman intellectuals adopted the self-defensive reflexes of a state that strove to save the day at any cost. The *Tanzimat* did not produce its philosophers. It did not understand Europe and was too ingrained within the East. Ottoman intellectuals admired Europe to the fullest extent. But, contrary to their assumptions, Europe’s divergence from the East did not start with the French Revolution. Europe differed from the eastern mentality and civilization not through the declaration of human rights, but through its innate dynamism and its distinctive capacity to create. The 1789 declaration was among the myriad consequences of this dynamism—perhaps it was the most resplendent of all, but not the most fundamental. Şinasi sought to unite this very dynamism with the *sagesse*² of a static existence. Do we need to describe the child that is born out of this marriage; a freak of nature that is

¹ See İbrahim Şinasi, *Odes*.

² Wisdom (the italicized words in French are the author’s).

inflicted with a new kind of boil on his misshapen belly every day. Şinasi's generation and their successors would have been so powerful had they been able to discover the immutable nature of the dualism that they faced. [...]

The steamship is indeed a more perfected form of the sailboat, and the factory a more orderly and efficient version of the workshop, while the frock coat and trousers represent an alternative modeling of the mantle and the robe. Nonetheless, the sailboat and the workshop served the same functions as their modern variants. What actually lies behind all these changes is an inquisitive spirit, a lifestyle that neither tolerates repose nor contents itself with existing needs, a mind that forces the gates of every possibility, and lastly, a type of man who is completely alien to any form of escapist delectation. This is what we have not been able to realize.

The *Tanzimat* achieved the ideals shaped by the limits of its own foresight. It did not seize the West, but brought its transportable aspects to the East, representing them one by one. But truly, is there anything easier to represent than a machine that is disengaged from the workspace from which it originated; a workspace where riddles of *probabilité* are being tackled?

The determinism of Turkish history is not constituted by such and such defeats or easily avoidable individual events. Our historic destiny was to join the West. The *Tanzimat* failed to recognize this goal as it only sought urgent remedies to daily needs. [...]

Europe laughed at the *Tanzimat* while applauding it. The colonialist mentality was all-pervasive. Yet, the westerners could not regard the awakening of the "western [Republican] Turk" in such condescending terms; the magnanimous smile is now replaced by a deep and quizzical frown. The reason for the desperate rage of Maurice Bedel [a contemporary traveler] is not that he was unable to view strange costumes, or walk through filthy narrow streets that culminated in a coffeehouse shaded by a large plane tree. He is enraged because we deprived him of the degenerate pleasure to witness a profound *inferiorité*. Alas, how delighted Pierre Loti was.³ Those were the days, when they came, walked around among us, and returned, savoring the pride of their superiority and thrilled to be Europeans. With the advent of the westernizing Turk, today's Europe needs to face the gravity of the threat that has been haunting it for a while. Aging Europe has many reasons for dismiss-

³ Pierre Loti (1850–1923) (pseudonym of Julien Viaud) was a French novelist and naval officer. Infatuated with the East, and especially with Istanbul, he authored many orientalist fantasies, including the popular novels *Aziyadé* (1879), and *Les Désenchantées* (1906).

ing the prospect of expanding its borders. Thus it feels the need to observe and acknowledge new Turkey as it is, devising novel and alternative approaches every day in order to tackle this difficult matter. Europe is as yet unable to grasp the essence of the present state of affairs, but surely, one day it will.

Translated by Ahmet Ersoy

The real source

The Turkish national soul is separated from its contemporaries today by a highly particular destiny shaped by a deep-seated tragedy. The tragedy pertains to an inner struggle between two great universes. On the one hand, we move towards the West with the forceful impetus of historical necessity, and on the other, we fail to resist an inner voice when it speaks to us with the true essence of the past. Such an ordeal, as experienced on a national scale, is quite unparalleled in history, only comparable perhaps to times of massive migrations, separations and reunions that change the face of continents ... The change is decisive in our case, so much that at one point it even threatened the very notion of "continuity," which constitutes the basis of national existence. This essential confrontation, witnessed in customs, culture, institutions, and in every aspect of daily life, was a great drawback for Turkey. But now, as we leave behind many major obstacles, it can even be regarded an important resource. [...]

Events would have unfolded differently had an intellectual groundwork been prepared for the [westernization] movement, or if the period between the 18th century and the *Tanzimat* had not been wasted. But with a ruined *madrassa* system, a disarrayed economic life, and the borders [of the empire] becoming more vulnerable every day, there was not much time to contemplate more thoroughly ... There were only two options: wiping out the past and building something entirely anew, or nurturing the new alongside a past that is left, as it is, to deteriorate on its own. The scarcity of resources and the threat of reactionary forces compelled the architects of the *Tanzimat* to opt for the second option. And hence, our life was severed into two, transforming itself into the gaudy spectacle of a colonial city. [...]

The eradication that started with the Republic in 1923 put an end to the unequal struggle between old and new. Once we eliminated the half-dead life forms, those institutional relics rendered ineffective by the new synthesis, we

began to discern the great reality of our life. Today, far and wide, we witness the beginnings of a rightful respect for the past ... But is this sufficient? I believe that neither respecting history nor knowing and admiring the West is enough for us. History, after all, is a time that has passed; it can only endure if we keep on contributing to it with our inner selves. And we; we are not even “today,” we are tomorrow. The real duty of every generation starts by preparing for what comes after it. What we really need to do is to create novel life forms in this land. We can only regard the East and the West as two separate sources, both of which, to a considerable extent, occupy our reality. But their individual existence does not constitute an asset in and of itself. It only compels us to forge a broad and pervasive synthesis, an individual and distinctive life of our own. Our inner confrontation and negotiation can be rendered productive only on the basis of such a synthesis; which can, in turn, be achieved by unearthing the third source, that is the “reality of this land.”

The virtue of our ancestors derived from the fact that their lives were genuine and real. Similarly, the fundamental virtue of Western civilization rests upon a single reality, by which it is engendered and advanced. Thus, our true heritage is located neither in the past nor in the West. It exists in our very life, which stands before us as a massively entangled skein. We shall be able to perform the great role designed for us by our particular history and geography when we start dwelling upon the problems of our own life, and when we consider these problems as the core of our own intellectual universe, not as its obligatory way-stations. Then the chain of “continuity” will be restored within us, and we shall occupy the place we deserve in the contemporary world with a unifying outlook informed by our own life-perspective. Then the whole torment of carrying out a precarious existence in the middle of two disconnected universes will pay off with the blessings of a true life.

Translated by Ahmet Ersoy

LEOPOLD ANDRIAN: AUSTRIA THROUGH THE PRISM OF THE IDEA

Title: *Österreich im Prisma der Idee. Katechismus der Führenden* (Austria through the prism of the Idea. Catechism for the leaders)

Originally published: Leopold von Andrian, *Österreich im Prisma der Idee. Katechismus der Führenden* (Graz: Schmidt-Dengler, 1937)

Language: German

The excerpts used are from the original edition, pp. 201, 226–27.

About the author

Leopold Andrian (full name Leopold Freiherr Ferdinand von Andrian zu Werburg) [1875, Berlin – 1951, Fribourg (Switzerland)]: author, dramatist, cultural politician, career diplomat. A friend of the poet **Hugo von Hofmannsthal**, his early poetic works were likewise published by the German aesthetic radical Stefan George in 1894. A year later his best-known work appeared, soon becoming a key text associated with the literary decadence of the Viennese *fin-de-siècle*: *Der Garten der Erkenntnis* [The garden of knowledge]. After graduating in Law in 1899, Andrian joined Austria-Hungary's Ministry of Foreign Affairs with a number of overseas postings, culminating in promotion to General Consul in Warsaw (1911–1914, 1915–1917). During the First World War, he helped formulate the Monarchy's war aims, and in 1918 took up joint directorship of the Vienna Burgtheater. Informed by conservative, Catholic and patriotic (that is: Austrian-separatist) views, which overlapped with those of Hofmannsthal, this role did not outlast the war, but Andrian found outlets in political writing and other activities, for instance the former's "Austrian Library" project of the war years, and the Salzburg Festival (est. 1920). In the years before the *Anschluss* (1938) he published works reflecting conservative-patriotic views out of step with Nazi thinking, and his literary output declined. Andrian fled to South America during the Second World War, returning to Europe to settle in Switzerland. He is now mainly remembered for his single significant literary work, *Der Garten der Erkenntnis*, and for the evolution of his pro-Austrian sympathies into communion with the country's fascist-inspired rulers of 1934–1938.

Main works: *Der Garten der Erkenntnis* [The garden of knowledge] (1895); *Hannibal* (1888); *Gedichte* [Poems] (1913); *Die Ständeordnung des Alls. Rationales Weltbild eines katholischen Dichters* [The Estates of the Cosmos. A Catholic poet's rational view of the World] (1930); *Österreich im Prisma der Idee. Katechismus der Führenden* [Austria through the prism of the Idea. Catechism of the leaders] (1937); *Erinnerungen an meinen Freund* [Memories of my friend] (1949).

Context

That the fall of the Habsburg Monarchy led not only to calls for *Anschluss* with Germany, but to a persistent discussion about Austria's separate course, has frequently been overshadowed by two factors: the jubilation that greeted Hitler's entry to Vienna in 1938; and the sharp, sustained ideological division within Austria itself. The second factor, symbolized by the short Civil War of 1934, and the subsequent imposition of authoritarian rule along fascist-inspired lines until 1938, resoundingly informs historiography on the First Austrian Republic. It rightly stresses political division between Left and Right, and a weakly rooted sense of Austria possessing a separate "nationhood." This weakness is seen to have derived both from its lack of commonality with modern nationalist movements that stressed ethno-racial and linguistic factors, as opposed to historical and cultural arguments; and from the lack of time since the collapse of the Habsburg Monarchy for any such new self-definition to have gained traction.

But while these patterns are hard to dispute, by the early 1930s there was nevertheless plentiful evidence of a renewed, if tentative Austrian self-consciousness in public life and culture: for instance in the newly configured repertoire of Vienna's Burgtheater, with a glut of high-profile plays and gala performances stressing glorious episodes in Austria's past; and at the self-consciously Austrian culture-affirming Salzburg Festival. To what extent the public received these projections of an Austrian culture as affirmations of a politicized view of its separate fate and course from Germany is moot, since such efforts were in any case outrun by the *Anschluss* in 1938. And yet, the existence of the fascist-inspired authoritarian state from 1934–38, run according to an explicit agenda of "Austrian" patriotism, is testament to the ongoing strength of discourses about Austrian separatism, on which this contested state explicitly drew. Those discourses contained four fundamental components, as propounded in the agenda-setting Trabrennplatz speech of its first Chancellor, Engelbert Dollfuss (1892–1934), in 1933: Christian, German, Authoritarian, and the revived medieval concept of corporatism, in explicit counterpoint to modern democracy and social organization according to class.

Popular appeal or its absence notwithstanding, this new state did not exist in a vacuum, but absorbed re-readings of Austrian history that stressed its historical role as the counter-revolutionary vanguard of the German lands, in explicit counterpoint to Prussian-ruled, post-1871 Bismarckian Germany. Central to this project was Austria's Catholicism, conceived both in doctrinal

terms and as a spiritual projection of an order and world-view that reflected the value system of the Habsburgs, as “universalist” monarchs ruling over a multinational realm. Leopold Andrian’s was one of several overlapping voices propounding these ideas, although his 1937 coda, presented here in extract form, is more explicit than earlier, less directly programmatic works by other cultural commentators, such as those by his lifelong friend Hugo von Hofmannsthal.

As an aristocrat, a diplomat formerly in the service of the supranational Empire, and also a writer who found brief fame in the late 1890s, Andrian was a firm believer in what Hofmannsthal had in 1917 called “the Austrian Idea.” Andrian’s title is a refraction of this shared concern with Austria as a spiritual projection deriving its existential necessity from culture and history rather than ethno-nationalism; his emblematic subtitle points to the explicitly Catholic dimensions of that interpretation (“Catechism for the leaders”). The subtitle also reflects the literal connections with Catholicism that the new state sought to embody: Dollfuss had proudly proclaimed that Austria would be the world’s first state to incorporate actively the teachings of two papal encyclicals, *Rerum Novarum* (1891), and in particular, *Quadragesimo anno* (1931), into the fabric of the state’s constitution.

The four interlocutors in this work represent spiritual and political leaders in the reconfigured, post-1934 authoritarian Austria: a middle-aged noble (likely a self-projection by Andrian); a priest; a poet; and a young officer of Austria’s right-wing paramilitary, the *Heimwehr*. They trace the development of an Austrian consciousness that is separate from Germany; and they associate the authoritarian state in Austria fashioned by Dollfuss as necessary for maintaining an organic continuity with the social structures of the past. The state, as a manifestation of the “Austrian idea” (which itself is counter-revolutionary, since it is Catholic and founded on a Habsburg model) is construed as a bulwark against the “tyranny” of equality unleashed by the French Revolution. But the conversation in this extract also, in generational form, makes manifest the clash between a radical vision of technical modernity (as voiced by the *Heimwehr* officer) with the notions of precedence, tradition, and of “genius” being found in the past more than in modern invention (as voiced by the poet). The prevailing views of the older generations (the poet and nobleman) are those given greater emphasis by Andrian in his work, and link explicitly to his (then-current) views of Austria as an encapsulation and symbolic projection of an “older” set of European values, in contradistinction to those emerging from the technocratically modern states of Italy and (Nazi) Germany.

On the question of Austria's symbolic role, the contrasts as well as the similarities between two very public representatives of "The Austrian Idea," Hofmannsthal and Andrian, are ultimately revealing. While Andrian's writing overlaps with Hofmannsthal's wartime essays substantially in the affirmation of a separate Austrian consciousness, it differs in his explicit suggestion that Austrian culture, although part of German culture, is a superior variant thereof. Hofmannsthal, in his well-known essay, "Writing as the spiritual space of the Nation," pointedly does not make this distinction, but merges the two. Andrian therefore represents one of Austria's most staunch and sustained separatist thinkers of the interwar period, which even led him to choose Hofmannsthal himself as the representative of a "Greater Austrian" type and mentality, as illustrated by the essays "Hofmannsthal und die Österreichische Jugend" and "Die Sprache des Österreichers" (both published in the journal *Vaterland* in 1934/35). And yet, the book presented here in extract form represents a divergence from Hofmannsthal. The latter died in 1929, before the establishment of the authoritarian state; his stance towards Catholicism, as Andrian acknowledged in published correspondence, was more symbolic than doctrinaire; and his literary talent and interest, political inclinations notwithstanding, stood the test of time. Andrian's oeuvre, and with it our memory of him, is slighter.

RP

Austria through the prism of the Idea

NOBLEMAN: I did in fact fully agree with the conclusions of your speech since I like you, and probably like the other two, am a Legitimist. But please explain to me what you really meant when you said: "We Austrians are the carriers of the true German culture?"

HEIMWEHR OFFICER: Do I really need to explain this sentence? When half, no, more than half of the current German Reich belonged to Slavdom and barbarism, Austria was a German land of culture from whose cloisters and courts educated men, artists, and saints had sprung.

NOBLEMAN: I have to admit honestly that I am not fully satisfied by your explanation. Because we had real German culture in the middle ages, it does not necessarily follow that we do so now. You think that we have it, but what are you trying to suggest by that? That we possess it and the Germans across the border do not, or that Austrians and Germans possess one and the same culture? To me personally, it is doubtful whether our time is a time of culture at all within the whole European space. But if it indeed is, then we

Austrians, I think, have a particular culture, namely an Austrian one indeed. [...] At the very least I would not know wherein the culture of a German secondary school teacher would be similar to mine. But before we answer the question of German and Austrian culture, and that of the cultureless culture of our epoch, one ought to be clear what one means by the very concept. [...]

HEIMWEHR OFFICER: I cannot agree with you on all points. Both of you talk about our time as one of decay and decline. You must not be angry with me when I tell you my opinion quite openly. You older ones talk about decay, because you come from a time of decline, from the “long” 19th century. Young people were proud of being called decadent then, and that’s in fact what they were. We young people of today are not decadent, and we believe that we are living in a totally new, great age. Is it not peculiar that your older generation, which marvels at all the great new innovations it partakes in, and of which you had no clue in your youth, considers the time it bequeathed to you as one of decay? Motion pictures, aeroplanes and radios and all the many other unutterable fairy-tale-like things that every year brings you—all of that counts for nothing? What a strange time of decay, that invents more new things in the course of a decade than previously in an entire century!? And about the state of politics? One might think what one likes about the conditions in Germany or Italy, but one cannot deny that in the 19th century old corrupt institutions like, for example, democratic parliamentarism tended towards dissolution, while now, following the War, new thoughts that are not inhabited in any way by decay have created new forms in which the fundamental political ideas of ruling and obeying, which were misconceived by the liberalism of the pre-war age, can play themselves out! That which you look upon as a time of decay seems to me to be the Springtime of a new epoch. And a second thing to add to that: you all constantly talk of understanding, explaining, defining. I believe that you, the older generation, all of you, overestimate people’s intellectual capabilities. The will, driven on by the instincts of the soul or, in my opinion, of the blood, creates greatness, and the intellect can only explain it unwillingly and retroactively, and it is also quite right that it does so. Because of this I in no way want to withdraw from the discussion, and also believe that it will lead to good results. All I wanted to say is that I do not see the creative power that yields greatness in the intellect.

POET: I would like to ask you, my dear Franzl, to consider that the ingenious inventions that you attribute to the present, and you mainly are thinking of technical ones that have been made by men, arose from the supposed time of decay. Naturally, an era’s greatness does not derive from its technical in-

ventions. Now, it is a highly striking phenomenon which you young ones, if you are objective, cannot ignore completely, namely that the real great ones that you refer to as your leaders in the arts and sciences belong to the generation that came before your own. It appears that around the turn of the century the genius of the age began to fade. He who was born later, insofar as we have been able to judge until now, was prevented from appropriating, carrying out and representing with energy or indeed fanaticism that which the greater, older generation and its predecessors had shown him. I make do with referring to Nietzsche, the philosopher, [Stefan] George, the poet, but also to great figures that rule the present-day generation like Lenin and Mussolini. And the list may be extended to all areas of life for pages and pages. First of all, I would not like to discuss whether the present is in a state of growth or decline. What is certain is that this time, whatever it is, has without exception become what it is due to people who came from the previous century. And do not tell me that the century is too young to show the measure of its importance. At the age of thirty-five Napoleon had fought his greatest battles, Mozart and Rafael had created the greatest works of beauty. There will hardly have been a hero who did not reveal the spirit that gave birth to him by the middle of his fourth decade. The thing I particularly like about this new time, personally speaking, is that it pays homage to the ideal figure of the leader, in other words to the great individual. However, because it fundamentally subordinates the individual to the collective, the idea of the leader must be restricted by the idea of the wider community.

Translated by Robert Pyrah

MIHÁLY BABITS: MASS AND NATION

Title: *A tömeg és a nemzet* (Mass and nation)

Originally published: *Pesti Napló*, 15 May 1938.

Language: Hungarian

The excerpts used are from Mihály Babits, *Esszék, tanulmányok* (Budapest: Szépirodalmi, 1978), pp. 568–573.

About the author

Mihály Babits [1883, Szekszárd (Southern Hungary) – 1941, Budapest]: poet, essayist, writer, and translator. He came from a Catholic middle-class family; his father was a judge. He attended the Cistercian gymnasium in Pécs and, between 1901 and 1905, the University of Budapest, where he specialized in Hungarian and Latin. In 1906, he obtained a teacher's certificate and, until 1918, taught in secondary schools in Szeged, Fogaras (Făgăraș, present-day Romania), and Budapest. His early works had a strong formalist tinge, though they were rooted in impressionism and symbolism. From 1908 onwards, he contributed to the most important modernist periodical, *Nyugat* [The West], and, in 1916, became its editor. In 1918, he supported the democratic Revolution. In 1919, the Communist government appointed him professor of world literature and modern Hungarian literature at the University of Budapest. Consequently, after the fall of the Hungarian Soviet Republic, he was violently attacked, lost his position and was forced to self-criticism. From the mid-twenties, he re-emerged as the chief figure of the cultural camp around *Nyugat*. In 1927, he became administrator of the Baumgarten Foundation, which was the chief sponsor of modernist culture in Hungary at the time. He translated numerous works from English, French, German, Greek, Italian, and Latin, most importantly the *Divina Commedia* by Dante. In the 1930s, he advocated a Christian-Humanist cultural synthesis, while upholding the principles of political liberalism. During the late 1930s, he emerged as one of the symbolic figures of the anti-totalitarian cultural camp. He is considered to be one of the most important Hungarian poets and essayists of the 20th century.

Main works: *Levelek Írisz koszorújából* [Leaves from the wreath of Iris] (1909); *Gólyakalifa* [Stork Caliph] (1916); *Irodalmi problémák* [Literary problems] (1917); *Halálfiái* [Sons of death] (1927); *Élet és irodalom* [Life and literature] (1929); *Az istenek halnak, az ember él* [The Gods die, the Man lives] (1929); *Az európai irodalom története* [History of European literature] (1934); *Jónás könyve* [Book of Jo-

nah] (1939); *Írók két háború közt* [Writers between the two wars] (1941). His translations include *The Tempest* by Shakespeare (1916), *Eternal Peace* by Kant (1918), *Divina Commedia* by Dante (1913–1923), *Les fleurs du mal* by Baudelaire (together with Lőrinc Szabó and Árpád Tóth, 1923), and *King Oedipus* by Sophocles (1931).

Context

With the seemingly unstoppable rise of totalitarianism across Europe, the 1930s brought along a sharp debate about the nature of modernity in Hungary as well. The emergence of a group of politicians (the most important among whom was Gyula Gömbös, Prime Minister between 1932 and 1936), seeking to impose on the society a “Revolution from the Right,” challenged the traditional conservative political elite associated with the “consolidation-regime” of Count István Bethlen (Prime Minister between 1921 and 1931). This development alarmed some of the conservative reformist intellectuals (such as **Gyula Szekfű**), and pushed them towards a broader cooperation with the more liberal groups, whom they previously criticized for their presumed “cosmopolitanism.” The debate was further complicated by the ambivalent role of populism in Hungarian culture. On the one hand, populists proposed a democratic transformation of the country, while, on the other hand, they tried to reformulate the national discourse in ethnic terms. They thus wavered between ethnically based social radicalism, which was also present in the rhetoric of the extreme right, and the anti-totalitarian camp dominated by bourgeois liberals and moderate conservatives.

One of the crucial debates between the ethno-radicals and the conservative-liberals centered on the concept of the nation. The latter group reverted to Szekfű's arguments, asserting that only the traditional discourse of “political nationhood” could serve the interests of Hungary. This discourse offered the perspective of reintegration of the “lost territories” into a multi-ethnic framework, and sought to avoid the “self-mutilating” consequences of excluding from “Hungarianness” the already assimilated groups. This debate experienced a new phase in 1938, when the successes of Nazi Germany in destroying the “Versailles system” also encouraged Hungarian revisionism. Some, however, questioned the Hungarian involvement with German politics, which, although motivated by the hope of recovering the “lost territories,” could instead lead to an unprecedented catastrophe and threaten the country's independence.

Mihály Babits, who in aesthetic terms underwent a neo-classical turn in the 1930s, was probably the most authoritative figure of the “liberal” camp,

and was respected by the moderate conservative cultural groups as well. He thus had a pivotal role in formatting the debate and in trying to create a common ground, as wide as possible, to fight the specter of totalitarianism. He turned to defend the values of universalism, connected to an idiom of “true” national identity and normative past, and to support the supra-ethnic concept of the nation along the lines of Szekfű’s historical narrative. Babits’s essays from the 1930s also witnessed his concern with the European debate on the crisis of Western civilization and the “betrayal of the intellectuals” (he also published an enthusiastic review essay about Julien Benda’s *La trahison des clercs*).

“Mass and nation” starts with a personal reference to the illness of the author, who returned to consciousness after his throat operation, only to learn about the major transformations which had taken place on the international scene, such as the *Anschluss*, and about the outburst of the debate on the necessity to introduce anti-Semitic legislation in Hungary. Babits compressed the divergence of opinions surrounding the collective identity of Hungarians into a counter-position based on the *nation* (understood in spiritual terms, as being the product of assimilation, in contrast to race) and the *mass* (understood, following Ortega y Gasset and the 1930s “crisis literature,” as a non-spiritual aggregation of people—shaped by the exclusivisms of class or race). For him, the conflict between the two equaled an apocalyptic struggle between Spirit and Barbarism, and he poses the question whether this fight might not ultimately result in the total self-destruction of the nation—the “death of the nation,” so often evoked by Romanticism. Along these lines, he denies that the modern ethnicist movements should be called nationalist, as nationalism, in his opinion, is the doctrine of the 19th century, rooted in universalism.

As a remedy, he advocates a return to the universalist potentials of national identity, coupled with “national culture,” which is the only regenerating force against barbarism. Against the totalitarian “Spirit of the Age,” he posits the “eternal spirit” of Hungarianness, fusing the pagan cult of liberty with the Christian repudiation of tribalism and with peaceful assimilation of the “aliens.” He refuses to take the “racial question” on its own terms (anti-Semitism, in the Hungarian context of the interwar period) and asserts that the acceptance of racial premises and the abandonment of the universalist aspiration of the national culture are eventually undermining Christianity. In the last paragraph, he turns away from political questions and formulates the profession of faith of the writer, the man of the Spirit, whose service is to “keep the purest moral traditions of his people, and prevent the evanescence

of the spirit of truth,” to cultivate the ideas of Humanity, and to respect the Spirit and Liberty in the dark times to come.

The most interesting aspect of the present text is that Babits, whose cultural affinities were rooted in literary modernism, integrated his political agenda within the framework of an ambiguous discourse with strong anti-modernist overtones. In his vision, the universalism of Christianity and Humanity were threatened by the misunderstood adoration of the “actual” and seemingly “fashionable” exclusivist ideologies of race and class. Criticizing these ideologies, he declared himself to be the “man of the past,” keeping to his “anachronistic” values, such as the integrative concept of nation, and the primacy of the Spirit over the material. Modernity is thus considered to be fundamentally destructive, connected to mass-politics and the upsurge of “barbarism.” At the same time, however, the political-cultural order he advocates is not that of anti-modernism, but partly of pre-modernity (the supra-ethnic concept of nation), or the modernity of the 19th century (linking national emancipation to civil equality). It is important to note, however, that later commentators of Babits’s interwar essays usually played down the anti-modernist aspects of these writings and praised him mainly for his heroic struggle to defend the values of modernity against totalitarian barbarism.

BT

Mass and nation

For five weeks I have floated in a strange state of unconsciousness. When I came round, the first news reaching me from the world was forbidding and almost apocalyptic. It was the news of Austria’s fall. Its waves shook even the walls of the secluded sanatorium, and for weeks I heard about nothing but a general atmosphere of panic, or, what was yet more depressive for me, uncritical, naive hopes. The stake seemed hazardous, beyond all concepts: all was about extremes. Hungary will perish. Hungary will regain its integrity. “We can get back all that was ours without striking a blow.” “*Hannibal ante portas*: we are all ruined.”

My head was spinning; I could not speak yet; my thoughts whirled in chaotic plans. I wanted to write; I was contemplating odes and essays about the fate of my nation, about the grave dangers of our situation, about the indestructible power of the Hungarian spirit that I firmly believe in because I feel it within myself. My lofty plans were upset by petty and sad questions, and there was no time to ponder on the distant future. The present broke in, and

with rather vile words at that. All around me the Jewish issue was debated along with the methods of bringing the press under regulation. The level of these topics kept sinking; I hardly felt that I had anything to do with them. All this talk was no longer about the nation: it was merely about classes, races and parties.

Why am I writing about this after all; what forces me still in a half-sick state to take up my pen? Politics has always been far removed from me, and it still is. I should never dream of having the naivety to believe that I could interfere in events. As an uninitiated, I would hardly dare to interfere. What must and what can be said here and now has already been told by others much more competent than me. This is not my field, the poet is an alien bird here. This is the struggle of races and classes; a struggle I cannot interfere in, since I stand on neither racial nor class ground. The pace is set by the rush of a barbarous age that is not mine. I come from an ancient, more spiritual age, where the most sacred tie was the bond of the nation, a spiritual tie. The present age despises the spirit and despises spiritual ties. It is a bad judge of this sad 20th century who deems it the "age of nationalism." The age of nationalism was the liberal 19th century, which created modern national communities through the very fact that it made their divergent components possessors of equal rights and partakers of a common culture and tradition. Our century now slackens these spiritual ties; it prefers the physical ties signified by race, and the community of interests represented by class.

And thus it destroys, under national slogans, the very principle of the nation.

As I said, I have nothing to do with this century: I have stopped feeling like a modern man for a long time. Nevertheless, I am overwhelmed by bitterness and anguish when this barbarian modernity intrudes in our Hungarian life and leaves its fingerprint on our sacraments. Up to now I liked to think that my nation was not a modern nation, soberly guarding its honored traditions and not snatching at political vogues. But as I pointed out, I am not one to express political criticism, having no competence in anything that is actual. A politician can seldom do what would be proper in theory and from a higher aspect: he will have to compromise with the circumstances and, in today's democratic world, with the moods of the masses. This is *Realpolitik*. Indeed I feel no envy for the adherent of *Realpolitik* who must come to terms with the moods of today's masses. The masses are not identical with the nation. Sometimes the nation lives in no more than one or two people, while there are thousands and thousands howling out in the street. There have been times when the Hungarian nation was surviving in only one or two men. At

other times it was in hiding, taking refuge in study rooms and peasant-cottages. The nation is the soul, and the masses are merely the body. Unfortunately, we live in the age of the body's reign, the age of the "revolt of the masses." The great dilemma of modern politics lies in this very fact. Who shall restore the spirit's one-time prestige in the eyes of the masses? Who shall persuade the many to follow the sober few? A frightful paradox of democracy indeed! A paradox that can only be resolved by a more thorough and more earnest culture in order to make amends for the horrific offences of mass culture and semi-education.

[...]

The future is surely dark and uncertain. Just by thinking of it, I am filled with alarmed questions that I cannot answer. How will we stand in Europe's great crises, with an impoverished spirit and faltering principles? How many of us, and which ones will profit from swimming with this hateful tide? And what will be the price of this profit? Won't we end up like Esau from the Bible, who forfeited sacred rights for a mess of pottage? Won't we crash into a grave economic catastrophe claspng this mess of pottage? And won't we risk, like a gambler, higher and higher stakes in spiritual and material goods once we are on the downward path? It is the spiritual part that I am most concerned about. What will we do if we are engulfed by the torrent of tyranny and barbarity that is waiting at the threshold in each corner of this sad Europe wherever human rights and public liberties are relented in the tiniest degree?

I am not the first one to raise these questions. They have been raised by the most prominent politicians of this small country. If they could not answer them, how could I do so? However, one thing I know for certain: the free Hungarian spirit may go through severe crises but it will never expire. I know this because I can feel it: I feel it just as I felt all through my long illness that I was not going to die. This feeling was dwelling deep under my consciousness; in the innermost corner of my soul I could not for a moment take the danger seriously. And, giddy, convalescing and still half-feverish, as I heard the first news about the dazzling political turns and the new, perilous situation of Hungary, I identified my state, as it were, with my homeland's: all this must be just a passing illness.

I feel the same way now, and I cannot take fright at the dilemma whether we will become Jews or Germans. I still want to believe that eventually the Jews and the Germans will become true Hungarians among us. Political vogues come and vanish. The *Zeitgeist* itself, which inspires them, will also vanish. Here in Hungary, however, beneath the *Zeitgeist*, outshouted but not

yet completely stifled by it, there exists another spirit not dependent of the *Zeitgeist*! It is the ancient, noble and Christian spirit of the Hungarian people, which had turned against barbarity, defied heathen tribal life and begun to assimilate strangers already in King St. Stephen's days.

It is this spirit that has yielded the moral strength and the means of survival for the European Hungary among cultured peoples. Our Eastern nature and Western culture intertwined in this spirit, blending a righteous chivalry with a judicious shrewdness. The heathen love of freedom was united with the Christian faith in peace and justice! And from their union there sprang forth, among other things, the Hungarian sense of rights, one of the prides of our nation.

The Hungarian Liberalism of the 19th century was a blossom of this very spirit. It was inspired by the purest Christian sentiment: humanity and a respect for the freedom of the human soul.

Could this have been just another vogue of the times, to be compared with today's base racial hatred as a vogue of the same rank? No, it was a moral consummation of the Christian conviction of the greatest Hungarian spirits! A logical application of Christ's principles—Christ for whom "there was no pagan and no Jew," who wished to judge men not as members of a race but as individuals; who intended all of us to be brothers and the human soul to be free from the powers of the world! Do you want to see his spirit as a mere *Zeitgeist*, obsolete or capable of becoming antiquated? Could it be that the most sacred truth of one age is only to be discarded as old rubbish in another? Far from it; what has been true once shall always remain true. And if everyone acts in contradiction to it, it still remains true. Two times two remains four even if five is written on all blackboards.

The racial issue and all questions related to it are minor things in themselves, and, as I said, I have nothing to do with them in actual fact. Moreover, I share Schopenhauer's opinion that race itself (as a material and breeding principle) is usually an ugly and repugnant thing. Human greatness, sanctity or spirit is always manifested in the individual and never in a race. But what is at stake here is more than a mere racial struggle and racial issue. What is at stake is in fact an issue of faith, and more specifically an issue of our Christian faith and not the Jewish question. Are we to advance on the path of Christian principles, as we have done for almost a thousand years, or are we to return in our emotions to tribal heathendom? Do we still believe in moral truths independent of time and space, as our religion teaches us to do? Or are we to believe only in trends of the time, the "truth of our race" and the "demands of the present days?" I am a Catholic. For me truth also can only be catholic; that is, universal, beyond races and centuries.

And this is why—as I say, still ill and in great pain—I have been scribbling this essay for nearly two weeks, almost line by line, instead of easing my conscience by just signing a timely political declaration. I have nothing to do with politics: what I have to do with is morals. This writing is a moral manifesto. The struggle of interests is no concern of mine. I am all the more concerned about what is above all struggling interests.

I am, I confess, unskilled in practical matters. I am no adherent of *Realpolitik*, and I cannot judge the necessities of the moment. In fact, my task is the very opposite of this! I do not have to adapt myself to the circumstances—and indeed I must not! I am a writer, a man of the spirit. Let the slaves of action flounder amidst their petty constraints, and let them help themselves and their parties the best they can. My calling is to safeguard my people's purest moral traditions and not to allow the spirit of justice to become obsolete. To keep awake the smarting anxiety of the conscience amidst the uproar of incipient barbarism. To preserve for a better age the despised notions of humanity, the honor of the spirit and freedom. These are the real sacraments of the nation. If we let them fall prey to the torrent, what material profit can compensate for them? If this happens, the nation may no longer remain a nation. (But merely a mass of people or a state.) And, for certain, Hungarians may no longer remain Hungarians!

Translated by Dávid Oláh

STANISŁAW IGNACY WITKIEWICZ: UNKEMPT SOULS

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About the author

Stanisław Ignacy Witkiewicz (Witkacy) [1885, Warsaw – 1939, Jezioro (Ukr. Velyki Ozero) near Dąbrowica, in present-day Ukraine]: playwright and novelist. He was born into a family of the intelligentsia with a long tradition of Polish irredentist activities (many of his male relatives took part in the Polish uprisings of the 19th century; most of them died either in fighting or in exile in Russia's eastern provinces). His father Stanisław Witkiewicz was a prominent writer, painter and above all an architect (he invented the “national” Polish style in architecture, based on the Carpathian folklore). Due to his father's radical leftist convictions, Stanisław Ignacy never attended a public school. He was home-schooled in the family house in Zakopane and entered the Academy of Arts in Cracow in 1904. Subsequently he traveled to Italy, France, and Germany. Shortly before the First World War he participated, as a photographer, in the ethnographical research conducted by Bronisław Malinowski in Australia and Oceania. After his return he was called up, as a Russian citizen, to the imperial army to serve as an officer of the elite Pavlovsky regiment and took part in the battles on the Galician front. According to some biographers, he also participated in the October Revolution as a member of the Soviet committee of his regiment. The Russian chapter of Witkacy's life remains unclear, however, due also to his own efforts to mystify and manipulate his past. After 1918, Witkacy participated in Polish literary life, writing literary-theoretical and philosophical treatises, plays, and novels, drawing portraits of members of the Polish intellectual and financial elite, and working on experimental photography. Witkacy rather willingly contributed to his portrayal as a bon-vivant, alcoholic, and drug-using outsider. In his

theoretical writings, he developed a theory of the “pure form,” maintaining that the social role of arts was metaphysical, not descriptive. He was deeply pessimistic about the prospects of Western culture. His expressionist theories (part of what in Polish cultural history is known as “formism”), elaborated in the 1920s, gained him warm appreciation from avant-garde circles. Soon thereafter, he returned to the position of an artistic outsider, creating his own catastrophic visions of the decline of the West in his later novels. When he believed his prophecies were being fulfilled—after the Soviet troops attacked Poland on 17 September 1939—Witkiewicz committed suicide. His popularity grew after 1945 and survived the political changes of the 1990s. Witkacy’s oeuvre was a chief inspiration for Tadeusz Kantor’s experimental theatre; his own plays were frequently staged in Polish theatres (with a significant interruption in the 1950s). In contrast, the philosophical influence of Witkacy remains limited.

Main works: *622 upadki Bunga, czyli Demoniczna kobieta* [622 falls of Bungo or the demonic woman] (written 1910, published 1972); *Tumor Mózgowicz* (1921); *Szkice estetyczne* [Aesthetic sketches] (1922); *Teatr i wstęp do teorii Czystej Formy w teatrze* [Theatre and an introduction to the theory of Pure Form in the theatre] (1923); *Pożegnanie jesieni* [Leave-taking of autumn] (1927); *Nienasylenie* [Dissatisfaction] (1930); *Nikotyna, alkohol, kokaina, peyotl, morfina, eter. Appendix* [Nicotine, alcohol, cocaine, peyotl, morphine, ether. Appendix] (1923); *Szewcy* [Shoemakers] (1957).

Context

Witkacy’s oeuvre is difficult to assess in its entirety due to the fact that an unknown part of it was destroyed during the 1944 Warsaw uprising. Almost all his works in arts and philosophy were marked by an attempt to question a wide array of intellectual and ideological affiliations and to express a distinct and unique position within, or rather outside of, contemporary cultural life. The personality of his father, Stanisław Witkiewicz, an acknowledged leftist intellectual and artist, seems to have stimulated his need to express his own personality through successive rejections of group identity. Raised in the Polish cultural and intellectual life of the early 20th century, Witkacy was familiar with most of the liberal elite in the re-created Polish state and—like many other representatives of this milieu—was sympathetic towards the “strong man” **Józef Piłsudski**. This sympathy is also present in *Niemyte dusze*. Some of Witkacy’s plays were interpreted as an ironic commentary on the shallowness of Polish parliamentary politics in the 1920s, similar to the ironic commentaries of Piłsudski. In the 1930s, he was preoccupied with the disastrous living conditions of the Silesian workers, an attitude rather coldly received by the authorities. Otherwise, he rarely offered political statements and concentrated mostly on his philosophical theories.

The text included here is characteristic of Witkacy's style of writing: it mixes philosophical and historical theories with personal impressions and an analysis of current political life in Europe. Sophisticated passages alternate with brutal statements, creating an ironic treatise on the Polish past, Polish national characteristics and some—rather dark—prospects. On the whole, the text was considered a bitter commentary on the shortcomings of the Polish state and its psychological profile in the face of growing brutality in international politics. His intellectual sources are the pessimistic visions of the pre- and inter-war period, focusing on decadence and the anticipation of a revolution that would bring European culture to its end. This latter view is often believed to be the result of Witkacy's first-hand experience of the Russian revolution. But unlike most pessimistic prophets of the early 20th century, he did not participate in the intellectual defense of the white "race." Instead, Witkacy acknowledged that the future of mankind belonged to Asia.

Another source of inspiration seems to have been the hypercritical analysis of Polish history, going back to the writings of the Cracow school. Witkacy questioned the noble democracy of the *Rzeczpospolita* (which, according to him, was a *contradictio in adjecto*, since democracy cannot be restricted to one social group). His critical attitude towards national history was derived from **Michał Bobrzyński's** works. The latter, and other "scandalous" books published in the interwar period, especially those by Karol Zbyszewski, focused on the history of 18th- and 19th-century Poland. The difference between Witkacy and other critical authors is his diagnosis of national decadence. Contrary to Bobrzyński, Witkacy did not associate the decline of the Polish state with its legal and political structure, nor did he concentrate on the shortcomings displayed by the most prominent personalities in Polish history (as did Zbyszewski, when describing for example **Tadeusz Kościuszko**). For Witkacy, Polish decadence was of a psychological nature, derived from a form of "negative characterology." He did not see any possible cure or rescue; neither did he recognize positive features of his own nation, in contrast to most authors of this popular genre.

Among his other sources of inspiration, one should note the popular psychological theories of the early twentieth century, with special reference to psychoanalysis, and Ernst Kretschmer's theory of congruence between physical and psychological types, a theory popular among interwar criminal biologists.

Witkacy was a scandalous figure, and as such, his contemporaries did not take his intellectual work too seriously. He was known for his love affairs, alcoholism and supposed drug addiction more than for his cultural achieve-

ments. Furthermore, the personal, undisciplined way of formulating his “philosophical” statements situated him outside the professional scientific community. The majority of his writings were published from the 1960s onwards, and it is hard to overestimate their impact on literature and theatre ever since. He is the most celebrated representative of the Polish grotesque theatre. Moreover, Witkacy’s philosophy was acknowledged after the introduction of the Soviet political system in East Central Europe. His description of the forthcoming barbarian “Chinese” regime was used by Czesław Miłosz in his analysis of the Stalinist period in the pages of his *Captive Mind*. Witkacy was one of the sharpest critics of modern European culture, however, distancing himself from any form of totalitarian utopianism.

MG

Unkempt souls

[...] My aim is to highlight the difference between Poland and other countries in the world at the rise of our Western culture. To me personally, it is like seeing an awful swollen boil on a fresh, beautiful face. Let us stop feeding ourselves on some fictional past, convincing each other that we used to have it all—art, science, brilliant heretics, philosophy, technology, and hell knows what else—because as a matter of fact all these things were administered, or, at least, introduced by foreigners. As to the famed Polish individualism, whose progress (as far as the nobility is concerned) was never obstructed by anything, and as to the “supreme” (quasi)institutions for protecting liberty, such as the *liberum veto* [...], it was these institutions *en masse* (potentially beneficial, if they *all* obeyed one system of rules—but this can happen only in a highly cultured society), and this individualism (too eager, but at the same time belated, inappropriately distributed among the culturally heterogeneous nobility) that were the root cause of all our past miseries and our country’s deficiency in virtually all spheres of human activity.

Poland’s history is a tale of hideous and tragic mistakes, which frequently resulted from weakness. [...] The first cardinal mistake was the choice of the West over Byzantium as the source of our Christian religion and civilization. This was the initial fault, which withered the whole of Polish history and our national mission, while all the subsequent misfortunate moves were only its modalities. The constant struggle between our true destiny and the consequences of the first stumble has added to our Polish idiosyncrasies [...] particularly, the monster of the *noble democracy*, nurtured by no other nation except ours. [...] We created a caricature of democracy ahead of everyone—

Poles are always ahead of everyone! This brings disgrace upon us because it contradicts the idea of our possessing any racial or social instinct. Polish culture lacks any structuring. We adopt random ideas from outside, have splendid beginnings but no endings (this is the cardinal sin of even the greatest Poles, which goes along with a common conviction that any criticism should be condemned as so-called “spitting-on-yourself *à la manière russe*”), and we totally lack ingenuity in science, art, and philosophy, despite (this is the worst!) the colossal amount of material that could be used creatively. For all these deficiencies I blame the disorderly functioning of our noble democracy, which brought about the morass of chaos and the disintegration of individuality, and instead of enabling every man to freely develop his individual self, it went on ousting him of his inner discipline. Freedom must always be the primary goal—this is the cardinal law of both social and individual evolution—and that cannot be achieved without discipline. [...]

In our country, among the stench and nauseating fetor of the noble democracy, the forces were being distributed regardless of potentials and tensions, creating as a result the ghastly melting pot of social, national, and individual decay; a well of mental, social, and ideological disintegration, which had to be filled with foreign creativity. Countries, just like men, do not like being unoccupied: give some free space to your “fellow” man and he will get on your back in no time. The rule is even truer for all tribal, national, or artificially created national groups whose adjustability and subsequent proneness to expansion derive from these groups’ time-honored cultures, venerable enough not to undergo degeneration.¹ [...]

It takes a supreme character, a supreme mind, and great courage to create a truly supreme man. We have never had many such individuals, or they were lost in the country’s general disorder like moths in a flame. No one can really tell who is to be blamed for this situation, but it seems most likely that the biggest fault lies with the aristocrats. After all, someone had to raise and corrupt the grey mass of noble worms [...].

The source of our national vice—pointed out explicitly for the first time by Tadeusz Boy-Żeleński² in terms of family conceit, or as I call it: swaggering—springs from this one-of-the-kind institution of *the noble democracy*. Against the background of his social (pseudo) structure, consolidated by the

¹ However, Spengler argues that expansiveness is the feature of cultures that have only began to die out, and it is this stage which he calls “civilization.” [author’s footnote]

² Tadeusz Boy-Żeleński (1874–1941), a Polish gynecologist, literary critic and translator, was also a prominent liberal thinker.

current of history, every Pole had to swagger about his virtues and power as being greater than in reality. [...] Thus, every Pole exhibits a tendency to stand on his toes to appear taller and to create for himself “a crown of vanity”—an artificial superstructure, both decorative and empty—whose purpose is to deceive other people as to the actual content of the head which wears it. [...]

Although a few individuals undertook the effort to escape this ghastly legacy, the general atmosphere of decay and the ambivalent attitudes of distinguished persons hampered any radical change on a country scale. If the peasants had been given freedom and if a couple of heads had been chopped down by the guillotine, things would have been different in Poland, and indirectly also in 19th-century Russia. [...] Piłsudski, whose head had occasionally seemed to radiate the luminescent glow of the vanity crown, exhibited a strange asceticism with respect to the gravity of the moment (and this moment is the greatest moment in our history since the French Revolution), refused to carry the burden of responsibility, and ceased to be himself, allowing instead some subsidiary forces to act upon his not yet fully consolidated will. Poland itself turned from a would-be martyr, a freak martyr rather, into something ordinary, a typical representative of the present historical moment. (The only extraordinary thing today, no matter how we interpret it, is Russia.) There are silk hats, cocktail parties, decorations, and strategies, strategies, and once again strategies; there is no management, and with this selection of staff and this distribution of power, there never will be. Ideology is not something that can be searched for and mechanically *manufactured*; it has to be already *present* among the nation's masses, requiring only to be spotted, then torn out from the depths of the country's womb, and—with artistic passion—*created*. [...]

Some of the typically Polish idiosyncrasies, combined with the overdeveloped system of the noble democracy, which to some extent is also the function of the former, have made the Poles a nation discontent with its fate, a nation of losers whose only way of coping with their unfulfilled ambitions was to brag about their imagined greatness. Drinking, dueling and boasting of their utmost limitations seem to have been their only remedy for the subconscious discomfort of their pettiness. [...]

Alcohol offers the opportunity to temporarily lift the spirits of even the lowest creature in the hierarchy of beings. The uplift is only illusory and the inevitable fall brings suffering which, if one wants to regain the previous heights, needs to be drowned in an even larger toast. Unfortunately, the rule of addiction is such that the increasing doses will lead to a greater decay and

“gloosery” (my excellent gloom/misery combination for the *Katzenjammer*, which is stubbornly refused admittance into the alcoholic jargon), so that one needs even greater doses to elevate himself onto the platform of optimism. [...]

The ability to look further than the present moment while being caught in the house on fire, and to continue equipping it with electric plugs with one hand while extinguishing the flames with the other, would indeed demand supernatural skill. Yet, the modern man needs to possess such skill if he wishes to withstand the pressure of the future changes—changes that can begin at any moment, provided the white race of stupefied geniuses does not die a suicidal death in a new kind of lengthy war. Then, however, there will come the time for the yellow race and the black race—in fact, all hopes rest with the *schwarz-gelbs* because there is no longer any hope for the white race. The human race will endure, but in color, so that the whites will perhaps be traveling by train in cars marked “white people” (as it is the case with the Negroes in America, who travel in cars marked “colored people”), in an ideally structured yellow-black Global (Proletarian) State. This is an extreme scenario. Perhaps the healthy animal survival instinct will awake and speak above the smart-alecky, weak, and silk-hatted heads of the state officials and diplomats to the non-degenerate minds telling them that it is high time the intellectual elite (if it indeed exists) performed the bloodless transformation without sacrificing its status or damaging its earlier cultural achievements. In its process of gaining the described self-awareness, humanity should perhaps look to the Russian experiment—enlightening at least partly for its being conducted in abnormal circumstances—however, surprisingly, so far no one has studied its significance. [...]

Here I end my sketch of the background against which stands out our collective mentality of boastful sluggards, the mass of whom provided such lousy material for social creation that neither past nor present geniuses of action have been able to do anything with it. I feel that this inferiority complex can be treated only if we acknowledge its existence. I am, therefore, writing this here 1) not out of a need for self-humiliation (incidentally, I possess a relatively small propensity for exhibiting this national vice—I have others, I won’t deny, but this one, together with jealousy and enviousness, I have quite successfully minimized), 2) nor to unnecessarily hurt anyone’s feelings (I hate this—I only hurt others in the name of the so-called “higher purposes”), 3) nor out of some personal megalomania (because I by no means consider myself a genius). My only reason for writing this (besides writing a book about drugs), is to do something for others and to contribute,

even if my contribution should be minimal, in changing this country's general atmosphere, which is difficult enough for those who have the possibility to withdraw from the life of the collective, and simply unbearable for those who have to participate in this life, not to mention those condemned to breathe in the stench of certain segments of the Polish cultural habitat. [...]

I will not use big words here (they make me sick). [...] Instead, I will turn now from lofty generalizations to specific everyday issues, believing that although often invisible and insignificant, they are capable of poisoning with their cumulated and fractionated properties the splendid moments in our history, and of obstructing the nation's engagement of all its potential when such an important moment comes. [...] The nature of the Polish lifestyle makes it impossible for this country to accumulate substantial power resources, and to use them in the right way and with the correct intensity. With the inferiority complex (the source of mental injury) at its core, the Polish way of living leads instead to a gradual dissipation of these resources in everyday arguments and pathetic fighting over leftovers, without ever recreating them. Our existence lacks form; it is shapeless like powder. This situation can be blamed on everyone's neglecting even the tiniest duties and responsibilities towards oneself and others, which he justifies with his position being inappropriate, that means, of course, "too low," or blames it on the fate's unfair verdicts. However, since he lacks the characteristics necessary for his reaching beyond himself, he has to make up for this deficiency with constant boasting and swaggering. I am not talking here about those individuals who have been exploited and suffered injustice from a bunch of manipulators, or about those indeed forced to perform below the level of their actual abilities and talents; that Poland is the country of unexploited talents remains another matter—legitimate only for exceptions. Crowds of people who have the capacity to raise this country's cultural standards are forced to waste their last effort on earning a living in a meaningless way so as to be able to, on the margin of their existence, resolve to creating that which is most precious for them and others—their creation usually remaining completely underestimated during their lifetime. By and large, however, Poland is made up of boastful braggers, better than anything other than what they are or should be. This is why, despite tremendous indifference to the suffering of others (only America beats us in this respect), we are also the masters in showing unjustified contempt towards one another—I say *showing* because in 98% of the cases the feeling really has no grounds, either in the contemptor's superiority (which is generally a product of his imagination), or in the inferiority of his opponent, whom the former can hold in contempt only after having deliber-

ately degraded him (usually in his thoughts). The reason for all that is that showing contempt to others is almost the only and most reliable means of improving one's status in a meaningless way. [...]

Translated by Zuzanna Ładyga

IVAN HADZHIYSKI: AN OPTIMISTIC THEORY OF OUR PEOPLE

Title: *Оптимистична теория за нашия народ* (An optimistic theory of our people)

Originally published: *Философски преглед*, X, 1938/2.

Language: Bulgarian

The excerpts used are from *Иван Хаджийски. Съчинения в два тома*, edited by Nesho Davidov and Efrem Karamfilov (Sofia: Български писател, 1974), vol. 1, pp. 25–28, 32, 45–46.

About the author

Ivan Hadzhiyski [1907, Troyan – 1944, on the front in Southeastern Serbia, near Vlasotince]: sociologist. He was born into a poor artisan's family. After graduating with degrees in philosophy and law from the University of Sofia in 1936, he worked as a lawyer. He had been a member of the Bulgarian Communist Party since 1931 and was arrested a few times. He died as a volunteer in the Bulgarian army, which after the coup of 9 September 1944 participated in the Second World War on the side of the Allies. Between 1933 and 1944, Hadzhiyski wrote four books and over twenty shorter studies. He was one of the most important leftist intellectuals before and during the Second World War and one of the leading figures of Bulgarian sociology and “national psychology” (*народопсихология*). His polemical and critical essays, fusing scholarship and journalism, form a very important part of his work. Among them, “An optimistic theory of our people” serves as an ideological manifesto of sorts and a synthesis of his main ideas. Hadzhiyski was almost completely neglected during the first decades of the communist regime; his texts provoked renewed interest during the reformist period in the 1960s (his principal works were re-published in 1966) and especially during the 1970s and 1980s (a second edition of his works appeared in 1974). This contributed to a revival of the quasi-discipline of national psychology in Bulgaria, offering an alternative to the Marxist interpretative model of history and social relations. As a leftist, moreover, Hadzhiyski was used to legitimize a position that was less and less connected to communist internationalism. After 1989, however, his radical leftist sympathies were held against him, to some extent preventing his “canonization” as a central figure of social thought in Bulgaria.

Main works: *Авторитет, достойнство, маска* [Authority, dignity, mask] (1933); *Любов и брак* [Love and marriage] (1936); *Бит и душевност на нашия народ* [Life and mentality of our nation] (Vol. I, 1940; Vol. II, 1945); *Психология на Априлското въстание* [The psychology of the April Uprising] (1943).

Context

Ivan Hadzhiyski's sociological and anthropological approach to the traditional Bulgarian society was in sharp opposition to the "national metaphysics" advocated by the rightist adherents of conservative revolution in the late-1920s and 1930s. The latter was built upon the tradition of "national psychology" or characterology and attempted to place the National Spirit, seen as a mythical, a-temporal entity, at the very heart of their philosophical constructions (see **Janko Janev** and **Nayden Sheytanov**). At the same time, under the influence of racial theories, national characterology took another direction: toward "scientific" analyses of the nation in terms of its racial substance. The racist approach to the national essence had various supporters, from poets like Kiril Hristov (1875–1944) to established scientists like the biologist Metodiy Popov (1881–1954), the zoologist Stefan Konsulov (1885–1954), and the sociologist Ivan Kinkel (1883–1945). These racial theories were criticized by the leading leftist philosopher of the period, **Dimitar Mihalchev**.

In this context it is possible to see Hadzhiyski's sociological studies as an attempt to confront right-wing interpretations of the national character in a way similar to Mihalchev's, both opposing the racial interpretation of the nation. It is not by chance that his first writings on the topic were published, of all places, in *Философски преглед*, the journal edited by Mihalchev. Hadzhiyski aimed at demystifying the "holy fiction" of radical conservative authors: the *national past*. Whereas for nationalist philosophers, the past was a metaphysical reservoir of the Spirit of the Nation, Hadzhiyski's scholarly ambition was to unveil the ideological implications of this a-temporal mythical vision and to submit the national past to historical and socio-anthropological analysis. At the same time, there is no doubt that Hadzhiyski's approach is determined to some extent by the very arguments it sought to demolish. First of all, the focal points of his research are almost identical with the mythical decorum of "national metaphysics" (e.g., the national community, its way of life, its moral qualities). Secondly, even if one assumes a historical perspective, it is clear that Hadzhiyski's studies rest on the underlying assumption that patriarchal culture is a-historical, thus allowing for its investigation on a purely synchronic level. Indeed, in Hadzhiyski's most important books, there is no strict historical delineation of discrete periods in which the patterns of Bulgarian traditional life—Hadzhiyski called it "primordial" [*првобитен*], implying somewhat the "archaic," a term used by the national ontologists—are explored.

Thirdly, a common ideological trope in Hadzhiyski's works and those of the "national metaphysicians" is the "primordial" *collective*. "An optimistic theory of our people" derives from a fundamental opposition between the collective and the individual: national destiny is a collective endeavor, therefore individualism is its natural enemy. The conflict between collectivist and individualistic positions constituted one of the common *topoi* of Bulgarian national discourse from the Late Enlightenment through the interwar period (see for instance the programmatic essay "The Collective Man" by the psychologist and philosopher Spiridon Kazandzhiev [1882–1951]). Individualism was perceived as an essentially bourgeois attitude (in Hadzhiyski's view, the negative figure, embodying this bourgeois attitude, was the leading modernist poet Pencho Slaveykov). Hadzhiyski considered collectivism as the form of existence of the working classes, which he projected onto the entire national community (**Petar Mutafchiev** was criticizing **Mihalchev** for precisely the same reason: according to Mutafchiev, the left-wing philosopher was "partycizing" (*napmuzupa*) the nation (see **Petar Mutafchiev**, *Towards the philosophy of Bulgarian history*).

"An optimistic theory of our people," published in 1938, contains the main ideological and epistemological claims underlying Hadzhiyski's scholarly work. The first of these is anti-essentialism. Consistent with this (racism is also perceived as a version of the essentialization of the nation), he advocated historicism. Consequently, racial nationalism, based on essentialist claims, was to be rejected. (It is not surprising that Hadzhiyski was criticized for his "anti-patriotism"). In a rather deterministic fashion, Hadzhiyski interpreted the peculiarities of the Bulgarian life and the actual historical situation as resulting from a number of social-economic and historical factors.

While in general his position (like the socialist intellectual tradition in general) could be situated in the context of modernism, there are also certain aspects that made his discourse resonate with anti-modernist ideological paradigms. His model of social transformation was much less linear than that of the Bulgarian social democrats of the Second International, who hoped for a gradual social development that would eventually lead to socialism. Hadzhiyski, in contrast, operated with a quasi-cyclical scheme, since the envisioned socialist future was described as a return to the equality and organic harmony that characterized archaic societies, albeit on a higher level. Significantly, he also turned for inspiration to the "national revival" period, which served as the central point of reference for the Bulgarian integral nationalists in the interwar period. However, while the neo-nationalists sought to reactivate the "true spirit" of the Revival, Hadzhiyski distinguished between a pro-

gressive early phase, when the programs for national and social emancipation overlapped, and a later phase (after the foundation of the modern Bulgarian state in 1878), when the emerging oligarchy appropriated the state and blocked the social mobility of the peasantry. Finally, and especially in the texts written during the war, he projected a form of socialization characterized by an organic feeling of collectivity, while at the same time praising the exertion of collective will and excluding political violence. To some extent, these ideas reveal affinities with the Leninist reinterpretation of the role of the Party and with some of Gramsci's theories.

Hadzhiyski's works, republished in two volumes in 1966 and again in 1974, enjoyed real popularity (all 4000 copies of the first edition sold out in few years) and were acclaimed by both "orthodox" Marxist and "national communist" thinkers at that time (in particular, by the influential essayist Toncho Zhechev [1929–2000]). In this context, "An optimistic theory of our people" gained a peculiar authority. Arguably, the interest in "national psychology" (*народопсихология*) between the mid-1960s and the 1980s was symptomatic of a deepening crisis of legitimacy of the official socialist project in Bulgaria, which, consequently, triggered a search for alternative, often neo-conservative and anti-modernist projects.

BM

An optimistic theory of our people

In the name of that lack of faith in the strengths of our people [Prince] Alexander Battenberg¹ once used his extraordinary powers to try to pursue a policy of enlightened absolutism. Were he to rise from his grave today, he would hardly find his own palace, hidden as it is in the modern Sofia born by the Bulgarian democracy that he despised.

The theories of *autocracy, of government by the elites*, have as hidden motivation the ideas that *our people is incapable of governing itself, that our moral defects are incurable*.

A culmination of all those insults is the theory about the *origins* of the Bulgarian people, disseminated in conversations by a son of our tribe, who, with his talents and European career, is a living refutation of his own pessimism. Our people [this theory goes] was formed during the great migrations

¹ Alexander Battenberg was the first ruler of autonomous Bulgaria, elected as prince in 1879. He sought to impose modernizing measures from above, and eventually was removed by a coup in 1886.

from the fusion of races, so that everyone physically incapable of moving on, or morally inept and therefore banished from one's tribe, stayed here to form our *national substance*. And the blood that filled that inauspicious ethnic aggregate is the same blood that is flowing in our veins today and is poisoning our private and social life.

II.

Yet the worst here are not the wrong generalizations drawn therefrom: [namely] that it is a matter, not of social phenomena, but of manifestations of the Bulgarian blood; that we are dealing, not with a historical transience, but with some *eternal national substance*; that these were the sins, not of a social era, but of an eternal doom which no social system would be able to change; that for the negative balance of today's social reality should account, not the leaders of *our own time*, but the *whole* Bulgarian people, and *for all times* at that!

The worst thing is that those generalizations pass from the realm of logic to the realm of practice, inflicting fateful damages on our national destiny. Our feelings of national pride get smothered. Our social ardor is burnt to ashes. The power of our historical thrust gets stifled. *Political indifference* passes off as deep wisdom. *The historical valor* of those who are fighting for the new, instead of being glorified as a supreme duty, is caricatured as *historical naïveté*.

Slaveykov's attitude to social life is purging it from the best and the fittest to make room for mediocrity and the semi-intelligentsia. We can count a daunting number of people who, having fallen victim to historical despair ("I cannot set this situation right, nor will it be set right in my time"), have isolated and *atomized* themselves in their studies, in their *private* work, leaving *social* affairs to develop with frightful historical production costs. [...]

III.

An *optimistic* theory of the Bulgarian people can nowadays be socially meaningful only if it is *scientific*. Today one cannot raise national and social fervor with naïve idealizations of the Bulgarian people, like those made in 1762 [by Paissy Hilendarski] and in Rakovski's writings. Today it would be ridiculous to call the Bulgarian nation the *first* nation in Europe, proving it with the fact that the Sanskrit language was in fact Bulgarian because "Sanskrit" meant "сам [alone]—скрит [hidden]," i.e., a secret language, and because the French word "tête" came from the Bulgarian word "тею" [father]. We cannot do that, despite the ridiculous Teutonic example [in this respect], because in a broad historical perspective there are in fact no inferior and superior races, no

great and small peoples; because the greatness or the backwardness of any single people depends on the point it has reached in its social development; because the social development of all peoples proceeds generally *in compliance with the same laws*, and because no people is excluded from this development.

Lastly, to be convincing, this optimistic theory should not turn a blind eye to the facts that give food for pessimistic conclusions. On the contrary, by facing them, it will have to forge its incontestability through their analysis. [...]

IV.

That the indicated *negative morality* is not an expression of some Bulgarian blood but an ordinary *social phenomenon* is demonstrated by the moral sublimity of the Revival - the epoch that represents not the awakening of a slumbering nation, as it is widely thought, but the process of building that nation.

Those same words—"Bulgarian," "Bulgarian business," "Bulgarian made"—stood at that time for national upsurge, national pride and dignity. And how could it be otherwise? [...]

VIII.

The way out is one: Bulgaria must become rich, prosperous and happy, but for *everybody*. Then the whole Bulgarian people will develop its hidden forces and will create for itself a place and a destiny in its modern history that its zeal, its ambitions, its industriousness and its beautiful land deserve. It will become as great and respected as it used to be in the past. The question is: how can this come about?

For us the English route is out of the question. It won't be long before it will be ruled out for England as well, when, following the liberation of the colonies, the British lion will squat alone on his misty island. There is one single road on which all peoples will soon set out: *settlement of their internal social relations*. And since today's economy, based on the global division of labor, is *worldwide*, our problems will have to be solved in an international co-ordination as well. The question of how concretely this can be done goes beyond the scope of this exposition.

IX.

There's only one more thing that can be stated here. *The tasks we set forth are not personal but social*. Therefore any desertion from social life is a *crime*. Not defeatism but treachery is the *seclusion behind a study door and*

shooting arrows of pessimism from there at the haggard face of our people, which still awaits its leaders. It is true that a studied peacefulness, the gentle philistine warmth of the quiet homestead, is subjectively preferable to the tensions of struggle. It is also true, on the other hand, that nobody can keep his nails clean from the manners prevailing in today's social struggles, so one has to enter the marshland of traditional political mores. But these are the forces we have to begin with, or nothing will ever begin. There is but one road: either from here or escapism! It is precisely the readiness to muddle the dirt of life while being aware that this dirt on the road to historical transformation will be shining as sunrays, this is called historical valor. *History is made, not by Hamlets, but by people of will and historical valor.* Today we cannot doubt the wartime principle: when victory must be obtained, means do not matter. And history has long been on a war footing.

Lastly, when we demand sacrifices from the people, we must be ready to make some ourselves.

These lines would only be meaningful if they could infuse in our reader the desire for historical value so that we will all join the first ranks of the Bulgarian historical avant-garde.

Translated by Zornitsa Dimova-Hristova

ION DRAGOUMIS: HELLENIC CIVILIZATION

Title: *Ελληνικός Πολιτισμός* (Hellenic civilization)

Originally published: In the review *Γράμματα* (Letters), Alexandria, 1914.

Language: Greek

The excerpts used are from Ionos Dragoumi, *Έργα* (Athina, 1917), pp. 231–235.

About the author

Ion Dragoumis (known also by his penname Idas) [1878, Athens – 1920, Athens]: politician, diplomat, and writer. He was born to a prominent family; his father Stefanos was the head of the last government before **Eleftherios Venizelos** took over in 1910. His sister was married to Pavlos Melas, a Greek military officer involved in the inter-ethnic clashes in Ottoman Macedonia at the beginning of the 20th century. After completing secondary education, Dragoumis studied law in Athens. He then took part in the ill-fated 1897 war. In 1899, he started his career as a diplomat. Starting from 1902, he was appointed at several consulates in Ottoman Macedonia and Thrace, where he actively participated in the struggle against Bulgarian and Slavic Macedonian armed groups. In 1907–1908, he served as a secretary at the Greek embassy in Constantinople. There, together with Athanassios Souliotis-Nikolaidis, he played a crucial role in founding the *Οργάνωσις Κωνσταντινουπόλεως* (Society of Constantinople) (see **Georgios Boussios**, *The political program of Hellenism in Turkey*). In the 1915 elections, he was elected deputy in Florina, by then Northern Greece. During the National Schism between Venizelos and King Constantine I, Dragoumis took the latter's side. Therefore, upon the King's defeat, he was exiled first to Corsica and then to Skopelos. In 1919, when he was released, he started working for the unification of the royalist forces, and his efforts met with success in 1920 when the *Ενωμένη Αντιπολίτευσις* (United Opposition) defeated the Venizelists in the November elections. However, he did not live to enjoy the victory. In August 1920, after an attempt on Venizelos' life in Paris, a military squad of the Security Corps, in Athens, executed him. Dragoumis was a man with social sensitivity, deeply moved by national values and human intellect. His works, written in a poetic language, did not endorse specific political strategies, but rather aimed at Greece's national regeneration in a time of turmoil and imminent change. In his writings, one can trace an interest in Nietzsche's ideas, social Darwinism, and socialism, as well as French integral nationalism. It is not accidental that the modernist **Giorgos Theotokas** devoted his first essay to Dragoumis. However, later on in the interwar period, his ideas were taken up by ultra-conservative groups. This ideological appropri-

tion determined the reception of Dragoumis' thought after the Second World War. It was only in the 1990s that his intellectual work was placed within the broader ideological atmosphere of the time. More recently, the rise of the neo-Nazi Golden Dawn party led to a new round of heated debates on the use of Dragoumis' work by the extreme right.

Main works: *Μαρτύρων και Ηρώων αίμα* [Blood of martyrs and heroes] (1907); *Όσοι ζωντανοί* [Whosoever is living] (1911); *Ο Ελληνισμός μου και οι Έλληνες* [My Hellenism and the Hellenes] (1914); *Ημερολόγια* [Diaries (6 vols.)] (1895–1920); *Ελληνικός Πολιτισμός* [Hellenic civilization] (1914).

Context

At the turn of the 20th century, Ottoman Macedonia witnessed a fierce struggle among Greek, Bulgarian and Macedonian autonomist groups fighting each other in a determined attempt to attract the allegiance of the Christian population. The preconditions for this struggle can be traced to the Ottoman edict (*ferman*) of 1870, which proclaimed the foundation of an autonomous Bulgarian church under the title of an Exarchate. The most crucial and ambiguous article of the *ferman* stated that a majority of 2/3 among the population, at the level of the *kaza* (district), would determine whether it would remain loyal to the Patriarchate or accept the authority of the Exarchate. The rival nationalisms identified the Patriarchists as Greeks and the supporters of the Exarchate as Bulgarians, despite the fact that, at the time, loyalty to a religious institution was not necessarily a marker of national identity. Furthermore, there were many who did not identify with either of these national projects.

Towards the end of the 19th century, Bulgarian armed groups coordinated by the so-called Macedonian Committee (established in Sofia in 1895), together with the fighters of the Inner Macedonian Revolutionary Organization—founded in 1893 in Salonica with the aim of achieving Macedonian autonomy (see **Krste Petkov Misirkov**, *On Macedonian matters*)—launched an increasingly violent campaign, challenging what they perceived as an agreement between two “illegitimate rules”: the Ottoman state and the Patriarchate of Constantinople. Eventually, this led to the Ilinden uprising, in 1903, which was suppressed by Ottoman troops. Towards the end of the same year, in Athens, a Greek Macedonian Committee was founded with the task of supplying ammunition and money to the volunteers who crossed the borders. Pavlos Melas (1870–1904), Alexandros Mazarakis-Ainian (1869–1949), and Georgios Katehakis (1880–1939) were its most prominent members.

It was the first time that the Greek state offered any significant support on this matter. The defeat in the Greek-Ottoman war of 1897 had instigated a widespread atmosphere of despair within society (**Kalliroi Paren**, *The life of one year. Letters from an Athenian to a Parisian lady, 1896–1897*). Many Greek intellectuals felt nothing but contempt for the Greek state and turned towards the Greek-Orthodox populations outside its borders in an effort to reconfigure the irredentist discourse of the “Great Idea” (**Ioannis Kolettis**, *Of this great Idea*). Within this political and ideological atmosphere, Ion Dragoumis accused the Greeks within the kingdom of having become “Helladites” (Helladics)—“a different kind of being.” Yet, this was not only a critique of state nationalism. For Dragoumis, as for others, the notion of “Hellenism” did not correspond to the European definition of the nation. Well-known for his restless and poetic mind, he elaborated on the specificity of Hellenism and appropriated the concept of “national aesthetics” articulated by his close friend and fervent opponent of European culture, Periclis Yanopoulos. Dragoumis believed that the Greeks had their own culture and tradition and could therefore create their own civilization, without any need to imitate the West. However, this could happen only outside of the Greek kingdom, in the area where “Hellenism” had been historically active, that is, in the territories of the Ottoman Empire. He admitted that the fate of the nation was to coexist with other ethnicities, as had been the case for centuries. Yet, he clearly suggested that, in their relations with other ethnicities, Greeks would play a leading role. Based on the idea of “natural” competition among nations for survival, he had no doubt that the Greeks would succeed in their leadership.

Conceptually, Dragoumis separated the nation from the state, advocating what has been called an “imaginary stateless nation.” Yet, the despair among young intellectuals notwithstanding, the Greek kingdom, especially thanks to an international control imposed over its public finance, went through a fast and impressive recovery. This resulted in a reorganization of the army, which played a role in the Greek victories during the two Balkan Wars, in 1912–1913. After the allied Balkan states defeated the Ottoman armies, they turned against each other over the issue of dividing the newly acquired territories. After Bulgaria’s defeat in 1913, the treaty of Bucharest led to the division of Macedonia among the Balkan states, with Greece and Serbia receiving the lion’s share. Consequently, a different version of the “Great Idea” came to dominate, one that privileged state nationalism and the elimination of ethnic minorities. Dragoumis saw his dream of a peaceful takeover of the Ottoman Empire by the Greeks evaporate. He even accused Prime Minister Venizelos

of being obsessed with the state. He greeted, however, the territorial expansion as a step towards the creation of a powerful empire, demonstrating, thus, the antinomies within his ideas.

It was within this “post-Balkan War” atmosphere that the collection of essays “Hellenic Civilization” was published in the journal *Grammata* in Alexandria (Egypt). It came in response to a questionnaire related to an “enquiry about the future directions of the race” that the journal had published in 1913. The main issue, as described by one of its editors, Michalis Peridis, was whether, after the victorious outcome of the war and the territorial expansion, the path to be followed should be “nationalist policy” (εθνικιστική πολιτική) or “civilizational patriotism” (πολιτισμικός πατριωτισμός). Dragoumis’s response, which he began writing in Athens and finished in St. Petersburg, was also printed separately.

In this essay, Dragoumis describes the civilization modern Hellenes will create. It will not look like the ancient or the Hellenistic or the Byzantine. Modern Hellenes have to prove that they are able to create something different, following their folk traditions and keeping from the old ones only the Hellenic spirit of creativity and vitality. It should definitely not be like the European civilization, either. Greece stands between the East and the West and thus, its civilization will be different from both. Dragoumis insists that it is only through the nation that civilization can be achieved. However, the nation should break away from its current shameful state, which forgets that its real aim was to unite all Greeks in an Empire. The Balkan Wars restored faith in the “grandeur of the race” in Greece, and paved the way to its final triumph. Thus, according to Dragoumis, what now needs to be done is to further promote this state and create its civilization. In fact, the specificity of Hellenic civilization lies in that it can give shape to different beliefs. Once, it appropriated Christianity; now, it promotes the notion of nationalism.

The reception of this essay was controversial. Dragoumis was criticized from two different positions. On the one hand, he was targeted by socialists, such as Nikolaos Yannios (1885–1958), who accused him of behaving as the staunchest supporter of Greek imperialism when claiming that the triumph in the recent wars had to be credited to the qualities of the “race.” Moreover, despite the fact that Dragoumis privileged popular culture and the use of the vernacular, Yannios accused him of abusing this culture to incite the Greeks to more warfare which, at a time when the nation was threatened by a new war—the First World War—might prove detrimental. Instead, the socialist intellectual proposed an alliance between the Balkan nations. Finally, Yannios challenged the idea that only nations could produce civilizations, claim-

ing that every society, national or not, was capable of doing so. A different critique was articulated by Michalis Peridis, who accused Dragoumis of trying to reconcile different aims and theories. While privileging the nation over the state, Dragoumis had claimed that only those nations that had managed to create powerful states were worthwhile. While pledging to offer a solid ground for a future ideology, he had endorsed folk culture and the vernacular, which according to Peridis could not serve as the core of a civilization. Finally, while arguing for a national culture, Dragoumis had invited his fellow patriots to indulge in European civilization first, so that they could absorb it and then move beyond it. Eventually, Dragoumis was accused of excessive aesthetization, utopianism and an attempt to project his emotions over reality.

The necessity for Greek society to produce a new form of ideology or “civilization” resurfaced in the interwar period, this time in an atmosphere of defeat. Ion’s brother, Filippou, reprinted his texts in 1927, so they were available when the generation of the 1930s began to promote a modern concept of Hellenicity—*ellinikotita*, motivated by much more urgent circumstances. **Giorgos Theotokas**, **George Seferis** and, later, Konstantinos Dimaras, who set the foundations of the so-called Neo-Hellenic studies, elaborated on one important aspect of “Greek civilization,” namely literature. At the same time, ultra-nationalist ideologies were also predicated on arguments resembling those of Dragoumis. The dictator **Ioannis Metaxas** and the ideologues of his regime, for example, developed the theory of the “Third Hellenic Civilization.” After the Second World War, when the debate on Hellenicity took a very different turn and evolved around the ideology of communism, Dragoumis’ text disappeared from cultural-political discussions. It was reprinted only in 1993.

VK

Hellenic civilization

[...] Neo-Hellenic civilization will be even more perfect than the Hellenistic one of the Macedonians and the Byzantine one, if the nation succeeds in freeing itself from the learned tradition which weighed down both these earlier civilizations and prevented absolute free will, originality, and unbridled flourishing. This does not mean that the Greeks can recreate a civilization as whole and spontaneous, as young and joyful as that of the antiquity; perhaps nations too grow old, just like people, perhaps experience and knowledge weigh down upon us too much for us to be able ever again to create, like

children, almost unconsciously and spontaneously, fresh, carefree worlds. But at least let us forget, as much as possible, the old molds, let us remember only the spirit, let us believe in our liveliness, and let us allow each of our capacities to open up, as much as possible, let us become daring and joyful as we face life.

Neither like the ancient one, nor like the more ancient one, nor like the Byzantine one, nor like the European one, of contemporary times: the new Hellenic civilization will not be like any of these. It will be something else, which will also include many oriental elements. The geographical location of the race's homeland, between East and West, also affirms that the civilization which will be born to the Greeks will necessarily be different to that of the West, and, despite the foreign or old elements it will have acquired, it will be Greek through and through.

And perhaps its only strong faith will be national faith. Swept away by this faith, the nation will flourish. Its time is now, and among contemporary peoples the Greeks have felt it again first and more consciously, even though the Frankishly-clad,¹ base and vulgar state strove to offer them another ideal, boorish and uncouth—a bourgeois Belgium, a neutral, emasculated, cow-breeding Switzerland—and make them go astray.

And the beautiful flower of the nation will be a work both human and humanitarian. From the moment it appeared in the world, our nation never sought political conquests; its polemic efforts almost always went together with the need for its political independence, but with its spiritual superiority it strove to civilize people. Perhaps it didn't even strive to do this, but simply did so. The example of the Hellenes enslaved the world. Being born of humans, civilization contains the homeland within itself, together with the other human emotions, Eros, love, death, nature, but it elevates man above his homeland, whichever that may be. The main branches of civilization are the arts, the sciences, philosophies, a certain religion and a certain sense of ethics. And all these together or each one separately elevate man above homelands, as much as all these things may be founded on a homeland, as branches of each civilization, which also has its homeland. In order for a civilization to be born, what is needed is a place, a time, and people who have gathered together to make up a nation. Each civilization is born in a homeland, during a certain time and within a certain nation. A civilization

¹ Reference to "alafranga," i.e., Western-style costumes and habits. For the Byzantine and Ottoman Greek culture the Franks denoted the generic Westerner.

cannot exist outside these prerequisites. As for cosmopolitanism, it is the tired, last-born child of each civilization.

The Hellenic nation was not able to spread its own, earlier religion among all men. It traveled quite far, but not everywhere. But when, paying attention to every expression of the spirit, it observed in Judea a human religion, the Hellenic nation took it, transformed it and made it welcome throughout the world, because it gave this religion expression. That was the genius of the Hellenic nation since old times: to be able to express the things people half-felt; to civilize; to give shape to the unconscious; to draw from the depths of the soul's treasures, from the riches of the unconscious, and to bring to the light as much as it was able, making it conscious or giving it a comprehensible form. If the new religion is the nation, its expression, its form will be devised once again by the Hellenes, and thus they will reveal to the world the true worship of the nation, the love and the comprehensive cultivation of the individual and collective soul of man.

Civilization is not only a community of thought, sense and will, but also a foundation upon which to erect the superior species of mankind, the excellent flowers, the great men representing all manner of human capability. Civilization has the ability to shape these excellent men, who contain and represent all the capacities and capabilities of civilization and the nation that gave them life.

Translated by Mary Kitroeff

JAROSLAV DURYCH: THE MISSION OF THE CZECH STATE

Title: *Poslání českého státu* (The mission of the Czech state)

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Language: Czech

The excerpts used are from the original.

About the author

Jaroslav Durych [1886 Hradec Králové (*Ger.* Königgrätz) – 1962, Prague]: novelist, poet, playwright, and political essayist. Born in the family of a writer, he first studied to become a priest, but was cast out of the Příbram seminary for reading *libri prohibiti*. He studied medicine and in 1913 became a physician in the Austrian army. He served on the Italian and Galician front during the First World War, and later in the Czechoslovak army rising to the rank of colonel. Influenced by turn-of-the-century expressionism, neoclassicism and religious mysticism as well as by Roman Catholic writers such as Jakub Deml (1878–1961), Josef Florian (1873–1941) or Otakar Březina (1868–1929), he became the most important Czech Catholic writer of his generation, developing a very idiosyncratic literary style. Although he debuted in poetry, his main literary field was prose, both historical and contemporary. He wrote love stories with strong symbolic and mystic elements in which the dominant heroine was modeled after St. Mary. In his historical novels, he concentrated on the period of post-Tridentine Catholic Reform in Bohemia and Central Europe. He made several trips to Western Europe seeking inspiration for his favorite topic: the 17th-century Bohemian warlord, Albrecht of Wallenstein. Apart from belles lettres, he wrote numerous religious stage plays, stories and other texts he himself called “pilgrimage commodity.” Between 1923 and 1927, he was the editor-in-chief of the cultural-political journal *Rozmach*, and between 1928 and 1933 of the journal *Akord*. Both journals were to a great extent his own creation, and their main political line was the fight against the mainstream Czechoslovak liberalism from integral Catholic and conservative positions. Durych’s coarse and sarcastic attacks against “democratic” writers and politicians, especially Karel Čapek (1890–1938), are well-known in Czech cultural history. He was officially condemned after 1945. Ignored during most of the communist period, he died as a marginalized author. The literary qualities of Durych’s novels became widely recognized again after the fall of state socialism in 1989.

Main works: *Na horách* [In the mountains] (1919); *Gotická růže* [Gothic rose] (1923); *Ejhle člověk* [Ecce homo] (1928); *Bloudění* [Erring] (1929); *Rekviem* [Req-

uiem] (1930); *Sedmikráska* [Daisy] (1925); *Paní Anežka Berková* [Mrs. Anežka Berková] (1931); *Píseň o růži* [Song about the rose] (1934); *Masopust* [Carnival] (1938); *Služebníci neužiteční* [Idle servants] (1941); *Boží duha* [God's rainbow] (1969); *Duše a hvězda* [Spirit and star] (1969).

Context

Political Catholicism in the Czech lands became a movement at the end of the 19th century, though it remained fragmented politically. In Moravia, in contrast to Bohemia, Catholicism was stronger. During the Great War, all Catholic parties were pro-Austrian, and it was only in 1918, under the leadership of Msgr. Jan Šrámek (1870–1956), that they began to cooperate with anti-Austrian politicians and joined the National Committee striving for an independent Czechoslovak state. They thus formed the united Czechoslovak People's Party (ČSL), one of the important political parties of the inter-war republic. However, every effort to co-opt the Slovak Catholics failed and, at the beginning of the 1920s, the Slovaks left the shared deputy club in Parliament. The main reason for their move was the discrepancy between Czech and Slovak national programs. The ČSL, led by Šrámek, supported the institutions of the democratic political order, the idea of a "Czechoslovak political nation," and of Czechoslovakia as a "national state of Czechs and Slovaks." But these ideas were hardly acceptable for the Slovak autonomists. The party had a similar attitude toward the Sudeten Germans, who were understood as just a minority. ČSL also refused broader cooperation with German activist pro-republican parties, including the Christian Socialists. Only in the late 1930s, after the rise of Konrad Henlein's (1898–1945) *Sudetendeutsche Partei*, did the Peoples' Party begin to call for a closer collaboration with pro-republican German activists.

Apart from mainstream political Catholicism, however, there was an alternative concept of the nation that was used by intellectuals and writers grouped around journals such as *Rozmach*, *Akord*, *Řád*, *TAK*, or *Obnova*, and influenced by the so-called "circle of Stará Říše"—a group of writers around Josef Florian, based in the Moravian town of Stará Říše and inspired by Leon Bloy's Catholic mysticism. The majority of these writers opposed not only the political line of ČSL but most of the political life in the new republic. They condemned modern democracy as decadent and immoral. The only way out of this situation was a radical renewal of the spiritual life and of the national community, which they conceived primarily as "a spiritual formation." The leading figure in this group was Jaroslav Durych. For him, as for the rest

of the 1918 generation, the creation of Czechoslovakia represented a major historical event; however, unlike the liberal authors, he did not support the new political order. He complained that after the horrors and sacrifice during the Great War the Czechs, instead of going back to their Christian roots and St. Wenceslas tradition, had resorted to a democratic liberal order fostering petty party bickering, down-to-earth everyday work and civic life without any pathos or spirituality.

For Durych in the 1920s, the nation was neither a theoretical concept nor a sociological phenomenon, but a personified subject, and as such an actor of history, responsible only to God. The life of a nation relied on conscious activity, diligently looking after and fulfilling its national and state mission. In his political writings, Durych challenged the Wilsonian principle of national self-determination, based on the concept of natural rights, which was an indispensable part of the official interwar Czechoslovak political doctrine. For Durych, only the nation that fulfilled its predetermined mission had the right to its own state. In the case of the Czechs, such a mission was to form again, after the Middle Ages, a spiritual center of Central Europe. Significantly, Durych used the term "Czech State" simultaneously with the term "Czech Empire" alluding to an imperial body politic that evoked the memory of the medieval Bohemian Kingdom. That he was somewhat alienated from political realities is shown by the fact that he ignored the Slovaks altogether. In the excerpt from "The Mission of the Czech State" presented below, Durych fused his ultramontane Catholicism with integral nationalism and reflected on the current geopolitical, cultural and religious situation.

Durych's political romanticism, underpinned by strong conservative motives, stood in sharp opposition to almost all important political and cultural trends characterizing the first Czechoslovak republic. He harshly criticized the Masarykian "Protestant" interpretation of Czech history and the crucial notion of "humanity" (*ideál humanitní*) that fostered the proverbial "Czech progressivism" (*české pokrokářství*). Moreover, he equally condemned the professed liberalism and pragmatism of his own generation (Karel Čapek, Ferdinand Peroutka, František Langer, and others), as well as Marxism and Communism (which for him had one great merit, namely fighting capitalism), together with the moderate political clericalism of the Peoples' Party. Instead, he called for the revival of the forgotten heroic spirit of the Czech nation and deplored the loss of the idealized Roman Catholic hierarchical society. As such, Durych's writings never became part of the Czech national political canon. His "Catholic absolutism" and Baroque dualism were in many ways akin to radical right-wing nationalism (Viktor Dyk), corporatist

political clericalism (Jan Scheinost) and fascism (Radola Gajda, Jiří Stříbrný). Yet he never collaborated with Czech fascists or with the Nazis, whom he found unacceptable due to their neo-paganism. The leftist political discourse after the Second World War almost erased him from public political and literary history, and he was rediscovered as a political thinker only in the 1990s.

MK

The mission of the Czech state

In domestic politics, there are three interesting factors: the nationality conflict, the social conflict and the religious conflict. In foreign politics, there is the relation between the state and the Great and the Little Entente, the German States and Hungary, Poland and Russia. In addition, there is the shape of the Czech Empire, as it was established by the peace conferences. At this point, one can predict that under these circumstances, defense would be bitter, shabby and short-lived. Neutral isolation might perhaps last a little longer, but the difference would not be great or glorious. Both these courses of existence and development would be unnatural.

The only possible course for the Czechs is to expand their wings.

Let us reflect, therefore, on the specific circumstances.

The nationality conflict is a kind of paradoxical phenomenon in this country because people thought it would be irrelevant. It was something both sides had forgotten. The Czech nation neither used its title nor its executive power to negotiate an appropriate status for itself that would undermine any possible nationality rebellion against it. At the time of the revolution, by right of war, it might have acted in a most radical manner and dismissed any kind of reproach. It did not do so and recourse can no longer be made to right of war, but peace has not been established. Politically, it has not yet overcome this difficulty, because it still lacks the consciousness of a sovereign state, without which it is impossible to rule, to forgive or to manoeuvre. Thus the efforts of the national parties are split over petty details where good sense falters.

The social conflict was ushered in even before the disintegration of the Habsburg Monarchy, when the socialists stipulated that the new state should have a socialist form. Although their demand may have seemed very just and acceptable, it was nipped in the bud by the decline of the social morale. The socialist alternative conceded a complete lack of interest in the restoration of the Czech State. There was no ideological interest here, but rather an eco-

nomic one. There was no talk of compromise; there was no negotiation, but only coercion at the most critical moment. This socialism was incapable of struggling over or for the state; it had no interest in it except as an easy prey, to be gained without sacrifice, struggle or obligations. It did not offer a new contribution, nor did it promise anything. It was sterile and powerless on its own. It only exploited the balance of the tongue of the scales. [...]

The religious conflict is the heritage of the Habsburgs, a debt that no one has yet wanted to liquidate officially. The original Czech religious indifference, joined with all the defects that the Viennese Court had grafted directly or indirectly onto the provincial Roman Catholic outlook, was suddenly placed into a revolutionary fire, which small-town eyes were not accustomed to. The official state was not prepared for religious politics; it did not have the competent, or even moderately informed, powers to cope with it. Czech Roman Catholicism, in so far as it got involved in the struggle, was no better off intellectually; indeed, it was much worse off than the official intellectuals of the state. Complete disorientation with regard to the nature and diversionary tactics of Roman Catholicism predominated, to the detriment of all, literally on all sides. In addition, the religious conflict was exploited simply as a diversionary tactic—by the progressive parties to make up for the shortcomings of their platforms, and by the party under attack for a number of older reasons. It thus distracted attention from and recollection of individuals highly responsible in the past for the Viennese tendency of Roman Catholic practice. It also disguised the religious, political and social shortcomings of its platform; and it prepared the ground for an imminent change of course. But the meaning of Roman Catholicism is still something unknown and generally scorned by both sides. Only rarely in history and in very few states has it happened that a battle has been waged over religion and against religion by two different sides that knew nothing about it and were not even interested in it, but rather looked on it merely as a symptom of partisan economic interest.

These are the three symptoms of life within the Czech state; three symptoms that testify to a very flippant outlook and very flippant practice; symptoms that testify to the fact that it would be best to let this culture vanish in a wastebasket. But the consequences will not vanish so quickly because they are usually different and greater than anticipated. If the passive tendency were to remain as widespread as it is now, the ceilings and roofs of Czech culture would soon collapse. But its foundations are somewhat stronger.

The authority of the Czech State was founded on its relation to the Great Entente. Because the Czech State, in its new form, could not on its own satisfy the Great Entente, and because this relation could not satisfy our state in

the long run, relations became complicated on account of the diversity of interests of the individual allies. The Czech State could not be satisfied with the permanent function of guard over Germany without a guarantee of real and honest aid against rivals in the East. The creation of the Little Entente was the first active, programmatic or provisional step.

The two mobilizations against Hungary were different in nature.¹ The first ended in the too rapid failure of the action, organized in a makeshift way as a diversionary tactic in the struggle between nationalists and socialists. One could say that the state had more luck than good sense. From an absolute perspective, it looks as if the Czech State had and still does have such historical significance that not even dishonesty or betrayal can destroy it. The second mobilization was, however, brighter and more effective. It furthered the moral consolidation of the state and clarified the relationship between the Czech Empire and Hungary in such a way that there was no longer any doubt in the matter.

The relationship with Poland is complicated. Polish expansion and Czech expansion clash with one another in such a way that reconciliation can only be achieved through considerable sacrifice on the Czech side. The advantages that derive from this reconciliation are relative. A complication arises on account of relations with Russia, and here a twofold problem arises: one that is religious and social.

The Bolshevik Revolution created a certain state of affairs in Russia. What is at stake is whether this state of affairs should be acknowledged or permanently denied recognition.

Yet the Czech practice to date has demonstrated that a negative relation to the Bolshevik Revolution, whether in the form of intervention or boycott, has no moral title. Or rather that the practice limps woefully behind the morality of the title. Czech interventionism was nothing but armchair interventionism. And the present boycott of Bolshevik Russia is nothing but personal. [...]

Let us consider the present borders of our state. Let us concede, according to the principles of historical materialism, that they arose passively as the

¹ Durych alludes here to the struggle between the emerging Czechoslovakia and the Hungarian Soviet Republic in Spring 1919. Using a combination of patriotic and socialist propaganda, the Hungarian communists successfully mobilized against the Czechoslovak troops and even established a short-lived Slovak Soviet Republic. Eventually, however, the Romanian, Serbian and Czechoslovak forces, relying also on French logistical help, dispersed the Hungarian troops, which led to the collapse of the communist government and to the rise of the radical conservative and nationalist Horthy-regime.

result of a peace-conference treaty. Then they are the borders of a buffer state, which is supposed to be sacrificed as a vanguard of the allied armies. Or they are the borders of a neutral state. But the protectors of the state were certainly not trying to create a neutral state that would be of no use to them. Defense would certainly be possible, but not pleasant.

But the same historical materialism can also allow for the possibility that these borders, highly advantageous for an attack, have an active purpose. When we reflect on the psychological relations with our neighbors, we see that the historical formation of the lands of St Wenceslas is less predestined to an aggressive role. Acquiring the lands of the former Hungarian Crown, by contrast, is a real, visible and conspicuous incursion, a catastrophic incision into the Hungarian body, an invasion of the Hungarian-Polish communication and a menacing aggressive line that is overly exposed. Then the addition of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia is an almost illogical element because there lies the gate to the great Orient, even if it has remained shut thus far. The same historical materialism can explain this state of affairs by arguing that the shape and aggregate of our state were deliberately organized in such a way that the many difficulties that thereby arose would not give the state much peace for consolidation. The state would thus always be heavily reliant on aid from allies and forced to enter into a servitude from which it could not extricate itself. Surrounded by three powerful enemies, filled with disruptive elements and, in addition, in close proximity to the Bolshevik ocean, it might appear to be a sovereign state, yet be at the mercy not only of the Entente, but of any great power whatsoever.

On the whole, however, people are not soulless or mindless. It has become evident that an independent Czech decision could on occasion have immense consequences for Europe. A dispute arises as to whether the Czech State should risk such instances of decision-making, or whether it is condemned to permanent indenture. Usually, however, disputes are settled by people who have no title to do so. It is enough for us though to know that such instances of historical decision-making are possible for us.

We can, however, only acknowledge historical materialism as an auxiliary theory. In practice, matter is victorious only when it is joined with spirit. History is thus a spiritual process. [...]

If the spirit ceases to grow, it does not remain the same and undiminished, but rather sinks down, dragging the body with it. It is the same with every idea, with every life, work, nation and state. The only possible course for the Czech State is to spread its wings, otherwise it will be condemned to a doomed defense.

Everything that would hinder defense turns into an advantage for advancement. Conditions are reversed; paradoxical things become logical.

Concentrating on the appeal of the Czech State is the one thing that can resolve or alleviate the current nationality problems and relieve political tension at the borders. The active appeal of the state can divide neighbors and define exactly what is unacceptable and where a radical solution is necessary. The active appeal does away with external and internal isolation. It clarifies relations between parties and prepares the ground for changes, whether evolutionary or radical, in the social order. At the same time, it protects the state from exploding and from any kind of internal harm. If the Czech nation has no longing for collective or independent agency in the ordering of world history, it will learn that the history of a state consists not only of its own history but also of the history of other states. If another state or nation acts, it is necessary to act on it as well; it is better to come first than to come second.

Czech politics has two different kinds of trends: one Eastern, the other Western. Both can be documented as early as the history of the Přemyslyds.² The Western tendency culminated in the era of Charles IV, when Prague was the centre of the Holy Roman Empire.³ The Eastern tendency was sought out instinctively, rather than for intellectual reasons. Now it is delineated by Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, a seemingly inconspicuous headland on which, however, the dispute between Poland and Russia will one day be decided. It depends on the Czech scope of vision and intent whether or not the Czech nation will be the deciding judge at this trial. The value of many things that have been despised or unfamiliar until now will be recognized, restored or enhanced, in particular the spiritual riches, which the Czech nation has in such abundance that even with the best will it cannot make full use of them.

The history of the power and expansion of the Czech State is determined by these three heights, which must be scaled:

1. The arrangement of relations between the Czech State and the neighboring states in such a way that the former will not be an isolated centre, but a centre of power in a federal empire.
2. Immediate and perfect justice with respect to the demands of the Bolshevik Revolution.

² The Přemyslyds were a Czech royal dynasty that ruled in medieval Bohemia from the 9th century until 1306.

³ Charles IV (1316–1378) of Luxembourg was a Bohemian king and Holy Roman Emperor, dubbed “father of the homeland” in the 19th century, whose reign is still considered the golden age of the medieval Bohemian kingdom.

3. The arrangement of a stable foundation and mobile campaigns for unionism.

All these things are equally important. It is necessary for the state and the nation to carry out numerous revisions of their traditions, as the outcome of these revisions will be staggering. Before the war, too many stuck their heads in the sand and now it is no longer appropriate. If the Czech Empire spreads its wings, it will not be to the detriment of anyone. It will contribute tenfold to everyone; instead of vanity it will bring glory. Even for those whom it will lead as *primus inter pares*, its leadership will not only be beneficial but also honorable. For the Czech spiritual treasure is such that it will be enough to cover all advance payments. The visible and demonstrable mission of the Czech State is, in the present era, sovereign and sublime beyond all the calculations of politicians by trade.

Do not be afraid to be the first nation in the world, first not only in terms of brilliance and pride, but also in terms of tasks and obligations!

Translated by Katherine Hayes

FRANCE VEBER: THE IDEAL FOUNDATIONS OF SLAVIC AGRARIANISM

Title: *Idejni temelji slovanskega agrarizma: programatična socialna študija*
(The ideal foundations of Slavic agrarianism: A programmatic social study)

Originally published: Ljubljana, Kmetijska tiskovna zadruga, 1927.

Language: Slovene

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About the author

France Veber, also Weber [1890, Gornja Radgona, *Ger.* Oberradkersburg (Northeastern Slovenia) – 1975, Ljubljana]: philosopher. He studied philosophy at the University of Graz under Alexius Meinong, graduating in 1917. Between 1919 and 1945, he taught philosophy at the University of Ljubljana. In 1940, he became a member of the Academy of Sciences and Arts in Ljubljana. Veber's philosophy was rooted in the tradition of the Graz school of phenomenology, sharing its interests in the philosophy of mind and theory of knowledge. Veber's philosophy is usually divided into two phases: an early one, characterized by an adherence to Meinong's theory of objects, and a later evolution towards ontological realism. His book, "The ideal foundations of Slavic agrarianism," is situated on the dividing line between the two periods. This philosophical evolution was accompanied by an embrace of Christianity. Throughout his life, Veber avoided any ideological positioning. During the Second World War, however, he opposed the revolutionary practice of the Communist-led partisan resistance. In 1944, he participated in a series of lectures organized, for propaganda purposes, by the Nazi-sponsored collaborationist regime. In 1945, he was forced to resign from all academic positions, and spent the rest of his life away from public life. The interest in his work was revived in the late 1980s. Since the 1990s, he has been presented as one of the main figures of the newly established Slovenian philosophical canon. Nevertheless, the social and political aspects of his thinking have been almost completely neglected.

Main works: *Uvod v filozofijo* [Introduction to philosophy] (1921); *Etika. Poizkus eksaktne logike nagnonske pameti* [Ethics. An attempt at an exact logic of the instinctive mind] (1923); *Znanost in vera. Vedoslovna študija* [Science and Faith. An epistemological study] (1924); *Očrt psihologije* [An outline of psychology] (1924); *Estetika. Psihološki in normativni temelji estetske pameti* [Aesthetics. The psychological and normative foundations of aesthetic memory] (1924).

cal and normative foundations of the aesthetic mind] (1925); *Filozofija* [Philosophy] (1930); *Sv. Avguštín. Osnovne filozofske misli sv. Avguščina* [St. Augustine. The basic philosophical thought of St. Augustine (1931); *Knjiga o Bogu* [The Book on God] (1934); *Nacionalizem in krščanstvo: kulturna pisma Slovincem* [Nationalism and Christianity: Cultural epistles to Slovenes] (1938); *Vprašanje stvarnosti. Dejstva in analize* [The problem of reality. Facts and analyses] (1939).

Context

During the 19th century, the idea of Slavic affinity was a core notion shaping intellectual debates about Slovene identity. There was a tradition of emphasizing the Slavic character of the Slovenes as a distinguishing trait from their Germanic and neo-Latin neighbors that dated back to at least the 16th century. From the late Romantic period onward, the idea that the Slovenes participated—or should participate—in a wider Slavic historical mission gained support among the nationalist intelligentsia. This idea had different manifestations—from Austro-Slavism, to Illyrianism, pan-Slavism and neo-Slavism; the relation between Slovene individuality and these wider Slavic frameworks was a recurrent source of polemics until the 1940s. For a long time, the Yugoslav idea gained support among Slovenes mostly as a local and partial manifestation of this sentiment of belonging to a wider Slavic community. This remained the case also after the establishment of Yugoslavia; it was only during and after the Second World War that Yugoslav patriotism in Slovenia distanced itself from a broader Slavic allegiance.

Veber's book on Slavic Agrarianism was probably the most articulate philosophical manifestation of the tradition of Slovene Slavism. Paradoxically, it appeared at a moment when this paradigm was already in decline. Veber's insistence on an inherent connection between the "Slavic spirit" and agrarianism was also part of an older, slowly fading tradition. As elsewhere, the glorification of the peasantry was strongly represented in the Slovene national tradition not only due to the predominantly agrarian character of Slovene society prior to the Second World War, but also because, traditionally, most of the towns on Slovene territory—especially the larger ones—were predominantly German or Italian speaking. As a consequence, during the "national revival" in the 19th century, the tendency to vilify the city was not only the prerogative of conservatives, but also of many progressive nationalists. Anti-urban *topoi* dominated Slovene literature well into the 20th century. However, in the interwar period, the rapidly changing social structure also triggered a shift in cultural sensibilities: especially dur-

ing the 1930s, the rural vs. urban dichotomy lost much of its potential both as an explanatory model of social dynamics and as a tool of political mobilization.

Veber's text was also a rare attempt to articulate peasantry in a philosophical, rather than a folkloristic or anthropologic-sociological language. The text, however, had very little impact. This was probably due to the fact that it was published exactly at the moment when Slovene political agrarianism was undergoing an evolution from centrist, conservative liberal positions towards more leftist ones: in ideological terms, this meant precisely abandoning the discourse about the peasantry as a homogeneous class and an emphasis on the strategic alliance between rural and urban working classes. At the same time, Slovene agrarianism experienced a clear shift from previously pro-centralist and Yugoslavist positions towards Slovenian national particularism and demands for territorial autonomy. In other words, the type of political agrarianism that could have adopted Veber's philosophical contribution disappeared simultaneously with the publication of the book.

This ideological vacuum arguably also explains why this text failed to constitute a crucial point of reference following the rise of political pluralism in the late 1980s, when different political forces were busy devising the Slovene ideological canon. At the same time, taking the references to agrarianism and the Slavic community as part of a philosophical argument about the different levels of identification of the human being, the text can be read as a paradigmatic Slovenian instance of the "nationalization of philosophy" that became a central intellectual preoccupation in the interwar period all over Eastern Europe.

LLG

The ideal foundations of Slavic agrarianism

In his physical-bodily aspect, man is a piece of *inorganic* nature [...]. In his physiological-physical aspect, he is a piece of *organic* nature [...]. He is furthermore in the first half of his psychological or psychic aspect a piece of *animalistic-psychic* nature. [...] Exactly in the human, we also ultimately find the second half of the psychic nature, which is no longer animalistic-instinctive but *rational-spiritual*.

[...]

But if man is therefore the *sole* direct crossing of generally *all* the real forces, inorganic and organic, animalistic and spiritual, it is clear that also every proper world-life outlook [...] may indeed in one turn encompass ev-

everything while corresponding to the human needs of both the mind and the heart [...]. Thus, this relationship is confirmed in a fully intelligible way also by the history of significant individual periods in the cultural development of mankind. Every such period was built only on a certain world-life outlook, and every such outlook was ultimately focused on the problem of Man.

[...]

Greek antiquity was characterized by its secular optimism [...], rooted in the circumstance that the "modern" divide between nature and man did not yet exist. Hence [...] the "classic objectivity" or "epic character" of all ancient public life, as it appeared in the [...] arts, etc. [...] This was essentially an era of a merely *natural conception* of man. Diametrically opposite to it was the period of [...] medieval Christianity, [...] inaugurated by Christ's words: "The Earth is a vale of tears; your home is not here on earth, but with your Father in heaven!" Secular optimism was replaced by secular pessimism and "transcendent optimism" [...] The third, "new" era is not in the same way original, but composed by all possible compromises between the former and the latter (e.g., renaissance-romanticism, materialism-idealism etc.). This era has an obvious aspect of man's bare *preparation* for that special and again truly original fourth era of his cultural development. It seems that we ourselves are at the starting point of this era. This is best proven by the fact that never before has a special, namely the *social*, aspect been affirming itself [...] with such vehemence as today.

[...]

[*T*]he *national principle* is now attested as *the fundamental principle* [...] of the cultural human development, which is outwardly shown by my following definitions [...]:

1. *The family* is that elementary social unit which, by its *own* social force, produces and nurtures the instinctive-animalistic social human life. To this axis also belongs the "tribe" as a bare organic group of individual families.

2. *The nation* is that elementary social unit which, by its *own* social force, produces and nurtures the rationally-spiritual social human life, in accordance with his instinctive-animalistic aspect, which only gives it an actual possibility.

3. *Humanity* is [...] that elementary social unit, which by its *own* social force [...] produces and nurtures exclusively the rational-spiritual social human life; as such it still remains only an idea that is concretely realizing itself only in the nation.

[...]

My second definition [of the nation] does not exclude the possibility for many individual and [...] already properly asserted nations to unite into a yet higher national unit. Such a unification is especially possible, likely to succeed and also culturally required everywhere, where an *instinctive-animalistic major or minor kinship* exists among nations (as e.g., between the Slovenes, Croats and Serbs, and ultimately in general e.g., among all "Slavs"). Thus we come to the following interesting finding: just as in the frame of a *particular* nation the (family-tribal) instinctive form of life constitutes the base of its spiritually-social life, so for the spiritually-social life of entire *national groups* the indispensable base is also formed by the collective instinctive force of their kindred parts. This finding enables us the same kind of psychological fixation for the special factor that also belongs here (in the line: family, tribe, nation, humanity), namely the so-called human *race*. Above all, it is immediately visible that "race," as a social factor, belongs, by its psychological background, between the "nation" and "humanity" in the same way that the "tribe" comes between the "family" and the "nation." [...] Race is the real principle of the *instinctive-animalistic community or homogeneity* of the individual, and of those nations that are, according to our definition, already genuine ones: as the tribe is psychologically based on the instinctive-animalistic kinship of the respective individual *families* and mediates on this basis between these families and the respective nation, in the same way race is based in the psychological aspect on the instinctive-animalistic kinship of the respective individual *nations* and mediates on this basis between these nations and humanity. Race is thus the "tribe" raised to the second power, that is to say, already a family-tribally-nationally-founded "tribe."

[...]

Man's animalistic life imprints an indelible seal also on his spiritual life; the fundamental rational-spiritual differences between two people are in this sense developmentally built upon parallel fundamental differences to their instinctively-animalistic divergences. Only this truth explains to us the fact that we discover so many differences between people also on the points of the purest [...] rational-spiritual activity, or why e.g., also the scientific, the artistic, the political, etc., thinking of, say, a Slav is different from that of a Teuton [*German*], and both of these again differ from that of a Latin [*Roman*], etc. Since the rational-spiritual field—therefore also science, art and politics—is ultimately revolving around the same generally-human principles and norms, all such differences would be completely unintelligible; yet they are explained by the fact that they are due to the same differences [...] in the

instinctive-animalistic experience of the respective people. [...] At the same time, an already often stated principle is now also made clear—namely, that (and why) every nation in the history of mankind has its *own* specific *cultural* mission: that mission is to develop and fulfill all its *rational-spiritual* forces in exactly those directions and by those aspects that are at the same time also the typical directions and typical aspects of its *own* specific *instinctive-animalistic* strivings and aspirations. [...]

Agricultural production is the only empirically realized class-production that can in all respects be attributed the character of *fundamental*, and, thus, a class-production, upon which all others are built as on their inevitable psychological fundament.

With this ultimate finding also the second part of the argumentation [...] is involved—namely the proof that agrarian and only agrarian production is the fundamental class-production also from the family-national perspective. For if the class and the family-national social perspectives [...] ought to intersect [...] at any point at all, then this is self-understandably possible and realized exactly on the point of the fundamental [...] class-production.

[...]

And this final proof for the double fundamentality of the agrarian production, namely its fundamentality from the class-theoretical as well as the family-national viewpoints, now simultaneously psychologically explains why the agrarian production is not only the historical beginning of human cultural development, but at the same time the sole indispensable *further* base for such human mentality, without which also in any later moment there could be no discussion about the true *cultural* state of man.

[...]

It seems that only via the entirety of *Slavdom* an empirically realized familial-national-racial population on the Earth is constituted, what by its own nature forms the most favorable ground for the final creation of such a truly and in all respects democratic state system. For, exactly in the Slavdom I discover, in the largest and purest extent, realized all that [...] distinguishes [...] the agrarian class-social community from all other social elements [...]. Also at such points, where it does not have anything more to do with agriculture itself, [...] the Slavic psyche has in the greatest and purest extent retained the basic structure [of] the agrarian psyche, and exactly this structure is so characteristic and constitutive for it, that it becomes the less “Slavic” the more it is at particular points moving away from it.

[...]

From all this, also the equally characteristic and fundamental postulates of Slavic politics follow evidently.

The fundamental postulates of Slavic politics

a) Slavic politics should be agrarian

[...]

In the first place, this politics should in the economic respect rely on the Slavic *soil*, which should be the principal production base for the final construction of all the remaining Slavic economic system. [...] Slavic politics should in this sense be the politics of a *continuous* and not of an interrupted historical development of all Slavdom. [...] Slavic politics should also aim [...] at serving [...] the abovementioned main three goals: that the industrially-technical development of Slavdom adapt itself harmonically to its "earthly" development. [I]n Slavdom's highest cultural productions, too, those ideals of the human psyche should be shown and discovered, which are to be found in [...] obscured form [...] solely at the point of agricultural life. Ultimately, all the assimilative social processes in the frame of the entire Slavdom should be carried out in terms of careful consideration and sincere respect for all of its relevant [...] past.

b) Slavic politics should be of a West-East and an East-West kind. With this postulate I think foremost of the earlier delineated mentally-theoretical distinction between western ("European") and eastern humanity. All history [...] unequivocally testifies that the basic motive of human development in the East is the *instinctive* side of the human psyche—animalistic and spiritual—whereas western humanity has developed, already during the first outsets of its cultural existence, [...] mainly in the direction of *rational* spirituality.

[...]

As this perhaps sounds paradoxical or impossible, we must and we can talk about a true *culture* only in regard to the most outstanding points of eastern humanity, whereas all western culture is merely refracting through the prism of so-called *civilization*, whose basic center of gravity is precisely not the goal but the means that crumbles all cosmic occurrences into countless causes and effects and reasons and consequences, being unable to ascend by its own power to a harmonious unity between the mental and instinctive "ascertainment" of phenomena on the one hand, and their "explanation" on the other.

[...]

c) *Slavic politics should be juridical-pacifist.* [...] We had seen then that the rural life is being permeated by the spirit of defensive peacemaking, whereas the nomadic [life] by the one of a bellicose aggressiveness. And likewise had we already then seen how on the one side the nomadic type within the scope of agriculture gradually withdrew in favor of the rural one and how all the other political life of mankind that had followed this first deep social antithesis of humanity developed further in accordance to this pattern. Well, the entire present book wants to be, so to speak, one single piece of evidence not only of how precisely Slavdom also from the family-national perspective is closest to the basic psychological organization of all agriculture in the broadest and in the narrowest sense, but also of how exactly at the point of Slavdom both the perspectives, the family-national and the agricultural class-based one, at least actually straightforwardly intersect. If, however, according to the above [discussion] and in terms of earlier relevant argumentations, exactly agriculture has through its development evidently realized the indispensable need and tendency for a peacemaking-defensive human development and not the aggressive-combative one, then it is now also from the deepest psychological viewpoints clear that this task goes precisely to Slavdom, that it [Slavdom] is and in an ever increasing degree is becoming the most elite *peacemaking political factor* of all the state system on Earth.

Translated by Oskar Mulej

ANTON WILDGANS: SPEECH ABOUT AUSTRIA

Title: *Rede über Österreich* (Speech about Austria)

Originally published: *Rede über Österreich* (Vienna: F. G. Speidel, 1930)

Language: German

The excerpts used are from Anton Wildgans, *Zu Zeit und Welt* (Vienna: Bel-laria Verlag, 1958), pp. 412, 416, 421–22.

About the author

Anton Wildgans [1881, Vienna – 1932, Mödling, Lower Austria]: lawyer, poet, playwright, cultural functionary, and journalist. He practiced as an examining magistrate from 1909 to 1911, before turning to writing full-time, incorporating observations of social conditions into his work. The early dramas *Armut* [Poverty] (1914) and *Dies irae* (1918) blended naturalism with Christian social justice and stylistic elements from Expressionism, although watered down by comparison with mainstream German exponents, e.g., Georg Kaiser (1878–1945). These plays found audiences at the aesthetically conservative Vienna Burgtheater, of which he was twice director (1921–1922; 1930–1931). His two short stints at this former court theatre, which claimed inheritance of an all-German tradition, but now served a shrunken Austrian Republic, were marked by personal frustration, ill health and battles with the incumbent Ministers of Education, to whom ultimate control over repertoire and funding were ceded. However, they honed his sense of Austria's separate cultural mission from Germany, and of the special role that Austrian literature, drama and its newly defined “national” theatre should play. Numerous newspaper articles and his “Speech about Austria” testify to this mission. Having originally been chosen as a compromise candidate, Wildgans evolved into a spokesman for Austrian patriotism before the establishment of the authoritarian regime in 1934. He was one of the few interwar Austrian authors to feature prominently in post-1945 attempts to create a distinct Austrian literature and culture, as illustrated by the “Anton Wildgans Award” for outstanding performance in literature created in 1962.

Main works: *Herbstfrühling* [Autumn-Spring] (1909); *Armut* [Poverty] (1914); *Liebe* [Love] (1916); *Dies irae* (1918); *Kain* [Cain] (1920); *Kirbisch* (1927); *Musik der Kindheit* [Music of childhood] (1928); *Gesammelte Werke von Anton Wildgans* [Complete works] (1930).

Context

1929 marked ten years since the foundation of Austria's First Republic: a creation famously willed into existence by the Peace Treaties of 1919, rather than by the popular desire of German-speaking residents in the western, ex-Habsburg heartlands. Despite linguistic affiliation with Germany and the granting of self-determination elsewhere, unification (*Anschluss*) between the two countries was blocked. However, *Anschluss* was the aim of Austria's first government in 1919, and it remained an official policy goal of the Social Democratic Party until Hitler's ascent in the 1930s. Over the course of the 1920s, the cause of a separate Austrian identity and consciousness became linked with the conservative Christian Socials, albeit gradually, sometimes subtly, and often unsystematically. This cleric-dominated party led Austria's interwar coalition governments until the imposition of authoritarian rule in 1934, and supplied its longest-standing chancellor, the prelate Ignaz Seipel (1876–1932), who cautiously espoused the principle of an Austrian historical mission separate from that of Germany in his publications.

However, "Austrian identity" was not a popular cause that could unify a society divided mainly along class and ideological lines. Politics and society in the Republic had become increasingly polarized; only one coalition government, the very first, had been with the Social Democrats, who subsequently concentrated their political power in the housing citadels and social projects of what came to be called "Red" Vienna, where they controlled the City Council throughout the interwar years. The polarities in Austrian social life and political geography had by the late 1920s become both entrenched and militarized. Rival groups such as the *Schutzbund*, affiliated with the Social Democrats, and the *Heimwehr*, linked to the right, were established, and clashed with increasing regularity. In 1927, tensions spilled over into central Vienna when the Palace of Justice was set alight by a mob angry at the judicial acquittal of men who had killed two workers in an act of apparent class hatred. As the battle-lines hardened, the clamor in rightist circles for more authoritarian governance rose: thus, a new, more authoritarian constitution that strengthened the powers of the President vis-à-vis the fractious Parliament was passed in 1929. These changes stopped short of the more radical revisions of 1934, when Dollfuss suspended Parliament and became Chancellor of a one-party state run along Italian fascist principles. However, such developments, against the backdrop of economic hardship and the Great Depression, arguably set the course for the definitive skirmishes between left and right in 1934 known as the Austrian civil war.

This fractious background imposed particular demands on cultural functionaries in the First Republic. Anton Wildgans, a home-grown author who had penned some patriotic verses during the First World War, was deemed inoffensive to both political sides and indigenous enough to take on the running of Austria's leading theatre in 1922. This experience was personally frustrating for Wildgans, who felt artistically encumbered by party politics; but it helped shape his emerging vision of Austrian culture and history as marks of distinctiveness from Germany. Wildgans's early battles at the Burgtheater had been concerned with avoiding the interference of Education Ministers, but also with keeping theatre impresario Max Reinhardt (1873–1943) out of this hallowed institution, whose uniquely “Austrian” traditions and virtues he came to defend and espouse: for instance in a series of newspaper articles to mark the theatre's jubilee year in 1926. These themes were intensified and systematized in Wildgans's definitive patriotic coda, the *Speech about Austria*, which followed three years later, and which helped expedite his return to another frustrated directorship at the Burgtheater in 1930. The *Speech* was originally intended for delivery before a royal and diplomatic audience in Sweden, but the visit was scuppered by ill-health. Instead, the following year, Austrian radio broadcast the text and it was published in book form. These events transformed Wildgans into a confirmed patriotic spokesperson, although of a specific kind, one who appeared to chime with his times.

Superficially, the *Speech* embraces a pre-existing idea from late Habsburg times that had been espoused by **Hugo von Hofmannsthal**, **Leopold Andrian** and others. Namely, that Austrian uniqueness was based on her specific historical experience at the helm of multi-national Empire, which generated a culture and type of human being distinct from those of (North) Germany. An immediate parallel with Hofmannsthal's schematic essay “Prussian and Austrian” (1917) comes to mind, in which their opposing characteristics are juxtaposed for satirical effect. Wildgans's Austrian patriotism also followed a loosely “Habsburg” historical model, including a Catholicizing impulse, linking the passion of Christ symbolically to the sufferings of the Austrian people. Like the German Austrophile Oscar Schmitz some five years before him, he laid claim to the idea of “homo austriacus” (*der österreichische Mensch*) as a specific human type unique to Austria that her specific historical circumstances had created. However, Wildgans's vision of Austrian specificity is very much a product of post-Habsburg Austria in its robust insistence on the Germanic ethnic and cultural basis of a separate Austrian identity. He did not endorse any notions of “supranationality” based on

a fusion of ethnic components, as was the case with Hofmannsthal, but rather a vision of Austria “doing cultural work for the German spirit,” and “in [whose heart] German blood was beating” (“Speech about Austria”). As his dealings with the Burgtheater make clear, Wildgans avoided direct involvement with politics. But the sentiments espoused in his Speech found a clear echo in the ideology of the authoritarian “corporate state” founded in 1934, and foreshadowed the principles laid out by Chancellor Dollfuss in a keynote speech at Vienna’s *Trabrennplatz* that same year: that Austria should be Christian and German. Against the appeal of Nazism, room for ideological manoeuvre using such cultural arguments was clearly limited at best, fatally compromised at worst, and the overlaps were mercilessly exploited by those seeking *Anschluss* from within the supposedly patriotic, separatist Austrian regime, until Hitler finally marched across the border to a positive reception in 1938.

Unrecognized by German literary historians, Austrian counterparts had already canonized Wildgans by 1937, and his works remained staple fodder in school textbooks from 1945 until the early 1960s. Thereafter, Wildgans was displaced on primarily aesthetic grounds in favor of writers like **Robert Musil** and **Karl Kraus**, whose stock remains high to the present day, and to whom the mantle of an Austrian identity rooted in literature has steadily passed. But aesthetics are not the whole story. From the 1970s, the revised Austrian canon was joined by a third writer with impeccable anti-fascist credentials: Jura Soyfer, a Russophone Jewish immigrant born in Kharkov in 1912. He perished in a Nazi camp (Buchenwald) in 1939, and provides an “authentic” voice from the interwar Austrian left in stark contrast with the widespread clerical authoritarianism at the time. That Soyfer has displaced the First Republic’s *de facto* literary figurehead, Wildgans, therefore says much about the need for the canon to reflect contemporary Austrian political sensitivities towards national self-definition, as well as shifting literary taste.

RP

Speech about Austria

This may indeed be pronounced once and for all, without holding back, especially in an hour like this, when the task is, ladies and gentlemen, to bear witness before you to the *new* Austria. For we who are toiling on the construction of this new Austria do not need to deny the old one. On the contrary, we know exactly that for the time being we still have it to thank for

more or less everything, even if the inheritance handed to us was, in its wake, laden with many a curse and disappointment. But there are also values in the inheritance, values of an honorable culture and of a particular kind of human form, and in what follows I will only be talking about these two aspects.

There, there had been an Empire, ladies and gentlemen, the third largest in our Europe, the second largest after Germany, and in its heart—in which German blood was coursing—a German spirit carried out cultural work, having an effect that reached as far as the gates of the Orient. In these heartlands, which alone form the Austria of today, the tracks of a rise and fall, of midday and midnight, have been crisscrossing since time immemorial. [...]

Precisely this Vienna, the Imperial city on the Danube, was the first real metropolis on German soil at a time when Germany was a long time away from being conscious of its powerful *Volk*-based unity of the people. But more than this: alongside London, Paris and Rome, [it was] the German world city [...] in Europe. And in it, but also elsewhere in Austria, amid the radiant effects of its political and cultural life, a type formed over the course of the centuries that I prefer to call the *homo austriacus*. And from one to another, ladies and gentlemen, hereby allow me to give testimony of this type to you!

Yes, ladies and gentlemen, I dare to declare myself an advocate of this *homo austriacus*, although in so doing I am breaking a tradition, according to which Austrians previously, especially if they went abroad, would tend very much to emphasize its disadvantages. But now, since we, starting again from scratch, have taken on an inheritance of culture, one that cannot be more important; now that we are in the process of building this precious inventory into our new, if still small house, and managing it, *not* (in fact) as narrow-minded owners but at the same time as the custodians of all cultivated mankind ... in this important and hopeful moment it is time to renounce the bad habit of false modesty and all too unreflective self-sacrifice and to train up within us something different, namely the *historical consciousness*, and pride, of the Austrian! [...]

There is certainly still plenty to be used and elevated in the *new* Austria! Then, ladies and gentlemen, one must have seen this people in its deepest misfortune, in the time that adversity was pounding on every door and the ground was unsteady beneath almost every foot! Those who earlier knew how to take enjoyment now know just as well how to go without and go hungry! And the despair of being downtrodden felt by this people never degenerated into unchecked rage, although there was enough that would have merited its anger! For it also cast its bait and laid its traps in the form of spoilers,

have-a-go types and rabble-rousers. But in the deluge of dirt and confusion, to which every collapse of a state and societal structure gives rise, the essential core of our people remained untouched, and that core, upon which a nation ultimately depends, the priest and the servant of their ideal, they did not sell their honor for the sake of butter on their bread but preferred to eat their bread dry. The artist, the learned man, they continued carrying out their work in badly lit rooms with shivering hands, and while all around them threatened to collapse, hungry skeletons of senators, undeterred, sought and proclaimed holy, pure justice as in the days of plenty! No, ladies and gentlemen, a harder test for the soul and culture of a people was never before demanded, and he who passed this test, this is the *homo austriacus*—flogged by every whip, wounded by every thorn and nailed to every post.

Translated by Robert Pyrah

LUCIAN BLAGA: THE MIORITIC SPACE

Title: *Spațiul mioritic* (The Mioritic space)

Originally published: in *Gândirea* (1935), re-published in *Spațiul mioritic* (Bucharest: Cartea Românească, 1936)

Language: Romanian

The present excerpts are from *Trilogia culturii*, vol. 2 (Bucharest: Humanitas, 1994), pp. 9–10, 21–22, 24–25.

About the author

Lucian Blaga [1895, Lancrăm (*Hun.* Lámkerék), Transylvania – 1961, Cluj]: poet and philosopher. His father was a teacher. He studied in Braşov (*Hun.* Brassó, *Ger.* Kronstadt) and Vienna. In 1919 Blaga published his first volume of poetry, *Poeleme luminii* (The poems of light). In 1920 he obtained a doctorate in philosophy from the University of Vienna. Blaga's poetical talent was immediately recognized, and in 1921 the Romanian Academy awarded him the *Adamachi* prize for his literary debut. Between 1920 and 1924, Blaga worked in the editorial offices of various newspapers in Cluj. At the same time, through his friend, **Nichifor Crainic**, Blaga entered the traditionalist *Gândirea* circle. He published some of his most interesting philosophical articles in the journal *Gândirea*. In 1935 the Romanian Academy awarded him another prize, this time for his theatrical work, and elected him as member in 1936. In 1938 he became a professor of philosophy at the University of Cluj. In the interwar period, Blaga also had various diplomatic jobs, such as being the press attaché of the Romanian Embassies in Bern and Prague. He was appointed Romania's plenipotentiary in Lisbon in 1938. He mostly lived in Sibiu during the Second World War, where he edited the philosophical journal *Saeculum*. In 1946 Blaga returned to Cluj as a university professor, but the communist regime expelled him from the university after 1947. From 1948 to 1951, he worked at the Institute of History and Philosophy, and from 1951 onwards at the Library of the Romanian Academy in Cluj. Blaga is one of the few Romanian poets to have acquired international fame, as illustrated by his nomination for a Nobel Prize in literature in 1956. Gradually, his poetry was manipulated by the regime so that his theories on Romanian culture became synonymous with the national communist glorification of Romanian civilization. After 1989, he was celebrated equally for his poetry and essayism; traditionalist circles, in particular, emphasized the latter.

Main works: *Poeleme luminii* [Poems of light] (1921); *Zamolxe. Un mister păgân* [Zamolxis. A pagan mystery] (1921); *Fenomenul originar* [The original phe-

nomenon] (1925); *Cunoașterea luciferică* [Luciferic knowledge] (1933); *Geneza metaforei și sensul culturii* [The genesis of metaphor and the meaning of culture] (1937); *Elogiul satului românesc* [Eulogy of the Romanian village] (1937); *Despre gândirea magică* [On magic thinking] (1941); *Trilogia cosmică: Diferențialele divine. Aspecte antropologice. Existența istorică* [The Cosmological Trilogy (Divine differentials. Anthropological aspects. Historical existence)] (1983).

Context

During the interwar period, Romanian intellectuals of diverse ideological orientations engaged (or some of them continued engaging) with long lasting debates about the nation and the developmental path Romania should follow. Lucian Blaga belonged to the traditionalist group, although he stood for a more Europeanized approach to the problem of national character than his Orthodoxist contemporaries, especially **Nichifor Crainic**. Composed as explorations of the local peasant culture, Blaga's writings on Romanian national identity blurred the national and the universal, recurrently invoking a supra-national rural identity for Romanians, one transcending time and space. At the same time, the assertion that in the same geographical space there were ethnic communities whose spatial matrices were utterly incompatible with each other, and that thus there was hardly any cultural dialogue taking place between them, had an obvious political implication in the context of interwar Romanian nation-building, seeking to nationalize the newly acquired multi-ethnic provinces of Transylvania, the Banat, Bukovina, and Bessarabia.

Blaga offered, in fact, a philosophical theory of the national character that encompassed a personalized reading of traditional Romanian life and folklore. Influenced by German philosophy (especially Kant, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and Wundt), Blaga practiced a genre of *Kulturmorphologie* (morphology of culture) that was very popular in interwar Germany and in some parts of Central Europe. He also believed, following Kant, that to understand the mystery of the world necessitated both sensibility and intuition. Blaga's speculative philosophy centered on deciphering this mystery through "stylistic aphorisms," forms of knowledge allowing one to be both inside and outside of the world. The Romanian village was one such instance where the mystery of the world expressed itself, and where culture remained untouched by the eroding forces of modernity. It was also in the village that Romanian ethnic creativity was to be found. Every cultural creation, according to Blaga, followed a certain pattern, a matrix composed of three essential elements: material life, spirituality and "style" (uniting the first two elements). This theory of culture was then applied to philosophy and literature.

Blaga also suggested that the Romanians' origins could be traced to the immemorial Thracian world that existed before Dacians and Romans. Although Blaga acknowledged that Romanians retained much of their Latin heritage, the Thracian soul was what gave them creativity and fortitude against the dangers of history. In order to ordain the plethora of ideas that governed his indigenous philosophy, Blaga resorted to several original key-concepts such as "style" (the sum of those features that differentiated one community from another), "the Great Anonymous" (the first principle), "the stylistic matrix" (the collective ethnic psychology) and, most importantly, "the Mioritic space." *Miorița* ("The little ewe lamb") is one of the best known and most intriguing Romanian folk ballads, the tragic story of a lamb who foretells to the shepherd that his fellow-shepherds plot to kill him. Instead of defending himself, the shepherd embraces his death and burial, which is described in terms of reintegration with mother nature, evoking nuptial rituals. The ballad had already been extolled by the romantic generation as expressing Romanian national spirituality. In contrast to the romantic reading, however, Blaga focused not so much on the plot but on the underlying spatial symbolism (the alternation of valley and plateau, the "undulation of space"), which he read as a folkloric expression of a "national ontology." Seen from this perspective, the Romanian nation was the result of a physical and spiritual symbiosis, rooted in specific geographical conditions one could not duplicate elsewhere.

Rural spirituality was, according to Blaga, the main characteristic of the Romanian nation, which was best preserved in the traditionalism of the peasant life. The urban world was characterized by "non-creative" preoccupations, such as rationalization and accumulation of knowledge. To Blaga, only the "cosmic sentiment" nurtured in the village would generate wisdom and philosophical meditation. Using extensive references to German theories of culture (Leo Frobenius and Oswald Spengler in particular), Blaga described the "infinitely undulating horizon" of this "Mioritic space," which in turn served as the "spiritual substrate" of the anonymous creations of Romanian spirituality. The coordinates of Romanian national character existed in the unique musical arrangement of the elegiac song (*doina*) and in the topographical structure of the village. It was this musical expression of the Romanian soul that emphasized a profound love of nature and the stoical acceptance of destiny, both seen as quintessential Romanian qualities.

Like Crainic, Blaga believed that the Romanian national spirit was perfectly preserved in Orthodoxy, but he did not simply equate ethnic and religious identities. Blaga unveiled elements of pagan rituals and cosmology that

survived in the Romanian villages, suggesting that it was this religious syncretism that contributed to the emergence of rural Romanian culture. He also combined aesthetic and philosophical interpretations of the national character, so that they are at times indistinguishable. This conflation of the literary, the religious and the philosophical separates Blaga's nationalist language from its contemporary counterparts. Moreover, Blaga's concept of myth, a notion extensively used by interwar intellectuals, did not require political activism and foundational violence (as argued, for instance, by **Mircea Eliade**). In praising the beauty of sacrifice and violence, both essential features of the ballad *Miorița*, Blaga was not interpreting them as sources of revolutionary renewal but as sources of morality and virtue.

During the interwar period, sociologists and ethnographers often received Blaga's arguments about "rural eternity" with skepticism. According to some critics (Henri Stahl, for example), Blaga merely speculated about the Romanian village, without really studying it. These authors argued that the "Mioritic space" had nothing to do with real historical time or sociological space and was just a philosophical metaphor. Nevertheless, this metaphor became one of the most important tropes of identity in the Romanian national canon; it exerted great influence over old and new Romanian assumptions of historical uniqueness and cultural particularity.

After 1945, the communist regime manipulated Blaga's cultural legacy. His theories of Romanian specificity served the autochthonist official ideology of the late 1970s and 1980s, contributing to the wide dissemination of Blaga's literary works in schools and universities. Some of the aesthetic theories that Blaga bequeathed to Romanian nationalism survived until the late 1990s, although recent analyses of his work tend to concentrate more on his poetry, theatre, and philosophy.

MT

The Mioritic space

Let us listen—with the same intention of interpreting the horizon of the soul in words—to one of our *doina*. After we have got a little used to the chioromancy of hidden backgrounds, it is not difficult to guess a completely particular horizon opening up behind a *doina*. This horizon is the *plai*. The *plai*: a high, open field, on a green hillside, descending slowly into the valley. A *doina* sung not sentimentally—like a young town lady dressed in ready-made artist's costume would, or like, in the poor neighborhoods, the Gypsy musician prone to adorn it with arabesques—but like a peasant woman or a shep-

herdess would [...]; this song evokes a specific horizon: the high, rhythmic, and indefinite horizon drawn by the profile of hills and valleys. [...]

To this day, there has been no monumental Romanian architectonic style, but this is not absolutely necessary for us to speak about the spirit of architecture, which is totally revealed in a simple peasant's house or in a little church buried under grass and nettles. As regards the architectural forms and construction of the peasants' houses, we believe we can point out at least one, strong, negative effect of the specificity of our spatial horizon. The effect is especially visible if we compare the architectures that involve the horizon. It is well known that the Russian house, compared to the Romanian house, wastes space. The flat horizon invites it to stretch out. Similarly, it is known that western architecture, especially the northern one, manifests—obeying who knows which heavenly call—a clear tendency to stretch out vertically. In both cases, spatial horizons specific to people and places have a marked say. Since, from the very beginning, our indefinitely undulated spatial horizon makes use of both vertical and horizontal space, we will point out our architectonic genius in an intermediate position, which preserves in an attenuated manner, in equilibrium, the two opposing tendencies. The specific horizon prevents the dimensional hypertrophy in the singular sense, and thus intervenes at least negatively in the shaping of architectural forms.

It is hard to say to what extent the metrical phonology of our folk poetry could serve as an argument, besides all the others, in support of the thesis about the specific horizon. Our folk poetry is anyway consumed in an exclusive preference for verse built of stressed and unstressed syllables, one after the other; that is the rhythm made up of hill and valley, or of valley and hill. This metrical phonology simultaneously also shows an obvious fear of the playful dactyl. Indeed, we also find dactylic or anapestic intermissions which are, however, not developed but disappear, swallowed by the rhythmic undulation of hill-valley that is a marked presence powerfully pervading the entire poem, like an inner sway. It will be said that the metrical phonology generated by dactyl or anapest is not in the nature of our folk poetry. Or that it is too savant for folk poetry. The last argument is not convincing, because the old Greek folk poetry knew this metrical phonology very well. The first argument, based on the nature of our language, is not an explanation either. The issue stems from this very fact. The Romanian language developed, probably concomitantly with the rhythmic construction of our space, an inner rhythm that made it more apt for the metric system based on trochee and iambs, rather than for the metrical system developed by the other rhythmic units. This inner rhythm gave our language the stamp it will preserve forever;

a mark under the pressure of which versification must inevitably adopt certain forms and reject others.

I was arguing that the spatial horizon of the subconscious is made up of essential structures, tissues, rhythms, and stresses. We imagine the horizon of the subconscious as always interwoven with a sense of destiny. It is hard to say which one is the initial factor. We merely state that in the cases when the sense of destiny is the primary factor, then a certain matrix-space can be born and crystallize into almost any type of landscape. Therefore, the landscape plays a totally peripheral and almost irrelevant role in respect to building the matrix-space. But here we are dealing with a theoretical fact upon which discussions can continue. However, another fact seems much more controllable to us: in one and the same landscape, there can coexist souls that in their subconscious can be set on completely different matrix spaces. [...]

Neither the hard-working philologists, nor the industrious historians are in a position to say exactly when the Romanian nation was born. Of course, we are not so childish as to look for the precise calendar date, but we would probably be entitled to ask for a theoretical and somewhat definitive explanation. The language has evolved in infinitesimal stages, permanently, failing to indicate any caesura that might serve as the date of birth. As regards history, this is a more recent reality, which appeared relatively late in relation to the non-historical existence which preceded it. Only the stylistic and psychological considerations of the depths could enable us to give an answer to the question posed. The Romanian people were born at the time when the matrix-space morphed into a shape in his soul, the matrix-space or the specific subconscious horizon, which together with other factors was able to determine the inner style of his spiritual life. The Romanian language may have evolved and undergone mutations, the geographical landscape may even have been unstable; what was preserved [...] was, beyond language and landscape, the matrix-space.

After this detour, we return to the *plai*. For the spatial subconscious horizon has given the Romanians, wherever they were, nostalgia for the *plai*. This unchangeable nostalgia took the Wallachian shepherd, in the middle of his life, to all the ranges of the Carpathians, from the waters of the Danube to Maramureș, and from here on to Moravia, or the other way round. Likewise, to all the Yugoslavian lands and Pannonia, everywhere within the limits of a vast territory, where the landscape satisfied the appetite of a subconscious horizon. In crepuscular times, during the long prelude to the present day ethnic formations, when the Romanian had no motherland, the *plai*, the sacred *plai*, sanctioned by a certain sense of destiny, was his motherland.

Researchers, from theoreticians of the environment to morphologists of culture, have frequently asked what the impact the landscape may have on the human soul. They have paid less attention to what the landscape gets from the human soul. The distinction between the questions has to be tackled. For the landscape is the starting point for a series of spiritual effects; the matrix-space as the horizon of the subconscious is different; the same initial landscape is different yet again; over it [...] flows a certain human perception of fate. The landscape, in this last sense, is integrated in a spiritual ensemble. The landscape becomes the spectacle of a spiritual plenitude; a sense of destiny is embodied in it, like wind in the sails of a ship. The landscape is, in this last sense, man's second face.

Translated by Mária Kovács

VLADIMIR DVORNIKOVIĆ: EPIC MAN

Title: “*Epski čovek*” ili *Jesmo li mi anahronizam u Evropi?* (Epic man, or are we an anachronism in Europe?)

Originally published: *Borba ideja* (Belgrade: Geca Kon, 1937), pp. 85–98.

Language: Serbian

The excerpts used are from the original, pp. 93–97.

About the author

Vladimir Dvorniković [1888, Severin na Kupi (Western Croatia) – 1950, Belgrade]: philosopher and political writer. He came from a family that was part of the Croatian intelligentsia. His father, Ljudevit, was a college teacher and an adherent of positivism, publishing articles on various psychological and philosophical questions. The young Vladimir studied philosophy in Vienna, receiving a doctoral degree in 1911. Afterwards he worked as a teacher in Sarajevo and Zagreb. During the First World War, he was interned by the Austro-Hungarian authorities for his pro-Yugoslav political convictions. After the war, he lectured at the University of Zagreb, becoming a regular professor in 1925. Apart from his philosophical interests, he also published studies on literature, psychology (being one of the first Yugoslav promoters of psychoanalysis) and ethnography. In the 1920s, he was active on the left-liberal side of the Yugoslavist ideological camp, linking the agenda of integral Yugoslav nation-building to social and cultural modernization. Due to his political convictions, he was forced to resign his university position in 1926. After that he traveled widely in Europe, giving lectures on philosophical and political issues. He supported the royal dictatorship in 1929, seen as an opportunity for national integration and modernization. Subsequently, he was employed by the Ministry of Education until 1934, when he resigned for the second time. In the latter part of the 1930s, he published his mature works. He was inspired by contemporary discussions of the crisis of European civilization and searched for a normative definition of Yugoslavism as a dynamic new framework of identity that might serve as a catalyst for national regeneration. Having spent the years of the Second World War secluded in Belgrade, he resumed publishing on cultural and ethnographical issues after the war. He is best known as the author of *Karakterologija Jugoslovena*, an attempt to provide scientific justification for the political project of Yugoslav unity. In the 1990s, with the renewed interest in national characterology, his works became again quoted and re-edited, but due to his rather complex national allegiance he did not become a key reference for the competing ethno-nationalist canons in the post-Yugoslav space.

Main works: *Die beiden Grundtypen des Philosophierens* [The two basic types of philosophical thinking] (1918); *Studije za psihologiju pesimizma* [Study on the psychology of pessimism] (1923–1924); *Psiha jugoslovenske melanholijske* [The psyche of Yugoslav melancholy] (1925); *T. G. Masaryk kao filozof i sociolog* [T.G. Masaryk as a philosopher and sociologist] (1927); *Naša kulturna orijentacija u današnjoj Evropi* [Our cultural orientation in contemporary Europe] (1930); *Borba ideja* [Struggle of ideas] (1937); *Karakterologija Jugoslovena* [Yugoslav characterology] (1939).

Context

The interwar period in Eastern Europe was characterized by the rise of essentialist discourses of nationhood. These discourses were connected to the pressing need to create a coherent framework of identity for the states that had emerged after 1918 or radically changed their territory as a consequence of the Great War. The Yugoslav state (initially called Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes) was no exception; however, the situation there was even more complex due to the multiple identity-building projects (ranging from integral Yugoslavism and Serbian centralism, to various concepts of federalism and eventually separatism on the part of the Croats and the Slovenes). Consequently, an analysis of ideas of national specificity provides an excellent insight into the mechanisms of identity incorporation and delimitation that characterized the South-Slavic state in the first two first decades of its existence.

Vladimir Dvorniković's work is usually referred to as a prominent example of the "national characterology" genre and the "ethno-psychological" approach. This trend was rooted in the *fin-de-siècle* tradition of *Völkerpsychologie* but achieved different theoretical underpinnings during the interwar period. Authors in this vein were interested in studying the connections between patterns of culture and personality types, seeking to give synthetic definitions of the national character in order to underpin various ideological projects. In contrast to earlier conceptions rooted in positivism and operating with an evolutionary model of civilization, these new constructions of national characterology, written in an atmosphere of the "decline of the West," usually challenged the modernist/Occidental symbolic geography. What they offered instead was a more ambiguous narrative about the regenerative potentials inherent in pre-modern social and cultural structures situated at the peripheries of Europe.

While references to Serbian "national character" can already be found in the works of **Vuk Karadžić** or **Joakim Vujić**, the most influential theory was doubtlessly that of **Jovan Cvijić**. Bringing together geo-morphology and

ethnography, Cvijić suggested the existence of the “Dinaric type” (located in the mountainous center of the Balkan peninsula, mostly among the Serbs), which he described as the most authentic and dynamic representation of the South Slavs. The ensuing discussion focused on this “Dinaric type” as an uncorrupted human resource full of vitality. The characterological discourse also subverted the prevalent Western image of the Balkans and especially that of Serbs as “uncivilized brutes.” For instance, in his “Character and mentality of a generation” (1919), the writer Dragiša Vasić questioned Gustave Le Bon’s remarks about the “barbaric nature of the Serbs,” pointing to the self-sacrificial heroism of the war generation. Vasić argued that the Serbs were not belligerent and aggressive by nature, as they only waged wars as acts of desperate self-defense. In the 1920s and 1930s, other theories were proposed. Both the Serbian centralists and the cultural Yugoslavists insisted on the Dinaric element as a common ethno-psychological ground of the unitary nation-building project, while some of the dissenters, such as the Croatian peasantist intellectual Dinko Tomašić, challenged exactly this construction by contrasting the peaceful communitarianism of the lowland peasants to the bellicose and destructive Dinaric mountaineers.

Among the commentaries on Cvijić’s work, it was Dvorniković’s that had the greatest impact and can be considered intellectually the most complex example of Yugoslav characterology. It drew on both his philosophical and psychological studies and relied on empirical (anthropological, sociological and ethnographical) research. His characterological construction reflects the intensive cultural fermentation and cross-pollination of various intellectual trends in interwar Southeast Europe. At the same time, it documents the ambiguities of the Yugoslav nation-building project.

“Epic man” can be considered one of the most important essays by Dvorniković, published in his volume of studies dealing with the clash of ideologies amidst the European crisis of values. Reflecting his multifarious interests, the volume tackled issues such as the theory of nation-formation, the Slavic psychological type, socialism, the intellectual heritage of Dostoevsky, Croce, Bergson, and Masaryk, as well as psychoanalysis and the woman question. Seeking to position the Yugoslavs on the new map of Europe, “Epic man” also encapsulates the main argument of *Karakterologija Jugoslovena*, which would be published two years later. Dvorniković, like many interwar intellectuals, posited that Western European culture was in a profound crisis. He asserted that the so-called “epic man,” to be found in remote parts of Europe, especially in the Balkans, represented the last refuge of the old European values—more traditional, elevated and heroic. Consequently, in the

text, Dvorniković traces the history of the “racial” and psychological transformation of the South Slavs during the Middle Ages and after their encounter with “modern Europe.” The text finishes with an optimistic vision about the role of the Yugoslavs, and the Slavs in general, in the envisioned regenerated Europe. At the same time, Dvorniković blamed Europe for being arrogant towards the so-called “young nations” and ignorant of their historical roots and culture, which, according to Dvorniković, offered a “deep potentiality.” This argument fit very well into the contemporary re-evaluation of the Balkans as the locus of heroism and authentic existence (as it can be seen in the work of the German Slavist Gerhard Gesemann on Montenegro, or the Bulgarian **Janko Janev**’s works stressing the Balkans’ world-historical mission).

Dvorniković’s vision is also comparable to that of the writer Vladimir Velmar-Janković entitled *Pogled sa Kalemegdana—Esej o beogradskom čoveku* (View from Kalemegdan—an essay on the Belgrade man, 1938). This book also elaborated on the question of national psychological type, but focused on the Serbs instead of the entire Yugoslav state. It thus documents the re-emergence of a Serbian identity discourse that, in the late 1930s, became increasingly disentangled from the Yugoslavist vision. Interestingly, however, while Dvorniković placed stress on anthropological (racial, psychological) aspects, the future collaborationist cultural politician Velmar-Janković emphasized spiritual values. On the whole, both texts reveal basic dilemmas concerning the image of Europe and the Balkans. Their parallelism also indicates that even in the same context, national characterological discourses could take radically different directions. While Dvorniković kept to the idea of “Slavic spirituality,” which he saw as the savior of European civilization, and thus his focus on the “Dinaric type” was not completely at odds with his previous liberal/modernist political commitment, these *topoi* could also be instrumentalized by fully-fledged political projects, some of which were seeking to inscribe the Balkan space into the Nazi-dominated *Neue Europa*. This ambiguity also determined the long-term trajectory of Dvorniković’s ideas, as the categories he established for substantiating a supra-national Yugoslav vision were easily “re-nationalized” to underpin various projects of national essentialism—as became evident in the context of the dissolution of the Titoist supra-national project during the 1980s and 1990s.

Epic man, or are we an anachronism in Europe?

Thus, still an anachronism?

... It was before a sophisticated and perfumed Europe that we performed our rhapsody at the beginning of the 19th century with our rough instrument, our one-stringed, maple *gusle*, which so resembles an Arabian-Bedouin musical instrument. The *hajduk* (rebel) and the *gusle*, of Asiatic appearance; the song, old, medieval—a virtual anachronism in modern Europe.

After the admiration of literary and scientific gourmets, the different sounds of another, more real Europe were to be heard. Primitiveness, cultural backwardness—those were the first headlines to describe us. For many politicians and statesmen we were Balkan rebels, the “Wetterwinkel”¹ of Europe, wild and naughty political brats in the far southeast of Europe. “They are not worth even the bones of one single Prussian grenadier,” Bismarck stated, etc., etc. Such odium went so far as to spawn the expression “Balkanization of Europe” after the First World War. That was because we had “enflamed” Europe, which had always chirruped along so peacefully...

Yugoslavs have no intention of justifying themselves to anyone, and least of all to Mother Europe, for their bitter historical destiny. On a number of occasions, over there in the north and the west, right up to Vienna, they have had the opportunity to smell Turkish gunpowder and “bite the Turkish sabre,” as our Bosnian “Turk” likes to say today.

But, nonetheless, that Europe has never shown that it perceives the tragedy of the Balkans. It did not even do so when it made the “Holy Alliance,” when it gave “great European statesmen” and proclaimed civilizing European “humanity.” No single nation in world history has ever had worse “step-mothers” in history. To that Europe, the people of the Balkans have remained objectionable barbarians, despite the fact that it was those very Slav Balkans that performed a formidable deed worthy of a martyr: it defended Europe with their own body against the onslaught of the Mongols. Turkish force took its terrible pleasures on the Balkans, on living Slav flesh, more than it did anywhere else, and it was there that in 1912 it was crushed as an imperialistic force on European soil.

And so we had to peek into the proud, reborn 19th century with the anachronistic face of cultural belatedness. And, wonder of wonders, we were still

¹ A “storm center”.

asked: and where have you been until now? We have been here and we shall protect you, we reply.

The relative nature of all anachronisms

We are often spoken of in the West from on high, as if we were a “new, young nation.” If becoming civilized in Europe means getting old, then, we admit it: yes, we are a young nation. Another matter again is the fact that those same people who call us that know absolutely nothing of our past. There are few people in Europe, with the exception of experts, who know anything about our past at all. They do not know that long ago, before our collapse in the face of the Turkish onslaught, we had our own medieval states on the same cultural level as those of Europe on the whole at that time. Many Austrian functionaries, “bearers of culture” (as they were wont to call themselves) spent their working lives in Bosnia without ever knowing or even trying to find out that the despised “*dummer Bosniak*” had had his own state five centuries earlier, his own *banove* (governors) and kings and his own free great-grandfather sleeping his eternal sleep in the Bosnian mountains, under a marble slab or a tombstone on which even today one can read the proud inscription “Here I lie on my own land.”

That era and then the four centuries of battles for freedom cannot be lost. They bear a deep potential within them. That potential is epitomized and still equally alive in the rough and archaic form of the epic and the epic spiritual world. The language in which our historical potential was lent voice, and the form of that latent historical energy is foreign and incomprehensible to Europe. *It is true, the form was an anachronism.* But form is only form and thus something of secondary importance. A *force* was expressed through it. The hitherto expressive form of that force can be transformed, and we have started that transformation. When that is done, and we give more contemporary forms to our spiritual forces, Europe will understand us. The forms of life and the expression of spiritual and cultural forces are different, but the life energy is one. The whole of that epic anachronism of ours is, finally, still relative. There is no such thing as only one time and one flow of time, but several times in different flows, and everyone feels and experiences it in his or her inner self. That is true both of individuals and of entire nations. We have experienced the time of history designated to us in our own way and felt it on our own skins. We have survived long and dark centuries and then, when we found ourselves marching alongside the rest of Europe, we were out of step. And now it is up to us to adapt the rhythm and tempo of life. This is

without doubt the most difficult task in the transformation of epic man into the modern European man. Instead of the rhythmic shift between lengthy condensed effort and lengthy lethargic reaction, a short, rapid pulse is now necessary, an accelerated and constant rhythm of effort. To Europe, the epic man naturally seems slow and culturally unproductive.

If we could look back and see the way we were one hundred years ago, we would barely recognize ourselves and, therefore, concerning the actual tempo of progress, we should not allow ourselves to become depressed. It is only a little more than 100 years since the transformation of epic-heroic energy of life began. We need to resolve the still grave issue of the new accommodation of the life of one whole nation. We are not yet aware of the essence and difficulty of that question. We are now in the midst of a shift between two eras, and we are at the acute stage of that process. And, in this context, a dangerous illusion has become prevalent amongst us: it is as if that passage means some kind of definitive entrance into a national “safe harbor,” that is entrance into European civilization. But civilization can be even more dangerous for new nations. We must overcome that civilization too, for it could swallow us up even more easily and quickly than any barbarian force. Our people have sensed that and they are arming themselves with civilization, but not of the snobbish and imitative type—like Japan, which is assuming a totally foreign civilization both from a racial and spiritual point of view, but with the sense of ancient blood kinship and racial anamnesis: *that it has already once been equal to all those advanced bearers of culture.*

Translated by Krištof Bodrič and Vedran Dronjić

NIKOLAJ VELIMIROVIĆ: THE SERBIAN NATION AS A SERVANT OF GOD

Title: *Srpski narod kao Teodul* (The Serbian nation as a servant of God)

Originally published: written in 1941–1942, published posthumously.

Language: Serbian

The excerpts used are from *Nacionalizam svetog Save; Srpski narod kao Teodul* (Belgrade: Ihtus, Svetosavska književna zajednica, 2001), pp. 65–68, 77–80.

About the author

Nikolaj Velimirović [1880, Lelić, near Valjevo, Serbia – 1956, Libertyville, IL, USA]: Orthodox theologian and clergyman. Born into a modest family, Velimirović finished primary school in the Čelije monastery, and secondary school in Valjevo. In 1902, he graduated with a degree in theology in Belgrade. He continued his education in Switzerland and received his doctorate at the Old Catholic Theology Department of the University of Bern in 1908. In the following years, Velimirović spent time in England and Russia, where he devoted his time less to formal study than to getting to know the culture and life of the respective nations. At the end of 1909, he entered a monastic order, in Rakovica monastery, near Belgrade. In the years before the First World War, Velimirović worked at the Theology Faculty in Belgrade, where he taught philosophy, psychology, logic, history, and foreign languages. At the same time, he gave popular public lectures on religious issues. At this early stage of his clerical career, Velimirović was widely perceived as a progressive young theologian and a liberal force within the Serbian Orthodox Church. During this period, he also expressed vivid interest in Oriental religions and philosophies, particularly in Indian sacred texts. His reputation as a modernist and progressive, his sympathy for the Anglican Church, and his obvious erudition and knowledge of languages induced the Serbian government to choose Velimirović for a fundraising mission to the USA and England during the Great War. He spent four years, from 1915 to 1919, mostly in England. His activities abroad were part of actions taken both by the Serbian Relief Fund, and the Yugoslav Committee, which was leaning towards the idea of South Slav cooperation. After his return to Yugoslavia, Velimirović served as a Bishop in Ohrid (1920–1934), Bitola (1930–1934) and Žiča (1935–1941). As a result of a personal conflict with the Serbian Patriarch, Velimirović remained outside of high level church activities, and became an active supporter and subsequently a leader of the grass-roots religious movement of *bogomoljci* (Devotionalists or God Worshipers). He successfully turned the evangelical movement into a national one, which had close affinity with the para-fascist organization of Dimitrije Ljotić, *Zbor*. At the beginning of the Second World War, due to his anti-

German position and significant influence in the country, Velimirović was confined first to Ljubostinja and, from 1942, to Vojlovica monastery. He was later transferred, together with Patriarch Gavrilo Dožić, to Dachau, where both were interned for several months until Ljotić negotiated their release. At the time, Velimirović wrote one of his most controversial books, “Words to the Serbian people through the dungeon window,” in which he expressed radical anti-Semitic views. After the war, Velimirović left for the USA, where he stayed until his death. In 1991, his remains were returned to Serbia, where they were reburied, according to his will, in his native village. In 2003, in spite of fierce opposition from the liberal public, the Serbian Orthodox Church canonized him as a saint.

Main works: *Religija Njegoševa* [Njegoš's religion] (1911); *Beseda pod gorom* [Oration under the mountain] (1912); *Reči o svečoveku* [Words about the all-human] (1920); *Molitve na jezeru* [Prayers at the lake] (1921); *Misli o dobru i zlu* [Thoughts on good and evil] (1923); *Nacionalizam svetog Save* [The nationalism of St. Sava] (1935); *Reči srpskom narodu kroz tamnički prozor* [Words to the Serbian people through the dungeon window] (1944).

Context

The interwar period brought about a revival of Orthodox thought in Southeast Europe, with Nikolaj Velimirović as one of its leading figures. In the 1930s, Velimirović established around himself a circle of disciples and followers from among younger students of theology (including Justin Popović, who was to continue developing his ideas in socialist Yugoslavia), who further elaborated on his ideas on Serbian nationalism, Orthodox Christianity, and the social and political role of the church. By the mid-1930s, Velimirović had abandoned his earlier interest in the ecumenical movement and protestant theology in favor of the national question, which became central to his thought. His main line of argument in this context was linked to the idea of *svetosavlje*, merging Serbian nationalism with Orthodoxy. The word *svetosavlje* derives from the name of St. Sava, the youngest son of the founder of the first medieval Serbian dynasty, Nemanja. Sava is remembered as the founder and the first archbishop of an autonomous (autocephalous) Serbian Church. Upon his death, he was canonized together with his father, Nemanja, and remains to the present day one of the most respected, praised and loved saints in Serbia.

Velimirović proclaimed “Heavenly Serbia,” attainable only through complete devotion to Church and Christ, to be the ideal for social and political development. It was only through mystical communion with Christ and belonging to the institution of the Serbian Church that society as a whole could reach salvation. Velimirović developed a highly sophisticated argument, which brought together the universality of Orthodox Christianity and the par-

ticularism of Serbian nationalism. A distinct Serbian type of Christianity was said to be the way towards the Heavenly Kingdom. The foundations of Serbian Orthodoxy, as well as the entire Serbian culture, state and society were, in Velimirović's narrative, laid down by St. Sava—the founder of the medieval Serbian Church.

Velimirović wrote "The Serbian nation as a servant of God" at the height of his intellectual career—at a time when he was well known as an exceptional theologian, charismatic leader of the God Worshipers' movement, and arguably the second most influential person in the Serbian church after the Patriarch. The core of his national and philosophical thought had taken shape by then. In his writings, Velimirović paid a lot of attention to historical tradition, which served as justification and an important source of inspiration for his ideological constructions. He skillfully recreated national history so that it could serve his aims. Apart from "Heavenly Serbia," another essential trope was the image of suffering Serbia, or Serbia's sacrifice. The two were closely linked, since it was through sacrifice that Serbia could reach its position of Christ's chosen nation. The line of national suffering was traced back from the Kosovo battle through Ottoman times, to the period of independence and the Great War. The metaphor of Serbian Golgotha, which was popular in the interwar period and originally referred to the losses of the Serbian army in 1915, was taken to a new level, describing the full trajectory of national history. The role of Serbia as the defender of Orthodoxy, the only true form of Christianity, was successfully added to the picture by employing the traditional myth of *antemurale christianitatis*. Such strong emphasis on Orthodoxy and Serbian national uniqueness was highly problematic, given the fact that interwar Yugoslavia was religiously diverse, and was built on the presumption that the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes were parts of a single Yugoslav nation, the "three-named people," to use an oft-quoted expression.

A gifted public speaker, Velimirović maintained interest in popular religiosity throughout his career. On the one hand, it served well his cause of fighting the secularization and de-Christianization of society; on the other, it provided an efficient means for mass mobilization. When describing popular religiosity, Velimirović tended to paint an ideal picture of what he would have liked to see, rather than registering the social reality of the late interwar period. In fact, a good part of his popular sermons aimed at bringing people back to the church.

Some contemporary critics stressed the controversial nature of Velimirović's theological and philosophical discourse. The main criticism came from Yugoslav-oriented secular liberals, who saw in the archbishop's activi-

ties a threat to the multinational and religiously heterogeneous Yugoslav state. This fear proved well-founded, as Velimirović embraced and supported Dimitrije Ljotić, who placed Orthodoxy together with corporativism in the center of his proto-fascist political project. Another line of criticism came from within the Serbian Orthodox Church and was primarily directed against the prominence of the nationalist arguments. A small group of Serbian clerics argued for the necessity of social work of the Church as a way to regain their authority in society.

The life, work, ideas and political standing of Nikolaj Velimirović became the source of numerous controversies and conflicting interpretations in Serbia. Controversies surround his stay in Dachau (whether he was imprisoned or simply detained, thus indicating his closeness to or distance from the Nazi regime), his political affiliations and sympathies, and his ideological orientation—anti-Westernism and anti-Semitism. His life and work became extremely politicized, and serve as a source for the creation of sharply divided political opinions. He is considered to be one of the greatest and most innovative theologians of 20th-century Serbia and beyond. Although most of his ideas have been taken up by rightist organizations that emphasize his nationalistic rhetoric and anti-modernism, lately there have been some alternative views, coming from the church, that offer an interpretation of Velimirović as a figure representing integrative, even modernizing, processes both within the Church and the wider Serbian society.

MF

The Serbian nation as a servant of God

65. Nations have always looked to their leaders for guidance. The Serbian nation has looked to its rulers, leaders and to its bishops and its ecclesiastics and taken example from them. And what kind of example has this nation received from its secular and spiritual leaders? The example of *theodoulia*, the service of God as the sense of life and the path towards the Celestial Empire. Learning that from the example and the works of their religious and secular leaders, the people have acted in accordance with that example in all their activities and social life.

66. Sitting and contemplating by his fireside, be it in freedom or slavery, the Serbian peasant had to address himself in this way: if our kings and emperors served Christ the God, why should I seek anyone better to serve? If one has to serve somebody, then it is best to serve the Best. If Nemanja, old and powerless, became a monk, what then am I waiting for and why should I

not become a monk before the inevitability of death? And if Sava trampled upon his youth as if it were a cheap cloth and entered a monastery, why should I then esteem my youth, which has blossomed and withered and become as dry as grass? And if our kings have fasted as monks and slept on rush-mats for the salvation of their souls, why then should I seek lordliness and delight, while death stands nigh? And if our empresses and princesses have grown weak and fragile in nunneries, why then should I break my fast and grow fat for someone's delight? And if all Serbia's lords and landowners have built churches and monasteries, should I not at least light a candle in those endowments of theirs, donate something or serve in them for some time for the sake of the salvation of my children, when I myself am not able to build a church? And if all our great men, both secular and religious, had places of worship in their homes, why then should I not pray in my home with my children too?

67. On the basis of my experience and what I have seen, the Serbian master of the house has created something exceptional in the mountains with God's help. He has turned his home into a place of worship and a church; he has turned it into a monastery and the Holy Mountain; he has turned it into Jerusalem. He has placed the cross of Christ on his house, dedicated everything to the cross and hallowed the divine and unknowable Holy Trinity; he has taken one of the illustrious holy servants of God as his Patron Saint and serves him as the Patron Saint of the Family. He has taken a shortened version of the Typikon (Monastic Rule) into his home; the Typikon of fast and prayer. The Serbian home has become a true monastery with the addition of the hallowed bond of marriage to beget children and multiply God's people, and with a rule of prayer shortened as and when necessary but compensated for with greater effort. Faith, honesty, obedience and submissiveness, that has been, in short, the Typikon of every Serbian household. What is the Holy Mountain if it is not service to Christ the God? I cannot go to the Holy Mountain, a Serb could say, but, for that reason, let my home be the Holy Mountain. What is the earthly Jerusalem against the celestial Jerusalem? I would like to set out on a pilgrimage to the earthly Jerusalem, where the feet of my Savior trod, but I am not able to do so. That is why I shall rise to the higher Jerusalem, the better Jerusalem, where not only have His feet trod, but where He Himself is, the risen and resurrected Victor over death. My Master and my God.

68. However, although every Serb has not been able to travel to pay homage in the Holy Mountain and Jerusalem, each Serb has been able to walk in his own monasteries, the endowments of his glorious emperors, and each

Serb has done so. He has visited them frequently and stayed in them for a long time. He has confessed, he has received Communion, he has risen and joined his spirit with that of his God; he has committed feats of glory together with monks and just like monks. He has come to a monastery to see his son or grandson studying there, and started to learn himself. And he had a wealth of learning before him. The monasteries are the best schools for the people that have ever existed amongst the Serbian nation. Both general Christian and Serbian national tradition have been preserved in their totality in them; both to the service of Christ the God. He came to see the most devoted and learned servants of God and to learn from them how to serve God and the saints of God. He also came to hear how the saints of God—including many of his own Serbian ancestors—had served God on earth: with travail, prayer, restraint, endowments, and sufferings of all kinds. He would then return home to transmit what he had learned to his family and to put those things into practice in his own home, as in a small monastery.

[...]

77. Serbs did not finish their battle against the Turks in Kosovo. Neither did they in Smederevo or Belgrade. They have never finished it anywhere, from Kosovo to Orašac, from Prince Lazar to Karadjordje, or from Karadjordje to Kumanovo. The battle continued even after the fall of Smederevo and Belgrade, a terrible and relentless battle that lasted for centuries and spread to Montenegro and Dalmatia, to Udbina, to Hungary, to Romania, and Russia. The cross-bearing Serb has been everywhere, and is the main protagonist in the battle against the crescent to the very end. The great Vojvod Bakić defended Vienna from the Turks and, on yet another battlefield, led the German army against the Turks. The Jakšić brothers so astounded the Hungarians with their heroism in the fight against the Turks that King Matthias called them “pillars of Christianity.” The same can be said of members of the Branković dynasty and others in Romania and Bulgaria, as it was of members of the Smiljanić and Janković families in Dalmatia. And all this does not make mention of Montenegro, that centuries’ old, impregnable wall defending Christianity from Islam.

78. And all will hate you in My name, the Savior told His Apostles. That did indeed happen to the Apostles. But that has literally happened in the case of Serbs too, the main bearers of the cross of Christ in the Balkans and in Austria. Non-Christian Turkey and Non-Orthodox Austria hated Serbs more than all other nations on their borders. And it was hard, unbearably hard for the Serbs. And had they not looked at the fate of Christ as their own they would not have persevered. But they looked on the suffering of Christ as

their own suffering, on the death of Christ as their own death and on His resurrection as their resurrection, and vice-versa. They believed that Christ himself relived His fate through the Serbian nation. That vision made their centuries of suffering bearable and insatiable death easy.

79. Christ has been for Serbs the sense of life and struggle, of suffering and death, of freedom, renewal, and labor. He has been the sense of the church, the sense of the state, the sense of the family, and the sense of the individual. No single nation has beautified the festivals of Christ with such caring deliberation and tenderness of custom as has the Serbian nation. Just imagine Christmas and Epiphany, Good Friday and Easter, Ascension, Pentecost, Transfiguration, and the Exaltation of the Holy Cross. Religious customs bedeck everything like a finely woven carpet. And the festivals of the Mother of God are bedecked in the same manner. Serbs have not built as many churches to anyone in the Celestial World as they have to the Virgin Mary. Serbs have further learnt to love and recognize God's saints, particularly their Family Patron Saints. They are truly unique in the world. The Celestial World has from time immemorial been closer than the earthly world to the souls of Serbs. They have always seen more of their nearest and dearest in that World than on earth. That is why they pay so much respect to their dead, light candles and honor their memories. And, through service, they prepare themselves to pass into that higher World with faith, honor, and respect, and to become united with their own before the face of Christ. There, only there, where the Great Celestial Serbia lies.

80. Oh, Great Celestial Serbia! It represents the long since fulfilled ideal of Great Serbia. We believe that there are more than one hundred million baptized Serbs who have served Christ in their earthly lives or have suffered and died for Christ throughout the centuries. And there are more of them basking in the light of Paradise from the ages of battle, slavery, and suffering than from the ages of freedom and prosperity. Those who are more like Christ are truly closer to Christ in that World. We believe, according to the Evangelists, that some nations, which are far greater than the Serbian nation on earth, shall be smaller in the Celestial Empire. And the Lord said that those who are first shall be last, and the last shall be first. And the martyr Prince Lazar shines among the first in Heavens, while the rich have fallen among the last into the darkness of Hell.

Translated by Krištof Bodrič and Vedran Dronjić

NAYDEN SHEYTANOV: BULGARIAN WORLDVIEW

Title: *Български светоглед* (Bulgarian worldview)

Originally published: In the journal *Просвета*, 4 (1942), pp. 193–204.

Language: Bulgarian

The excerpts used are from Ivan Elenkov and Roumen Daskalov, eds., *Защо сме такива? В търсене на българската културна идентичност*. (Sofia: Просвета, 1994), pp. 305–308.

About the author

Nayden Sheytanov [1890, Troyan – 1970, Sofia]: essayist and cultural historian. After finishing secondary school in Sofia, Sheytanov studied philosophy in Leipzig and Prague. Upon his return to Bulgaria, he worked as a teacher of the German language in the prestigious First Boys' High School in Sofia. He was an influential essayist, contributing to many important cultural magazines, such as *Златорог* [Golden horn], *Просвета* [Enlightenment] and *Философски преглед* [Philosophical review]. He was one of the first Bulgarian authors to stress the importance of the ancient Thracian heritage for Bulgarian culture. His early texts, describing the archaic Motherland, its myths and magic culture, were undoubtedly influenced by various modernist movements, including Expressionism and the emerging *Rodno izkustvo* [Native art] movement. Later, his position took on more pronounced political dimensions. In the 1930s, while a clerk in the Ministry of Education, Sheytanov became close to the “official” nationalist camp, although his texts, abounding in messianic and mythical visions, are rather uncharacteristic of the Bulgarian right-wing discourse of the period. Sheytanov's work was completely marginalized during the communist regime. In the 1990s, his works resurfaced in some pioneering works on the intellectual history of Bulgarian anti-modernism, but also as a source of inspiration in the much less critical neo-nationalist intellectual subcultures.

Main works: *Култ на тялото* [The cult of the body] (1928); *Великобългарски светоглед (Част първа: Балканобългарски титанизъм)* [The Great-Bulgarian worldview (Part I: Balkano-Bulgarian Titanism)] (1939); *Великобългарска младеж* [The Great-Bulgarian youth] (together with N. Pamukchiev) (1941).

Context

Nayden Sheytanov is one of the most original Bulgarian intellectuals of the interwar period. He pleaded for a return to the archaic and to “Bulgarian magic,” and attempted an original interpretation of the main figures of the “Bulgarian Soul.” He found in archaic culture the highest expression of Bulgarianness, which he sought to convert into “Great-Bulgarianness,” a potentially expansive and regionally encompassing national ideology. Pursuing this project, he introduced the key term, “Bulgarianism.” Influenced by Romantic models, especially the works of Georgi Rakovski, Sheytanov built a relationship between Bulgarianness and ancient Greek and Indo-European culture.

The article “Bulgarian Worldview” represents a continuation of the fundamental ideas developed in “The Great-Bulgarian worldview” (1939). Searching for a unique Bulgarian ideology, Sheytanov draws a panoramic picture of contemporary European ideologies. Not surprisingly, he was fascinated with the resurrection of archaic rituals in Hitler’s Germany, Mussolini’s Italy and even Soviet Russia. In his view, by returning to archaic sources—rituals, myths, and mythological heroes—associated with the ancient Dionysian culture, the Bulgarian nation could build its own “titanic” dimension. Thus conceptualized, Dionysian Bulgarianism was one of the powerful concepts in 1930s Bulgaria pursuing the escape from the stigma of “Byzantinism” (see **Petar Mutafchiev**, *Towards the philosophy of Bulgarian history*).

“Byzantinism” had as its deep structural motivation the impossibility to appropriate the archetypal model of Western European culture. Such an appropriation was impossible because it would have in fact implied the abandonment of the competition with the Greek national project and, consequently, subordination to it. From this point of view, Sheytanov’s *Dionysianism* is an attempt to identify with the hidden suppressed Dionysian side of the Greek culture and, through it, to oppose, in a Nietzschean manner, the rational Apollonian paradigm underlying Western European cultural and political history. This identification was the ultimate goal of the process of archaization undertaken by Sheytanov. To regress to the magical and to the irrational ecstatic force is not a goal in itself: according to Sheytanov, the contemporary incarnation and the manifestations of this primary Dionysian energy are to be found in the “turbines and factories” of the Balkan Mountains. Thus, in opposition to modernism and artistic avant-garde movements, which were trying to *technicize* the aesthetic sphere, Sheytanov’s national ontology was *aestheticizing* politics (in the words of Walter Benjamin).

Sheytanov's view of national culture was messianic. For him, the Balkans, and their natural center—Bulgaria—was the root and the focal point of European culture, acquiring universal dimensions. Such a vision combined ancient Greek gods and heroes (like Dionysus and Orpheus) with Bulgarian medieval political and religious leaders (Tsar Simeon and the priest Bogomil) as well as semi-legendary characters (Boyan the Magician, Krali Marko) and modern political and cultural activists (Georgi Rakovski and **Hristo Botev**). This Bulgarian worldview had to fuse the “ancient legacy” with the work of modern political leaders. This should be the task of a new, *total* National Revival in Bulgaria (which was primarily the duty of national education).

According to Sheytanov, the new Bulgarian worldview consists of three main elements: faith, mythology, and politics. In political terms, Sheytanov formulated an explicit Bulgarian imperialist project. In the context of the Second World War, he claimed that the Bulgarian state had a dominant role in Southeast Europe and should integrate all Bulgarians in the peninsula. Consequently, Sheytanov could be seen as an ideologue of the nationalist pro-military camp, even though he had limited direct political impact. Nevertheless, there were other manifestations of his ideological significance. The Prime Minister of Bulgaria at the time, the influential historian (and President of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences) Bogdan Filov (1883–1945), a leader of the pro-German political camp, prefaced one of Sheytanov's books, “Great-Bulgarian youth” (co-authored with N. Pamukchiev), in 1941, the year when Bulgaria entered the Second World War on the side of Germany. After 1945, Sheytanov disappeared from the public sphere. Nevertheless, the revival of national characterological arguments in the 1970s, in the context of an incipient Bulgarian national communist project, made it possible for some authors linked to this agenda to experiment with references to the national metaphysics of the interwar period, even though Sheytanov's name could not be mentioned. Sheytanov re-emerged as a reference in the 1990s; as the populist and neo-nationalist subcultures are less concerned with creating an intellectual pedigree for themselves, however, he did not become a central figure of the post-communist cultural canon.

BM

Bulgarian worldview

It is necessary, it is an imperative to create and inculcate in the people our own, Bulgarian worldview. For the world war of today is not only a fight for world domination, but also a fight for a national unification of the Bulgarians; for balance and supremacy in the Balkans. And our weapon in this is, above all, the national worldview.

What should a purely Bulgarian worldview contain? This is clear from what has been said so far. *A Bulgarian ideology should embrace the spirit of the time and our national legacy.* Simeon, Bogomil, Botev, Rakovski provide examples of it. Simeon borrowed the spirit of the time from the Byzantine Empire, but coupled it with the Bulgarian state and national principles. Bogomil was influenced by the East, but created a purely Bulgarian religious and sociopolitical system. Botev was inspired by the socialism of his age, but fused this spirit with our national legacy and gave his life for Bulgaria. Rakovski borrowed ideas from Europe, from Garibaldi, for example, from our neighbors, but related these to our national mythology and created a system of a purely Bulgarian worldview. This is the route we should take up today as well. Continuity is the first law of every historical creation. Therefore, now we need to combine, to weld together the spirit of the time and our national legacy.

What is the spirit of our time? This is a matter of historical diagnosis. A difficult task. I see three things as typical of our world-fighting and world-creating reality: neo-nationalism, that is, a movement for the internal reorganization of nations, small and big ones, and a striving for an international and interstate system; socio-ethics, or a fundamental reorganization of socio-economic nature; and neo-humanism, that is, the movement for a new individual, reborn nations and supreme humanity. This spirit of our time has to be incorporated now into the Bulgarian worldview. The other element is our national legacy. It is represented by eternal ideals cherished, pursued and fulfilled by our people. Through an in-depth analysis of our past, this legacy should be uncovered and systematized. This is a task as difficult as the historical diagnosis of our time. I think that, in solving this great problem, attention should be paid to the following: our homeland is located on the boundary between Europe and Asia, and, in a way, Africa as well. It has a bi-continental, even tri-continental message, which means a universal one. This is why it is here that Alexander the Great was born, and again here is the native place and the worldwide vocation of Constantine the Great; here medieval Bulgaria became a great power under Boris and Simeon. The culture that

emerged in our lands has a wide-ranging, all-Slav, almost European and even worldwide scope: Orpheus, Dionysus, Boyan the Magician, Cyril and Methodius, Bogomil, Botev. In a word: here, in the Balkans, things are being built on a huge, almost continental scale. World-makers and demiurges are born and perform their miracles here. Or, as I would put it: there are titans, and their deed is a Balkano-Bulgarian titanism. The legacy of these titans is in fact our national legacy. And the worldview, of which it is the principal ingredient, should be called, I think, a Great-Bulgarian worldview.¹

But the analysis of the past should not stop here. It should become clear why our national legacy is never entirely fulfilled, or why our titanic achievements never survive the blows of our historical destiny. Here the page shall be turned, and the reverse side of our existence so far shall be examined. The following will have to be pointed out: the universal message of our native land does not bring only titanic glory to the Balkans. This message also brings ruin to our region, indeed more ruin than glory and progress. The flow of Asian, and later, European peoples passed through our lands. Therefore, destructions are here always the greatest, enslavement is the longest, sufferings are the most horrible, and social injustice is always the gravest. Almost half of the fourteen centuries of our historical existence we have been sunk in slavery! The nation-Titan turns into a nation-martyr. The Bulgarian becomes Christ, the Balkans—a Golgotha. This is why in our folk songs there moans, so to say, a whole ocean of tears.²

The conclusion is clear: our titanic national legacy has not been fulfilled due to historical reasons, both external and internal. The question then is raised: should we give up this legacy now and sink in fatalistic and passive depths? In order to answer this crucial question we need to solve another problem: is it light? is it titanism that prevails in our past and our national essence? or, is it darkness? is it cabalism? In my view, titanism predominates, in the victor as well as in the martyr. This is something I have discussed in detail elsewhere. But it has to be admitted that in answering the fateful question I consider here, the mythical aspect of the Bulgarian miracle has to be approached. A historical miracle had to happen sometimes in order to break the chains of our titan nation, and bring on not just salvation but also

¹ Dr. N. Sheytanov, “Великобългарски светоглед” [The Great-Bulgarian worldview]. Part I. *Балканобългарски титанизъм* [Balkano-Bulgarian Titanism]. Sofia, 1939, p. 243. [the author’s note]

² Dr. N. Sheytanov. “Балканска Голгота” [Balkan Golgotha], Part II of *Великобългарски светоглед* [The Great-Bulgarian worldview] (forthcoming) [the author’s note]

vigorous progress. Such a miracle, for example, was Paissy and the Revival. There are and will be other Bulgarian miracles as well...

Therefore, the descendents of Simeon, Bogomil, and Botev must believe in the bright star of their martyr and Titan nation. They must not give up the national Great-Bulgarian legacy. There is even more to this. The imperative historical duty is now being imposed on us—and on those who will follow—to fully accomplish this legacy. This accomplishment, this implementation of the Great-Bulgarian scriptures has to follow, I think, the guidelines of this purely Bulgarian worldview, which we need to create now, against all odds. The Bulgarian worldview, consisting of the spirit of the time and the national legacy, shall comprise all three traditional parts: faith, mythology and politics.³ The first part involves, in brief, the profound issues of Balkan mystics, faith-breeding gorges, popular Orthodox faith and Messianism. The second, mythical part is, just like with Rakovski, the worldview's miraculous milieu. It will provide life-infusing water, living fire for creation, and wings for feats. The great tokens of our national magic⁴ will be outlined and updated, and will reach heaven. A cry shall be raised for a total Revival—of the remotest past, of classical Thracian antiquity, of our Middle Ages and of the times before the Liberation.⁵ The third part of this worldview contains the active, history-producing principles of Bulgarianism or, mythically speaking, Great-Bulgarianism. These principles are known, but so far have not been realized in terms of a worldview. Here is the first principle of Bulgarian politics: Bulgaria is the eternal unity of territory, people, and state. Then comes the ideological definition of a native territory. For example, our national or historical territories are Moesia, Thrace, and Macedonia, together with their natural extensions. Our Motherland is located in the middle of the Balkan Peninsula. Throughout the ages, Bulgaria has been the backbone, the brain and the heart of the peninsula. And our capital, Sofia, is the natural center of the Balkans... The Bulgarians are the main and lawful inhabitants of our native land. All other nations in our country are only our guests. [...] Nation-centrism is the history-making principle... The state is an age-long crystallization of the people. We Bulgarians are the oldest state-creators in the Balkans. We have created the most powerful state in Southeastern Europe. Our

³ Dr. N. Sheytanov, "Средец на Балкана" [Center of the Balkans], Part III of *Великобългарски светоглед* (forthcoming) [the author's note]

⁴ Dr. N. Sheytanov. "Българска магия" [Bulgarian magic], in *Златороз*, 1923. [the author's note]

⁵ Dr. N. Sheytanov. "Цялостно Възраждане" [A total revival], in *Философски преглед*, 1936, no. 4. [the author's note]

internal policy is worldview-based. Our external policy protects our historical territories and the united people. We join international formations in tune with our national interest... The national army fulfills our legacy. Economy and culture are a kind of policy, resulting from alertness to the worldview. [...] Another fundamental worldview principle is our neo-humanism, i.e., the striving to create a new Bulgarian—after the example of the worldview models: gentleman, citizen, fellow countryman, comrade—of course, within the limits of our Balkan abilities. I would call this new Bulgarian a Great-Bulgarian...

This is how, not according to daily, passing needs and interests, but under the sign of a Bulgarian eternity, a purely Bulgarian worldview must be created. The changeable aspect of it shall be the spirit of the time, while the lasting, the eternal and the immortal one shall be our national legacy. Such a worldview corresponds, in a way, to the ideology of our neighbors. But why shouldn't our worldview inspire generations of Bulgarians on their way to the heights and grandeur of the great ideologies of the world, like it was with Simeon, Bogomil, Rakovski, and Botev? On the other hand, a Bulgarian worldview, supplemented according to the spirit of the time, constantly improved, and, above all, having become the flesh and blood of all compatriots now and of times to come, shall certainly signal a nation-wide activism, shall bring a general well-being and shall result in historical maturity, while our national mission in history will also be fulfilled. Because a purely Bulgarian worldview is a compass; and it is the only thing capable of guiding us through the storms of history, to the shore of salvation.

Now and forever!

Translated by Zornitsa Dimova-Hristova

LÁSZLÓ NÉMETH: IN MINORITY

Title: *Kisebbségben* (In minority)

Originally published: *Kisebbségben* (Kecskemét: Magyar Élet, 1939)

Language: Hungarian

The excerpts used are from László Németh, *A minőség forradalma—Kisebbségben, I–II.* (Budapest: Püski, 1992), vol. 2., pp. 871–78.

About the author

László Németh [1901, Nagybánya (*Rom.* Baia Mare, present-day Romania) – 1975, Budapest]: novelist, dramatist, essayist. He came from a middle-class family. As a secondary school pupil, he became involved in politics during the 1919 Hungarian Soviet Republic, after the fall of which he was harassed by the authorities. In the autumn of 1919, he studied Hungarian literature at the University of Budapest for a semester, then entered medical school, where he obtained a degree in 1925. He practiced dentistry for a time and then became a school physician, which he remained until 1942. He was an emblematic figure of the “new generation” of the 1930s, fusing cultural elitism with political populism. In 1932, he founded *Tanú* (Witness), a periodical that he wrote and edited singlehandedly. He also published regularly in *Válasz* (The Answer), which was the chief organ of the populist movement. In the early 1940s, he wrote a series of essays of cultural criticism, problematizing the process of assimilation. After 1945, he was increasingly marginalized. Between 1945 and 1950, he worked as a substitute teacher in a school in Hódmezővásárhely, and when entirely silenced (between 1949 and 1954), he turned to translating. His original works began to appear again in 1955. Németh enthusiastically supported the 1956 Revolution with important articles, but was pardoned by the new regime and subsequently became its supporter with reservations. He was awarded the Kossuth Prize in 1957, and visited the Soviet Union in 1959, publishing a laudatory article about his experience. In the 1960–70s, he was a crucial figure in the revival of cultural populism.

Main works: *Ember és szerep* [Man and his role] (1934); *Gyász* [Mourning] (1935); *Bűn* [Sin] (1937); *VII. Gergely* [Gregorius VII] (1939); *Kisebbségben* [In minority] (1939); *A minőség forradalma* [The revolution of quality] (1940); *Iszony* [Repulsion] (1947); *Égető Eszter* (1956); *Galilei* (1956); *Irgalom* [Mercy] (1965).

Context

The broader context of Németh's works in the late 1930s was the atmosphere of national mobilization promoted by the official establishment, under the sign of the pressing exigencies of "national unity" in a country preparing for the ordeals of the Second World War. The populist (*népi*) movement that had been demanding social reforms throughout the 1930s, faced the dilemma of whether to support the social politics of the regime, even at the price of giving up their belief in legal equality (as the cost of the reforms was meant to be covered by the economic disenfranchizing of the Jewish population), or to resist the temptation of solving the "peasant question" with the help of ethnic discrimination. Members of the movement solved this dilemma in various ways: some opted for the extreme right, others allied themselves with the anti-totalitarian conservative and liberal intellectual groups, while still others moved towards the extreme left, accepting planned economy and collectivism but rejecting the ethno-nationalist agenda. In this context, definitions of the Hungarian nation and national character became central elements of political controversies.

"In minority" relates directly to the debate about the nature of being Hungarian. In a programmatic article, the prominent historian and conservative ideologist **Gyula Szekfű** solicited some of the most important cultural figures of the country to write essays on the Hungarian character. Németh—who in the 1930s championed a program of "quality socialism" (a harmonization of socialism with the specifics of Hungarian society, retaining individual initiative and small-entrepreneurship) and was considered to be the most important protagonist of the populists—was also invited by Szekfű to contribute. He did not respond immediately, however, and his text did not become part of the anthology *Mi a magyar?* (What is the Hungarian?) published in 1939. Instead, he put forward his argument in book format, turning to cultural and literary history of the 19th century to answer the question: "How was being Hungarian lost in the Hungarians?"

While the question was historical, the answer given was anti-historicist—Németh offered a story of collective self-destruction and consequently a negation of historical normativity. "The Hungarian spirit suffered heavy disturbances of development even in periods thought to be flourishing—by 1867 it had destroyed itself so much that the assimilated people could simply move into the void." The process of history itself proves to be destructive: "Its turning-points were forced on the Hungarian spirit from without." Consequently, the history of modern national culture is re-described in terms of the conflict of

“deep-Hungarians” and “shallow-Hungarians” (or “newcomer-Hungarians”)—which Németh translated as the fight of the authentic and the assimilated.

The “loss of Hungarianness in the Hungarians” is thus described as the intrusion of aliens, and the unauthentic expressions of being Hungarian are always referred back to the “bad instincts”—the emanation of an alien national spirit. Hence his criticism of the old Austro-Hungarian establishment: “A dynasty, losing the loyalty of its peoples, gained some respite thanks to the Compromise, whereas the Hungarians, as a remuneration for having connected their future to the agonizing, gained liberty in only one direction—with respect to the treatment of the nationalities.” The subsequent fight with the nationalities necessitated assimilation, but the mass assimilation produced a “new middle-class of weak and newcomer-Hungarians, who (...) became the exterminators of the Hungarians who strove upwards, aiming at the re-conquest of their country.”

Although fusing aesthetic and ethnic categories, Németh’s conception, which in many ways echoed **Dezső Szabó**’s ambiguous ethno-populist language, was far from being unequivocally racist. As a matter of fact, the tragic tone of the text converged on the eternal opposition between the virtuous but self-destructive minority of cultural creators and the dull majority supporting the official or commercial cultural mainstream. This dividing line obviously cut across ethnic communities: Németh made it clear that he felt closer to the turn-of-the-century modernist writers of Jewish origin than to the supporters of the petrified post-romantic national canon. In this sense, one can argue that in his case the nation was not primarily a bio-social community but an aesthetic one: national literature. Furthermore, his analysis of Hungarian culture within a broader Eastern-European context implied an important shift of the system of reference and a radical repudiation of the traditional narrative based on Hungarian supremacy.

Probably the most powerful Hungarian example of the popular genre of national characterology in the period, Németh’s essay had a large public resonance. Most of the liberal and left-wing cultural circles considered it a “betrayal,” i.e., an appropriation of the racist discourse of the extreme-right. The Christian-humanist poet **Mihály Babits** wrote a very bitter criticism of Németh’s position. On the other hand, the text became a reference point for a relatively broad cultural middle-class stratum, which was less lured by the agrarian populist discourse but was prone to internalize Németh’s apocalyptic and ethno-centric cultural analysis. In fact, Németh tried to renounce the radical right-wing implications of his text, and his political discourse of the 1940s can be considered rather left-wing (albeit with a certain anti-Semitic and anti-Soviet tinge). It was mainly due to “In minority” that he was mar-

ginalized after 1945, and when he returned to cultural life after 1956, both the official cultural politics and Németh himself tried to de-emphasize the importance of this text. It was revived in the 1990s, when—taken out of context—some of its key tenets became the stock reference for the re-emerging cultural and political extreme right.

BT

In minority

The Compromise of 1867 made the Hungarian people the allies of the Habsburg house. The dynasty from whom the attachment of its peoples had slipped off received some respite, while the Hungarians, in exchange for binding their future exclusively to an agonizing power, gained freedom in their treatment of their national minorities. Taught by the distance of his exile to think in the context of centuries, Kossuth in his Cassandra-letter¹ was right to claim about the Acts of the Reconciliation that they were “at variance with the tendencies of the age we live in, with the inspirations of the European tendencies—it converts our neighbors both to the West and the East into foes, it makes a satisfactory internal solution of the question of the nationalities impossible, and turns Hungary into a target of competing ambitions in the apparently approaching European controversies.” With the early 19th century, the notion of nationalism burst also into the circle of small nations; and eight or ten peoples around us shook off, just as we did, a numbness much like ours had been. As our quotation from Eötvös stated, this national concept knew no frontiers and was bound to inflict severe wounds on the states of these tiny peoples, wounds which the states themselves could not heal. Hungary being the inheritor of a dual responsibility for a state-over-many-peoples, and at the same time sharing their desire for freedom, could hardly find an attitude to be justified by history subsequently. There has been something fateful about everything in the effect of nationalism in Eastern Europe, and once set off, the process can never come to a halt as long as this region cannot produce a concept harmonizing the national notion with the imperial idea. But we should never imagine that in history only success can prove anyone right, and that an unsuccessful but serious effort cannot become a capital for the spirit of the nation that has undertaken it. The reconciliation with the minorities, which Kossuth felt to be the

¹ A famous political pamphlet in letter form by the exiled Lajos Kossuth written after the 1867 *Ausgleich*, where he predicted the catastrophic consequences of the alliance with the “moribund” Habsburg Empire for the Hungarians.

inspiration of the European tendencies, may have easily led to disappointments, but, had such a step been carried out, even the partitioning of the country would have found us in a different moral condition. The Compromise should have only been undertaken by a people that knew exactly what it was taking on itself, and that was determined to exploit grimly and doggedly everything it gained at such a cost. But for such a determination even Kemény² may not have had enough realism and forced somberness. The ones who extorted the Compromise through their own “degeneration” knew nothing of this moral alternative; they were only attracted by the glamour and rake-off of the new schemes to milk the state: they were fed up with being constantly put aside, with indebtedness, with burdensome practical careers, and they needed a state with full udders putting a teat into every hungry mouth. The spirit to keep all this under control had perished, and politicians and writers were rushing with relief headlong into such deals as founding railways bound for destruction. The assimilates begging to be let into the New Joint Stock Company had to adjust themselves, not to what did not exist, but to what did. To the Hungarian world instead of the Hungarian spirit.

Before we move on, let us avert some thoughts confronting us. Isn't it unjust to blame the spirit for what was the malady of society? Everyone knows that after 1848 the nobility lost the ground from under their feet, the liberated serfs could not easily rise into the middle-class, there were few Hungarians in the cities, the absolutist system halted even the growth of our population, and the commencing capitalism was grating morals in a thousand ways; is it fair, then, to seek the cause of the general decline in the most eminent men, who, wherever and in whatever way they employed their talent, were still upholding a standard? Well, if we really seek the “cause” in them, we indeed deserve the pit in which to meditate on idealism and materialism as German historians of ideas or Jewish Marxists. Unfortunately, as finist³ Hungarians, we are ill-suited for such feats anyway, and, not knowing how fate moulds a writer, we suffice with observing how a writer moulds fate. All people must carve out their own fortune, and just as in a carver's body it is the collaboration of three hundred tiny

² **Zsigmond Kemény** (1814–1875), writer and politician, see the file: *After the Revolution*.

³ Németh most probably meant “finitist”—a concept from the national characterology of Lajos Prohászka, describing the ontological feature of Hungarians in terms of their “finitism,” in contrast to the “Wandering spirit” of the Germans.

muscles that does the work, so in a people's spirit the blows helping to form the people's destiny spring from the interaction-system of a hundred forces curbing, diverting or strengthening each other. Here we are examining this interaction-system: what held back, what helped, what derailed what—so that the hammer missed the mark again and again. Great peoples that can vegetate by their sheer numbers can afford to have a literary history that is a *jardin des plantes*—flowering works alongside each other; but among small peoples that pass through the centuries like anxious caravans, their writers are watchmen, and with them the spirit is to be judged by its alertness. If others talk of the constraints of circumstances: as for myself, my own memories, the analysis of our past and the control test-tubes of the Eastern European literatures all teach me what should be taken even more seriously than before by the Hungarians of the future: that in matters of the spirit, “even small things have a far-reaching effect,” and the laxity, vigor or self-denial of a few men may decide the fate of a whole nation. That this vigor, laxity or self-denial comes from the thick of the race and society, unexpectedly but never by chance, and that such literary analyses are also studies of national character and portrayals of society by the sudden light of the genius: all this is beyond doubt. But my human blunders also spring from my constitution and my circumstances without this fact ever exempting me from the intent of ruminating, repenting and remedying. [...]

“...newcomer Polish Jews who huckstered across the Carpathians two decades ago and now are making Hungarian literature and papers, Swabian colonizers ingrained in their medieval language with their dull landsknecht-look of the world, drill sergeants of Habsburg feudalism...”—this is how Krleža, the greatest Croatian writer splutters in a one-and-a-half-page sentence in which he dissects in one breath in a sociological description Ady's angry and derisive term, “Hunnia,” applied almost as a swear-word. What the one-time military academy student of Pest preserved thus in his memory was not perceived much differently by the Hungarians living here. Jews are avid, Swabians are dull. The Jews have hardly arrived here and are already making Hungarian culture; the “landsknecht-spirited” Swabians are “pillars” of the nation who are in fact ready to do anything against the nation, the most loyal auxiliary force of aristocratic Hungary ever to be found. However much injustice such summarizing sentiments may contain, they were still imprinted by the two ethnic groups' roles. The board of directors of the new Hungarian state was made up of our counts and state gentry; but the real work was divided up by the two layers that volunteered for the task with their time-tested qualities, almost like contract workers. [...] Boosting the economy, the Jews were strong in the areas of culture that required capital, enterprising spirit, a

propensity for importation and a sense of materials: they got the publishing industry, they got the press, they were the announcers of new directions, the organizers of literature and they were the creators—following their bent and out of grievance—of Socialism in Hungary. The Swabians were good functionaries, and being the least problematic people in the country, the state after the Compromise was glad to silence its guilty conscience with their qualm-free patriotism. Likewise, in the field of culture, they prevailed where a clerical correctness and systematic persistence can, if not be creative, still fill a gap: in science. In literature they carried less weight until they appropriated the role most befitting them: the role of the class watchman.

But take care, thoroughbred readers, let us not be hasty with our accusations. Culture is like blood circulation: even the greatest cultural explosions of the past could not have helped us through the age of assimilation, had it really been such a complete blood pressure-lowering halt to all creative work. This, however, is not the case. This age may not have created a real Hungarian culture, but it did create a culture that could later become Hungarian, and even if this culture was not great in its height—with its greater scope than before it provided a greater base for new ascensions. A teeming spiritual life is not yet great literature, but wherever it exists, literature may also appear. Our newcomer-Hungarians undeniably roused the spiritual atmosphere under the citadel of the Academy. The institutions of urban life were abounding, the urban genres were in full bloom. [...] And did we not erect our university, and did we not need to find lecturers for them so that the chairs could become departments? Had Deák set up some sort of academy producing university lecturers for Hungarian peasant boys, it would surely have been good. But as there was no such thing, let us admit that our assimilates did in fact raise up the new many-roomed building of Hungarian sciences. Why, even our Finno-Ugrian linguistics was founded by a Budenz; Ignác Goldziher's impressive work on Islam is the only product of our historians noted abroad; the best of our medical profession, Semmelweis, the two Korányis, Jendrasik, Lenhossék, Dollinger, Tauffer, Krompecher, Grósz:⁴ isn't it better that they lived among us than not to have had them at all—and we have not mentioned yet the Technical University. [...] It is not where they swarmed into the vacuum and did in fact fill it up; our assimilates' role becomes repulsive where defending their freshly occupied positions they became the destroyers

⁴ Prominent Hungarian physicians, engineers, and chemists of German and Jewish background.

of up-and-coming Hungarians ready to reclaim the country. And this is something that has been committed by both of these groups.

Were they familiar with it, the peoples of Eastern Europe could almost use each other's literature as their own: whoever knows the Serbian ballad tradition will also immerse himself more deeply in that of the Szeklers; the Romanian or Finnish folk poetry fills up the gap of a lost Hungarian age that still resounds here and there in our popular language, superstitions and tales. Comparative literary historians such as Iorga have proved the kinship between a whole range of our institutions. The new trends reaching us from the West are distorted here in a manner too uniform to be explained by anything but similar spiritual and social conditions, and the Eastern European languages themselves—diverse as they are in their origins and morphology—resemble each other all the more in their psyche and style. All this facilitates the traffic from one people to the other to a great degree. It is no paradox that József Erdélyi may have become such a deeply Hungarian poet for the very reason that, as Argyelán,⁵ he could also exploit his own Romanian depths. If our Germans were Romanians and our Jews Serbs, it would hardly have been brought up against them in a complaint so bitter in its tone that they were not adept in what they had become. For they really were not adept, and they could not be: they had attended a different school of the centuries. This insensitivity was undoubtedly greater among the Germans. And it is not just the *landsknecht*-look mentioned by Krleža that is to be blamed. As a teacher, I have taught good many Swabian children: none of the German tribes seem to have such limited abilities. But the very same insensitivity has become the object of complaint not just in the neighborhood of Dunakeszi but wherever Germans and Eastern Europeans have been in contact. Dostoevsky, if he wants to present someone genetically incapable of understanding the Russians, will shove a German into his novels. The Germans have dispatched much for the indolent Eastern Europeans: the only thing they were incapable of was to understand and like them: this is the point at which all their Eastern European aspirations have failed and will fail. They have done much work for us too—why, they have built up Buda twice, to be re-conquered twice by us (in the times of Sigismund⁶ and Francis Joseph);—but I confess that I

⁵ Reference to the poet's original name, meaning "Transylvanian" [*Rom. Ardelean*].

⁶ Sigismund I of Luxemburg, Hungarian king (1387–1437) and later Holy Roman Emperor. From 1408, he held his court at Buda, turning the city into his virtual imperial capital.

cannot recall offhand a single example of a German ever gaining a deeper insight into the foundations of Hungarian culture. [...]

Their earlier life had forced the Jews to spend too much time hiding among the Eastern European peoples not to adapt themselves to a certain degree—much like the Gypsies playing dance music for them—to their character. Berzsenyi already scolds them as accomplices of outlaws and instigators of the serfs: and if one can debauch us, he must at least know us a bit. Those who were familiar with the rural Jewry in Transdanubia, which has almost completely vanished since then, can recall with how much savor these enclosed people could speak the dialect. The same happened in literature: the Jewish heart has always preserved an ulterior motive, the soul-forming centuries have been more stubborn than the desire to embrace and fuse; the Jews remained Jews, but they could at least start a dialogue with the best of us and they were interested in us; their sense of values was fastidious, and as they got more used to us, they even reared an elite that was not an entirely unworthy comrade-in-arms for us. [...] There is one thing that cannot be denied about our Jewry: in this encrusted society, the up-and-coming Hungarians could only emerge through them. Did they need us? Had they wanted a career, the Hungarian writers would only have hampered them; had they wanted a Jewish revolution, they could have found weightier allies than such nameless writers. Hatvany, Jászi or Lukács⁷ turned towards Ady from the threshold of the Academy, and the coarser Jewry, the likes of József Kiss,⁸ had just as little use for Ady as the Talmudists of trade unions. The tiny Jewish elite that attached itself to the new Hungarian literature as its ally surely did it not merely out of fiendish schemes but out of the eternal attraction binding together men of eminence. [...]

Translated by Dávid Oláh

⁷ Lajos Hatvany, **Oszkár Jászi**, and György Lukács, three prominent intellectuals of Jewish origin who determined the intellectual atmosphere of the 1910s.

⁸ József Kiss (1843–1921), Hungarian poet of Jewish origin. He started as a post-romantic, but later became interested in articulating the modern urban experience. The Hungarian nationalist mainstream praised him as an example of the successfully assimilated Jew, “loyal” to the Hungarian national project, and he was often contrasted to the “irreverent” new generation of avant-gardism.

HUGO VON HOFMANNSTHAL: WRITING AS THE SPIRITUAL SPACE OF THE NATION

Title: *Das Schrifttum als geistiger Raum der Nation* (Writing as the spiritual space of the Nation)

Originally published: *Die neue Rundschau* 38 (July 1927)

Language: German

The excerpts used are from Hugo von Hofmannsthal, *Gesammelte Werke, Reden und Aufsätze III* (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1980), pp. 24–25, 27, 40–41.

About the author

Hugo von Hofmannsthal [1874 Vienna – 1929, Rodaun (today part of Vienna)]: poet, essayist, dramatist, and librettist. Hailing from a wealthy cosmopolitan family, his Jewish great-grandfather had been ennobled and his father was an Austro-Italian banker. His writing displays an evolution from putative modernist to cultural conservative, informed throughout by a perception of the fractured self. His early poems were published by German aesthetic radical Stefan George (1868–1933), and Hofmannsthal associated with the avant-garde *Jung-Wien* [Young Vienna] group in 1897. In 1901, he graduated in Vienna (philology) and began his conservative shift, writing libretti for the composer Richard Strauss (1864–1949), starting with *Elektra* in 1909. His later dramas, starting with the adaptation of the 15th century English morality play *Jedermann* [Everyman], (1911), are conceptually congruent with his libretti, essayistic work, and activity as co-founder of the Salzburg Festival in 1920 (with Max Reinhardt, 1873–1943). The Festival marked the attempt to realize a particularist vision of Austrian cultural identity within a broader German canon through ritual performance, founded on a conceptually (if not liturgically strict) Catholic worldview. The Strauss collaborations (especially *Der Rosenkavalier*) remain staples, and *Jedermann* still opens the Salzburg Festival. His literary recognition focuses on the early work, *Ein Brief* [A Letter] (1902), a key modernist text expressing profound unease. This continued recognition chimes with the wider re-discovery of *fin-de-siècle* Vienna that has fed a continuing mini-industry in historical and cultural studies, and of course tourism.

Main works: *Der Tor und der Tod* [Death and the Fool] (1891); *Der Tod des Tizian* [Titian's death] (1901); *Ein Brief*, aka *Brief des Lord Chandos* [A Letter, aka The Lord Chandos Letter] (1902); *Elektra* (1904; 1909 as a libretto); *Ödipus und die Sphinx* [Oedipus and the Sphinx] (1906); *Der Rosenkavalier* (1911); *Jedermann*

[Everyman] (1911); *Ariadne auf Naxos* [Ariadne in Naxos] (1912–1916); *Die Frau ohne Schatten* [The Woman without a shadow] (1919); *Der Schwierige* [The difficult man] (1921); *Das Salzburger grosse Welttheater* [The Salzburg Great Theatre of the World] (1922); *Der Turm* [The tower] (1925–29, incomplete); *Die ägyptische Helena* [Egyptian Helena] (1927); *Arabella* (1928).

Context

Hofmannsthal was, arguably, the literary embodiment of a certain form of the Austrian *Zeitgeist* both before and during the First World War, and in the first decade that followed. At face value, his early works expressed the decadence widely associated to this day with the celebrated Viennese *fin-de-siècle*. Together with other writers of the *Jung-Wien* [Young Vienna] circle, to which he briefly belonged, his early works, such as *Death and the Fool*, convey a fascination with decline, which some have read as coextensive with that of the Monarchy in the period. Other works express a striving for new aesthetic forms. But even at this early stage, Hofmannsthal turns this decline into a moral lesson, the *memento mori*. Similarly, his celebrated *Lord Chandos Letter* of 1902, albeit situated remotely from the present, captures the modernist preoccupation with psychological rupture, with a penetrating metaphorical clarity that guarantees the work's inclusion in the modernist canon. And yet, this sense of fractured selfhood already contains the germs of Hofmannsthal's later attempts, throughout his oeuvre, at a synthesizing reconstruction through art, literature, language, and theatre, construed as performative ritual, which he summarily calls in the extract presented here a "conservative revolution."

This term seems to embody the seemingly contradictory evolution of the one-time member of the poetic and decadent vanguard into a conservative thinker and aesthete. During the First World War, Hofmannsthal served in the Ministry of War, where he was charged with writing patriotic literature to shore up the war effort. This government-sponsored endeavor, mercilessly satirized by **Karl Kraus**, was designed to spare otherwise able-bodied writers from the horrors of war and enhance the propaganda effort; it also chimed with an evolving, specifically Austrian patriotism that Hofmannsthal shared with his friend, diplomat and writer **Leopold Andrian**, and which he voiced in a number of well-known essays. These carry such programmatic titles as "Österreich im Spiegel seiner Dichtung" (1916) [Austria in the Mirror of its Literature] and "Die österreichische Idee" [The Austrian Idea] (1917), and are devoted to shoring up the idea of an Austrian cultural speci-

ficity that, though it was rooted, to be sure, in a wider German culture, was in Hofmannsthal's terms of a superior, older, and specific nature that differed from that of Prussian-led Germany in its post-1871, unified guise. Indeed, Hofmannsthal codifies the differences between "northern" and "southern" Germanic types in his well-known piece "Preusse und Österreicher" [Prussian and Austrian] (1917), from the same period, which sets "Austrian" characteristics in loving, satirical, juxtaposition with the harder stereotypical features of the Northern German.

In tandem with this essayistic patriotism, Hofmannsthal's post-war oeuvre reflects an increasing cultural conservatism, expressed for instance through a suggestive lament for passing "Austrian" characteristics and mores, as in the drama *Der Schwierige* [The difficult man] (1921), or in his various libretti for Strauss, notably *Der Rosenkavalier* (1911). Furthermore, in the extract presented, the "conservative revolution" identifies its roots in a counter-movement of long duration, pitched explicitly against Romanticism, which suggests a programmatic form of anti-modernism, interpreted as a cultural (and ultimately, political) program. Most revealing of all was arguably Hofmannsthal's growing preoccupation with a Catholic world view, conceived as a symbolic projection of Austria's own values, as embodied by its former rulers: the Habsburgs. It was this symbolic projection of an Austrian culture that informed his program for the Salzburg Festival, which he established in 1920 with Jewish-born theatre impresario Max Reinhardt (1873–1943); and it is the guiding tenor of his later play written specifically for the festival, *Das Salzburger Grosse Welttheater*. This play, like Hofmannsthal's essays, blends culture with overt politics, with the "red" figure of the beggar (representing Bolshevism) pitched as inimical to, but overcome by, "true" Catholic values at the work's close.

Hofmannsthal's development therefore mirrors the broader "conservative turn" in the Austrian literary and political establishments from the late years of the Habsburg Monarchy to the late 1920s. Converging with the political dominance at the state level of the Christian Socials, this "turn" saw the summary promotion of such "indigenous, Austrian" writers on the basis of their religious, autochthonic and anti-modernist credentials, arguably over literary merit per se. Thus, the likes of now-celebrated satirist Karl Kraus and the Marxist Jura Soyfer (1912–1939), and to a lesser extent Arthur Schnitzler (1862–1931), the key dramatist of *fin-de-siècle* Viennese society, were displaced by now-forgotten but then-celebrated figures like **Anton Wildgans**, Karl Schönherr (1867–1943), a Tyrolean writer of rural and urban dramas, and the determinedly Catholic playwright Max Mell (1882–1971). All of

these received plaudits and ample promotion in the years before 1938, and the latter two, whose indigenous credentials also appealed to the Nazi “blood and soil” ideology, also made the jump to secure favor beyond those years.

However, a closer examination reveals important ruptures within this inter-war modernist canon, which in turn reflects the ambivalent direction of the separate Austrian state to 1938. Hofmannsthal stands at the crux of these contradictory trends. These distinctions pivot on the rival conceptions of “Austria” as distinct from, yet sharing, a common “German” culture; but also with regard to the manner in which its Catholic dimensions were interpreted. For instance, Max Mell was a staunch Catholic, but covert Nazi. He collaborated with Hofmannsthal on his project to establish an “Austrian Library” of works during the First World War, at the same time Mell’s Catholicism was not only more literal than Hofmannsthal’s, but was matched by an equally strong desire for *Anschluss*. The more symbolic, pro-Austrian “Catholic” propagandists, which included Hofmannsthal and others with part- or fully Jewish ancestry, tended to insist on Austria’s separate fate. But even this distinction was not always fully clear-cut, as demonstrated sharply by the essay from which the extract here is taken. In short, even Hofmannsthal, although addressing a German audience, seems to move away from his wartime insistence on a separate Austrian culture towards an unquestioning insistence on a common Germanic one. To extrapolate a political shift towards a pro-*Anschluss* position is moot, and not backed up by the remainder of his work and biography; however, the shift is a telling one, which mirrors the Janus-faced insistence of the Austrian state itself on being culturally “German” yet separately “Austrian.”

RP

Writing as the spiritual space of the Nation

It is not by residing on our native soil, nor through our physical interactions in deed and change, but above all through a spiritual attachedness that we are tied to the community. It is this which separates our old European nations from that young, externally powerful, American state-system, one in which we cannot identify a nation thus defined. Through a language we come together in a way that is not merely a natural means of communication, because through it history speaks to us, a force affects us and becomes powerful—a force that political bodies can neither give growing room to nor fence in—and a peculiar connectedness takes hold linking the generations, and we suspect a certain something reigns here, and this something we dare to call the spirit of the nation. [...]

In such a context, in which things only appear as fleeting contours, it is merely possible to hint at the correlation that this side of life certainly and in every way has with the political one. There is an intricate relationship between the skeptical attitude, characteristic—if not its only one—for this nation, and that political ability to unleash fruitful revolutions that awaken rather than destroy the nation. There is a complete correlation between a certain basic tendency of linguistic posturing and the drive of this worldliness, whose most powerful eruption in the French Revolution led to a materialistic and simultaneously cultural break into the German world that in its repercussions has not yet been fully dealt with.

Enough: French literature vouches for their reality. Where the imagined wholeness of existence is—not turmoil—there reality resides. The nation, held together by an un-breakable web of language and spirit, becomes a *community of belief*, in which the entirety of natural and cultural life is included. A nation-state of this kind appears as the inner universe and, from epoch to epoch every time anew, as “the solid counterpart of German absent-mindedness.”

The conceptualization of space that emanates from this spiritual whole is identical with the spiritual space that the nation assumes in its own consciousness and in the world. Nothing in the nation’s political life is reality that does not exist in its literature as spirit; nothing contains this vibrant, dreamless literature that did not realize itself in the nation’s life. [...]

Like no other generation, this and the following one, which we already see rising in our midst, knows to face life in its entirety, and does so far more rigorously than romantic generations could have even imagined it. All fractions, into which the spirit had divided life, are to be overcome through spirit and converted into spiritual unity; all that is externally fissured has to be torn into its inner self and sealed, so that its exterior be united, because only that which is in itself whole will become a unit to the world. Here the lonely Self of the ever-searching, left to its own devices, breaks through to the highest community, by uniting in itself all that which, with thousands of fissures, has for centuries split a nation unfettered to its culture. Here the solitary become connected, these scattered worthless individuals become the nation’s core. Because ascending from synthesis to synthesis, loaded with a truly religious responsibility, omitting nothing, nowhere slipping off to the sides, skipping nothing—such a concerted striving, where the nation’s genius does not abandon it, must arrive at this highest destination: that spirit become life and life spirit, in other words: to the political comprehension of the spirit and the spirit’s comprehension of the political, to the creation of a true nation.

This fundamental position anticipates the safeguard of spiritual space in the same way that, intrinsically, the romantic attitude squanders space and the educational philistine attitude constricts space.

That which the synthesis seeking spirit gains—wherever here, and in the individual's breast, one can speak of achievements—these are points of reference projected into chaos that, connected, outline the spiritual space's contours.

I speak of a process, in the midst of which we stand, a synthesis, so slow and spectacular if one could see it from the outside, sinister and testing when standing within it. We may well call this process slow and spectacular when we consider that the long developmental period from the twitches of the enlightenment era unto us is only a period within it [this process], that it actually begins as an internal counter-movement to those spiritual upheavals of the 16th century whose two aspects we customarily call Renaissance and Reformation. The process of which I speak is nothing other than a conservative revolution of such proportions as European history has never known. Its goal is structure, a new German reality, in which the entire nation can take part.

Translated by Tudor Georgescu

GYULA SZEKFÜ: THREE GENERATIONS

Title: *Három nemzedék. Egy hanyatló kor története* (Three generations. The history of a decaying epoch)

Originally published: *Három nemzedék* (Budapest: Élet, 1920); revised ed.: *Három nemzedék, és ami utána következik* (Budapest: Királyi Magyar Egyetemi Nyomda, 1934)

Language: Hungarian

The excerpts used are from *Három nemzedék, és ami utána következik* (Budapest: AKV-Maecenas, 1989), pp. 301–307.

About the author

Gyula Szekfű [1883, Székesfehérvár – 1955, Budapest]: historian, editor, university professor. He came from a family of the Catholic intelligentsia. He studied history, French, and German at Budapest University, and was a student of Eötvös College, where many important intellectuals had been educated since the turn of the 20th century. From 1907 onwards, he was employed at the State Archive in Vienna. His first book, *A száműzött Rákóczi* [Rákóczi in exile], was an attempt to demolish one of the crucial myths of the anti-Habsburg canon, and was fiercely attacked by the nationalist camp. After 1918–1919, however, Szekfű emerged as the chief ideologist of the neo-conservative course, and his book, “Three generations,” became an emblematic text of the “counter-revolutionary” discourse in the 1920s. From 1927 to 1938, in close collaboration with István Bethlen (1874–1946), he edited *Magyar Szemle* [Hungarian observer], the most important conservative periodical of the interwar years. Among other important publications, he co-authored with Bálint Hóman (1885–1951) the most authoritative and successful synthesis of Hungarian history of the period. In the late 1930s and early 1940s, he became a key figure of the conservative anti-fascist political network, and after the outbreak of the war increasingly cooperated with left-wing groups. Through his articles in the opposition daily, *Magyar Nemzet* [Hungarian nation], he emerged as one of the most important anti-Nazi spokesmen among the Hungarian intelligentsia. After 1945, he was co-opted by the new regime: he served as ambassador to Moscow (1945–1948) and, from 1954, he was also member of the Presidential Council. In his last works, he made important intellectual concessions to the dominant communist ideology.

Main works: *A száműzött Rákóczi* [Rákóczi in exile] (1913); *Der Staat Ungarn, eine Geschichtsstudie* [The Hungarian state: A historical study] (1917); *Három nemzedék. Egy hanyatló kor története* [Three generations. The history of a decaying epoch]

och] (1920); *Történetpolitikai tanulmányok* [Studies in historical politics] (1924); *Magyar történet* [Hungarian history], vols. 4–7., (1929–33); *Mi a magyar?* [What is the Hungarian?] (1939); *Allam és nemzet. Tanulmányok a nemzetiségi kérdésről* [State and Nation. Studies on the nationality question] (1942); *Forradalom után* [After the Revolution] (1947).

Context

Szekfű's historiographical oeuvre had an immense impact on the national discourse in interwar Hungary, as it tried to come to terms with the experience of social and political upheaval and territorial losses after 1918. His methodological orientation in the 1920s was marked by the perspective of *Geistesgeschichte*, centered on the concept of the "spirit of the age." His most influential book, *Három nemzedék* (1920), was meant to provide a sweeping criticism of the spiritual transformation of the Hungarian elite that had led to the "catastrophes" of 1918–1919. He sought to devise a discourse of anti-liberal historicism: reasserting the most important tenets of Hungarian nationalism, while getting rid of the ballasts of the bygone liberal-nationalist era. He thus hoped to save the national tradition, as a potential source for regeneration, by turning it against the apparent decline of the decades preceding the collapse of "historical Hungary." Hence the essentially tragic tone of the book: it is trapped in a contradiction between the actuality of decline and the potentiality of a restored tradition. The book narrates the process of how the "authentic" spiritual structures, exemplified by the "political romanticism" of **István Széchenyi**, were devoured by the "inorganic" institutional and intellectual climate of the second half of the 19th century; how the "illusions of liberalism" made it impossible for the national community to make use of the advantages of the 1867 Compromise; and how these illusions had led to the failure of nationality politics and the Dualist legal establishment.

In the excerpts included here, Szekfű analyzes the relationship between assimilation and modernization in late 19th century Hungary. He points out that, after 1867, there was an increase in the process of urbanization, and the Hungarian ethnic islands in the cities of the east and south of the country started to expand. But, in his opinion, this assimilatory thrust did not result in cultural unity and did not reach deep "into the soul of the masses;" it rather led to a self-deceiving satisfaction with the seemingly successful national expansion and a self-congratulatory daydream of Hungarian imperialism. Szekfű contrasts this "naive" and "harmless" imperialism with the "more

serious” and committed irredentism of neighboring nations (Czech, Romanian, Serbian), formulating their plans for expansion at the expense of multinational Hungary. In his opinion, the Hungarian elite committed a fatal mistake in failing to make a real alliance either with Austria against the nationalities, or with the nationalities against Austria. It is this “geo-political blindness” of the liberal nationalist leadership that is eminently responsible for the ultimate collapse of “historical Hungary.” He also linked the “Jewish question,” which became central to ethno-nationalist political discourse after 1919, to this in the sense that he accused the liberal elite of deceiving itself by believing that the quick linguistic shift of the Jewish population to Hungarian also meant a deeper identification with “Hungarian spirituality.” Szekfű claimed instead that the Jewish participation in the “destructive” revolutions of 1918 and 1919 showed that this assimilation was actually unsuccessful. Along these lines, while he rejected the anti-Semitic violence following the establishment of the counter-revolutionary regime (his wife was also Jewish), he legitimized the measures of the Horthy regime in the early 1920s aimed at limiting Jewish presence in the liberal professions and the state bureaucracy.

Három nemzedék can be defined as eminently “anti-liberal,” with some elements of anti-modernism, and in many ways was inspired by the turn-of-the-century Central European trend of conservative social protectionism. In the 1930s, however, Szekfű grew increasingly critical of the official discourse. Significantly, the revised edition of the book (1934) contained a new chapter on the “antinomies” of the post-1919 social and political establishment, which he labeled as “neo-baroque,” i.e., characterized by grandiose gestures without much content. In trying to face the new challenges, Szekfű integrated certain elements from the emerging populist discourse, while, in the face of the totalitarian threat, he became much more conciliatory toward liberalism.

Throughout the period, Szekfű’s works remained central to the historical discourse. His position was far from being unchallenged, however. In the 1920s, *Három nemzedék* was criticized by some of the representative figures of the pre-1918 conservative liberal tradition, such as Győző Concha (1846–1933), for its blatant anti-liberalism, while a number of fellow historians distanced themselves from the book by labeling it as an essay rather than a historical monograph. The most important strain of criticism, however, came from the populist camp, formulated poignantly by **László Németh** (especially in Németh’s polemic work, *Gyula Szekfű*), and from a protagonist of the new generation of historiography championing *Volksgeschichte*, Elemér

Mályusz (1898–1989). Nevertheless, Szekfű's intellectual heritage proved to be lasting. After his death, the most important use of his works was in the debates (closely related to the legitimization of the post-1956 Hungarian regime) around the *Ausgleich* and the heritage of Hungarian cultural nationalism. His oeuvre was brought gradually to the fore in the 1970s and 1980s, and, in the 1990s, there was a veritable revival of Szekfű's historiographic theories.

BT

Three generations

Hungarian illusions do not go alone. They invade the Hungarian lands in flocks, spreading their wings over the slumbering nation and keeping away the healthy breezes of reality from it. Whereas elsewhere positive beginnings and first successes tend to steel the heart and call forth a mighty vigor and effort, our people, after reaping the fruits of commencement, will all the more peacefully cover themselves up in their ancient dreams.

The exterior impetus of the third period is well-known. At the turn of the century, hundreds and thousands of Hungarian schools were working in every part of the country, and the Hungarian language was taught everywhere. But the country's unity was manifested in a Hungarian form in the area of finances as well. Railways, the postal services, factories and mines, state-owned companies take the Hungarian people everywhere, even into formerly isolated corners inhabited by national minorities; Hungarian colonies sprang up everywhere, and the cities were becoming Hungarian one after the other purely through the peaceful work of Hungarian capitalist culture and the intelligentsia supported by the state. [...]

This process is undoubtedly the beginning realization of what Széchenyi yearned for, so that through it the Hungarians would be able to preserve and extend their supremacy through the peaceful means of their higher spiritual and material culture; it is a beginning of the development that was meant to complement our political unity in peaceful decades with self-confident work towards a cultural unity penetrating into the deepest layers of society.

However, all this would have required a clear concept of our national objectives, a strong will and purposeful fortitude—characteristics that do not go well with self-delusion and melt away like the snow in March whenever the latter approaches. Once again, the national achievements in the peaceful era of Francis Joseph set into motion our emotions instead of our will, and they rendered us victims of self-satisfaction. Not counting the perennial constitu-

tional¹ dissatisfaction, during the last period our days passed in an almost constant state of amazement at our deeds and development. [...]

Never have we talked so much about our Hungarianness as in this self-delusive period; never have we been so firmly convinced that our feet were rooted in the national soil, when in fact we left the homeland like heedless infants, rushing off to strange countries after phantasmagorias and glittering rags. It is thus that our vanity caused our self-delusion to get the mastery of our mind and will, and to hinder us from every positive work improving the Hungarian Fallow. We spent our precious time, which was in any case measured out briefer than we thought, with the playthings of illusions among which the fancy of Hungarian imperialism was outwardly impressive but in fact all the more childish.

In the last thirty years, each nation has had its own imperialism. The former, specifically liberal period weaned people from organic social and economic work: from discipline and contentment. The laissez-faire principle made individual success unlimited, and this opened up unbounded opportunities for capitalism in economic life, and multiplied all these unlimited features in the construction of state character, in the power politics of the states. Just as the intoxicated individual threw off the bonds of morals and discipline, just as the capitalist financier heaped up the wealth of continents with an unprecedented haughtiness of power just to squeeze out even more wealth from it; with the same greed and lust for power great and small states hurled themselves into imperialistic politics, whose starting point everywhere was the departure from morals and covetousness of another's property. In the imperialist age, whose ending is as yet unforeseeable, the states dedicate all their skills, the whole of their inner and outer life, to the service of imperialism regardless of their form of government, whether it be monarchical, democratic or proletarian. Commerce and industry, as in Germany, the army, foreign politics and nationalism, as in France and Russia; all these are just the means of imperialism, whose most vigorous advocate, England, is extending its realms, like a second Rome, into a well-nigh world empire. But the mobility and blazing intensity of the imperialistic forces in the Western nations are far surpassed by the small nations in Central Europe and the Balkans. Compared to the conscious fervor of Czech imperialism, its British counterpart or Bolsheviki-Russian expansionism are feeble botchworks. The six-million-strong Czech people organized their whole economic system,

¹ Közjogi: public law, the field of conflict between Vienna and Hungary after the *Ausgleich*.

public education, all their activities and wakeful dreams in the service of a single end: to subjugate under false claims but with a genuine yearning for pillage every people living around them, and to absorb their territories, thrice as large as their own land, into the Czech empire. The same aspirations were discernible in the Serbian and Romanian state and people. Thus, disregarding Viennese imperialism, which was by that time more of a self-delusion, there were no fewer than three imperialistic machineries at work on our borders, lubricated with all the oils of firm will, violence and lies; hundreds of Czech, Romanian and Serbian associations were propagating the imperialistic concept among the masses, Czech and Romanian banks and financial institutions were preparing for the great struggle, and even the imperialistic army was ready, trained under the innocent guise of sports clubs. And all this was carried out at our borders, with the openly proclaimed and passionately felt and desired end of tearing out the territories of the new empires from the bleeding body of Hungary.

Only hypocrisy or political needs can accuse *our* imperialism of disturbing the European peace. It was an elemental requisite to our self-preservation that we should defend and arm ourselves and not watch idly this savage craving, this plunderous greed ready to fall upon us. Our fault was not that we defended and armed ourselves; in fact our fault was that we did neither. For Hungarian imperialism, the only notion that we clasped against our imperialist foes lying in ambush for us at our frontiers, was neither good nor sufficient nor serious as a weapon.

Our imperialism was nothing else but, with a good old Hungarian expression, sophist talk,² empty prattle, a pious wish of a minor newspaper-reading layer of the middle class, which was expressed in truisms and which we did not even attempt to translate into action and deeds. Its obscure and woolly program contains emotions as well as fantastic dreams and childish tiny means. One program point which any one of us may recall demanded thirty, but at least twenty million Hungarians, alluring the public with the phantasmagoria of a homogeneous Hungarian nation at least as great as France or Italy—at the very time when, according to the well-known statistical data, there were only ten million Hungarians, and when in the same paper, after the imperialistic editorial about the twenty million patriots, more sober Hungarians were pondering about how to blot out the single-child system devastating the ten million Hungarians and impeding even their natural increase.

² Szekfű uses the colloquialism, “szófia beszéd,” an indigenized version of the notion of sophistry.

As it is, our imperialists have never elaborated on how we should obtain the missing millions. But they embellished and embroidered, in a fashion all the finer and more diverse, the empire to emerge all by itself with twenty million Hungarians. At times they wanted to “re-Hungarianize” the Balkans back to its state five centuries ago; at others they dreamed of a Great Hungary whose shores would be washed by three seas *again*—as if this had ever been true.

It is this grotesque divergence between ends and means that makes Hungarian imperialism the unhealthiest of all of our illusions. We harmed no one but ourselves, we did good to no one but our enemies, who set half the world against us by repeating our imperialistic phraseology over and over. The pie-in-the-sky empire stood before us, its top lost in the clouds, so that we were to admire its loftiness idly, neglecting at the same time all the great dangers threatening our very existence. Were there but a little bit of political common sense in our imperialists, they would have realized that under the circumstances determined by history a powerful Hungarian state could have been established only in alliance with Austria or with the national minorities, but in no way against *both* of them. Our own strength is much too little to force these two factors to acknowledge the Hungarian empire. Thus they would have had either to make peace with the minorities and to liquidate with their support the Austro-Hungarian connection and secede from Austria, or to reach an agreement with Austria and to restrict the spread of the minorities with the same determination and brutality that we can for instance see in Alsace by the French and in our neighborhood by the new Czech and Romanian states. They should have realized that there is no empire without an army, so they would have had to win over the joint army to the cause of the Hungarian empire at the cost of leaving off the constitutional struggle, or to attain—if necessary, even by a revolution—an independent national army. All these would have been expedient deeds and brave initiatives, at least from the viewpoint of Hungarian imperialism, but as we know, neither of them have come true: our imperialists took part, and at times even fought in the first ranks, in the fruitless constitutional struggles, while in home politics they completely identified themselves with the nationalistic illusions. Against the Romanian, Serbian, Czech and Slovakian movements, Hungarian society did bring to life some public educational associations, but due to the cold atomism of the Hungarian people these soon came to be dependent on state support, and their operation was confined to personal bickering and banqueting. We did not even try to compete with the political activities of the nationalities’ banks; we did talk about resettling actions but we never carried them out. The alien races living in the ethnically mixed areas were thriving cultur-

ally as well as economically, while the Hungarians there were degenerating in their morals and finances—in the era of Hungarian imperialism. Suffice it to refer to the example of the Szeklers, who were dispersing like sheaves undone at a time when politicians of Szekler origins were calling the tune in Budapest and enthusing over the Hungarian empire.

Our imperialism did no small damage to our approach to foreign affairs. In the race of imperialism, not even the proudest nation was apt to rely on its own strength: the French empire is making preparations in alliance with the Russians, and even the haughty Albion has renounced its isolationism for the sake of their dreams of world hegemony. A Hungarian power prevailing in Central Europe and the Balkans without the Austrian crutch, like a slender growing sapling, without the support of these world coalitions—this would have been inconceivable for common sense: we should either have had to join the anti-German coalition or stabilize the existing German-Hungarian friendship and implant it into the souls of the masses. In this crucial question, our imperialists again proved to be incompetent: although they did not denounce the German alliance, they seized every opportunity to make the nation distrust German culture, economy and military power. The chief mouthpiece of Hungarian imperialism, Jenő Rákosi's *Budapest News*, conducted a war of extermination against everything German for years, thus undermining the emotional foundations of our only positive alliance without acquiring a new one. And the nation, intoxicated by self-praise, was convinced that it could do without external political alliances, for it could surely succeed in its goals with its twenty to thirty million patriots.

Historiography will verify the responsibility of the imperialists, from the Tsarist and Bolshevik Russians to the Western and American democrats alike, in the outbreak of the World War and the events of the “peace” period. And it will deliver the verdict of “not guilty” on Hungarian imperialism, which is indeed not guilty either in the war or in consciously stirring up racial and social hostility, but guilty—and we had better state it ourselves— in putting Hungary to sleep, in wasting Hungarian resources on childish goals. It is guilty of national vices, it is guilty of mendacious heart-politics, which was the greatest vice against our poor nation that Széchenyi could ever conceive of.

Translated by Dávid Oláh

HEINRICH VON SRBIK: AUSTRIA IN THE HOLY ROMAN EMPIRE AND IN THE GERMAN CONFEDERATION

Title: *Österreich im Heiligen Reich und im Deutschen Bund, 1521/22–1866*
[Austria in the Holy Roman Empire and in the German Confederation]

Originally published: *Österreich (Erbe und Sendung im deutschen Raum)*,
edited by Josef Nadler and Heinrich von Srbik (Salzburg: Anton Pustet,
1936)

Language: German

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About the author

Heinrich Ritter von Srbik [1878, Vienna – 1951, Ehrwald, Tyrol]: historian. Srbik's rise to prominence in Austrian academia began eleven years after his graduation in 1901 from Vienna University, with his appointment as assistant professor in Graz (1912). He became full professor in History and Economic History in 1917, and seven years later was made professor of Modern History in Vienna. A prolific writer on Austria and Germany, Srbik sealed his reputation with a standard work on Metternich (1925), which systematized the politics of a designated post-revolutionary conservative. His post proved influential, and served briefly as a springboard into politics in 1930, when he was Minister of Education in the right-wing (but not yet undemocratic) government of Johann Schober (1874–1932), the former Viennese Chief of Police. Srbik's other works, including *Österreich im Heiligen Reich und im Deutschen Bund, 1521/22–1866*, increasingly manifested historical arguments in line with his conviction that Austria and Germany ought to be united. These views were voiced in letters to the local Nazi leader Arthur Seyss-Inquart (1892–1946), and in a speech given shortly after the *Anschluss* in 1938, celebrating the event as the “realization of the Germans' thousand-year-long dream.” His career continued under Nazi rule, but was stymied after the Second World War.

Main works: *Metternich: Der Staatsmann und der Mensch* [Metternich: The statesman and the man] (1925); *Österreich in der deutschen Geschichte* [Austria in German history] (1936); (with J. Nadler and R. Egger), *Österreich. Erbe und Sendung im deutschen Raum* [Austria, legacy and mission in the German Space] (1936); *Deutsche Einheit. Idee und Wirklichkeit vom Heiligen Reich bis Königgrätz* [German unity: Idea and reality from the Holy Empire to Königgrätz] (4 vols, vols. 1–2: 1935; vols. 3–4: 1942); *Gestalten und Ereignisse aus Oesterreichs deutscher Vergangenheit* [Figures and events from Austria's German past] (1942); *Das*

größere Reich: Großdeutschland am Anfang des 9. Jahres nationalsozialistische Staatsführung. Eine Vortragsreihe [The Greater Empire (Reich): Greater Germany at the beginning of the 9th year of national socialist state leadership: Lecture series] (1943); *Wien und Versailles 1692–1697: Zur Geschichte von Strassburg, Elsass und Lothringen* [Vienna and Versailles: On the history of Strasburg, Alsace, and Lorraine] (1944); *Aus Österreichs Vergangenheit: Von Prinz Eugen zu Franz Joseph* [From Austria's past: From Prince Eugen to Franz Joseph] (1949); *Geist und Geschichte vom deutschen Humanismus bis zur Gegenwart* [Spirit and history from the German humanism to the present] (1950).

Context

The discourse of a Germanic *Volk* that surpassed the boundaries of the political states in which Germans actually lived gained ground in the early years of the 20th century among thinkers, writers and politicians of both overlapping and divergent political orientations. Historically, Pan-German consciousness had assumed two competing forms: those advocating a “small” solution, based on Bismarck’s Prussian-led and Hohenzollern-ruled Germany from 1871, which excluded Austria; and those advocating a “large” Germany that would include Austria’s German population. Absent from this schema were the German minorities in other areas, such as the Sudeten Germans in western Bohemia, and the broader concept of a German cultural identity that went beyond state borders. The discourse of *Volk* introduced an element of flexibility that was both geographical and cultural. However, as is well known, the term became tainted by its later close association with Nazism and the emphasis on strictly racial and biological definitions of the *Volk* that superseded earlier cultural conceptions. And yet, at least in the Austrian context before the state’s absorption by Nazi Germany in 1938, an element of definitional slippage remained. How one chose to define that *Volk*, and how one gained membership of it—through cultural or religious assimilation (for instance for Jewish citizens of either monarchy) or simply through birth, language and race—was not always clearly defined, and allowed for thinkers representing competing ideologies or political viewpoints to use the term with different implied content. This partly explains how, by the 1930s, the concept could be invoked by the Austrian-separatist and not systematically anti-Semitic government of Dollfuss (1934–1938), and by the anti-Austrian, racial hardliner Hitler alike.

Certainly, “German-Austria,” as the state called itself in 1919 before Allied intervention, was almost universally conscious of its population being

ethnically German after the collapse of the multi-national monarchy. The Social Democrats, for instance, retained the *Anschluss* with Germany as a formal tenet of their political program until Hitler's rise to power in 1933; similarly Dollfuss, for all his separatism and Catholic self-consciousness, retained an insistence on Austria's "German" culture in programmatic speeches. This insistence informs a range of conceptualizations of "Austrian" specificity, many drawing on Habsburg models of historicity and culture, which came to the fore in public discussion in Austria by around 1930. In the realm of culture, the concept of adherence to a Germanic *Volk* among those of German language, settled in the western areas of the monarchy known as Cisleithania, was stimulated by the publication of such works as Josef Nadler's (1884–1963) influential *Literaturgeschichte der deutschen Stämme und Landschaften* [Literary history of the German tribes and landscapes] (1912–1918), which grouped Germans into geographically distinct "tribes." Nadler's influence and the imprint of *völkisch* consciousness suffuse the Austrian attempt to canonize its own cultural output, the emblematically titled four-volume *Deutsch-Österreichische Literaturgeschichte* [German-Austrian literary history] (edited by Nagl, Zeidler and Castle, 4 vols, 1890–1937). Parallel to these fashionings of cultural output came a shift in historiography from within the establishment, away from a longstanding interest in narrower, all-Austrian themes towards a broader concern with Austria's place in the wider German story. The instrumental figure in this development was Heinrich von Srbik, who by 1924 held a professorship in history at Vienna University.

Srbik's work (informed in part by German historian Friedrich Meinecke, 1862–1954) from the mid-1920s represents a historiographical turn from within Austria towards what he labeled a *gesamtdeutsch* [whole-German] perspective. Pivoting on the understanding of *Volk* as extending beyond political borders, he sought to explode the traditional paradigms with their "large" and "small" narratives of German statehood and the attendant, split conceptions of national identity. As an academic who insisted on careful methodological bases, producing works of credible research, Srbik nevertheless became embroiled in politics both before and after the *Anschluss*; his reputation after 1945 has suffered as a consequence. In the first instance, this involvement was direct, by serving as Education Minister in the 1930 cabinet of Johannes Schober; otherwise his involvement was indirect but unmistakable, especially after accepting Nazi party membership post-*Anschluss*. Furthermore, by 1942 the second volume of his work *Deutsche Einheit* [German unity] (the first had appeared in 1935) made more explicit the consequences

of his *gesamtdeutsch* version of historiography: namely that the Third Reich, by implication, would provide the practical shape for his vision. Whether Srbik can be seen as a politically naive idealist is arguably moot; although reportedly frustrated in the end by the reality of Nazi rule, he nevertheless retained his *gesamtdeutsch* principles, albeit attempting to reorient them away from Nazism after 1945 (e.g., in *Geist und Geschichte vom deutschen Humanismus bis zur Gegenwart* [1950]).

And yet his work has not entirely descended into the realm of a second-hand historical curiosity, that of the Austrian who sought to yoke disparate historiographies to affirm a now-discredited historical outcome. His work on statesman Metternich from 1925, for example, was republished in the 1950s and remains one of the standard texts on the subject. However, this fact in turn reveals wider patterns in Austrian historiography after 1945. The work is said by some commentators to reflect an early preoccupation with *gesamtdeutsch* themes, focusing on Austria's role in preserving Germanic interests in Central Europe (the term in German, *Mitteleuropa*, in context carries implications of German cultural hegemony and influence). But it also analyses the statesman's political system, using documentary evidence to examine the subject's techniques, and does not contradict a narrower Austrian narrative of statehood. To wit: Metternich was occasionally invoked by Austria's authoritarian, separatist government from 1934–1938 to affirm their course; and this preoccupation with Austrian themes similarly resurfaced in historiography after 1945 as a means of gaining distance and disassociation from Nazism and the tainted link with all-German narratives. Srbik therefore offers a microcosmic illustration of the problems facing Austrian historians more broadly. The return to a preoccupation with safer, more narrowly "Austrian" themes was scarcely a neutral gesture. Although there have been exceptions to the pattern within Austria (notably Friedrich Heer, 1916–1983), the consequences of that historiographical volte-face, which prevailed until the last ten years or so, were to reinforce a "victim myth" about Austria's self-implied innocence in Hitler's Third Reich that has only recently faced systematic deconstruction from within Austria's historical establishment.

RP

Austria in the Holy Roman Empire and in the German Confederation

Austria united non-German nations with its German core nation, and that was one of its greatest achievements for German culture until the Monarchy's end, that within her borders she could keep a foreign world from servitude to the East European Slavic world power, and tie it to German-led Central Europe. This Austria had sufficient lands and no need for expansion. The Austrian type of German man experienced yet another boost to his rhythm of life and his connectedness to the world during the Metternich era, and the Austrian understanding of itself as a complete state strengthened yet again. Simultaneously there existed, namely in the countries and their capitals outside of Vienna, a strong feeling of German national community; the human stream from the Reich did not dry up in the army, the civil servants, the middle and peasant classes. Albeit cut up by state borders, a thousand bonds of sympathy and interest connected the world of middle-sized and small countries composing the "Third Germany" and their particular sovereign principalities; the wills of its individual nations and the special national feelings for the imperial state and the afterglow of the Emperor and Empire's aura shimmered around Austria and its dynasty. Political and cultural aversions to Prussia, the variety of German cultural creation, the rivalry between Christian denominations—they too strengthened the Danubian power's might within the German Confederation, and Austria's presidial rights offered means of influencing politics that went far further than an honorary primacy. Conservative ideas old and new gathered, as in a focal point, in Metternich's "system," a rationalism of the overcome political and social order as well as the Chancellor's only superficially accepted aspects of romantic thought. If Austria became the leader in the preservation of the historically created German nation against its becoming politically united, of the monarchical principle against national sovereignty, of authority against Western constitutional ideas, then it has—in its struggle against national-political and liberal as well as democratic tendencies—undoubtedly discouraged much noble enthusiasm and pure idealism, many legitimate forms of life and organically ripened developments, but it has also prevented an all too tempestuous destruction and protected the counter-movement from blossoming and wilting all too hastily. And in this period of German restoration and reaction, Austria and Prussia were joined through their high conservatism for a few decades, above and beyond their conflicting principles, for the relatively uniform leadership of Central Europe. [...]

There were two paths he [Bismarck] thought of as viable: joint leadership and control of the German Confederation by both powers, so that north of the Main would be left to Prussia's and south thereof to Austria's hegemony, and that both, in conservative solidarity, would dictate the law to Europe; then Austria wanted, even with Prussian help, to become Italy's dominant power and shatter the Napoleonic empire together with Prussia and the German Confederation. Or: struggle against Austria, decide the German question on the battlefield. Again we see the deepest tragedy in Austria's inability to relinquish its exclusive primacy over Germans and to accept the division of Germany should it not want to contradict the very preconditions of its own existence.

Austria, after the onset of its constitutional era, also sought to win over the liberal circles of non-Prussian Germany, and the 1863 *Frankfurter Fürstentag* rallied non-Prussian Germany once more around the Emperor of Austria as the leader of the German Princes and the conceptual successor to the Holy Roman Emperors, but the Austrian federal reform package could not grant the federal state and the universal, direct, electoral suffrage introduced in Germany—which millions of Germans demanded and Prussia could give. The thought of a federal Reich was actually carried to its grave at that time. The war for the Duchies in the North¹ united these two German rivals [Prussia and Austria] once more in a great European power struggle to fight and be victorious over Denmark and the malevolent Europe, as European powers they secure German land first for themselves, indirectly for the German political communal body too; but then, as the German power and leadership problem is linked to the Duchies' future, they once again move to more and more hostile positions. In Bismarck, historical consciousness rises to victorious strength while contradictory life-principles force states to strive against each other according to the internal laws of the dynamic process of life, and in alliance with Italy and in the neutralization of France he creates foreign political preconditions for the victory over Austria—as balancing the spheres of interests on the German field becomes impossible. Not only Austria succumbed on the battlefield of Königgrätz, sixty years after the death of the first German Empire and its Emperor, but this Empire's universalist legacy—most faithfully preserved in Austria—died as well. The imperial state, which was now expelled from Germany and its Central European allies, dealt the old-fashioned idea of Empire a blow to the heart—and the road to a second, a

¹ The historical duchies of Schleswig and Holstein.

nation-state Empire merely of the majority, not the entirety of the German nation's hegemonic settlement area, was cleared in streams of German blood in 1866. The thousand-year-old political union between Prussia and Austria was severed, and South-Eastern Germandom's political destiny separated from its motherland's Germandom. Destiny and the acts of individuals, destruction and creative reconstruction give 1866 its world historical character. But Austria's universalist legacy and Austria's German mission remain akin, even after 1866 and until the old state's death.

Translated by Tudor Georgescu

ŽIVOJIN M. PERIĆ: RELIGION IN THE SERBIAN CIVIL CODE

Title: *Religija u srpskom građanskom zakoniku* (Religion in the Serbian Civil Code)

Originally published: *Religija u srpskom građanskom zakoniku. Povodom osnivanja Bogoslovskog fakulteta kod nas* (Belgrade: Izdavačka knjižarnica Gece Kona, 1919)

Language: Serbian

Excerpts used are from the original edition, pp. 2–26.

About the author

Živojin M. Perić [1868, Stubline, Valjevo county, Serbia – 1953, Oberurnen, Glarus canton, Switzerland]: legal scholar and politician. Born into a well-off peasant family, he completed primary and secondary education in Obrenovac, Valjevo and Belgrade. In 1887, he enrolled at the Faculty of Law in Paris, graduating in 1891. Upon his return to Serbia, he served as a junior civil servant in the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Switching to the judiciary, Perić advanced from a court clerk to a judge in the Belgrade Court of First Instance, becoming a secretary in the Ministry of Justice in 1898. In the same year, he left the judiciary to assume assistant professorship at the Belgrade Higher School, becoming a full-time professor of civil law at the University of Belgrade in 1905. He was also a member of the Serbian Royal Academy and an established scholar, whose academic work on the *zadruga* law brought him international recognition. Politically, at first he aligned himself with the moderately conservative Progressive Party, into whose Central Committee he was co-opted in 1906. He was elected to the Serbian Parliament (1908–1912). As a maverick within the party, he rallied his supporters around the weekly *Nedeljni pregled* (1908–1914). Contributors to this weekly eventually formed the Serbian Conservative Party, which Perić founded and chaired from early 1914. The Party proved unable to secure an adequate constituency and disbanded with the outbreak of the war. In 1918, Perić went to Switzerland, publicly campaigning for peace through a restructuring of Austro-Hungary into a modern federation. After the war, he grew increasingly disillusioned with individualism as the basis of European values, but continued advocating the federalization of Yugoslavia, the Balkans and Europe. Staying out of politics, he kept his academic post. After his retirement from the University of Belgrade in 1938, Perić entered politics once again, acting as a legal adviser to the collaborationist government of General Milan Nedić. In 1944, he fled to Switzerland, where he remained until his death in 1953. Marginalized during the communist period, Perić's work was rediscovered in the late

1980s and became the subject of scholarly interest. Due to the mixture of liberal and conservative ideas in his early work and to his wavering between individualist and communitarian values, his re-acceptance into the intellectual canon continues to be controversial.

Main works: *Političke studije* [Political essays] (1908); *Confédération Balkanique* (1912); *O konzervativnoj politici* [On the conservative policy] (1914); *Zadružno pravo* [The Zadruga family law] (1924); *Teškoće oko političkog organizovanja Evrope* [Difficulties in the political organization of Europe] (1931); *Jugoslovenska savezna država* [The Yugoslav federal state] (1940); *Srpski konzervativizam* [Serbian conservatism] (1943).

Context

Perić's entry into Serbian politics coincided with the period of so-called "radical democracy" following the assassination of King Alexander Obrenović by disgruntled military officers in 1903. The coup led to the return of the Karadorđević dynasty to the throne and the adoption of a new constitution, allowing for almost general male suffrage. Elections brought about the domination of the People's Radical Party, which, alternating with the Independent Radical Party, held power until 1914. Perić found himself among those discontent with the existing situation, who considered such parliamentary monopoly on power as a danger to the rule of law, the monarchy and individual liberties. Siding with the remnants of the conservative-liberal Progressive Party, reconstituted in 1906 by his close friend, Stojan Novaković, Perić retained considerable autonomy of political action in Parliament, often engaging in debates exploring the shady side of "radical democracy."

As one of the founders of the Society for the Legal Solution of the Problem of Conspirators, he vehemently called for the punishment of the 1903 coup leaders. Moreover, Perić advocated the introduction of bicameral parliamentarianism and a stronger role for the king in order to neutralize the excesses of mass democracy. To this end, he challenged a growing political consensus on the national question, which prevailed after the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary in 1908. Resenting the nationalist orientation of his own party, which lined up with the Radicals in seeking Russian support for an expansionist foreign policy, Perić became a lonely politician who argued for Serbian participation in a reorganized tripartite Habsburg federation in a future European federal community. After the Balkan wars, Perić sought wider political support for his views, launching the Serbian Conservative Party in April 1914. The timing could hardly have been worse, as the outbreak of the First World War radicalized the political scene,

hindering the reception of Perić's agenda. Perić remained outside the Serbian wartime coalition government and only his academic achievements and personal integrity shielded him from accusations of treachery. In 1918, he moved to Switzerland, where he continued to argue for the formation of a Danubian confederation. Upon his return to the newly formed Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, he resumed his academic post but abstained from direct political activity.

The transformation of Perić's political beliefs in the immediate post-1918 period shows the direct and obvious impact of the First World War. Disillusioned with the outcome of what he considered an atrocious European civil war, he abandoned his earlier political convictions. Rationalism, in his view, had utterly failed, due to the egotism inherent in individualist liberalism. He saw the attempts at rebuilding Europe on the basis of the principle of self-determination as anachronistic and potentially anarchic. In the quest for new sources of legitimacy for his vision of a federalized Europe, he briefly entertained socialist ideas, only to end up anchoring his beliefs in religion. Remaining faithful to the ideal of the universal human communion, he saw religion as a potential unifying factor in this project. His ideas on this subject were published in a short 1919 text, "Religion in the Serbian Civil Code," written on the occasion of the opening of the Faculty of Theology at the University of Belgrade. The text was written in Switzerland, but published in Belgrade and envisaged as a contribution to the constitutional debates on the organization of the new state. Facing the complexities of a new, multiethnic and multi-confessional state, Perić stressed the advantages of Serbian constitutional allegiance to Eastern Orthodoxy, appealing also for ethnic accommodation and toleration by extolling Christianity as a potential unifying factor in the state-building process. The text illustrates not only the transition of a previously determined secularist towards championing the alliance between Church and State; it also indicates the depths of Perić's intellectual disillusionment with "individualistic bourgeois democracy" and his endorsement of social institutions that could effectively promote the ideal of "altruism and solidarity."

Throughout the interwar period, Perić remained an influential critic of Yugoslav politics. He advocated the change of the centralist 1921 Constitution, and was also dismissive towards the policies of integral Yugoslavism (1929–1934). He even refused to support the 1939 federalist compromise between the Crown and the leaders of the Croatian Peasant Party, as in his view it led to the neglect of other ethnic groups. At the same time, a deeper traditionalist understanding of the communitarian ideal brought him closer to

the extreme right-wing circle led by Dimitrije Ljotić, but did not prevent him from advocating issues like gender equality. After the occupation of Yugoslavia in 1941, Perić acted as a legal adviser in the collaborationist government of General Milan Nedić, whose organic national ideology he did not fully share but whose insistence on traditional values he endorsed. With the collapse of the Nedić regime, Perić was marginalized and died in exile. His ideas were largely forgotten for more than four decades. Research on his works was recently resumed, mostly by scholars from the Belgrade Faculty of Law, who pointed out Perić's different streams of thought—conservatism, pacifism, monarchism, gender equality, traditionalism, as well as his contributions to legal scholarship and federalism.

VP

Religion in the Serbian Civil Code. On the occasion of the foundation of the Theological Faculty

I.

Religion precedes the State, just as a parent precedes a child. [...] Religion created the State, bestowing upon it the concept of authority, in the absence of which no state—simple or complex (federal), national or heterogeneous, bourgeois or socialist—can exist. This authority was given to the State by Religion, as Religion means God, and God is the highest authority accessible to human mind... The Church created the State out of love towards man. Because the State is a system, a system is order, and order prevents at least physical struggle among men... But the foundation of states did not prevent the physical struggle between states... and the Church, especially our Christian Church, which is universal and which strives for peace and love among Mankind, cannot stop halfway. As the Church has thwarted conflict between individuals by organizing them into the State, it will incapacitate physical struggle between states by organizing them into one World State... A Universal State of Mankind is a more perfect form of human organization because the remaining states, as long as they are half-sovereign states, would have neither the character nor the sense of independent powers with their constant tendency towards conflict. These states would be only instruments of this Universal State, which would maintain peace among its constituents, that is all people on our planet, as it would encompass them all. Seen from one angle, the present-day State aims to overturn the Church—and as a first step it has separated the Church from the State. Yet, from another angle, we see that the Church wants to overturn the State as it exists today: a sovereign,

independent, materialistic-imperialistic one... The victory of today's State would mean the victory of *egoism*... the victory of the Church will mean universal peace and love for one's fellow men, it will mean *altruism* [...].

The transformation into one Great State of Mankind—a State which would contain all peoples, with wider or narrower national autonomy—will not be possible at once and without taking into account today's system for organizing Mankind. It would be too abrupt and too great a jump, which would run against the principle of evolution. Apart from that, this jump would not lead us down proper roads, that is the *lawful (legal) road*. The principle of *legality and the principle of evolution* suggest, it seems to us, first the creation of federal states on individual continents—the creation of a European, an American, an African, an Asian and an Australian federal state—after which there would come, as a last step, one Universal Federation of Mankind. We Europeans, therefore, for the time being, should preoccupy ourselves mainly with the creation of a *Federation of European States*.

II.

Our Serbian state has always been religious, and as such it has been one of the most religious states. The Serbian state was always a religious state. This was how it was in the Middle Ages, as well as later, when the Serbian state, after its collapse, was again resurrected in the 19th century. Here, we will only dwell on the New Serbian State. All of its constitutions are proof of its religiosity... The current constitution from 5 June 1903, which, with only a few exceptions, is a restoration of the 1888 constitution, emphasizes the Eastern Orthodox religion as the state's religion. In jurisprudence, it is discussed whether the State has its own will, something distinct from the will of the individuals which constitute it. Well, whatever the legal studies take on the issue might be, the Serbian Constitutional Founder resolved this issue in a positive way: the Serbian state has its own specific will, because it has its own religion—one who has no will cannot believe. The Serbian state is, consequently, an organism: only organisms can have a will. This is how the Serbian Constitutional Founder discussed the question: is the state an organism? He states that it is... However, although a follower of the Eastern Orthodox Church, the Serbian state has not been intolerant, not even in the slightest: all of its constitutions have not only permitted, but have even legally protected all recognized beliefs, on the condition that the practice of religious rituals does not go against public order or morals... For myself personally, although I am very devoted to the Orthodox Church, I have always been impressed by the Catholic Church. It impresses me with its good organization and disci-

pline, and the great authority of the Roman Pope over the whole Catholic world. With its universality, the Catholic Church, it seems, reflects best the soul of Christianity, which is universal, does not know nationality and encompasses all God's children on Earth. In this way, the Catholic Church is the most conducive to the idea of a single World State. Our Orthodox Church with its divisions has assumed, over time, the character of national churches with exclusivist tendencies that greatly hinder the stated idea of a Universal State of Mankind. From this viewpoint, it seems to us that important and serious reform of our Orthodox Church is necessary... We think that it is not correct to claim that as religiosity falls, religious tolerance grows, that religious tolerance comes from indifference to religious affairs or from absence of religious beliefs... Tolerance is proof of belief in one's spiritual strength, and intolerance is a sign of the absence of this belief. Tolerant minds are strong, intolerant are weak [...].

III.

The religiosity of the Serbian state can be inferred not only from its public laws but also from its private laws... How is this connection between Religion and the Civil Code to be understood? We think that the relationship is explained thus: our Civil Code, like the Civil Codes of all bourgeois states, has its foundation on the principle of private property and the principle of free contracting. Therefore, it rests upon individualistic ideas of competition or struggle for life (Darwin's biological law). This struggle can be more or less merciless, more or less inhumane, even within the limits of the law. The basis of this struggle is egoism, yet egoism cannot be merciful or humane: by itself it is an evil, and all that is possible there is to strive to lessen that evil. Good there does not have a positive, but negative sense. Good there is equated with the least evil. Having that in mind, it is not hard to see what the Serbian legislator wanted to arrive at when he brought into the Civil Code thoughts of religion and God as we Christians accept Him: mindful of God, the Legislator strives to soften competition between humans, inspired by egoism, and to make humans less selfish. Love thy neighbor as thyself, said Christ, thus bringing the idea of altruism to Mankind. Our Civil Code, mixing man's rules with Christianity's rules, attempts to mix mankind's egoism with divine, Christian altruism, so that from this contact, egoism will be less brutal. From 1844, our Legislator, who found the Serbian economic life organized mainly on *zadruga* bases—that is, on a foundation of collective solidarity—felt instinctively the fatal impact of concessions to Western individualism on the feeling of reciprocity in Serbian society. By a cardinal alteration

in its character, the Serbian *zadruga* was transformed from a clearly collectivist institution into a typical individualistic household. The Legislator's intention was that, conveying thoughts of Christian belief and its altruistic teachings, like a clear thread through the civil code, Serbian society would refrain from complete imitation of the West and protect, as much as possible, the ties between Serbian society and the East—this East which gave us Jesus Christ and his divine teaching of love towards our fellowmen. Our civil code is a battlefield between Western egoism and Eastern altruism. Who will be stronger: the West or the East? We believe that it will be the East, because the East is Christ and Christ is victor. “Do not kill” and “Love thy neighbor as thyself” will win. There will be a Universal State of Mankind in which these two principles will reign.

Translated by Anna Rebmann

MILAN ŠUFFLAY: THE DEPTHS OF NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS

Title: *Dubine narodne svijesti. Radić, Bethlen i Mussolini* (The depths of national consciousness. Radić, Bethlen, and Mussolini)

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About the author

Milan Šufflay [1879, Lepoglava (Western Slavonia) – 1931, Zagreb]: historian, writer, and politician. He came from an elite family of mixed ethnic background, his father being a Croat nobleman and his mother a German from Hungary. He earned his doctorate in history in Zagreb, specialized in Vienna and subsequently lived in Budapest for three years, studying Dalmatian and Albanian history. In 1908, he returned to Zagreb and took up a university position, but stayed in close contact with leading Austro-Hungarian academics working on Southeast Europe. In the 1910s, he became one of the pioneers of Albanology by editing a series of important primary sources. After 1918, he was a key figure in the Croatian Party of Rights, which criticized the centralist policies of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes and fought for Croatian autonomy. In 1921, together with a number of prominent Croatian nationalist intellectuals, he was arrested, tried for treason and sentenced to three and a half years of imprisonment. His advocate at the trial was Ante Pavelić, the future leader of the Ustasha movement. In 1922, he was released and returned to public life, publishing various articles as well as writing the first Croatian science-fiction novel. In the late-1920s, he was mostly occupied with Albanian history and was financially supported by the Albanian king Zog. Following the proclamation of royal dictatorship in 1929, the unitary nation-building project in Yugoslavia came increasingly under attack. Šufflay was ambushed and murdered on the street in Zagreb by four members of the “Yugoslavian Youth” organization, who were most probably commissioned by the secret police. His death caused international consternation and, among others, Albert Einstein and Heinrich Mann sent a protest letter to the International League of Human Rights in Paris. During the Second World War, the Ustasha regime cherished his memory as a martyr to the national cause. After 1945, he was completely erased from official memory, and was only gradually reintroduced to the public from the mid-1960s onwards. After 1990, especially in the context of the quest for a Croat identity detached from the Yugoslav framework, there were impor-

tant political and scholarly attempts to re-cast him as one of the most important Croatian intellectuals of the first half of the 20th century.

Main works: *Acta Albaniae (Acta et Diplomata res Albaniae mediaevalis illustrantia)* (1913, 1918); *Kostadin Balšić (1392–1401): historijski roman u 3 dijela* [Kostadin Balšić: A historical novel in three parts] (1920); *Städte und Burgen Albaniens, hauptsächlich während des Mittelalters* (1924); *Srbi i arbanasi* [Serbs and Albanians] (1925); *Na Pacifiku god. 2255.: metagenetički roman u četiri knjige* [On the Pacific in 2255: A metagenetic novel in four books] (first printed in 1998); *Hrvatska u svijetlu svjetske historije i politike: dvanaest eseja* [Croatia in the light of world history and politics: Twelve essays] (1928); *Hrvati u sredovječnom svjetskom viru* [Croats in the global medieval upheaval] (1931).

Context

The history of the Croatian national movement from the late 19th century until 1918 was marked by constant conflict between a loosely defined Yugoslavist option and the assertion of specific Croatian interests, to a certain extent adjusted to the Austro-Hungarian imperial framework (with the additional combination of the two halves of the Monarchy offering alternative points of orientation). This dilemma was already present in the clash between the followers of Bishop Strossmayer and Ante Starčević (see **Franjo Rački**, *Yugoslavism*) in the 1870s and 1880s, and was also reproduced by the differentiation of political forces during the last two decades of the Monarchy. Thus, we can talk about a conflict of four camps: the radical nationalist, anti-Serbian and pro-Austrian Pure Party of Rights led by Josip Frank; the Croatian National Party representing the autocratic administrative center around the Bans and existing in a complex entanglement with the Hungarian establishment; the originally (for tactical reasons) pro-Hungarian and pro-Yugoslavist Croatian-Serbian Coalition of Ante Trumbić and **Frano Supilo**; and finally the emerging moderately pro-Yugoslavist and vocally anti-Hungarian—and, to a certain extent, also anti-Semitic—agrarian movement led by Ante and **Stjepan Radić**.

Naturally, after 1918, with the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the emergence of the Yugoslav state, the situation changed dramatically. While many members of the Croatian-Serbian Coalition became staunch supporters of the centralist policies of Belgrade, the Croatian Republican Peasant Party of Stjepan Radić emerged as the strongest representative of anti-centralist Croatian political tendencies, questioning the legitimacy of the new unitary state, criticizing the autocratic measures of the government and envisioning a more decentralized and socially egalitarian Balkan confed-

eration (see **Stjepan Radić**, *Speech at the Night Assembly of the National Council on November 24, 1918*). At the same time, the conservative forces, previously linked to the imperial framework, underwent a profound crisis and reconfiguration, seeking to define themselves both against the Serbs and the local socialist and agrarian camps.

Milan Šufflay was a rather idiosyncratic thinker, whose political and intellectual evolution, however, mirrors the trajectory of a considerable part of the Croatian elite before and after the creation of the SHS Kingdom. Coming from the Slavonian local elite, well integrated into the power structures of the Habsburg Monarchy, he was raised in the centers of the Dual Monarchy and was socialized in the ideological streams of the imperial bureaucratic and academic elite, fusing epistemological positivism and political conservatism. After 1918, he emerged as one of the main ideologues of the “new right,” opposed to the new state and searching for a new framework of cultural and political identity to replace the anachronistic Habsburg-loyalty (*Kaisertreu*). What made his ideological offer rather unique was that he couched it in a broader historical narrative rooted in his meticulous studies of Southeast European history. While in his scholarly works he was dealing with a wide range of topics pertaining to medieval Balkan history (ranging from questions of ethnogenesis and ethnic migration, early settlements, cultural contacts between Eastern and Western Christianity, or the impact of Bogomilism in Southeast Europe), he increasingly reverted to a more rigid ideological counter-position of Eastern and Western cultural influences, implying a fundamental difference between the Croatian and Serbian historical trajectories. In this context he also repeatedly asserted that the river Drina represented a borderline between Orient and Occident, and by implication the internal Yugoslavian conflict of Serbs and Croats could be described as a veritable “clash of civilizations.” Also, his writings on “Red Croatia,” a medieval historical term denoting the Southern shore of the Adriatic Sea, including parts of today’s Herzegovina, Montenegro and Albania, substantiated a possible “Greater-Croatian” geopolitical agenda. While these ideas had already been formulated by the romantic nationalist nation-builders and were also instrumentalized by Ante Starčević in the late 19th century, with his unquestionable academic authority Šufflay conferred additional legitimacy on these concepts.

The article, “The depths of national consciousness. Radić, Bethlen and Mussolini”—originally published in *Hrvatska misao*, the journal of the Party of Rights, and republished in Šufflay’s essay volume in 1928—is illustrative of the dilemmas of the neo-conservative Croatian intellectuals in the mid-

1920s. It sought to formulate a comprehensive critique of the political line of the most important political competitor of the Party of Rights in the Croatian context, namely the Croatian Republican Peasant Party of Stjepan Radić. In the early twenties, in ideological terms Radić gravitated towards the left and in 1923 even adhered to the Moscow-based Peasant International, while in practical terms his party increasingly represented a cross-section of Croatian society, transcending the social divide of peasantry and bourgeoisie, both frustrated by the heavy-handed policies of Belgrade. In an article elaborating on his conception of foreign policy, Radić lumped together the Serbian centralist, the Italian fascist and the Hungarian revisionist agendas as instances of autocratic politics, against which he championed pacifism and put forward the vision of a federal South-Slavic state, based on the free cooperation of "peasant nations."

Šufflay rejected this program as intellectually inadequate and politically suicidal. He argued that the politics of the agrarians did not take into account the need for preserving a fundamental continuity between past and future. Instead of a program focusing on social emancipation, a nation needs an integrative myth, based on the memory of its glorious past and the idea of ethnic continuity with its heroic predecessors. In this sense, while in geopolitical terms he was rather critical of the Italian and Hungarian nationalists, he also stated that their ideology was healthier than that of the Croatian agrarians, as their cult of the past (be it Roman imperial glory or the Kingdom of St. Stephen) was able to galvanize the irrational political mysticism of the masses. Furthermore, he also rejected the Balkan federalism of the agrarians. In this context, he pointed out that the lethal threat posed to Croatian national existence by the Greater-Serbian expansion was "Balkanization," i.e., tearing out the Croats from the (Western) European civilizational space and thus exposing them to oriental decadence and disintegration.

This discourse can be considered a transitional stage in the evolution of Croatian radical ethnic nationalism, which culminated in the Independent State of Croatia (NDH) during the Second World War. On the one hand, Šufflay's writings contained some of the key tenets that became formative of the radical nationalist ideology in Croatia, such as the cult of the distant past and the search for mobilizing historical myths, the assertion of ethnic links as fundamental constitutive elements of national cohesion, or the biologization of civilizational categories. At the same time, his actual political vision was linked more to elitist Habsburg conservatism than to any kind of totalitarianism, as he was lacking any vision of leader-cult and, as a bookish intellectual, was rather distant from mass politics.

This ambiguity can also be seen in the “afterlife” of his ideological agenda. While the actual impact of his political writings was rather limited (the Party of Rights failed miserably to prevent the peasantists from conquering the overwhelming majority of the Croatian electorate), and his ethno-genetic speculations focusing on early medieval history were too complicated to be directly instrumentalized by radical politics, his redescription of the Croatian-Serbian conflict in terms of civilizational categories (West vs. East) proved to be an extremely influential ideological move. The “defense of the Occident” was often evoked by Croatian nationalists in situations of conflict, both in the context of adjusting to the Nazi-dominated *Neue Europa*, as well as in the various crisis situations of post-Second World War Yugoslavia. As the legitimization of Croatian independence in 1990–1991 was also framed in terms of the struggle of a fundamentally Western nation against its Balkanic oppressors, it is thus not surprising that Šufflay’s *oeuvre* was rediscovered and reedited in the 1990s, becoming part and parcel of the new canon of Croatian social sciences developed as an alternative to the Yugoslavist tradition. While this recanonization was not completely spared criticism (some of the critics pointed to Šufflay’s praise of Mussolini), with some notable exceptions (especially the study by Ivo Banac), there were not many attempts to place him and the cohort of like-minded nationalist intellectuals of the inter-war period (like Ivo Pilar, Filip Lukas, and Kerubin Šegvić) into their proper ideological, socio-cultural and scientific contexts.

BT

The depths of national consciousness. Radić, Bethlen, and Mussolini

Stjepan Radić is not just the president of the Croatian Peasant Party. He is also an established leader of the Croatian people in the country and in the outside world. However, his importance goes well beyond that. He is the embryonic Messiah, the reformer of the white race, which has been exposed to the terrifying nervous shock caused by the world war.

Among numerous attempts to save social organisms, to liberate a Europe run amok from the cavemen in power and make it humane, his idea is the most realistic, the most practical and thus the most powerful one. It is not utopian like Russian communism, not partial like English Labour. The former is unfeasible today because people are not altruists. The latter can work only in the strongly industrialized countries where people have become slaves to the machine.

Radić's idea is neither fragmentary nor utopian. It is totally realistic because it is based on the most comprehensive, indispensably necessary, and eternally green class of the people, who maintain their connection with the whiteness that feeds us all, with mother Earth. Radić is Rousseau, Tolstoy, and Ghandi [sic!], all in one. His Milky Way of peasants' organization is far from being Godfather's Straw.¹ He himself could fail but this failure shall never be real. His name has already entered into world history and it will always remain there.

This very Radić wrote for yesterday's edition of *Slobodni dom* an article entitled *Mussolini, Horthy, and Pašić*. This is immediately followed by his article *Čovječanski nacionalizam u Indiji* (Humane nationalism in India), in which he celebrates Ghandi and his pacifism. Though not visible from the titles, these two articles are ideologically interconnected through their deepest meaning. The first article actually depicts the savage, inhumane nationalism in Europe.²

In this broad framework, Radić foremost launches an assault on "our Frankists," the Croatian Party of Right. We bring you the extracts from his first article, which have been selected to represent a specific whole:

"Today, Mussolini is a dictator in Italy. He is his own minister of foreign and internal affairs, the general commander of the military, armed forces and 300,000 armed fascists. He leaves financial policy to one solid professional and this is the smartest thing he has done. He singlehandedly runs or commands all the rest.

Horthy is a dictator in Hungary. Those who know him say that he lacks stamina and brains. This is why he has transferred all of his power to the Transylvanian Count Bethlen, who carries a famous historical name, has great connections and friends especially in England, hates the Jews, and is afraid of workers and loathes peasants. He has no social concept of internal affairs and sticks to the only thing he emphasizes, the undivided, thousands-of-years-old Great Hungary, from the Carpathians to the Adriatic Sea, under the holy and mighty Hungarian crown.

Why is it now more than ever before necessary to refer, albeit briefly, to these two dictators? Because these two are the biggest model and the main

¹ Godfather's Straw is an archaic phrase in the Croatian language denoting the Milky Way. It refers to the story of the godfather who was stealing straw from others and dropping dry stalks along the way, which corresponds to the Greek origin of the Milky Way and the story of Hera spilling milk.

² Croatian nationalism is not Horthy-like let alone Ghandi-like because neither of the two represents nationalism. [author's note]

hope to our Frankists, as visible from the printed material, which was compiled by their spiritual leader, General Sarkotić, and which is being disseminated by the Frankists to the representatives of certain organizations of the Croatian Peasant Party if they can get hold of their correct addresses.

General Sarkotić refers to this very document as his personal political message because due to his ill health, he no longer intends to be active in politics.

The whole document is purely military and patriotic in the historic sense. Nothing in this document can be identified as social or humane, or, for that matter, modern and progressive.³

Its main argument resides in the fact that from the political standpoint all our western neighbors are much closer to us, the Croats, than the Serbs, which is why we, the Croats, cannot have anything in common with the Serbian people, because they are our main and blood enemy, our 'arch-enemy.' Which is why going to Belgrade in relation to any political matter represents a true betrayal of Croatia and the Croatian people."

True, Mussolini is a dictator in Italy. True, Bethlen is a politician of the old school. However, both men are living manifestations of their peoples. Not the peasant peoples of the future, but nations in today's sense of the word, the historic peoples with remembrance and strong memory, and, consequently, strong identity, strong egotism. Because there is no identity without memory, as there is no nation without history. This is why Mussolini and Bethlen, exactly as they are, enjoy reputation and respect all over the West. Even Radić himself stresses that "Bethlen has great connections and friends especially in England."

Mussolini sits on the top of Ancient Roman imperialism and medieval papism. Bethlen works with the historical Holy Crown and in this abstract fiction, because it is emblematic of public memory, he finds a first-rate living power. And Pašić, too, is an exponent of the historic Serbian nation; his terrifying power lies in the catchphrase "Dušan's Empire."⁴

He who wants his people to be fresh and strong today, must not destroy his people's memory, because it destroys their identity. And in this way, in this way alone do the people fall prey to the egoistic neighbors.

There is no idea of the future that would have the strength of the past for the common people. Continuity must be preserved, otherwise chaos arrives

³ "Which does not fall under the above stated notes. The Croats do not need a mistress." [author's note]

⁴ The medieval Serbian state reached its highest point under the reign of Stefan IV. Dušan in the mid-14th century.

and not salvation. This is how Radić himself used to work, when he placed his peasant reforms, his peasant republic, in the Croatian national and state context, when he embraced the idea of Starčević. This party-of-right idea has transformed the Croatian peasantry into the unbreakable phalanx. And it is only on the basis of this phalanx that future reforms of global impact could be developed.

In the Easter edition of *Hrvatska misao*, we read the following in the article entitled *Hrvatski Uskrs* [Croatian Easter]:

“The electoral live coals of the banishment of Croatia have burst out of Croatian history, the faith of the forefathers, and Western culture twice, owing to the extended electoral law, and these were carried by the heritage of peasant and civic blood. This fire will continue to burst out with the same fervor as long as there are elections and Croatian blood, as long as our grandfathers live in our veins, and as long as we continue to live in the blood of our children.

The brain of an American politician, the brain of an English philosopher might see blood as the carrier of the stupid past, the heavy burden of inheritance.⁵ The brain of an enlightened Christian can sigh for the far-off times when there will be no idea of nationalism dividing mankind into inimical groups, especially transforming Europe into barracks, calling man an alien, changing Christian love for thy neighbor into uncontrollable hatred. But the brain of the most enlightened Croat must, due to ethical motives far more important than nationalism, listen to the voice of his Croatian blood. Because on the margins of the Balkans, on the borderline between West and East, Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy, European culture and barbarity, Croatian name, Croatian blood does not only imply a nation! Here Croatian blood means civilization. Croatianness is a synonym for everything beautiful and good that has been created by the European West.”

This is what the Croatian Party of Rights has in mind. However, the Party keeps in mind the layout of the land, the geopolitical forces which are stronger than any idea. The Party has in mind a thousand-year-old gap which has cracked open in the vicinity of the Croatian people. It has in mind its chauvinistic neighbors, who draw strength only from the past and against whom the pure future cannot successfully fight a battle. It has in mind the force, the historically alive force of Dušan's Empire. The idea of Tomislav's⁶ state must not run dry against Stephen's crown, against the Serbian imperial

⁵ “Because the brain itself is marked by stupidity.” [author's note]

⁶ King Tomislav (d. 928) is credited with founding the first unitary Croatian kingdom.

diadem, against Roman imperialism. Radić has to combine this idea with his humane republic, otherwise the Croatian people, the most wonderful homeland on the whole planet, shall be crushed. Radić should not see the enemy in the Party of Rights, but a corrective in order not to become unilateral, the corrective of the present, which merges the future with the past.

The Croatian Party of Rights does not put its hope in Mussolini or Horthy. However, the Party sees in Dušan's Empire, where it resides today, something far worse than death itself, it sees the Balkanization of the Croatian people. It justifiably does not believe that a "Serbian peasant and a Macedonian peasant and a Bulgarian peasant" can understand anything about the "magnificent movement in India." This idea can prosper there as in Radić's movement, but only if it is grafted on a historical shoot.

Western Catholic Croats have no place in the Orthodox Balkans. This is the domain of the Serbs today, who adapted to the place many generations ago. Even if Dušan's Empire were to fall apart and federations were to be established, this would still be a pure Balkan creation. And there, the Croats would lose what is the best in them according to the Party of Rights, and what is the best in them according to Radić's point of view. They would lose their sense of Western civilization and—humanity.

Translated by Iva Polak

KAREL KRAMÁŘ: IN DEFENSE OF SLAVIC POLITICS

Title: *Na obranu slovanské politiky* (In defense of Slavic politics)

Originally published: Prague, Tiskem a nákladem Pražské akciové tiskárny, 1926

Language: Czech

The excerpts are from the original edition, pp. 10–13, 80–88, 96–105.

About the author

Karel Kramář [1860, Vysoké nad Jizerou, *Ger.* Hochstadt an der Iser, northern Bohemia – 1937, Prague]: politician, lawyer, economist, and entrepreneur. Born to a wealthy builder's family, Kramář studied law in Prague and Vienna, economy in Berlin and political science in Paris. He started his political career as an ally of **Tomáš G. Masaryk**, and as one of the three co-founders of the “realist movement” in the 1880s, which stood for liberal reform of the Austrian state. In 1890, however, he joined the liberal nationalist Young Czech party, which he then represented in the Austrian Parliament. Abandoning his hope in reform and the federalization of Austria, he gradually moved to a more nationalist defensive position and started to develop a specific neo-Slavic conception based on the idea of cooperation of bourgeois political and economic elites of the Slavic nations in Central and Eastern Europe. In 1900, he married Nadezhda N. Abrikosova, from a rich Moscow family, who introduced him to leading Russian intellectual circles. His efforts to activate Slavic cooperation within the Habsburg Empire and to draw Russia more into Central European politics made him one of the major figures of the neo-Slavic movement before 1914. Active in the Czech resistance movement from the very start of the First World War, he was detained in 1915, sentenced to death in a trial that turned him into a national hero, and pardoned in 1917. In October 1918, Kramář was one of the leaders of the National Committee that declared the independence of the Czechoslovak Republic. Between 1918 and 1919, he was the first Czechoslovak prime minister, leading the Czechoslovak delegation to the Paris Peace Conference, where he called for an anti-Bolshevik intervention in Russia. After his Czechoslovak National Democratic Party lost the 1920 elections, Kramář's political star began to decline. As an opposition politician, his main criticism turned against the “Castle” group formed around President Masaryk and his Minister of Foreign Affairs, **Edvard Beneš**. Kramář was a chairman of the National Democratic Party and its progeny, the National Unification party, formed in 1934. Standing for right-wing national conservatism and a politics of national unity at a time of political and cultural fragmentation, he had an unequivocal symbolic position in the party (which won him the nickname “Leader of

the nation”). However, his direct influence on the politics of the party, not to speak of the state, in the interwar period was rather limited. After 1938, Kramář’s name was suppressed due to his strong anti-German attitude, whereas after 1945 he was attacked for his conservative political convictions and anti-Bolshevism. It was only after 1989 that Kramář re-entered public debates, arguably more as an important historical personality than a source of an expedient political tradition.

Main works: *České státní právo* [Czech state right] (1896); *Poznámky o české politice* [Remarks on Czech politics] (1906); *O české politice* [On Czech politics] (1909); *Ruská krise* [The Russian crisis] (1921); *O zahraničních otázkách* [On foreign policy issues] (1919); *Pět přednášek o zahraniční politice* [Five lectures on foreign policy] (1922); *Na obranu slovanské politiky* [In defense of Slavic politics] (1926); *Naše slovanství a uznání Sovětů* [Our Slavness and the recognition of the Soviets] (1926); *Československý stát a Slovanstvo* [The Czechoslovak State and Slavdom] (1927); *Dr. Karel Kramář o sobě* [Dr. Karel Kramář about himself] (1937).

Context

Ideas of Slavic reciprocity and pan-Slavism were part of the Czech political and cultural discourse throughout the 19th and the 20th centuries. However, they differed significantly in terms of both content (Russophilia, Slavophilia, Austro-Slavism, pan-Slavism) and political implications (see **Karel Havlíček Borovský**, *The Slav and the Czech*). At the beginning of the 20th century, pan-Slavism or neo-Slavism, as it was termed, found good reception in Czech financial circles that sought to make their way into the economically less developed Slavic countries of the Balkans. Neo-Slavism resurrected the idea of an all-Slav cultural and economic cooperation. It emphasized the equality of all Slavic nations and respect for the existing international political order. Neo-Slavism’s political axis was to be based on an agreement between Austria-Hungary and Russia, which should have also served as a barrier against the German *Drang nach Osten*. In Russia, this branch of thought gained support after her defeat in the Far East and the subsequent revolution in 1905. Karel Kramář, a major figure and later chairman of the powerful Young Czech Party, was also the main creator of the neo-Slavic movement in Bohemia. His activities in promoting the “Slavic politics” and his—ultimately unsuccessful—effort to bring Austria-Hungary’s and Russia’s foreign political interests into line made him one of the internationally best known Czech politicians of the time. In 1908, he organized the Slavic Congress in Prague and was elected chairman of the subsequent Slavic Congress held in Sofia in 1910. Although a long-term adherent of the federalization of Austria, Kramář gradually abandoned this idea and worked out a draft constitution of the would-be future Slavic federation in Europe, with

Russia as its leading nation. However, the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908, the Balkan Wars, and the drastic political course of the Tsarist government towards the Poles were major obstacles to the further development of neo-Slavism.

Nevertheless, having strong emotional ties to Russia, Kramář remained faithful to neo-Slavism even after the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution. At the Paris Peace Conference, he was one of the main advocates of anti-Bolshevik intervention and pleaded for the full military engagement of the Czechoslovak legions—which had occupied the Trans-Siberian railroad and were therefore highly appreciated by the Western interventionist politicians—in order to defeat the Reds. He also elaborated a draft of the new Russian constitution and visited General Denikin in the autumn of 1919. In the end, however, his efforts proved to be in vain both internationally and domestically and, in fact, his strong engagement with the Russian revolution and long absence from home cost him the post of Prime Minister. During the 1920s, Kramář turned decisively against the political course of President Masaryk and Foreign Minister Beneš, who was the main creator of the Czechoslovak pro-French foreign policy. Although Beneš did not agree with the French concept of *cordon sanitaire* on the Russian border, he fully supported the Versailles system, in which he saw the only guarantee for an independent Czechoslovakia. Kramář, on the contrary, never relinquished his dream of a new, national, and democratic Russia that would overcome the immense defects of the old Tsarist “absolutist egoism” as well as the excesses of Bolshevism, as he pointed out in his comprehensive book on the “Russian crisis,” published in 1921. Politically, Kramář never ceased to call for an active policy that would eliminate the Bolshevik power and create a new Russia.

The lack of explicit pro-Slavic rhetoric in official Czechoslovak foreign policy did not mean a lack of interest in the Slavic idea and Russian issues. On the contrary, up to 1934, when an international agreement with the Soviet Union was reached, Czechoslovakia and its leading politicians were among the main supporters of the “White” emigration. In academic Czech circles, Slavic studies (*Slavistik*) as an interdisciplinary science flourished at the time. Several important institutions were founded (the Slavic Institute, Slavic Library, the journals *Slavia* and *Byzantinoslavica*, etc.) often with Masaryk’s or Kramář’s personal support, and with significant help from the Russian, Belarusian, and Ukrainian political emigration. The most important journal, (*Slovanský přehled* [Slavic Review], founded in 1898, renewed in 1924), represented the civic democratic conception of the “Slavic Idea.” In a series of articles entitled “Problems of Slavic politics” written by Beneš, the journal

aligned itself with official Czechoslovak foreign policy. In this series, Beneš condemned every effort to resurrect political pan-Slavism. This, in turn, provoked Kramář to defend his own views and "Slavic politics."

"In defense of Slavic politics" exemplifies the conservative liberal variant of the Slavic idea, which combined belief in the intrinsically peaceful and democratic essence of the Slav nations with strong nationalist convictions involving, in Kramář's case, also anti-German and anti-Hungarian sentiments. The focus on Russia as the only possible unifying factor of Slavdom prompted Kramář, despite his democratic and national self-determination rhetoric, to disregard or downplay the claims of the Poles, the Ukrainians or the Belarusians in favor of Russian interests. He refused to use the term "pan-Slavism" as it had acquired negative connotations originating with 19th-century German and Hungarian liberals alien to Slav politics. Kramář pointed out that Beneš's and generally the Republic's stance towards Russia was actually ungrateful, since without Russia and its engagement in the First World War there would not have been an independent Czechoslovakia. Therefore the Czechoslovak state should help Russia, but not the Bolsheviks who, according to Kramář, were successful because of German influence and German money. The Russia he envisaged was united, nationalist, democratic and constitutional. As such, it would also be a natural ally of Czechoslovakia against Germany's and Hungary's "revisionist" claims, and Kramář made it clear that the liberty of the Republic cannot rely just on Western democracies, whose foreign policy might turn out to be rather unstable.

The Czechoslovak state, therefore, should become a "national state," with the Slavic idea as an important part of its official politics. The excerpts of the text presented below consist of two major parts. In the first, Kramář gives an account of the role the Slavic idea played in Czech political thought, which he outlines in contrast to Beneš's views. Kramář also dismisses to some extent Austro-Slavism as the most influential Czech political position in Slavic matters, although he himself had professed it before the First World War. The second part is an analysis of the international position of Czechoslovakia, where Kramář brings forth a geopolitical argument in favor of neo-Slavism.

During the 1930s, it became clear that waiting for a new, non-Bolshevik Russia to emerge was unrealistic. Although Kramář did not forsake his belief in Russia's constitutional and national democratic future, his colleagues in the National Democratic Party renewed the effort to pursue cooperation at least with the non-Russian Slavs. Here again the economic interest in finan-

cial investments in the Balkan Slavic countries played an important role, as the National Democratic Party was the most important representative of Czech financial capital in the 1930s. However, such plans did not have any considerable impact on the foreign policy of the time.

After the Second World War, when traditional right-wing political and cultural streams were eliminated from Czechoslovak political life, conservative neo-Slavism ceased to exist as a political option. Nevertheless, it was Edvard Beneš, together with Czech and Slovak Communists, who not only reverted to the Slavic idea during the war—hoping for the convergence of democratic and socialist ideas—but elevated it to one of the crucial tenets of post-war official state-political doctrine. This time, however, the object of this new left-wing neo-Slavic idea was not the envisaged democratic Russia, but the communist Soviet Union. After the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, Slavic ideas of any provenance were heavily discredited for Czech and Slovak intellectuals and political elites.

MK

In defense of Slavic politics

We always protested against misusing the word pan-Slavism in every attempt, even the most insignificant, to bring the Slavs together, and, in particular, we no longer wanted to work along the same lines as pan-Germanism, which to us meant the violent suppression of our nation and the other Slavs located along the road to the Near East. For us, Slavness (*Slovanství*) never had aggressive aims, even when considering what it entailed politically. For us it was only protection against Germanism and Magyarism and, mainly, the guarantee of European peace.

The Czech conception of Slavness, however, changed with the times and attitudes, and it will perhaps be good thing if I try to define the phases of its development from 1848 onwards more clearly and definitely than Dr Beneš did, who very obviously wants his Slavness to follow on from Havlíček and Palacký. That is rather bold, because Palacký fundamentally changed his attitude to Slavness, and the only reason Havlíček did not do the same is because cruel fate took him from us so early. It cannot be forgotten, after all, that Havlíček and Palacký were very much Austro-Slavs in 1848 (and Havlíček was one even in 1850–1851). [...]

One cannot have the slightest doubt that Havlíček would in any case have changed his views of Austria and Austro-Slavism, as Palacký (whose words, “We existed before Austria and we shall exist after her,” became the basis of

self-confident Czech policy in general and of our Slav policy in particular) changed his views. There had been Austrian-inclined Slavs and there remained some persons, perhaps even among the leading politicians, who very willingly, out of caution, used to refer to Havlíček. But, those who felt and thought as Slavs in our country, they had, with Palacký's slogan, to turn away from Austro-Slavism. "We shall exist after her" could not be anything but faith in Slavdom (*Slovanstvo*), and it was that, too, for anybody who experienced the great Czech disappointment of the 1870s and the Czecho-Slav enthusiasm in the period of the war for the liberation of Bulgaria. With that, Slavness became a very relevant component of Czech political thought, and it was out of the question that anybody in our country would have thought about the break-up of Slavdom into two large and therefore competing camps—the Austrian and the Russian. [...]

The absolute and firm preservation of the character of each Slav nation was and will always be the key principle not only of our Slavness but also of the Slavness of all small Slav nations, which, as I said, does not mean endorsing the separatist endeavors of the Ukrainians, just as it cannot mean endorsing those of our Slovaks. That is the principle Palacký and Rieger adhered to in Moscow, in 1867, and we, too, adhered to it in neo-Slavism (*novoslovanství*). [...]

Dr Beneš expresses pleasure that his "sketched" program of Slav partnership (*slovanské souručenství*) can be adopted without difficulty by every Slav state and nation. [...] And if he gives us as a substitute for our pre-war "mystical leanings" a Slavness inspired by the "philosophy of modern realistic democracy," that is to say, the idea of democracy and *Humanität* (*lidství*), then I must say that for that sort of Slavness he need not have written such a long condemnation of everything that had been here so far, and particularly need not have reproached the old Slavness for a lack of philosophy and sociology. [...]

It is, of course, necessary to look at the whole Slav question from a viewpoint other than that of democracy and *Humanität*. The life of the nation, its future, the freedom and the external and internal independence of its State, and its position among the nations of the world, all that means more than all those beautiful but vague words! And there is a profound dispute in our country over the foundations of our life. The dispute runs deep to the root of our entire existence, to its intellectual foundations—it is not about the criticism of our old Slavness, a criticism that is absolutely distorted, biased and incorrect, but as such it is ultimately Dr Beneš's private affair. The main thing is what the director of our foreign policy wants for the future, what he

orders us to believe and what he forbids us to believe, and whither he wants to lead our nation. What he writes today is not current; it is the policy of our resistance abroad, which was completely reoriented after the Russian Revolution and the rout of the Russian army, so that the national and Slav policy—which the policy of our resistance abroad had to be, perhaps (or most likely) against its will, as long as the Tsar was on the Russian throne—became the so-called “democratic” policy, though it was actually Western and very socialist. [...]

It would be dangerous self-delusion not to admit that the question of Germany was not solved by the peace and the post-war policy of the Allies to provide full security for the future. I do not mean the military restrictions, because to informed people it is clear that Germany will, with its trained organizational talent, be able to circumvent these obstacles; nor do I mean the downright ingenious solution to the question of war reparations, whose solution remains a task for the Allies in the future, and thus caused poor France, which suffered the most, a dreadful financial rout. I mean only what has to do with us, namely the future German threat, which Dr Beneš wishes to avert with democracy or the League of Nations. [...]

We shall certainly not be so ungrateful to anyone as Dr Beneš was to Russia, certainly not to our Western Allies, and we shall not forget that their victory enabled us to have liberty; but we must build our future on firmer foundations than merely their benevolence to us. [...]

For our security, for ensuring our liberty, we need a deeply anchored unity of vital interests, and we can have that only with those who share our interest in Slavdom finally getting a place that belongs to it in the concert of nations, so that Slavs are not always considered inferior, so that they can show the world they can give it something other than formal culture, something of their own, something characteristic of Slavs alone, and so that they can be firmly joined by an organized, prepared defense against the danger of the understandable German desire to be released from the straightjacket of the Versailles Treaty and the decision to cede Upper Silesia to Poland, which bind her! All of that can be provided only by a firmly built political partnership of Slav nations, and if not of all, then at least of those that want to be Slavs and see in Slavdom—even though they are first and above all Russians, Czechs, Slovaks, Serbs, Croats, Bulgarians, or Poles—something higher, which is an opportunity for them to become equal to all other nations. Surely the Russians need this least, owing simply to their numbers, their literature, their art; surely they give Slavdom more than they receive from it; but the moment the whole world knows that the Russian is a Slav, and that Russia is

in a firm political union with the rest of Slavdom, she will naturally have more importance, because nobody will take from the Russians their leading place in Slavdom, which means that their position in European politics will be so important that the world will be forced to take another, quite different look at Russia, as well as the rest of us and all Slavdom.

With his strictly Western-orientated policy, Dr Beneš is not convinced of that, and he therefore wants to limit the Slav partnership, for he cannot completely get rid of it, except in the worst case, that is to say, if democracy failed and Slavdom were threatened. That, however, means everything but the serious securing of the future of the smaller Slav nations, because Russia has had too much unfortunate experience with its own sympathy for threatened Slavs, who are ready in the name of democracy and *Humanität* to deny Russia again when they are well off and nothing else threatens them. The serious Russian cannot agree with such a policy, and Russia will not play the part of the friend in hard times. [...]

But, ultimately, the main question is whether such a partnership is at all possible and whether we are ready for it. It is obvious that one cannot discuss this question without assuming that there will be no more Bolshevik Soviets and that there will be a new, nationalist, Slav Russia. Here we may say that great changes, especially with revolution and Bolshevism, have taken place in the internal life of the Slavs. I am not thinking here of the governments of the individual Slav states—that is obvious. [...]

Although I therefore think that Slavdom must be secured for any future mainly through its unity, and that a Slav partnership would be strong and powerful enough to ensure the internal liberty, external independence and inviolability of the borders of all Slav states, and though I naturally put a great emphasis on closer economic cooperation, particularly the possibility that with our surplus of intellectuals and specialists in production we could help the economic development of the other Slav nations, especially the future Russia, I nevertheless cannot forget that Slavness must give the Slavs something heart-warming and uplifting. In particular, for us as well it is a matter of the meaning and aim of our independent life as a State. We got our independence unexpectedly, and we do not yet have a definite line of development, when the running of our whole intellectual life has been put completely in our hands. With our independence not only did we get the power-politics task of being a strong barrier to historical Teutonic expansionism to the Near East, but we also joined the free nations of the world and thus took on the difficult, responsible task of winning a place for our nation in the world arena, a place worthy of our history, which will, in the history of the

liberation of human thought, always hold a place of honor, because we were the first nation to fight and suffer for freedom of conscience. And here we are faced with the basic question of our whole future: would we better serve our new great tasks by remaining alone, relying on the development of democracy and the interest of the West, or by trying to effect the development of mankind with what we bring of our own to the new life of the Slavs? [...]

We can also be something more than a small, though cultured and economically and socially well-organized nation. We can participate in world history! I do not want to deprecate our position in the League of Nations, but the fate of the world is not decided there, and even if it were, it would always be the Great Powers that decided, not an aggregate of small nations or states overseas. [...] If we, the small Slav nations, are now to have the opportunity to take part everywhere where the fate of nations is really decided, we must be influential members of a great whole, and for us that can only be a united Slavdom. We, the small nations, shall then not be without importance next to the great ones.

And we, our nation, can be a very influential member of a Slav partnership. We were always amongst the foremost intellectual leaders of Slavdom, and there is no question that in our country Slavness penetrated deepest into the spirit of the nation. Moreover, we actually never demanded anything of Slavdom other than an awareness of solidarity, and, when the struggle for freedom came, we, with our seditious work in Austria and our Siberian anabasis, did more for the Allies than is sometimes admitted. Nor in the future will we want anything from Slavdom other than what is most in the interest of all Slavs. Geographically, our position is more than precarious, but for Slavdom and its security our position, as the vanguard of Russia and frontline of Slavdom, is invaluable, not only for South Slavs but also for Russia. It is therefore of vital interest to the other Slavs that we are strong and firm, and we can be that way only when we are secured by a Slav partnership. Nor am I talking about our high-level economic development, owing to which we shall always be a very important factor for Slav economic unification, because the geographic position of our State is, after all, the most important fact for the whole position of Slavdom in world politics. But we do not, on the other hand, desire any territorial expansion of the borders of our State, and that fact by itself has determined the whole of our political thinking. We are not "imperialists," nor shall we ever be, and naturally we bring also this philosophy of ours to Slavdom. For us, the most important thing is that peace should be preserved, and that, too, would be our policy in a Slav partnership. We shall always stand mainly for the internal consolidation, the internal

strengthening of the Slav States, because we consider it not only the most important problem of their future but also an important question for the preservation of world peace. And the democratic make-up of our nation will always be a guarantee that in a Slav partnership we shall be an element of peace, internal work and tolerance among the Slav nations.

All of that not only guarantees us an important place among the Slavs, but also, on account of what we should contribute to Slavdom, we should become a very considerable factor of the foreign policy of Slavdom and thus of all world politics. And it would therefore be possible for us to step out of the narrow framework of possibilities of a small nation and discharge the great duty that fate assigned to us when it placed us in the very heart of Europe. We were an important factor of European politics and European intellectual development once before, and now, free again, we are obliged by this history of ours to be something more than one of the small nations whose place and importance among the large states would depend solely on the development of democracy in the world. [...]

Translated by Derek Paton

PETAR MUTAFCHIEV: TOWARDS THE PHILOSOPHY OF BULGARIAN HISTORY

Title: *Към философията на българската история. Византинизмът в средновековна България* (Towards the philosophy of Bulgarian history. Byzantinism in medieval Bulgaria)

Originally published: *Философски преглед*, 3, 1931/2, pp. 27–36.

Language: Bulgarian

The excerpts used are from Ivan Elenkov and Roumen Daskalov, eds., *Защо сме такива? В търсене на българската културна идентичност* (Sofia: Просвета, 1994), pp. 352–356.

About the author

Petar Mutafchiev [1883, Bozhenci (Gabrovo region) – 1943, Sofia]: historian and essayist. He graduated in history and geography from the University of Sofia in 1910, and specialized in Byzantinology in Munich (1920–1922). After 1927, he taught Byzantine and Eastern European history. Mutafchiev was not only the most prominent Bulgarian medievalist in his day, but also one of the first and most influential authors in the field of Bulgarian philosophy of history. He was one of the paradigmatic conservative thinkers of the 1930s. Mutafchiev was also an influential essayist, often delving into issues of Bulgarian national identity. In his essays, he expressed his ideological and “meta-political” position in a direct and eloquent way. At the very heart of his rhetoric was the theme of the Bulgarian nation’s “second national Revival” (championed by nationalist circles around the *Отец Паисий* [Father Paissy] journal). This theme was also one of the main *topoi* of the official ideology of the Bulgarian state in the period after the 1934 military coup d’état and during the authoritarian personal regime of Tsar Boris III. In 1935, the Ministry of National Education appointed Mutafchiev as Director of the newly founded journal *Просвета* [Enlightenment], the official platform of the Union of Teachers established in the same year. After the 1934 coup, *Просвета* (which was published in more than 25,000 copies, an impressive number at the time) was invested with an ideological mission: to unify the teachers and, more generally, the intellectual elite, around the nationalist agenda endorsed by the new regime. Under Mutafchiev’s direction, *Просвета* succeeded in bringing together leading authors representing a wide spectrum of ideological and epistemological positions (Alexander Burmov, Todor Vlaykov, Mihail Arnaudov, Ivan Duychev), including even left-wing authors like Hristo Radevski. In 1941, Mutafchiev published the article “Nationalism and international cultural partnership,” in which he described nationalism as a modern world-

view and discarded cosmopolitanism. At the same time, apparently frustrated by the ideological pressure on the journal, he published only one more article there before his death in 1943. In the same year, Mutafchiev's fundamental "History of the Bulgarian People" was published under Ivan Duychev's editorship. Mutafchiev's work was marginalized during the first decades of the communist regime. A change occurred during the 1970s, in a period when the communist regime suffered from increasing lack of legitimacy, which resulted in a revival of interest in ancient cultural and historical heritage and national psychology. In 1973, Mutafchiev's selected writings were published in two volumes. In the 1990s, Mutafchiev's work became an important point of reference for both the liberal and the neo-conservative political camps.

Main works: *Изток и Запад в българското средновековие* [East and West in the Bulgarian Middle Ages] (1925); *Българи и румъни в историята на дунавските земи* [Bulgarians and Romanians in the History of the Danubian Lands] (1927); *История на българския народ*. Т. 1–2. [History of the Bulgarian People, vol. 1–2.] (1943); *Книга за българите* [Book on the Bulgarians] (1987).

Context

Mutafchiev occupied a complex position in interwar Bulgaria. On the one hand, he attempted to oppose the radical right, championing the "conservative revolution" ideology by proposing a historical foundation of national specificity, seen as an alternative to the mythical definition of the national essence. On the other hand, he strongly opposed leftist sociological historicism. He shared a nationalist pathos with other authors on the Right, arguing (most forcefully in "Present-day Bulgaria and the spirit of our Revival," 1940) for a new national revival. This was a pressing concern due to Bulgaria's postwar national crisis. Examining the causes of this crisis represents, in fact, the main ideological task of Mutafchiev's scholarly work. "Towards the Philosophy of Bulgarian History" places this national crisis within a long-term historical perspective, where the *crisis* becomes an expression of the historical *essence* and the core of the Bulgarian nation.

The authors close to the "conservative revolution" ideology conventionally explained the national crisis as resulting from the corruptive effects of modernity and Westernization, which had been destroying traditional life-structures and organic community. In these theories, the Middle Ages were described as a heroic, mythical period. Symptomatically, national neo-romantic popular literature became very fashionable during that time: for one, Fani Popova-Mutafova's historical novels created an idealized image of the ancient Bulgarian nobility. In contrast, for Mutafchiev, as one of the leading Bulgarian specialists on the Middle Ages, this is the period where the

origins of the national crisis must be located. A key notion in this interpretation is that of *Byzantinism*. According to Mutaſchiev, the “failure” of the Bulgarian spirit, or of the spirit of the organic community, was the result of a mimetic imitation of Byzantium, especially its political and cultural institutions. This mimetic relationship was unavoidable, because it was the only way to compete with a *universal* empire like the Byzantine and resist assimilation, and in this sense had a *tragic* character. The ambition to make a “cosmos,” in Mutaſchiev’s formulation, out of their kingdom, that is a universal empire, was beyond the powers of the Bulgarian kings. This incapacity was due to the fact that the Bulgarian nation was not a natural descendant of the universal ancient Greek culture and, in consequence, could not express universalist ambitions. As a result, not only were the periods of historical glory in Bulgarian history brief, but the ambition to compete with the Greeks had forced the Bulgarian aristocracy to adopt divergent and incompatible cultural attitudes. Thus a split between the community and its elite emerged, whose consequences reverberated well into the 20th century (in fact, Mutaſchiev claims that there is no other European medieval culture where such a serious rupture between high and popular culture can be observed). The ideological implications of this argument can be interpreted as a critique of the national romantic myths about the “natural” and/or “historical egalitarianism” and “democratism” of the Bulgarians.

Furthermore, this split between the two categories of Bulgarians neutralized the positive effects of Christianization, the most important result of which was the homogenization of, according to the dominant ethnogenetic narrative, the two ethnicities composing the Bulgarian nation: the proto-Bulgarians and the Slavs. Byzantinism replaced the ethnic barriers with new, social ones. In this way, Mutaſchiev provides a genealogical explanation for the thesis about the Bulgarian people’s non-institutional or even anti-institutional organic collective body—a thesis that can also be found in **Botev**’s writings, where he claims that, since the time of their Christianization in the 9th century, the Bulgarians “had been separated by their deep social morality from the corruption of the government” due to its “Byzantinism” (**Hristo Botev**: *The People*) and in **Nayden Sheytanov**’s essays.

This rupture, moreover, is considered responsible for the emergence of a “spirit of negation” characterizing the Bulgarian nation—an inherent penchant for nihilistic resistance against state institutions, religion and social norms, which had led to the emergence and contagious dissemination of various heretical movements (such as Bogomilism) and of asocial tendencies within the Orthodox Church (like hermit seclusion). Priest Bogomil and St.

Ivan Rilski, seen as incarnations of the “Bulgarian soul” by authors like Nikolay Raynov (1889–1954) and Sheytanov, were described by Mutafchiev as negative agents of the national awakening. The disintegration of the powerful medieval Bulgarian state was a direct result of these tendencies, and its fall under the Ottomans represented their natural culmination. It is worth noting that Mutafchiev is perhaps the strongest proponent of the interpretation that attributes the fall of the Bulgarian medieval kingdom to domestic factors only.

The contemporary relevance of Mutafchiev’s conception of Byzantinism can be seen, on the one hand, in its connection to the idea of a “new national revival,” which was at the center of his debate with the left-leaning philosopher, **Dimitar Mihalchev**. Mutafchiev disagreed with the latter’s claims that the period of the Bulgarian Revival was historically and socially predetermined and as such could not be repeated. On the other hand, the implications of Mutafchiev’s theories could be seen in the light of the debate on the national role of Bulgarian intelligentsia. Following the programmatic modernist statement, “Our Intelligentsia,” by the leading literary historian **Boyan Penev**, authors of different orientations such as Konstantin Petkanov (1891–1952), Atanas Iliev (1893–1985), Spiridon Kazandzhiev (1882–1951) and **Ivan Hadzhiyski** took part in this debate. Underlying it was the shared idea that the intelligentsia, as the nation’s new elite, may be in danger of antagonizing the national community, thus reproducing the vicious effect of Byzantinism, leading to yet another division between the aristocracy and the masses.

Mutafchiev’s work was initially marginalized by the communist regime, but in the 1960s and especially in the 1970s it was brought to bear on the revival of the genre of “national psychology.” He was rehabilitated on the occasion of the centenary of his birth in 1983, when several articles dedicated to his work appeared. Among them was a text by the historian Vasil Gyuzelev, who in 1987 edited the unpublished manuscript of Mutafchiev’s “Book on the Bulgarians.” On this occasion, Gyuzelev made an explicit connection between reviving “national psychology” and the re-publication of Mutafchiev’s work.

Towards the philosophy of Bulgarian history

The self-preservation and moreover the development of the Christian Bulgarian state has always been possible—at this time even to a larger extent than before—only as a struggle against Byzantium. In fulfillment of its vital

aspiration to unite the Southeastern part of the Balkan Slavs it was doomed to such struggle by its very geographical location. Although often defeated on the battlefields, *Byzantium had always remained ultimately invincible*: not only by virtue of its abundant material resources but also by virtue of the tested organization of its powers, by virtue of its high culture. To bereave her of the weapons she used against them—and not just for the sake of fixing the structure of their newly Christianized community—Bulgarian political and spiritual leaders were forced to *consciously* borrow from Byzantium everything to which, as they saw it, she owed her supremacy. There had been no other choice and here lies the whole tragedy of Bulgarian history: times of upsurge always started with a heightened self-awareness and spurs towards comprehensive national development, only to turn inevitably into periods of swift denationalization. The mounting rivalry, thence the increased borrowing from Byzantium, diverted our development from its natural routes into *directions that could never create anything durable and strong*. And if, nonetheless, those epochs shone with fast and unexpected achievements, it was because the engrafting of ready-made foreign models *saved the efforts and the slow diligence of gradual and genuine creativity*.

Thus, in exerting itself to catch up in power and resources with Byzantium, blind to the futile dissipation of national energy, *the medieval Bulgarian state was betraying its own self*. This is why its very upsurges already contained the elements of a future fast decay. But the contradiction did not stop here. That which gave the Byzantine state its wondrous resilience was unattainable in medieval Bulgaria—first of all because here it was not grounded in a deep tradition that meant everything in Byzantium. And despite the fact that the coexistence of two neighboring Byzantine empires was impossible, Bulgarian rulers cherished the terrible delusion that with the power of *their people* alone they could take over Byzantium's universal political mission.

It was equally impossible, on the other hand, to transplant onto Bulgarian soil the genuine values of the refined Byzantine culture. It [that culture] had its roots in classical antiquity, while it was precisely the latter's heritage which remained *incomprehensible and unattainable for peoples like ourselves*, who were just experiencing, through Christianity, the stage of true civilization. That is why, by the way, the Bulgarians remained alien to Byzantine theological thinking, which [king] Simeon tried to introduce here. It [Byzantine theology] was not only incapable of fertilizing the national spirit for its true creativity: it was also unsuited to answer the simple questions *muddling the minds of a people cut off from the faith of its ancestors*. For that

reason, the Bulgarians had to seek solutions for their bewilderments and doubts, not in this philosophical-theological literature imported from Byzantium [...], but elsewhere. The ancient pagan beliefs still extant among proto-Bulgarians and Slavs then converged with the simple yet sobering teachings of Eastern sects *to give birth to the world-view of Bogomilism*. Thus against the official religion, preached by a church which again followed the Byzantine model, there arose *a new religion that swept the masses*.

Christianity in Bulgaria was meant to fulfill a great mission: to create the ideological conditions for the complete merging of the two ethnic elements that constituted the Bulgarian people—the proto-Bulgarians and the Slavs. By rushing it, Byzantinism brought out just the opposite results. In place of the old ethnic dualism it created a new *division*—a spiritual one—that was impossible to eradicate as it was fed by a living and ever-active power—Byzantium, which, in its turn, was constantly encountering *the sturdy reaction of popular masses which had preserved the attachment to their past*.

The significance of this *new split* becomes even clearer when one takes into account *causes of social nature*. Along with the conscious transplantation of elements of “spiritual” and “political” Byzantinism, there was an unconscious and spontaneous penchant for Byzantine models. Here already was a manifestation of the *law of imitation* and—as usually happened in such cases—this penchant affected the uppermost, ruling strata of Bulgarian society. After the ruler who, by the bombastic title of “Tsar of Bulgarians and Greeks,” assimilated notions of power and outward attributes associated with the emperors of Constantinople, there probably followed the boyars and the clergymen who didn't want to lag behind their Byzantine counterparts in taste and trends; in their social ambitions too. True, we do not have sufficient and definitive proof in this regard, yet there is no other explanation for the words of presbyter Cosma, a 10th century Bulgarian writer, according to whom the Bulgaria of his time was already undergoing a *severe social crisis*, all too similar to the one experienced in contemporary Byzantium. The difference was that the Bulgarian rulers lacked the wisdom and foresight permeating the social policies of the Byzantine emperors, from Romanos I Lekapenos to Basileus II. Thus *the inverse and dark phenomena of Byzantine life* burst into Bulgaria unaccompanied by the appropriate antidotes.

Therefore, having *severed the continuity of our state and spiritual tradition*, the impact of Byzantinism was also *eroding the inner structure of the one-time homogeneous Bulgarian society, its cohesion, its material basis*. The masses were made to see in their spiritually alienated leaders the representatives or agents of a *hostile destructive power*, and thus rejected them.

And together with them—the state they governed. Thus the latter was deprived of its indispensable inner support and *was bound to collapse under the slightest blow from without*. This explains why degradations came about so *swiftly and unexpectedly* in moments when the state was at the height of its power.

Inner resistance always found its spiritual manifestation in Bogomilism. Originally a teaching called forth to satisfy the religious needs of the people, it very soon and by force of an invincible logic *came to express the principles of a special socio-political outlook*, which at times could even eclipse its religious essence. That is why it became *something more than an ordinary sect*. Having renounced orthodoxy in its dogmatic notions, ritual or organizational forms, it had to renounce its social and political tendencies as well. And since Orthodoxy had thrown in its lot with that of Byzantinism, to which it served both as an ideology and a weapon, the Bogomil movement had to finally take a negative stance against all Byzantine manifestations in the political and social life of medieval Bulgaria and to openly oppose the Byzantinized Bulgarian state. Which does not mean that it was a subversive and anti-social doctrine. Indeed *it only reflected the people's instinct for self-preservation and authenticity*. This is why it was the Bulgarian Bogomils who, depending on the circumstances, stepped forward *sometimes as preachers of defeatism, sometimes as ideological instigators, albeit distant and indirect, of movements of national liberation and state independence*. [...]

Why does Serbian and Russian medieval history present different elements to that of the Bulgarians? Weren't they also developing under the influence of Byzantine culture? Due primarily to the geographical location of their lands, the Byzantine influence among the Serbs and the Russians could not be as direct and strong as it was on the Bulgarians. For them, moreover, political rivalry with Byzantium was never as inevitable and severe as it was for the Bulgarians. As for the Serbs, their natural development was not disrupted before the reign of king Dušan, toward the mid-14th century. And this was precisely why a rapid decay came in immediately after his death. Besides, Dušan's Serbia was nowhere as thoroughly and deeply corroded by Byzantinism as the Bulgaria of Simeon, Petar and Ivan Asen II.

Translated by Zornitsa Dimova-Hristova

NICHIFOR CRAINIC: THE MEANING OF TRADITION

Title: *Sensul tradiției* (The meaning of tradition)

Originally published: In the journal *Gândirea* (1935), re-published in a volume, *Puncte cardinale în haos* (Bucharest: Vremea, 1936).

Language: Romanian.

The present excerpts are from Nichifor Crainic, *Puncte cardinale în haos*, 2nd ed. (Bucharest: Cugetarea, 1940), pp. 95–99, 113, 116–117, 125–126.

About the author

Nichifor Crainic (original name: Ion Dobre) [1889, Vlașca (Muntenia) – 1972, Bucharest]: philosopher, theologian, and poet. His family was of peasant origin. After finishing secondary school in his native village, he studied at the *Seminarul central* [Central Seminary], a theological school in Bucharest. He began publishing poems in 1907. Between 1916 and 1918, he was one of the editors of *Neamul Românesc* [The Romanian people], a nationalist journal edited by the historian **Nicolae Iorga**. In 1919, one of the most important Romanian journals in Austria-Hungary, *Luceafărul* [The Morning Star], moved to Bucharest, and Crainic became its editor. Between 1920 and 1922, he studied in Vienna. Beginning in 1922, he worked as a cultural advisor at the Fundația Culturală “Carol I” [The Cultural Foundation “Carol I”]. In 1926, he became editor-in-chief of *Gândirea* [The Thought], a journal fusing modernist aesthetics and Orthodox traditionalism. The journal was one of the most important intellectual publications in interwar Romania. In many ways, Crainic identified with the political and cultural program of national renewal advocated by *Gândirea*. In addition to his career as a journalist, he was a university professor and a politician. Between 1926 and 1931, he taught at the Faculty of Theology in Chișinău, and between 1932 and 1944 at the Faculty of Theology in Bucharest. In the 1930s, he became one of the leading ideologues of the radical nationalist camp, especially after his program of an “ethnocratic state” was published. Between 1940 and 1941, he was Minister of National Propaganda in the government of Ion Antonescu. After 1944, he was condemned by the new communist regime and hid for a while in Transylvania. In 1947, he was captured and sentenced to prison. After his release, in 1962, he was co-opted by the communist regime and worked as the editor of *Glasul Patriei* [The Fatherland’s voice]. This was a journal written for an exclusively foreign audience, which published a number of prominent “converted” nationalist intellectuals from the interwar period. After 1989, Crainic was recognized as an important author of the Orthodoxist and anti-Europeanist canon and became one of the central figures of the autochthonist and neo-legionary discourse in Romania.

Main works: *Zâmbete în lacrimi* [Smiles in tears] (1916); *Țara de peste veac* [The country over time] (1931); *Puncte cardinale în haos* [The cardinal points of chaos] (1936); *Ortodoxia* [Orthodoxy] (1936); *Nostalgia paradisului* [The nostalgia of Paradise] (1940); *Zile albe—Zile negre* [White days—black days] (1991).

Context

Theories of national character developed during the interwar period aimed at defining the Romanian nation's historical and cultural place in a transforming Europe. While most Romanian intellectuals retained a scholarly admiration for the universities of Western Europe—where they continued to receive education and scholarly recognition—the domination of Western cultural life had given rise to various ethnocentric attitudes, widely expressed in debates about Romanian national specificity and ethnicity. In the name of indigenous originality and cultural autonomy, as opposed to the cosmopolitanism and decadence of Western European culture, a variety of texts were published in Romania during the 1930s, announcing the emergence of a new cultural and nationalist movement.

Some authors, like **Lucian Blaga**, elaborated a form of poetic and aesthetic nationalism, according to which the specific Romanian geography was at the center of a new project of national revival, based on indigenous values and religious morality. Others, like Nichifor Crainic, promoted a radical ethnic discourse, which biologized the Romanian national community. The nation's racial body and soul, and the ways they shaped the ethnic community, depended on a wide range of factors, including a particular racial origin and a specific national topography. Crainic assumed that the new Romania would be a country of enlightened peasants and uncorrupt politicians. Due to the fact that Romania was a predominantly agrarian country, it was not surprising that traditionalists like Crainic advocated the creation of an organic Romanian community, completely integrated within its own natural space.

This fusion of conservative thinking and autochthonism was by no means exclusively rooted in Romania's historical past. For Crainic, a glorious past was important in validating claims of social unity and sacrifice, but the national revolution he envisaged was not about composing lyrical odes extolling the achievements of ruling princes of old. In particular, and taking into account the diverse currents of anthropological and racial interpretations characterizing interwar Romania, Crainic's radical Orthodoxism, inspired to a large extent by his encounter with Russian Slavophile and Orthodox philosophical thought, should not be seen exclusively in terms of an atavistic

revolt against modernity. Rather, its overtly cultic form of politics was the expression of a quest for an alternative *nomos*, a new form of social and political modernity adapted to the unique conditions of Greater Romania that—if realized—would have created its own totalitarian state.

During the 1930s, Nichifor Crainic's diagnosis of Romanian culture and politics promoted a form of nationalism that was both biological and cultural. Moreover, Crainic's poetic and theological formation and longstanding friendship with Blaga were instrumental in determining his aesthetic and cultural allegiances. As the moving force behind *Gândirea*, one of the most prominent traditionalist publications in interwar Romania, Crainic exerted much of his influence through his journalistic essays. He did not write many books. For example, his most-cited work, "The cardinal points of chaos" (1936), is in fact a collection of essays.

As a leading representative of Romanian traditionalism during the interwar period, Crainic defined the Romanian essence as Eastern and, especially, as Orthodox. Romanians, he maintained, were qualitatively different from Western Europeans and should build a new society based upon their innate spiritual strengths, rejecting Western liberalism and modernity. The principal repository of these spiritual qualities was the peasantry, which Crainic described as thoroughly religious. Alongside Eastern Orthodoxy, the other marker of the Romanian national identity was tradition. The new Romania was thus imagined as a space of ethnic and spiritual transformation. Medieval Romanian history was also apotheosized, and with it the racial basis of the envisioned political transformation of the country. As the present text shows, he also sought to offer a reinterpretation of more recent intellectual traditions, seeking to distinguish between the "historical romanticism" of the national revival period, whose pro-Western stance he considered partly justified, and the modern trends of his own age, which he fiercely condemned as inorganic and superficial. Behind Crainic's arguments there is also a polemic against the competing intellectual sub-cultures fusing modernism and traditionalism, such as the "young generation" grouped around the philosopher, **Nae Ionescu**. It was their "cult of experience" that he dismissingly labeled "intellectual reporterism." While eventually most prominent members of this generation, such as Mircea Eliade, Emil Cioran, or Constantin Noica, also opted for the extreme right, in the mid-1930s they represented a competing orientation with a more ambiguous stance towards Orthodoxy and a more engaging relationship with Western intellectual models.

In contrast to the other cultural theories seeking to redefine Romanian identity, Crainic added greater dynamism to his philosophical and poetical

diatribes against Western modernity by using a religious language. He imagined a “resurrected” Romania, able to create a new culture amidst the decadence fostered by parliamentary democracy and liberalism. Accordingly, any definition of the national essence other than the one Crainic and his supporters suggested was deemed “intellectualist,” “cosmopolitan,” “Europeanist” and estranged from the “true” Romanian spirit. His objective was a total transformation of Romanian culture and politics, through imposing Orthodoxy on literature, science, law, and, finally, the state, which Crainic envisioned as an “ethnocracy”—a mixture of cultural racism, socio-economic corporatism and ethnic protectionism.

Crainic insisted that the specific Romanian contemplative style was not suited to modern rationality and that, therefore, Western modernity was totally alien to the Romanian peasant. Not surprisingly, his pro-oriental position made him a partisan of those theories of origin that considered Romanians as the direct descendants of Dacians. He thus rejected Romantic connections with Latinity. Finally, and like many other traditionalist writers, Crainic argued that Romanians had a historical mission in the East. In this sense, his political discourse also had a regionalist implication, aiming at the cooperation of Balkan Orthodox nations, which during the Second World War he inserted into the broader German geopolitical framework of the totalitarian “New Europe.”

Upon his release from prison, Crainic collaborated with the communist regime, but his interwar nationalist texts only became known to the general public after 1989. His poems were also reedited. It is also during the last two decades that his contributions to interwar debates on society and culture have received the critical attention they deserve. As with other interwar authors, many of his fundamentalist ideas were appropriated by various nationalist and Orthodoxist movements emerging in the post-communist period.

MT

The meaning of tradition

There is a distinction between our Europeanized romantics of the last century and today’s Europeanized “intellectualists” that must be explained. The romantics discovered the Romanian people in light of new European ideas. It is true that they prescribed it political and social treatments according to the West’s cookbook, but in culture, romanticism sent them to the local sources and taught them how to become autochthonous. Historical romanticism

guided them toward our ancestors; poetical romanticism toward folklore. Europeanizing the social-political order, they were autochthonizing the literary creations. Today's "intellectualists" re-edit in the mental sphere yesterday's Francomania. They are "intellectuals" to the extent that they are Francomaniacs; they are Europeanized in direct opposition to autochthonism. The romantics championed the people and the national legend; the "intellectualists" deny the people and justify their assimilation of the French culture with the Latinist legend. What they call Europeanism is barely Frenchism; what they call intellectualism and rationalism is barely an adjustment to a certain trend in French culture and, at the same time, abdication of autochthonism. They give in to the prestige of French seductive powers and think of themselves as riders on the planets of the universe when they deny the autochthonous and the Orthodox ideas. [...] In the survey that they carried out lately, one could read the answers that they had offered, such as: "A new spirituality? Is this not somehow pretentious? Tell me first if there was an old spirituality, a spiritual nobleness of the Romanian people, since the time of its awakening from darkness! Consequently, as there had not been an old spirituality, likewise, there has been no possibility for a new spirituality to emerge. Though there is a "moment of awakening from darkness," this people would only be able to live a physical life, any possibility of spiritual life is *a priori* denied to them. And if, nevertheless, there are spiritual directions, these directions must be rejected as dangerous to intellectuality; "the excess of traditionalist, nationalist and orthodox directions constitute a stab at the liberty and the intellectual education of today's generation" [...]. And then, between "intellectualists" who want to "perfect" themselves and the "imperfect" people there is a gap! Supposing that the people is not defined, "our enemy is indefinite and the big thirst is for knowledge." Knowledge of what? Could knowledge define the unknown? But this would force you to look inquisitively upon the realities of this people and explain their significance with directions [and] guidelines. Our "intellectualists" refuse this toil and this dignity. A fundamental flaw of this category of scholars is the laziness to think properly in relation to the realities we experience. They performed a lamentable show on the day they had decreed "national atheism," and none of them was able to demonstrate this light-minded statement. Comfort is the familiar principle of "intellectualists," not only in relation with Romanian realities, which they can summarize in a couple of words, but also in relation to the West. The big thirst is for knowledge, they say, but to know for them is to store things that are already known by others who are more advanced than we are. "We march toward Europe," says someone. "This is my belief. We head toward the West

of the Greek-Latin renaissance, which is our continent's major claim to glory." His very words are commonplace, learnt by heart from French *feuilletons*. From this thirst for knowledge, that is to repeat what is known and written in the West, a typical phenomenon was born from our journalism: intellectual reportage. The "intellectualist" movement is, in fact, an ideological reportage, conceited in appearance but modest in reality. From the philosophy journal to the newspaper column, there is the same news coverage from abroad, written more or less academically, depending on the promoting institution. The Romanian intellectual is an intellectual reporter. The prestige of the West seduced him to such an extent that he mechanically imitates things from all over the world, in the illusion of an original production of the Western brand. [...] Prey to a seducing prestige, the Danube-bred "intellectualists" have never wondered about what they add to the glory of our continent. By what means did they acquire the right to call themselves ideal citizens of the continent? And what does this continent think of its enthusiastic reporters from the banks of the Dâmbovița?¹ They fool themselves with the misty illusion of Westernism, and brag of the deeds they have done—for the continent!—namely the negation of their own people. But this negation is also their own negation, and thus the intellectual reporters turn into annex-intellectuals of the West which, oh!, does not even acknowledge their existence! [...] Along the lines of the autochthonous tradition, *Gândirea* is the inheritor of *Sămănătorul*.² Two main ideas are to be remembered from the *sămănătorist* movement: historicity and folklore. The animating genius of the movement had prescribed it a precise, unquestionable goal: the political unity of all Romanians. This was the epoch's seminal slogan. To accomplish this goal, it was necessary to believe in national energy. Hence the glorification of the past in history, poetry and novels; the glorification of the people [...] in poetry and short stories. [...] The peasantist orientation of *Sămănătorul* was an exaltation of anonymous heroism, which was necessary to blow life into the army of the future war. [...]

Here is a series of facts that define the character of our history and of our historical culture, and which cannot be clarified without the strong presence of Orthodoxy in the Romanian soul. For the one who sets out to write the philosophy of our history, Orthodoxy will be the key to understanding this history. In this nation, which has never waged offensive war to conquer other

¹ The river crossing Bucharest.

² The main ethno-populist journal of the turn of the century, edited by **Nicolae Iorga**.

nations, but only wars to defend the ethnic and religious patrimony, the Orthodox religious conscience has always dominated. Enter any church and contemplate the wall at the back which bears the founders: princes, boyars, merchants and peasants, with their families, painted in the perfect ecstatic apparel of piety, offering to the invisible Lord, on their palms, the ark of faith. They built the establishment with their toil, but their pious faces are painted only next to the entrance, after the last painted saint—this because of their sins and out of respect for the consecrated hierarchy of the Church. Their gesture is the gesture of giving, the generous nature of the entire people which had given what was best in them—soul and land—to the Great Church of the East. Are these people possessed by tellurian instincts, as our modern literature sees them, or are they atheists, as they are mocked by the Europeanized intellectuals? [...]

The theological rule of tradition is valid everywhere, always and for all. This is the rule of the universal truth of the Spirit. The ethnic, permanent and living tradition, within the limits of autochthony, is freed and spiritualized, once absorbed by the power of the Church's eternal tradition. The Church is the universal community founded on the connection between faith, hope and love of all believers and, at the same time, the eternal community of the dead and of those who will be born—under the sign of Christ's resurrection. Based on the same faith, on the same hope and on the same love, the national community is found in a transfigured version in the community of the Church. Its local and temporal order is transposed in the eternal universal order. What deep insights does the cult of the ancestors gain through the cult of the saints, the cult of national solidarity through the cult of Christian love, faith in our vitality through faith in resurrection and in immortality, the sense of culture through the spiritualist sense of the cult! If the Church is—as it indeed is—indubitably connected to the people, our creative autochthony, based on the vivid truths of the people, includes the possibility of transfiguration and spiritualization. For directions to our future we must not look randomly, they are given—like fragments of the infinite—in the intra-historical substance of our tradition. Therefore, the method of our art and culture cannot be renouncing our people, which the nihilistic youth preaches, but Christian love, through which we will reach the understanding of the people's mysterious depths.

Translated by Mária Kovács

ÖMER LÜTFİ BARKAN: THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE PEASANT CLASS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

Title: *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda çiftçi sınıfların hukuki statüsü* (The legal status of the peasant class in the Ottoman Empire)

Originally published: In installments in the journal *Ülkü*, vol. 9. no. 49 (March, 1937), 33–48; no. 50 (April, 1937), pp. 101–116; no. 53 (July, 1937), pp. 329–341. In vol. 10: no. 56 (October, 1937), pp. 147–159; no. 58 (December, 1937), pp. 293–302; no. 59 (January, 1938), pp. 414–422.

Language: Turkish

The excerpts used are from Ömer Lütfi Barkan, *Türkiye'de toprak meselesi: Toplu eserler I* (Istanbul: Gözlem Yayınları, 1980), pp. 725–788.

About the author

Ömer Lütfi Barkan [1905, Edirne – 1979, Istanbul]: one of the most prominent Ottomanist scholars of Republican Turkey. After getting a certificate from the Edirne Teachers' School, he started working as a primary school teacher. In 1924, he enrolled in the Faculty of Letters of Istanbul University (the *Darülfünun*), graduating from the Department of Philosophy in 1927. Later, he received a state scholarship to study at Strasbourg University, where he received teaching certificates in philosophy, sociology, and psychology, while also obtaining a diploma from the Faculty of Law. After his return to Turkey in 1931, he worked as a philosophy teacher at Eskişehir High School. Following the higher education reform of 1933, when a number of promising teachers from secondary education were incorporated into the academic establishment, Barkan was hired as an associate professor of history at the newly founded Institute of the History of the Turkish Revolution at Istanbul University. The Institute would come to serve as a seedbed for the nationalist, official historiography that would serve the statist and authoritarian policies of the Republican regime. Here, Barkan embarked on his life-long pursuit of exploring the Ottoman state archives, and started publishing his seminal essays on the Ottoman land tenure system, price and population movements, and the status of the peasants. As an economic historian, he made ample use of French methodology, particularly that of the *Annales* school, in order to examine the Ottoman economy in global context. In 1937, he was promoted to the Chair of Economic History and Economic Geography at the Faculty of Economics. In 1941, he began teaching Turkish Legal History at the Faculty of Law, and in 1950, he founded the Institute for Turkish Economic History, where he served as director until his retirement in 1973. Barkan first formulated his ideas on Ottoman history in the 1930s, and by the 1950s became a major intellectual figure in Turkey.

He was also a pioneer in utilizing state archives for the study of Ottoman social and economic history. Although he never wrote a major book that attempted to present a more comprehensive and synthetic approach to Ottoman history, Barkan published many sourcebooks as well as a wealth of articles that relied mainly on the analytical reading of archival documents. Barkan's Rankean archivism, and his state-centered, idealizing and particularistic approach to the Ottoman past was essential in shaping generations of Ottomanist scholars who represented and sustained the nationalist-conformist mainstream in Turkish historiography.

Main works: *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda kuruluş devrinin toprak meseleleri* [The question of land during the foundation of the Ottoman Empire] (1939); *Kolonizatör Türk dervişleri* [Colonizing Turkish dervishes] (1942); *İstanbul vakıfları tahrir defteri* [The register of Istanbul pious foundations] (1970); *Süleymaniye Camii ve imareti inşaatı* [The construction of the Süleymaniye Mosque and soup kitchen] (1972); *Türkiye'de toprak meselesi: Toplu eserler I* [The question of land in Turkey: Collected works I] (1980).

Context

The 1930s, between the Great Depression and the onset of the Second World War, during which the Turkish state remained neutral, contributed to the consolidation of an autarkist program administered with increasing severity by the authoritarian single party regime. In line with the rise of authoritarianism in Europe, the single party pursued a heavily statist and isolationist policy backed by a strongly corporatist political and cultural agenda. Turkey's growing political and economic isolation, coupled with the rigid nationalist inclinations of the new nation-state, contributed to the rise of conformist and highly particularizing tendencies within an academic environment that had limited contacts with the international scholarly community.

In historiography, the all-encompassing presence of the state and its growing insularity fostered increasingly homogeneous and reductivist visions of the national past, prompting more state-centered and self-celebratory approaches to Turkish and Ottoman history. This transformation curtailed the relative polyphony of the late Ottoman and early Republican historical establishment, which had been characterized by an array of approaches ranging from the autochthonism of the official "History Thesis" (see **Afet İnan**, *Prolegomena to an outline of Turkish history*) to Fuad Köprülü's (1890–1966) interdisciplinary and long-term inquiry into the question of Turkish identity. Crude and naïve as they may have been at times, the historians of the early Republican period endeavored to extend and diversify the temporal and geographical boundaries of their inquiry into the past. Driven by a secularist urge to maintain a critical distance from the recent Ottoman past, they sought to

trace a separate and multi-faceted trajectory for the national history of the Turks. The period that followed, on the other hand, was marked by a rising pro-Ottoman sentiment informed by the paternalistic and state-centered aspirations of the authoritarian Republic. The rigid statism of the single party regime was extrapolated backwards into the Ottoman past, and the centralized Ottoman state of the 16th century was recast as an idealized mirror-image of the patriarchal Kemalist Republic. Hence, the “classical age” of Ottoman history was glorified as a golden age of power and impeccable social harmony, which was thought to be facilitated by the unique organizational powers of an omnipotent state.

Ömer Lütfi Barkan’s works played a prominent role in setting up the paradigmatic image of the Ottoman state as an unparalleled historical entity, exalted for its exemplary virtues and superior capacity to maintain social justice and freedom. Immersed in the meticulous documentation of the Ottoman archives, Barkan, in truly Rankean fashion, fully identified with the official viewpoint of the Ottoman state, thus helping establish a new and enduring form of orthodoxy in Turkish historiography that was firmly indexed to the visions and interests of the statist regime. Barkan’s approach to history was marked by an austere reductive form of historicism geared towards confirming the ineffable singularity of the Ottoman system. For him, the Ottoman success story was made possible by a unique and elaborate state mechanism that had to be analyzed only in its own special terms. Barkan’s overly particularizing methodology promoted a supra-historical and almost sanctified vision of the Ottoman Empire. He dismissed any possibility of maintaining a critical distance from the object of research, or of situating it within a universal comparative framework.

The selected text is the first major example from a series of articles on Ottoman history published by Barkan in *Ülkü*, the official journal of the Republican People’s Party. Published at a time of intense public debate about an imminent and ultimately unaccomplished land reform in Turkey, Barkan sets out to explore, with recourse to abundant archival references, the Ottoman peasant’s mode of existence within a state organism ruled by a privileged military class. He emphatically warns his readers against the dangers of assessing the Ottoman system according to contemporary categories of freedom, justice, or class conflict. The assertive militarism of the state was, for him, a necessity in an empire that had to exist under the constant threat of destructive enemies. While the military class fulfilled the arduous task of protecting the empire from the incursion of the “inordinately more primitive regime of the infidel,” the peasants, in accordance with the “wide-ranging

division of labor within the empire,” contributed to the sustenance of the military elite in the form of taxes. Barkan’s statist reconstruction of history thus renders the relationship between the ruler and the ruled in the Ottoman context as a unique form of social contract administered by an omnipresent state. This was a system of perfect solidarity and organic coexistence, within which every member and every activity was directed towards the single objective of serving the state. The state, in turn, secured the freedom of the inhabitants of the empire, all of whom, in Barkan’s model, could be considered as “employees” of the extensive state mechanism.

The professed “freedom” of the peasant class in the Ottoman context formed the basis of Barkan’s convoluted theory about the “non-feudal” nature of Ottoman society, which was to become a lasting trope within his oeuvre. For him, serfdom, a primitive and inhuman condition, was an utterly inappropriate category for discussing the status of a class whose rights and resources were safeguarded by a just and egalitarian system. As a diligent archivist with a flair for historicism, Barkan was quite perceptive with regard to the regional and temporal changes that contributed to the transformation of the Ottoman system. Yet he argued that the perfect Ottoman symbiosis between state and society, enhanced by all these shifts and adjustments, was ultimately corrupted and destroyed by unassailable extraneous forces. The Ottoman world, a sheltered Arcadia of immaculate harmony and solidarity, was ultimately the result of the peripheralization of the Mediterranean within a changing global economy dominated by the West.

Well-suited to the defensive propensities of the Cold War era, Barkan’s state-centered formulation of the Ottoman past, as well as his empirical, archive-oriented methodology, continued to dominate mainstream Turkish historiography for decades to come. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, advocates of the “Asiatic Mode of Production” theory in Turkey tapped into the Barkanian corpus for confirmatory evidence. His glorifying vision of the Ottoman past was gradually incorporated into the “national history” format propagated in the educational system. After the 1970s, under the impact of right-wing conservatism, Barkan’s more secularist image of the Ottoman order, with minimal emphasis on the social and political role of religion, was reconciled with a broader vision of Islamic history. The strong particularism remained, but was now inflected with notions of a unique Turkish-Islamic cultural “synthesis” that was thought to constitute the essential ingredient of Ottoman success.

The legal status of the peasant class in the Ottoman Empire

The investigation of Ottoman laws and regulations pertaining to the land tilled by the peasant offers a fascinating and untapped area of study, in that it demonstrates the legal milieu within which the social and economic factors informing the agrarian conditions affecting the Turkish peasant today evolved in history. Let us consider issues as vital as the organization of social and economic life through the agency of the state, the estimation of different classes' share from the social income, and finally, the implementation of the state's land policy. Surely, the significance and effectiveness of the laws that we aim to publish here, pertaining to taxes and the specifics of the ownership and use of land, are nowhere so worthy of attention as in the case of the [Ottoman] imperial order.

There, we observe how the willpower of a colossal and omnipotent state, tempered in the fire of the political values and turmoil that it spawned, could manipulate all sorts of economic, social, and demographic forces in order to create its unique form of order and harmony. Under the initiative of such a state, we witness the presence of a mobile army organized for great battles and invasions, and as the whole empire functioned as a single body during the long centuries of its existence, we observe that even the most ordinary matters, such as the fixing of prices, or the balance of levels of production and consumption, were maintained with orders issued from the center; that the prices of leather in Kayseri and alum in Diyarbakır were specified with royal decrees in order to enforce price limits on predetermined shoe types in Istanbul; that the customs of Egypt, Moldavia and Wallachia were opened or closed in accordance with the demands of the Istanbul grain market. In delineating the role played by the power and will of a reformist state in the legal regulation of all aspects of life in a country, and to contribute to the study of the science of state (*statologie*) that investigates the power and capacity of states, it is beyond doubt that the Ottoman Empire offers a remarkable area of research. Furthermore, we can also add that concerning the exceptional forms of land regime, land ownership and inheritance, all of which were derived from the special circumstances and everyday necessities of the Ottoman domain, the empire displays particularities that are also of interest to the sciences of agrarian politics and social economy.

No doubt, and this we should reiterate, there is no reason to believe that the laws in question, in all their detail, emerged from the minds of the lawmakers or from the personal will of the sultan; accordingly, we will demonstrate how these laws were formulated gradually through a systematic con-

firmation and classification of various measures which were conceived in order to modify, in accordance with changing conditions and circumstances, living traditions that were rooted in each land in the form of local customs and conventions. [...]

Before further elaborating on the subject, we would like to draw the attention of the reader to a few issues of method, since he will be inclined to apply his own value judgments with regard to the mentality and proclivities particular to the state order called the Ottoman Empire.

It is commonly recognized that in terms of its social body and organization, the Empire displayed an absolutely military character. That is, because it based its *raison d'être*, the protection and maintenance of its life, firmly upon the force of arms, it founded all of its organizations and institutions in accordance with the conditions and objectives of war, just like a constantly mobilized army. Therefore, the peasantry and the productive classes engaged in non-martial activities were made subservient to the state and to other clans and powers that collaborated with the state in matters of war. This order, which appears overly militaristic, and yet was acceptable for its time and in accord with the *raison d'être* of the state, necessarily led to a state mechanism comprising two main classes: 1) the military class, which conducted warfare, ruled, and administered; and 2) The *reaya*, or flocks of people outside the military class. [...]

When measured against contemporary standards and advanced conceptions of the state, the Empire, [...] even during times when it appeared to have established its own ideal order, might seem like a great apparatus of exploitation and parasitism which preferred the order and rule of people over that of objects, and which derived welfare and affluence not from the exploitation of nature with a technical mind, but from a mentality of conquest and a sheer desire to reign over its subjects. Whatever the role of such a state mechanism or of its collaborators (such as the military class, or institutions such as religion, the *madrasas*, and dervish lodges) in maintaining the peace and security necessary for the development of economy and civilization in such a wide geography of global scale, when today's standards of justice are applied, it would be impossible to argue that [the Ottoman Empire] demonstrated a form of class harmony operating on notions of justice and fairness.

We, however, must make an effort here to understand the [Ottoman] order in objective terms, taking into account the economic and political necessities of the times, and refrain from searching here and there for forms of class conflict and exploitation in accordance with certain socialist conceptions. This was an age when the requirements of internal and external security deter-

mined all kinds of economic and social activity, and against the infidel organization which represented a terrible and destructive force of oppression for the peasant classes, the Empire's men of the sword were engaged in constant warfare, protecting the land from the incursion of the infidels' inordinately more primitive regime. It was entirely natural, we might say, that in return for the fulfillment of such demanding military obligations, the military class partook of the peasant's produce in the form of tax in kind, for this was a milieu that lacked a developed form of monetary economy. Furthermore, as we shall see later, it would be incorrect to assess the relation between the peasant and the *sipahi* (lord) with concepts culled from western medieval feudalism, thus assuming a condition of personal subjection and serfdom between those who possessed and disposed of the land and those who tilled it. [...]

We should reiterate here that, despite the heavy duties they had to fulfill in accordance with the wide-ranging division of labor within the empire, it is impossible to view the [Ottoman peasantry] as a pariah class, or as a shameful horde of subjects that enjoyed no legal privileges.

In fact, this empire displays a strange and extraordinary existence of its own, and seems to carry its own purposes. Within this order, everyone and every object is mobilized for a single purpose, and that purpose is the state itself—both the instrument and the ultimate goal of the regime [...]. For this purpose, which lies beyond social classes and racial categories, members of all classes perform as employees that are obliged to serve the state.

Translated by Ahmet Ersoy and Funda Soysal

LADISLAV HANUS: SLOVAK STATEHOOD

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About the author

Ladislav Hanus [1907, Liptovský Mikuláš (*Hun.* Liptószentmiklós) – 1994, Ružomberok]: philosopher, priest, translator, and historian of culture. He studied at the theological faculty in Spišská Kapitula (*Hun.* Szepeshely, *Ger.* Zipser Kapitol) and later in Innsbruck. In 1932 and 1934, he received doctoral degrees in philosophy and theology respectively. He served as a priest in the parishes of Spišské Vlachy, Spišská Nová Ves, Ružomberok, and Kežmarok. In 1938, he was named professor at the Theological College (*Vysoká škola bohoslovecká*) in Prešov and then Vice-Rector and Rector of the Seminary at Spišská Kapitula, where he spent the years of the Second World War. He was persecuted during the communist rule in Czechoslovakia, and imprisoned between 1952 and 1965. Beginning in 1965, he worked as a stoker in Bratislava. After 1968, he was allowed to return as a priest to the parishes of Kvačany and Hybe. At the end of his life, in 1994, he was awarded an honorary title of papal prelate for his life-long service to the Church. Hanus also served as editor of several important journals, such as *Kultúra* (Culture, 1941–1944), *Obroda* (Renewal, 1943–1944) and *Verbum* (1946–1948). He is considered one of the founders of “culturology” in Slovakia, with a special interest in the philosophical and anthropological aspects of culture. During the communist period, he became one of the main authorities on Slovak Christian dissidence and a major representative of the conservative Christian tradition in Slovak social theory and philosophy. As such, his legacy is kept in high regard in today’s Slovakia by a civic organization and a scholarship bearing his name, aimed at educating Christian Democratic political leaders.

Main works: *Rozhl'adenie* [Looking around] (1943); *Rozprava o kultúrnosti* [Discourse on culturedness] (1943); *Všeobecné kresťanstvo* [Universal Christianity] (1944); *Romano Guardini. Mysliteľ a pedagóg storočia* [Romano Guardini. The thinker and educator of the century] (1993); *Kostol ako symbol* [The Church as a symbol] (1995); *Človek a kultúra* [The human being and culture] (1995); *Princípy pluralizmu* [Principles of pluralism] (1997); *Pokonštantínska cirkev* [The post-Constantinian Church] (2000); *O culture a kultúrnosti* [On culture and culturedness] (2003); *Pamäti svedka storočia* [Memories of a witness of the century] (2006).

Context

In the interwar period, Slovak intelligentsia was divided along several cultural and ideological lines. On the one hand, there was the liberally oriented intelligentsia, influenced by **Tomáš G. Masaryk** and his Slovak followers (the so-called *Hlasists*), who connected Slovak national emancipation with the project of Czechoslovak statehood, the liberal democratic state and modernist culture. On the other hand, the Christian, traditionalist, and conservative intelligentsia refused the liberal and secular idea of the nation. These authors stressed the fundamentally different character of Slovaks and Czechs and preferred a more or less explicit autonomist political stance. The most influential philosophical stream of this latter camp was neo-Thomism, which made its first inroads among Slovak Roman-Catholic intellectuals at the beginning of the 20th century and found its widest acceptance during the war-time Slovak state.

With the establishment of the independent Slovak state in March 1939, some prominent neo-Thomist thinkers (M. Chladný-Hanoš, L. Hanus, L. Zachar) took part in the effort to create a state doctrine. The central element was the drafting of a new national program that would replace the idea of Czechoslovakism along with its conception of a liberal democratic political order. The central pillar of the new ideology should have been a synthesis of Christianity and nationalism. Its proponents stressed the importance and functions of national collectivity—represented by a dominant political party and the authoritarian head of state—and criticized liberal individualism, consumerism and cultural relativism. These neo-Thomist ideologues all welcomed the existence of a Christian, predominantly Roman-Catholic Slovak state. In contrast to the more radical conceptions influenced in one way or another by National Socialism, such as those of **Jozef Tiso** or **Štefan Polakovič**, however, many neo-Thomists rejected Nazi racism and defended Catholic universalism, perceiving Slovak nationalism to be compatible with it.

Ladislav Hanus was an outstanding representative of this current of ideas, who in his theological-philosophical project of a specific Slovak culture (*kultúrnosť*) was inspired especially by Jacques Maritain's and Romano Guardini's Christian personalism and humanism. For Hanus, culture played a central role in elevating human beings, and thus was the fundamental precondition for the essentially specific mode of human existence. It is only through culture—the impersonal and objective result of human activity that outlasts its creator—that the individual recognizes him/herself as a human being. Hanus understood culture and nation primarily in spiritual terms. The

cultured individual was anchored in Spirit and all his/her relations were in fact spiritual. In the philosophical conception of the individual, Hanus was drawing on Maritain's idea of integral Christian humanism, whose basis is the "Incarnate Word" as the ideal of human sublimity and a reminder of the human being as an image of God. It was this philosophical background that informed Hanus' attempt to formulate his Christian nationalist idea of a Slovak state that would, on the one hand, reflect the existing historical and political circumstances of a particular nation, while satisfying the needs of Catholic universalism, on the other. This was to be accomplished in the people's state (*ľudový štát*), a national state directed primarily at spiritual endeavors and fostered by the people (*ľud*). The people was, for Hanus, the carrier of an original life, a reservoir of emotions, creative consciousness and inspiration. In spite of the clear reference to the German *Volksstaat*, and his stress on the racial components of Slovak national individuality, Hanus developed the idea of the people's state in conscious opposition to and rejection of the *Blut und Boden* principles of Nazism and its Slovak proponents, even though he surely was not explicit about it in his war-time writing. He was thus closer to the Austrian "National Catholic" intellectuals of the 1930s, who also rejected the "pagan" German National Socialism but sought to create a state ideology fusing social Catholicism, ethnic protectionism and corporatism.

For obvious reasons, Hanus' formulation of the Slovak state doctrine was tolerated but did not enjoy significant political support during the Second World War. Despite the increasing marginalization of neo-Thomism and religious thought in general after 1945, and despite his own long incarceration during the communist period, Hanus continued to develop the philosophical foundations of the concept of culture, Christian humanism and universalism. It was only after 1989 that his work and thought began to draw greater attention from the Slovak intellectual and cultural community.

MK

Slovak statehood

From among various concepts of state it is the people's state (*ľudový štát*) that comes to the foreground at the present time. It stands in opposition both to the capitalist state, the aim of which is exclusively economic; such a state is the guardian of economic goals and its imperialist expansion too is harnessed for economic profit; and to the socialist state, which desires to be the sole proprietor, agent, and educator. The people's state is, in its main fea-

tures, identical to the Christian state: both perceive society as *societas perfecta*, the perfect society, the aim of which is the worldly well-being of citizens, *bonum commune*. Both recognize the basic rights of the individual to life, freedom and property, spiritual as well as material. The individual, after all, is the object of all communal efforts. The interest of the individual has to conform to the interests of the community, yet this too is to his benefit. These two concepts of state also agree on a very substantial point: they both recognize nation as the most natural and stable, even if not exclusive, state-building principle. It is the ideal they wish for, when and if possible.

[...] Scholasticism portrays individual distinctiveness as the indescribable secret, *ineffable*, yet this applies all the more to the distinctiveness of the people, to the infinite diversity and complexity of forces and agents. The distinctiveness of the people arises like a celestial body from the cosmic nebula. A centripetal force attracts all homogeneous elements and particles into one body. The life of the community usually takes place in the depths under the surface. Each step in the process of community-building has its appropriate time. Inner forces control its gestation and maturity. Once it breaks through to the surface, it cannot be stopped. It will find its way at all cost. The movement is twofold: inner, to establish control and exhaust all its potential; and eccentric, to capture space and soil for its substance. The people's community gravitates, controlled by its inner laws of existence, toward statehood, which it perceives as the ultimate expression of its maturity. Different from previous static ideas of state, or we could say the Moloch state, to which almost divine attributes were ascribed, and which was to be preserved at all costs, even at the cost of violating the natural rights of its constituents, the popular principle (*ľudovost'*) introduces a dynamic element to state conceptions. The state is not an end, an independent form, but only a means, expressing the distinctiveness of the people; it is a tool of their will and existence. Nations live through their states, not the other way around. A people's state returns to the (political) state its natural substance and mission. Community and state will finally be united in one living organism.

The Slovak state is a classic fulfillment of the people's state. The difference between nation and state was created in the mind of our community during the long struggle to define its distinctiveness, during which it should have fallen prey to the imperialist beast. Tensions and controversies helped to cultivate a precise sense of the people, not only in rational perception, but also in sensibility, blood, and general awareness. If a state is to have meaning for a Slovak, it has to be a mere vessel, the content of which is the pure Slovak essence, a form whose only function is to protect and cultivate the entity

which was and is the Slovak nation. This way, every Slovak can and does have the same passionate relationship towards his state as he has towards his nation. Both elements belong to his inner world. Both are alive in genuine understanding, permeating his spiritual horizon. Not only is it his home, the space he lives in, but also the paradigm of his existence.

The foundation of this state is the Slovak community. In the mosaic of sciences describing nation, people, and race, we have to develop a concept befitting the Slovak perception of the nation. We can speak of the Slovak race, for it has its typical and distinctive biological attributes. We have physical features and characteristics determined by our soil, food, atmosphere, and lifestyle. But blood, its composition, is only the most inferior material substance. Blood in itself contains no character, nor does it possess the power to unite and create. It is subject to physical laws and decay. The Slovak concept of the nation is, for the most part, spiritual. The nation creates and develops a spirit, from the most inferior biological functions to the highest religious endeavors. The spirit bestows life; the body cannot do anything. It is the spirit that grants a specific character and nature to the body. The life-giving power of the spirit, which is only one, from the lowliest to the highest function, awakens the nation, creates its awareness, fosters its development and unity. The spirit creates history and tradition, the bridge between generations, so that the nation is perceived throughout the ages as a single unit, as a living personality encompassing past ages and present times. The spirit creates culture, moral and religious values. It is the source of conscience and heroism, of transcending narrow personal ambitions, and of the capacity to make sacrifices for the whole. Spirituality, a visceral tendency towards an almost religious perception of life, is the fundamental moving force of the Slovak man, community, and all of our traditions. This does not mean extreme spiritualism, estrangement and detachment from life. The roots of our community go deep into the reality of soil and time. Yet these two components, body and mind, earth and heaven, culture and the toil for daily bread, are in balance. Nothing is more foreign to this nation than a low, instinctive, material understanding of itself and its destiny.

The Slovak understanding of the nation is a Christian one. The folk is a natural form, just like a man and his family. The nation is also a source of the Slovak relationship with the metaphysical. Faith supplements and balances the hateful principle of race. It protects and preserves the substantial, i.e., divine view of man, created in the image of God, who is a subject of salvation and seeks to perceive Him. The Slovak concept perceives nations as particularities, which in their own ways, via their talents and powers, are to ful-

fill their natural and transcendental mission. Above natural differences between nations and races there is a higher unity of mankind and a transcendental community, the Church. Its mission and necessity lies in balancing the opposite poles of individuals and communities, which sometimes tend to create an absolute gap between them and are threatened by the effacement of some basic human and religious concepts.

The Slovak state is a fact, and without it the existence of the Slovak nation would be unfathomable. In the short time of its existence, it has grown strong in reality. But even if it is the ultimate form of Slovak existence, a sort of a conclusion of a long process, it still is not the ultimate fulfillment, but a beginning, bestowing the most difficult task on current and future generations. The Slovak nation is yet to prove its ability to preserve and administer a state. Its mission is to refute the frequently heard declarations denying this ability to the Slavic tribes. Only negative, selfish and subversive attributes are ascribed to them: the ego as the focus of all their interests, the inability to obey, unless trampled by the iron boot of an outside power, indifference to common goals, fickleness, lack of steadfast devotion to sustain the initial growth, lack of concentration on the main target, unintelligent choice of methods, inconsistency in implementing one's own resolutions, lack of discipline in matters small and great, unreliability, dominance of instinct over reason. Slavic nations, as state building agents, are viewed with contempt because of many of these real or imaginary characteristics. A centrifugal instinct, particularization, revolt against unity, no matter how hard-won, are also often ascribed to them. These features are a heavy burden on the Slavic past. Due to them, a state may be more of a pretext for ultimate disruption and decay than an opportunity for its essence to blossom. (On the other hand, a great ability to build and protect the achieved goals is often attributed to the Romanic and German races). To step over this menacing shadow, to overcome age-long traditions, a great effort of collective will, as well as the rich heritage of natural talents, will be needed. The most important attributes are those transmitted through family, blood and spirit, not those imitative of the others. The latter have no connection to the native soil. The Slovak people began its statehood with better conditions than most of the other Slavic tribes. Its central position between the East and the West, with two sets of cultural and religious influences, helped to consolidate positive qualities. In the Slovak community, national and moral traditions have nourished the creative talents necessary for state construction: obedience, service to natural and divine laws, harmony between instinct and reason, balance between the opposing forces of spirit and nature, a sense of conscience and responsibility,

devotion to principles and finally, great steadfastness and diligence. These are the preconditions of every success and progress. [...]

The aim of the people's state is to secure, cultivate and enable the most extensive development of the national community. The term itself points to its first and foremost task: racial, i.e., national, policy. In the Slovak state, this is an especially urgent, almost burning, issue. This state has to, before solving other problems, complete the process of unification of the Slovak nation. Here too we see two crucial directions: to concentrate and integrate all elements into one whole, so that the Slovak nation can finally be united with all its members in its own state and make the great Slovak experience come true in the space we have inherited. Natural gravity pulls all diverse groups dispersed around the world into its state-frame. Yet immediately after this state was founded, fatal blows were delivered. Even those parts previously belonging to the whole were carved away. To complete this spontaneous effort, yet another obstacle has to be cleared. National policy must concentrate on a pressing issue first: to perfect the inner unification of the Slovak community. This process is far from completion. Regardless of the long strides it has taken since the beginning of the last century, regardless of the completion of the main structure in recent post-war years, only a general framework has been created, and the gaps are still wide. This process must capture with equal intensity not only all the regions of central, western and eastern Slovakia, but also all the parts and tiers of the nation. We must not abandon any element, estate, generation or class to passivity or indifference. A spontaneous convergence has to capture everybody, to affect the innermost being of all people, to mould them into a passionate national body so that all will take part in the communal circulation, in the tremendous endeavor of will and spirit. Should it fail, a choice must be made and a possibility of eviction from the body of the state contemplated. If the Slovak national agenda has been guilty of anything, it was more of excessive moderation, leniency and even confusion than radicalism. The present situation, the instinct of self-preservation and protection as well as the natural character of the national state, call for greater consistency. This has to be the first concern of Slovak statehood, not personal political ambitions, various peripheral, and often private, projects. This is what the executive organs have to focus on. We need to give the Slovak national idea great human and spiritual substance, so that it becomes a natural and cherished property for everyone. For generations, its most important part has been called the fight "for our Slovak language." This program had time enough to develop and mature. Now it includes a wealth of Slovak issues: economic security, development and enrichment, cultural uni-

fication and advancement, cultivation of national ideals, so that a new form of communal life, more fair and noble, would arise through common efforts.

Translated into concrete actions, it is necessary to spread the national idea among all layers, common people and intelligentsia, workers and peasants. Not only peasants, but all elements have to act as its strong organic carriers, as the cornerstones of national will. The efforts to win over all the intelligentsia to participate in the inner life of the community are far from satisfactory. This stratum is a most diverse patchwork of directions, trends and opinions. It swerves, attracted by different influences, which are often half-real and exist only in the imagination of our daydreaming romantics. Slovakia's spiritual atmosphere has not been strong enough to attract these elements, or at least to make an impression on them. Yes, we can rely in part on the psychological impact of the state itself, on the untamed stream of real life, which does not tolerate idle observation; still, targeted re-education is needed. Then there are the crowds of Slovak workers, brought up, for the most part, in a foreign environment, fascinated by strange and raw international ideologies. To win them over, to change their inner convictions and to incorporate them into the Slovak body and its bloodstream, is a different and a very difficult task. In Europe, this stratum has pulled away from the national tradition. For much too long it has been influenced by subversive slogans. The temptation that took shape in the neighboring empire is too close, and it won't be easy to win the workers for the national program. This was and is the most difficult problem of all European states. This is the most volatile and explosive part of the body politic. [...].

The people's state is not the result of instinctive efforts only, but, above all, is the result of an idea, granting a deeper meaning and mission, permeating its attitude to everyday reality. To find this idea in itself, to extract it from the present and history, from the spirit of its tradition, is a sovereign right and duty of such a state. Yet all has to be in accordance with the prevailing ideological directions, which helped to create it.

The Slovak state has to realize that it has arisen and exists on the fault line of times, orders, world-visions. The renaissance of mankind is enacted in the background of tumultuous and galloping political events, of an elemental onslaught of opposing sides and ultimate struggles for victory. Superficial events are rooted in existential depths. That's where they are to be followed, that's how they are to be explained. This is a more final breakthrough than the last war, described by Masaryk as a "world revolution." The inner and ultimate meaning of that onslaught is being revealed only now, in this war: it is the fundamental reconstruction of the world, man, state and society. It is

the shift from an individual to a communal, organic world order. On the other pole, there are the last promontories of the so-called individualistic stance, which raised its voice as early as the end of the medieval age through the destruction of the social order and the religious, philosophical, artistic, and social authority in general. The face of all the following centuries was determined by this stance. The individual separates himself from the community. It is a resistance of freedom against any limitations. This can lead only to isolation and failure in all fields. An individualist stance is accompanied by many crises, culminating in the last years of this century. Its results everywhere are impotence and confusion. Even the former Czechoslovak Republic was a product of the liberal attitude. Its existence started with a general attack against inherited national and religious values. Its laws upheld freedom against familial, academic, moral and even state authority. Truth, as a matter of principle, was on the side of the child, not the parent; on the side of the student, not the teacher; citizen, not the law. Such irresponsible organization could lead only to inner destruction. It seems as if the Czechoslovak Republic was governed by self-destructive instincts, as if it was intent on destroying everything as soon as possible. After such a catastrophe of the past, we see, in every direction, a return to order and authority. The creative, foundational, constructive and preserving power of order is now recognized, together with its real meaning: to balance opposing forces, to unite and keep them together in a solid framework, is to enable the best performance. This does not suppress freedom. The main prerogative of man as a creature endowed with reason is preserved, but freedom's destructive and, if unchecked, even demonic powers, demonstrated by ages of experience, are neutralized. Freedom, yes, but only as much as *bonum commune* allows. That is the limit. Such a limit never causes any harm but, on the contrary, is always beneficial. A perfect social order is characterized by freedom balanced by duty, rights with obligations. Such limits are not to stifle the stream of life, just to direct its flow into the required riverbed. Too much emphasis on any of these elements leads to disaster. The balance is lost; potentials remain unfulfilled, chaos results. Today's turning point, the bonding of the individual to the community, stems from Europe's life experience. It's rooted in the existential depths of the present. The resulting statehood is not only outer, mechanical discipline, but discipline stemming from inner order. To renew this inner order, *ordo*, in the metaphysical sense too, is the mission for the present age. Ever since the beginning, *ordo* has been the ideal of Christian social doctrine. For centuries, the Church has tried to implement it into every existential sphere of society. Thus it had to be in strong opposition to the previously dominant individual-

ist stance. Still, it welcomes any philosophy and program helping to renew the organic whole of the European family. The present teaches us that to reach this goal, a movement with a political program was needed, and, above all, with a leading personality. Personality is the central value of the new order. This personality, however, is incorporated into the body of society [...].

The organic incorporation of all these elements and each individual into the great national organism, in which each is attributed a suitable function, creates trust in the success of the whole. Here we mean the existential trust in the meaning and proper organization of communal life. Trust is the spontaneous fruit of order. It is accompanied by balance, serenity and peacefulness of life. It creates a framework, an atmosphere for intimate worlds, inner deeds, for the creation of homes. This is how we imagine national life. Tension, controversies and fights belong to the laws of life, and yet are to be reduced to the smallest extent possible. Instead of useless fretting, we should concentrate on substantial matters. The inner order of the Slovak state is consolidating: our household has a leader. The noble efforts of the head of the state, the reliable activities of the whole state organization, deserve everyone's trust. A positive attitude and inner integration into the Slovak statehood are to be expressed through trust, active and existential.

Translated by Pavol Lukáč

MANIFESTO OF THE SLOVENIAN NATIONAL DEFENSE CORPS

Title: “Slovenec sem...tako je mati djala,” (I am a Slovene ... so my mother told me)

Originally published: *Tolminski glas* (winter 1944 / spring 1945)

Language: Slovene

The excerpts used are from the original publication.

Context

The collaboration with the Axis occupation forces in Slovenia is a complex issue. Its roots can be traced back to the radicalization of Slovenian conservative and right-wing political Catholicism in the decade prior to the outbreak of the Second World War. The clergy had an important role in the formation of the first counter-guerrilla units in the summer of 1942. These were soon identified by the Italian occupation authorities as potential allies in the fight against the Communist-led partisan insurgence and reorganized as a Voluntary Anti-Communist Militia (*Milizia Volontaria Anticomunista*, MVAC) under Italian military command. Catholic integralist groups, dating back to the early 1930s, assumed key positions within this formation, which existed until the Italian armistice of September 1943 and which became an important political and military opponent of the partisan movement, with strong roots in Slovenian society.

Initially, Slovenian collaborationism was restricted to the Italian-administered areas. After the Axis invasion and dismemberment of Yugoslavia in April 1941, Germans occupied and *de facto* annexed northern Slovenia (the provinces of Styria and Upper Carniola) to the Third Reich, while the southern parts (Lower Carniola and the Slovenian capital Ljubljana) were annexed to Italy under the name Province of Ljubljana (*Provincia di Lubiana*).

German occupation policies followed similar principles and aims as in other areas in East Central Europe directly incorporated in the Third Reich (especially Lower Silesia and Posen in Poland). A ruthless persecution of the local

population was carried out in an attempt to erase all signs of Slovenian identity. All Slovenian associations were dissolved and the use of the Slovenian language was only permitted in a distorted, Germanized form and limited to official communications aimed at the local population. The Province of Ljubljana, on the other hand, was granted a relatively wide cultural autonomy and a *sui generis* administrative status within the Italian kingdom. Furthermore, tens of thousands of refugees from the German zone found asylum under Italian tutelage.

These circumstances led the conservative political elite to accept the Italian occupation as a lesser evil, and to engage in a policy of accommodation with the new authorities, while at the same time maintaining contact with the Yugoslav government in exile. With the rise of the pro-Communist resistance, this “tactical collaboration,” as it was later dubbed by the postwar political emigration, shifted towards an active participation in the fight against the anti-Fascist resistance by summer 1942. The collaboration with the Italians was not motivated by a pro-Fascist attitude; rather, it was justified by a radical anti-Communist rhetoric, similar to other militant conservative Catholic movements (for example in **Tiso’s** Slovakia or Franco’s Spain).

After the German troops moved into the Province of Ljubljana following the Italian armistice in September 1943, they opted for a similar strategy as the Italians before them: they kept and, in certain aspects, expanded the administrative and cultural autonomy of the province, and engaged the local anti-Communist forces in the fight against the partisans. The Slovene Home Guard (*Slovensko domobranstvo*), established in autumn 1943 by disbanded units of the Anti-Communist Militia, was the immediate result of this cooperation. The compromise between local conservative forces and the Nazis was reflected at the level of organization: for the Germans, the Home Guard was an auxiliary police force, with special units trained in counter-insurgency tactics, while the Slovene anti-communist groups treated it as a military extension of their underground political activity. The Germans, aware of this, tried to keep these units under constant military supervision, while at the same time promoting those considered loyal to the Nazi cause in the propaganda departments.

This led to two quite different discourses. On the one hand, there was the conservative anti-Communist discourse, not dissimilar to the one employed by the Pétain regime in France; it incorporated a depoliticized interpretation of the Slovene patriotic and ethno-nationalist tradition, purged of its anti-German elements, with some symbolic references to the Habsburg past, and frequent, albeit vague, references to a wider Slavic solidarity. A second discourse, closer to the Fascist and Nazi models, had a virulent anti-Semitic

component and an emphasis on the notion of “New Europe.” It was imposed through official propaganda, sponsored by the pro-Nazi circle around the former Yugoslav general Leon (Lev) Rupnik, installed as President of the Province of Ljubljana by the German authorities.

By the late 1943, the quite successful model of the Slovene Home Guard was exported to the Slovene-inhabited areas of the formerly Italian *Venezia Giulia* (Julian March) region, occupied by the Germans in late autumn 1943, after the crushing of a popular uprising there, following the Italian armistice. Here, the Germans tried to exploit the anti-Italian sentiments of the local population, as well as the positive collective memory of the Habsburg Empire. Nevertheless, the rapid growth of the Yugoslav partisan resistance in the region limited the impact of the German strategy. Furthermore, the local Slovene Catholic lower clergy, which had been the main pillar of the anti-Fascist opposition in the region since the 1920s, was generally very reluctant to collaborate with the Germans, and in some cases used its influence to prevent the formation of collaborationist administrations. It was also difficult for the Germans to find allies among the upper clergy, which had been completely Italianized by the mid-1930s and remained faithful to the very traditional Italian patriotic sentiment—monarchist and committed to the irredentist tradition—that the Nazis tried to undermine.

Nevertheless, by late 1943 some members of the conservative minority within the former Slovene anti-Fascist underground opposition, alarmed by the prospect of a Communist revolution under the guise of anti-German resistance, proposed that the Slovene Home Guard should extend its presence to the Julian March region as well. The Germans, who had already decided to create some sort of anti-guerilla units by recruiting the local population, eventually opted to establish a separate militia, composed by volunteers, named the Slovene National Defense Corps (Slovene: *Slovenski narodni varnostni zbor*, German: *Slowerische Nationales Schutzkorps*) (SNVZ). This new entity, although officially under the authority of the SS and the Police Leader in Trieste, was organically linked to the Slovene Home Guard in the Province of Ljubljana, from which it received its initial propaganda material and most of its commanding cadre. This connection was also reflected in the name: unofficially, the SNVZ was known as the Littoral Home Guard (*Primorsko domobranstvo*). Different from the Slovene Home Guard, which was controlled by a pro-Nazi leadership, the SNVZ's command was politically linked to moderate conservative groups and was also hostile to radical Catholic integralists.

By exploiting the divergences among the Nazi commanders, coupled with the precarious situation of the German forces, the SNVZ managed to attain a

higher degree of autonomy in the sphere of propaganda. Its organization, with loosely coordinated and static local units, was frequently stationed in remote mountainous areas, thus avoiding close German supervision. The limitation of German censorship was another element that enabled the SNVZ to develop its own political discourse, which was characterized by anti-Communism, anti-Fascism and the rejection of the Italian state, conservative Catholicism, and a universalistic ethno-cultural nationalism. In contrast to the official propaganda of the Slovene Home Guard, the SNVZ's publications rarely vilified the Western Allies; the most surprising feature, however, was the almost complete lack of anti-Semitism.

The present text was published in one of the last issues of the journal *Tolminski glas* (The Voice of Tolmin), between July 1944 and April 1945. At the time, the Alpine town of Tolmin in the upper Soča (Isonzo) Valley was part of the German-occupied Northern Adriatic region. The journal served as the official herald of the local unit of the Slovene National Defense Corps.

The Declaration reveals many of the specific features of the national discourse shared by mainstream Slovenian political Catholicism and the more radical integral Catholic groups. The title is a quote from a popular 19th-century patriotic song. The text stresses the individuality of the Slovene nation based on ethno-linguistic arguments. Its genealogical understanding of nationhood contains a clear reference to the common origin of all nations, which can be understood as an implicit assertion of universalism. Its preoccupation with Slovene individuality, defended by stressing the level of the nation's cultural development, was a frequent feature in most contemporary Slovene national discourses.

What is particularly conspicuous in this synthesized account of Slovene ethnogenesis is the lack of any reference to Slavdom. Although the idea of South Slav solidarity could rarely make it through the German censorship, more generally Slavic references were quite often introduced in Slovene collaborationist propaganda. The fact that it was completely omitted from this text shows that it was probably written by a younger member of one of the integralist Catholic groups, who promoted a type of Slovene identity that focused on Slovene specificity and stressed the cultural-geographical allegiance to a Germanic "Central Europe" at the expense of the traditional framework of Slavic ethno-linguistic solidarity, prevalent since the late Enlightenment period.

Other features, such as the polemic against the Communist internationalism of the partisan resistance (the "Liberation Front"), are in line with the general discourse of Slovene collaborationism. The text also attempts to keep alive the essence of the traditionalist vision of Slovene national discourse,

one rooted in the 19th century National Revival as an alternative to the Socialist patriotism of the resistance movement. The innovative features are a stronger emphasis on culture and history rather than race, and an emphasis on language as the specific marker of identity. As such, the text can be seen as an example of the type of national discourse that would prevail among the Slovene émigré communities during the postwar period.

Since SNVZ was active exclusively in areas outside the borders of pre-war Yugoslavia (and many of them had never been Yugoslav citizens), its members avoided repatriation to Yugoslavia, therefore escaping the fate of thousands of other Slovene and Yugoslav collaborationists killed by the Communist authorities after their return. Their rate of survival was thus one of the highest of all collaborationist militias on Yugoslav territory. (The unit which issued the present manifesto, however, was captured by the partisans during its retreat in 1945, and all members were executed.) As a consequence, the SNVZ played a significant role in the Slovene anti-Communist emigration, disproportionate to their numeric importance during the war. Some of them remained in the Italian border region (Gorizia and Trieste), where their presence was felt in the cultural life of the Slovene Catholic community. Others emigrated to Great Britain and Argentina. Among them was the neo-Thomist philosopher Milan (Emilio) Komar (1921–2006), the most important thinker of postwar Slovenian emigration. During the war, he also edited, as a civilian, one of the journals of the SNVZ. He may have been the author of the present text, although there is no conclusive evidence to support this claim.

LLG

“I am a Slovene ... so my mother told me”

Millennia have already passed since the times when the European nations lived a common life in their original homeland. Back then, all of them were comprised in one unit with a common language and shared the same aspirations. But soon separate groups tore themselves away from this original nation [*pranarod*] and went further on to new places to live their own lives.

Our ancestors also went searching for their homeland at that time. They advanced into desolate, untitled places, going into the valleys of our rivers Soča, Sava, and Drava, establishing themselves in the foothills of the high Alps and Karawanken, conquering the Karst and reaching the sky blue Adriatic. And with their diligent hands they created a field out of forests and barren lands, built cottages and gave us a homeland, which is full of beauties and songs.

This land of ours, this Slovene soil is imbued by the sweat of our fathers, imbued by the precious blood of our heroes, who through millennia have defended their home and their native soil. And these sons of a Slovene mother were united by the same ideals, rankled by the same pains, their hearts being cheered up by the same delight. The nation on this soil has spoken—ever since having settled here—the same language. Common soil, our property for one thousand and five hundred years already, the same language, entirely different from other languages, the same historical past, the equal striving after a bright future, the same blood: this is the Slovene nation and no one should annihilate this truth.

Throughout its history, the Slovene nation has proven its strength, its entitlement and its mission. It erected an honorable monument for itself among other great nations. Its cultural achievement stands without shame next to the cultures of other nations; our beautiful books are our wealth—which is being transmitted to all European languages—our deep artistic painting wanders into the world and others are also admiring its beauty. We Slovenes must be proud of our University and Academy of Sciences, our highest cultural institutions—in the same way as other nations are proud of their own. And all that we have, all of it was not given to us naturally by history—we won it through work and struggle.

Sons of the Slovene nation may be proud of their nation; they do not need to be ashamed of it. Hence they will also never deny their own name, never forget their language, never sacrifice their national ideals to other ideals! Precisely this should distinguish them from those who have subjected themselves to Communism, joining the a-national, international and antinational organization, known as the “Liberation Front,” thus helping to instigate a revolution that only strives for world domination under the leadership of Asiatic proletarians.

But not us! For us, the first concern should be our nation, we must first of all be Slovenes, and only then something else. Only then we will be the true sons of our small nation. Sons who love their nation immensely but lead it through hardships, with a strong faith in a bright future; sons who are themselves guardians of the nation’s present and makers of its life.

Slovene I am, [and] Slovene I want to remain!

Translated by Oskar Mulej

IDEOLOGICAL DECLARATION OF THE GREAT POLAND CAMP

Title: *Deklaracja ideowa Obozu Wielkiej Polski* (Ideological declaration of the Great Poland Camp)

Originally published: In Roman Dmowski, *Pisma* (Częstochowa: Antoni Gmachowski, 1939), vol. 10, pp. 95–97.

Language: Polish

The excerpts used are from Wojciech Wrzesiński, Krzysztof Kawalec, Leonard Smółka, Włodzimierz Suleja, eds., *Polska w latach 1918–1939. Wybór tekstów źródłowych do nauczania historii* (Warsaw: Wydawnictwa Szkolne i Pedagogiczne, 1986), pp. 204–206.

Context

One of the characteristic features of early 20th-century Polish nationalism was its legalism. The so-called “national democrats” may have been radical nationalists and chauvinists, but they made use of various liberties in the three parts of partitioned Poland to make their way into municipal as well as central authorities and parliaments. In the first years of independence, the “national democrats” formed the core of several coalitions. In contrast, the predominantly leftist sympathizers of **Józef Piłsudski** critically commented upon the shortcomings of Polish democracy. In the mid-1920s, under the influence of authoritarian movements in Europe (above all Italy) and, ultimately, after the successful inauguration of the semi-dictatorial rule of Piłsudski in 1926, some of the nationalists, the main ideologue **Roman Dmowski** included, redefined their political program.

The establishment of the Great Poland Camp was directly influenced by two main factors. First, Dmowski, impressed by the growth of totalitarian and authoritarian movements across Europe, re-formulated his nationalist ideology, giving it a new image. He was dissatisfied with the parliamentary system as well as with the situation in his own political camp, and moderate politicians, like Stanisław Grabski (1871–1949), gradually marginalized him. Dmowski’s new idea was to build an anti-democratic, semi-fascist nationalist

structure attuned to the new wave of authoritarianism in Europe that would be able to take over the state power. That should have been the role of the Great Poland Camp.

The second factor contributing to the establishment of the new organization was Józef Piłsudski's *coup d'état*, which took place in May 1926. Before he gained power, Piłsudski launched an anti-parliamentary campaign, pointing at the selfishness, corruption and low intellectual level of the Polish democratic representation. It was directed against the National Democrats as well, whose own reflections eventually followed the same path. Dmowski, although always hostile to Piłsudski, did share his disappointment with the parliamentary system, and thus did not defend democracy against *sanacja* (the authoritarian state reform announced by Piłsudski after the coup). On the contrary, he was the first to use the new political climate to switch over to extra-parliamentary politics. In contrast to the authoritarian but ideologically rather conventional *sanacja*, the Great Poland Camp was intended to abolish, not only control, the democratic political system. In 1928, the *sanacja* managed to create its own organization—*Bezpartyjny Blok Współpracy z Rządem* (Non-party Block for Co-operation with the Government)—which in the following years proved to suffer from all the illnesses of parliamentary politics.

Although the Great Poland Camp was not very active, in 1933 the police disbanded it on grounds of public security. Its remaining parts, divided into several small and semi-conspiratorial organizations, spurred a Polish version of totalitarian ideology, and finally some of them, notwithstanding the feud between Piłsudski and Dmowski, found their way into the ruling group.

Although Dmowski was not the only OWP leader (he shared the leadership with Aleksander Dębski, Stanisław Haller, Tadeusz Kobylański, and Jerzy Zdziechowski), he was definitely the most active and original Polish nationalist politician during the 1930s. The text quoted below presents a Dmowski different from the author of the "Thoughts of a modern Pole." Here he seeks to lay out the foundations of a nationalist state made of one nation, one culture and one Catholic religion. His shift from nationalism to totalitarianism remained, however, an unfulfilled political agenda, for his adherents never gained power.

During the Second World War, Polish extreme nationalists, as well as other political groupings, formed underground armed forces. In 1943, most of them were incorporated into the Home Army (*Armia Krajowa*); yet the most radical parts of them remained independent. Along with creating military units that fought in the first line against Soviet Russia and the Polish communist movement, the extreme nationalists formed the structures of an

underground state (the “organization” referred to in their earlier political writings) parallel to that of the Polish underground state controlled by the exile government in London. Those underground activities were brutally interrupted by Soviet and Polish communists after 1945. However, certain extreme nationalist groups found their way into the communist camp, creating a “legitimate” Catholic movement around Bolesław Piasecki and the PAX organization.

MG

**Ideological declaration of the Great Poland Camp,
Poznań, 4 December 1926**

1. The Great Poland Camp is an organization uniting the nation’s enlightened powers, whose task is to nurture the capacity of this nation to control its matters, and guide it into becoming, literally speaking, the master of its fate.
2. The aim of this nation, as our organization sees it, is to become a grand nation in both domestic and foreign affairs. A grand nation is that which holds in great esteem its religion, its culture, and its state. Thus, the Great Poland Camp’s actions are aimed at fostering in the Polish people the attitude of respect—which they could then demand from other nations—for their religion, for Polish culture and the Polish State.
3. The religion of the Polish nation, Roman Catholicism, ought to be perceived as the dominant religion of the country, closely affiliated with the state, influencing social life and laying foundations for the education of future generations. Acting within the limits of the constitutionally granted freedom of conscience, an organized nation should never tolerate attacks on its religious faith, when, for whatever purpose, this religion is brought under the hammer, or when it becomes the target of organized actions aimed at bringing decay upon the nation’s religious life.
4. The grandeur of Polish culture, if it is to become a culture of a grand nation, should find its reflection in:
 - 1) respect and affection for the past and for the Polish tradition; pride in being Polish
 - 2) a profound sense of obligation towards the homeland; the responsibility of every citizen for the actions defined by his social function
 - 3) obedience to and understanding of hierarchy, both at work and on the battlefield, because without obedience and a sense of one’s place a nation is like a numb, motionless body

- 4) good manners and moral discipline which obligates citizens to hold in respect the nation's morality
 - 5) manufacturing of rigorous public opinion, whose pressure prevents all acts that inflict political, moral, and material damage upon the nation
 - 6) a rich and highly developed spiritual life in all spheres of activity
 - 7) high economic productivity; hard and well-organized labor which sustains citizens and grants the nation's power
 - 8) bravery of its citizens; their courageous battling against everything that disintegrates, weakens or humiliates the nation.
5. The state of a great nation must be organized so as to be capable of:
- 1) demanding respect and recognition from foreigners; protecting itself and its citizens against humiliation and economic exploitation
 - 2) ensuring justice to all citizens; protecting them from any harm and damage; ensuring security of their life and possessions, peace and freedom of labor; finally, guarding the citizens, especially the young, against depravity
 - 3) observing the law which is the foundation of the state and its social life; obliging all citizens to abide by the legal regulations, allowing no offence to remain unpunished
 - 4) commanding respect for itself and its institutions, beginning with the government and its departments, which must conduct their duties properly and fulfill their declared commitments, and ending with individual citizens
 - 5) being ready to suppress immediately all instances of anarchy, and to guard the country's affairs and dignity outside its borders
6. The above regulations constitute the ideological program of the Great Poland Camp and will be discussed in detail in publications and organizational instructions.

Translated by Zuzanna Ładyga

JANKO JANEV: THE SPIRIT OF THE NATION

Title: *Духът на нацията* (The spirit of the nation)

Originally published: In *Отец Паусий*, 1933, 1, pp. 8–10.

Language: Bulgarian

The excerpts used are from Ivan Elenkov, Roumen Daskalov, eds., *Защо сме такива? В търсене на българската културна идентичност* (Sofia: Просвета, 1994), pp. 342–344.

About the author

Janko Janev [1900, Peshtera (Southern Bulgaria) – 1945, Dresden]: philosopher and essayist. He graduated from a gymnasium in Plovdiv. In 1919, he went to Germany with the intention to study dramaturgy, but he studied philosophy and history instead. In Leipzig, he studied with Ernst Bergmann and Johannes Volkelt, in Freiburg im Breisgau with Edmund Husserl and Joseph Geyser. He defended his doctoral thesis on Henri Bergson's metaphysics under the leading Neo-Kantian philosopher, Heinrich Rickert, in 1924. After his return to Bulgaria, he worked as a librarian at the University of Sofia. In this period he published “Antichrist” (1926) and two books on Hegel. For a short period he became the director of the cultural department of the Ministry of National Education. After 1934 he lived in Germany, where he taught Bulgarian cultural history at the University of Berlin. He died during the bombardment of Dresden in February 1945. Janev was one of the most important right-wing philosophers in interwar Bulgaria. His first essays, published in important cultural periodicals of the period, including *Златороз* [Golden Horn], *Хиперион* [Hyperion] (the journal of the symbolist circle led by Teodor Trayanov [1882–1945] and Ivan Radoslavov [1880–1969]) and *Стрелец* [Sagittarius] (one of the leading post-symbolist cultural magazines) reflected the pathos of neo-romantic individualism. His intellectual maturity came about under the decisive influences of Hegel and Nietzsche, as well as that of the ideologist of Bulgarian modernism, **Dimo Kyorchev** (Janev wrote an important text on him and published the first volumes of his works [see **Dimo Kyorchev**: *Our sorrows*]). The second period of his activity, which began in the early 1930s, was related to a shift of interest from individual to collective destiny. In this period he published mostly in right-wing magazines like *Обществено развитие* [Social development] and *Прянорец* [Banner]. He also published a number of books in German on the Balkans. His last books were explicitly connected with, although not representative of, the mainstream of National Socialist geopolitical and philosophical ideas. Marginalized in his own time and during the second half of the 20th century, Janev's writings attracted a new audience in the 1990s,

especially following some new interpretations of his work (in particular by Ivan Elenkov, *Родно и дясно* [Native and right-wing], 1998) and the re-edition of some of his texts.

Main works: *Антихрист* [Antichrist] (1926); *Върху ирационалното в историята. Опит върху проблемата за историята с оглед към логиката на Хегел* [On the Irrational in History. Essay on the problem of history with regard to the logic of Hegel] (1927); *Хегел. Личност, съдба, философия* [Hegel. Personality, fate, philosophy] (1928); *Димо Кьорчев. Художествена биография* [Dimo Kyorchev. A literary biography] (1932); *Героичният човек* [The heroic man] (1934); *Der Mythos auf dem Balkan* [Myth in the Balkans] (1936); *Heroismus und Weltangst* [Heroism and world-anxiety] (1937); *Dämonie des Jahrhunderts* [The demonism of the century] (1939); *Zwischen Abend und Morgen. Eine Balkanrhapsodie* [Between dusk and dawn: A Balkan-rhapsody] (1943).

Context

Janev's views were formed in the context of Bulgarian modernism during the 1920s and 1930s. In a series of articles published in *Златороз* and *Хунепуон*, Janev glorified the godfathers of Bulgarian modernism, like Krastyu Krastev, Pencho Slaveykov, Peyo Javorov (all of them members of the paradigmatic modernist circle *Мисъл* [Thought]), as well as **Dimo Kyorchev**. He read the life and work of these modernist authors through a Nietzschean prism, which was naturally opposed to the vulgar life of the corrupted society and to the crowd of fake artists (eloquently dubbed "maniacs"). It was in this context that Janev brought forward the figure of the "heroic man." Hegelian in his views on history, he combined this perspective with a Nietzschean vision of the destiny of man: the leading theme of his oeuvre, that of heroism, was obviously of Nietzschean origin. "The *Übermensch* is an alternative to historical man, as philosophy of life is alternative to philosophy of humility," he wrote in a programmatic article entitled "The religion of Creation" (*Златороз*, 1924). Inspired also by Bergson and more generally by vitalist ideas, he was preoccupied with the notion of life.

Beginning in the early 1930s, Janev's attention was gradually reoriented toward themes such as the destiny of the nation, Europe and humanity. This turn was in tune with the main tenets of the movement of the "conservative revolution" in Germany. On a philosophical and discursive level, Janev's later texts represent a paradigmatic manifestation of the right-wing cultural and political discourse in Bulgaria. Janev questioned the values of modernity and proposed a radical alternative based on Spenglerian quasi-prophecies about the decline of the West. But his views did not end in cultural pessi-

mism. On the contrary, his “heroic worldview” implied a cultural optimism (an instrumentalization of the notion of optimism could also be observed in **Ivan Hadzhiyski**), which culminated in the Messianic idea of a new dawn for humanity.

The idea of a new era is related to the utopian view of a primary, uncorrupted mankind. Janev exalted the image of an apolitical community of people, living in a sort of post-historical idyll. But humankind could rediscover its lost innocence only through the expiation of its sins in the fire of war. War was thus needed in order to establish the era of eternal peace. The total war to come was meant to be the final war. These apocalyptic and Messianic visions are close to the visions of leading authors of the “conservative revolution,” such as M.H. Boehm and Ernst Jünger, but are also related to the Hegelian idea of the end of history.

The mystical return to the transcendent body of the Motherland was impossible without the absorption of its immanence; the blood and the soil, together with the (national) Soul, are, not surprisingly, key-motifs in Janev’s texts. Here he suggested what could be defined as the “immanentization” of the transcendent. Janev’s national Messianism has strong anti-Christian implications, as it was opposed to Christian universalism. The Bulgarian nation predictably appears in this context as an “elect nation.” Janev also stressed the nation’s racial dimension, particularly its Aryan origins. Paradoxically, he considered the Bulgarians as pure Aryans, compared to the modern Greeks who, according to him, were nothing but Slavs—this despite Alfred Rosenberg’s assertion that the Greeks were the Aryans of Antiquity. This peculiar contention should be read against the backdrop of the “Byzantinist” trauma and the mimetic competition with the Greek national project (see **Nayden Sheytanov**, *Bulgarian worldview* and **Petar Mutaftchiev**, *Towards the philosophy of Bulgarian history*). Situated between East and West and negating both, the Bulgarian nation, in Janev’s view, was still waiting to fulfill its titanic historical mission. That is why it was fully oriented towards the future. Its past was not historical but atemporal: referring to its transcendental origins, an eternal source of its eternal Soul.

The radical right-wing ideology did not succeed in becoming a leading paradigm in Bulgaria, even if the political situation was rather favorable. Janev’s texts did not provoke much debate either in Bulgaria or in Germany. The political implications of his “national metaphysics” remained largely hidden by their abstract and poetic rhetoric, and his texts were perceived mainly as poetic writings. Thus they failed to arouse interest among broader intellectual and political circles in wartime Bulgaria. In a broader sense,

Mutafchiev and Hadzhiyski's writings can be seen as indirect answers to this tradition of "national metaphysics" (most authoritatively represented by Teodor Trayanov, Sheytanov, and Janev himself). There is no doubt, however, that national identity was central to intellectual debates, both on the Right and on the Left, often focusing on race and, by an extension, on the issue of cultural and national character (see **Aleko Konstantinov**, *Bay Ganyo*). In view of his post-1989 canonization, Janev shared the destiny of other interwar Bulgarian authors of national metaphysics, namely that the key figures of the "national revival period," whose central position remains uncontested, relegated the interwar integral nationalists to the margins of the national canon. The intellectual heritage of Janev also remained largely unexplored, reinforcing the narrative of locally produced Balkanist discourses as democratic and integrative, and forgetting about those instances when the Balkan identity project was closely connected to the Nazi reorganization of Europe.

BM

The spirit of the nation

Our history after the Liberation has been more political than cultural. Our spiritual development had no program, no prospects that it should have had in order for the emancipated spirit to fulfill itself in a definite direction. We rushed forward to make up for what we had lost without having any particular means or a particular goal. Our fathers rose to greatness through their will to create. But they were builders rather than embodiments, external, administrative and political workers rather than carriers/vehicles of the issues of culture. It could not be otherwise: severed from the world, we remained strangers to historical development. Foreign influences did not suffice. As powerful as the apostolic feat of the revolutionaries was, it was incapable of setting the course of the Bulgarian spirit. We lacked historical thinking [and] historical awareness.

And so those who thought of themselves as being better educated, the so-called intelligentsia, had initially completely disregarded the issues of Bulgarian national culture and of Bulgarian self-consciousness in general. They quickly fell under the hypnosis of foreign doctrines. For them, the foreign was an ideal. Had Bulgaria broken free at another historical moment, the act of her first spiritual dawning would have been quite different. She would have had a Romantic or a materialistic intelligentsia, an individualistic or a mystically-idealist one. But the day broke over Bulgaria at a moment when

European life found itself under the influence of socialist ideas. These ideas were in fashion, especially in Russia; naturally they were the first to penetrate our country. Our intelligentsia hailed them as a religious creed. That was its first fatal delusion. Socialism tore it away from the problems of national awareness, turned it towards theory and reflection. Already back then it lost its ardor for great feats and proved itself unworthy of the legacy of those who had fought for the Liberation. Our culture's first step was a wrong one, as it was made not in the name of life but of theory. Our first historical impulse was fateful. Barren and hollow, our intelligentsia grew blinded, already then, by utopias, and began to nurture anarchist dispositions; already then it lost the sense of the sacrifice and the valor that solely endow a nation with historical glamour.

Alas! Our first intelligentsia bequeathed to us a rather bookish heritage. The living spirit of the nation was untouched by them. They preferred reading and reasoning, and the building of theories to taking decisions and action. Our schools were permeated by the spirit of letters rather than the spirit of action. The socialist-international prevailed over the national. The issues of Bulgarian individuality were abandoned. Exotic problems moved us more than our own fate. We were living without land; we created a culture without a landscape. The influences from the West further confused the intelligentsia, which had already grown impotent to deal with the commissions of the day. Future historical science will reveal the fictitious routes our intelligentsia had followed.

* * *

At long last we must come to our senses and forget about mirages. It is necessary that we bind our existence to the tragic array of problems characterizing the native spirit. It is high time that we come to a halt at the furrow of this spirit: to see that it has not yet been fulfilled, that it lives in the twilight and naïveté of traditions; to reveal its essence, to set it apart, to define its domain and thus give it life in the history of our time. We live in an age of national revolutions when nations no longer want to remain mute spectators; they want to take part in history, asserting themselves as national organisms, with their own earth and sky, with their own spiritual and political style. We must also become part of this age. Our intelligentsia, if it wants to have any importance, should go back to its people, not for the sake of being populist, but for the sake of thinking and acting in a national way. We should first solve our own problems, preserve and enlighten the spirit of the nation,

which is the divine principle and the divine power of the people. Only then can we start solving the problems of justice and brotherhood for all.

It is not just political nationalism that we need. The spirit of the nation is least manifested in politics, especially when it takes the form of mere party acrobatics and journalistic cynicism. Our primary need is for cultural nationalism, where the genius of the nation manifests itself by its entire spontaneity and its entire will for historical recognition. We must get used to despising the vulgar grimaces of our political and spiritual life and throw off the mask of all those who keep fornicating with the soul and the body of our people. If we could choose a course, let it be to get back: back to the ideals preceding the Liberation, back to the national Revival. We must embrace the bequests of those who had sworn on mountain slopes to die for truth and freedom. Our prewar intelligentsia, a dupe of socialist postures, barren dogmatism and bookish speculations, must transform itself into an intelligentsia of heroic deeds, especially at this time when fateful decisions are imminent.

Let us be aware that any idea that has not originated from our national hearth is anti-Bulgarian and reactionary. Anti-Bulgarian is Bolshevism as well as the whimpering for international agreement, as is the naive delinquency of integral sophists or the utopia of a pan-Slav republic. It is necessary, first and foremost, to find out who we are and to bring ourselves up to self-awareness. Our culture and society must start with that. We are in need of national personalities, of a national outlook. We cannot afford to yearn for distant things when our own home is ravaged by the storm of devastation and misery. The national spirit must be let loose from our village wells so that it can flood our land. Maybe this sounds romantic. But every revival, every great deed is romantic. We are going to create the new type of Bulgarian, determined by the structure of the time we live in. Therefore this Bulgarian can be neither internationalized nor communized nor integrated. He is the progeny of the eternal strivings of our race, as proud and inspired as the spirit of Paissy Hilendarski. It is with this heroic Bulgarian that our national romantics must start and shall start.

I am not speaking of patriotic virtues. These are basic virtues for each citizen and member of the state. What matters is to look at things from a higher position, from a cultural-philosophical and cultural-historical point of view. Besides the purely political and economic tasks there are others, much more vital and fateful: the critique of our national consciousness must take precedence over other issues. The new generation can be saved by a new faith only, by a new philosophy that would clarify the minds and harness the creative powers for work. Violence is not a means anymore. We must act upon

the Bulgarian soul and Bulgarian consciousness, which is being sold for petty silver coins. Our success in this direction can be historical. This will mark the beginning of our revolution, which is yet to pursue the liberation of the Bulgarian nation and the consolidation of its existence.

Translated by Zornitsa Dimova-Hristova

HÜSEYİN NİHAL ATSIZ: TURKISH UNITY

Title: *Türk birliği* (Turkish unity)

Originally published: In *Orhun*, no. 8 (June 23, 1934), pp. 141–144; reprinted with additions in *Türk ülküsü* (Istanbul, 1956), pp. 45–50.

Language: Turkish

The excerpts used are from a revised version of the article published in *Türk ülküsü* (Istanbul: Burhan Basım ve Yayınevi, 1956), pp. 45–50.

About the author

Hüseyin Nihal Atsız [1905, Istanbul – 1975, Istanbul]: novelist, essayist, and poet. After his high school education, he enrolled in the Military School of Medicine, but due to his ultra-nationalist views and activities (he was involved in a brawl at the funeral of the nationalist thinker **Ziya Gökalp**), he was expelled from the institution. Afterwards, he enrolled in the Teachers' College in Istanbul and the Faculty of Letters at Istanbul University, graduating from both in 1930. Between 1931 and 1933, he served as an assistant in the Institute of Turkology at Istanbul University under the tutorship of the eminent historian Fuad Köprülü. In 1931, he started publishing a nationalist/Turkist journal entitled *Atsız mecmua* [Nameless journal], while also adopting the word “nameless” as a surname after the purportedly ancient Turkic custom of keeping an individual anonymous until he performs a heroic task. Atsız was removed from his position at Istanbul University after he sided with his professor Zeki Velidi Togan in openly confronting the official “history thesis,” which was endorsed by Atatürk in the hope of establishing racial/cultural links between Turkish and Ancient Anatolia. He served as a literature teacher in various high schools in Malatya, Edirne, and Istanbul. Between 1933 and 1934, he published another journal named *Orhun* (after a Central Asian site, home to the monumental inscriptions left by the *Göktürks*—the “Heavenly Turks,” a 9th-century Turkic dynasty). During the final stages of World War II, the government initiated a series of investigations, known as the “Racist-Turanist trials,” against ultra-nationalist groups. Atsız was arrested along with other proponents of Turanism. Although he was acquitted and released in 1945, the process made Nihal Atsız the indisputable vanguard of the extreme nationalist/Turkist movement. From the 1930s onward, Atsız published many polemical articles in various journals and newspapers, defending a radical form of Turkish nationalism tinged by an overtly racist outlook. He also published several works on Turkish/Ottoman history and literature, while making a significant contribution to Ottoman studies by publishing transcribed editions of numerous primary sources. His first novel, *Dalkavuklar gecesi* [The night of the sycophants], involves a

harsh critique of the first fifteen years of the Republic. His later novels, *Bozkurtların ölümü* [The death of the grey wolves] and *Bozkurtlar diriliyor* [The grey wolves revive], both based on *Göktürk* history, retain their popularity for the ultra-right wing faction in contemporary Turkey, who regard him as an unappreciated hero of the struggle for Turkish supremacy. In the 1960s, Atsız distanced himself from mainstream Turkists, who placed increasing emphasis on the Islamic component of Turkish identity after being organized as a political movement.

Main works: *Türk edebiyatı tarihi* [History of Turkish literature] (1940); *Dalkavuklar gecesi* [The night of the sycophants] (1941); *Bozkurtların ölümü* [The death of the grey wolves] (1946); *Bozkurtlar diriliyor* [The grey wolves revive] (1949); *Osmanlı tarihleri* [Ottoman chronicles] (1949); *Türk Ülküsü* [The Turkish ideal] (1956); *Türk tarihinde meseleler* [Issues in Turkish history] (1966); *Ruh adam* [Soul man] (1972).

Context

Early Turkism, gaining momentum after the inauguration of the second constitution in 1908, emerged as a defensive alternative amidst the turmoil of a collapsing multi-national empire (see **Yusuf Akçura**, *Three types of policy*). As a nebulous political and cultural movement, it was nourished by multiple sources of influence, from Orientalist scholarship (and the growing field of Turcology), to Hungarian and Finnish Turanism, to rising Turkic (particularly Tatar) nationalism in Tsarist Russia. In the process of the crystallization of Turkish nationalism and its appropriation by the Republican nation-state as a founding ideology, the ethnic overtones of Turkism were largely retained, while the pan-Turkist ambition of universal expansionism was denounced in favor of a more peaceful international policy (see **Ziya Gökalp**, *What is Turkism?*). The Turkist movement gained a more uniform trajectory during the Republican period, as it was taken over by a second generation of Turkists who were largely the products of the new nation-state. In its early Republican incarnation, the movement acquired a new and wider social base, attracting a sizeable student body as well as teachers from major cities and provincial towns. Although the Turkists supported Mustafa Kemal's reforms and had close allies and supporters among the Kemalist ruling elite, the movement's enduring racist and expansionist tendencies often put them in conflict with the Republican establishment, whose vision of Turkish identity was centered upon the geography of modern Turkey. The tension mounted after the inauguration of the official "History Thesis" in 1931, under the personal directives of Mustafa Kemal (see **Afet İnan**, *Prolegomena to an outline of Turkish history*). The Turkists, who regarded nationalism as a

matter of blood, were enraged by the form of Anatolian autochthonism propounded, albeit convolutedly, by the Thesis, as well as the emerging quasi-scientific conjectures about the Aryan origins of the Turks. In these years, *Orhun*, the journal published by Nihal Atsız, became the most prominent channel through which the political aspirations and acrid criticisms of the extreme nationalist group were voiced in Turkey.

Published during the heyday of the Kemalist “cultural revolution,” the essay excerpted here is one of the earlier examples of the radical Turkist agenda. This agenda, which Atsız calls the “national ideal” (*milli ülkü*), has two main components. One is what he calls “racism” (*ırkçılık*), which concerns the objective of raising popular consciousness about the supremacy of the Turkish race, and involves measures to preserve its purity and integrity. The racist outlook, combined with aestheticized images of hostility and violence, envisaged the rise of a luridly militaristic and totalitarian order in Turkey, founded upon inflexible hierarchies, strict discipline, and a pervasive culture of submission nourished by a constant state of warfare.

The second component of Atsız’s Turkist program, elaborated in the essay excerpted here, is that “Turanism” can be defined as a political strategy connected to the purported national ideal. Atsız’s brand of Turanism maintains the ideals of the earlier pan-Turkists and conceives of Turan as the legendary Central Asian homeland of all Turks. When compared to Hungarian or Finnish Turanisms, this vision of racial affinity and unification is more exclusivist, in that it solely concerns the Turkic peoples of the world. The Turanic ideal, fraught with anti-Soviet and anti-colonial biases, prescribes a global struggle to salvage all imprisoned Turks around the world and to unite them under one flag. The expansionist ideal of global dominance, Atsız argues, is not a “romantic dream,” but an immanent possibility, and the necessary alternative through which the threat of western incursion and communism could be eliminated.

Turkish unity is a landmark essay that fueled the imagination of many generations of Turkists in Turkey. During the 1960s, aspects of Atsız’s “national ideal” were appropriated by a new generation of far-right activists, who managed to organize the dispersed Turkist groups around a political party. Although Atsız’s supremacist and militaristic rhetoric was cherished by members of this new movement and its paramilitary extensions, his brand of expansionist and exclusivist pan-Turkism was, nevertheless, marginalized by the leaders of the party, who were now embroiled in the local realities of Turkish politics. As the communist threat faded in the 1980s, what remained of the distant dream of Turkish unity was transformed into a more calculated

ambition for political and cultural hegemony over the ex-Soviet republics in Central Asia. Turanist overtones, nevertheless, survive in the rhetoric of the far right, as revealed in a recent slogan cherished by the nationalist movement's youth and paramilitary organizations (*Dünya Türk olsun*), which demands the "entire world to become Turkish."

AE

Turkish unity

The Turks of the world do not solely consist of the ones in Turkey. The number of Turks in Russia, Iran, China, Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Greece, Rhodes, Cyprus, Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan is at least twice the number of the Turks living in Turkey. We could add twenty thousand Turks living in Egypt, Libya, Europe, North and South America, and the Far East to complete the list. [...]

The claim that Turks constituted a populous nation throughout history has been disproved with the advance of historical research. What made the Turks seem very populous was their considerable political presence and their dynamism. In reality, despite all efforts to decimate the Turks, the nation has never been as populous as in the 20th century. [...]

As gigantic states are being established in the world, one wonders what the future will bring for a politically dispersed Turkish people of 50 or 60 million. In our view, this must be the starting point of our national program. The answer to this question formulates our national ideal, which can be summarized with the term "Turkish Union."

All nations need an ideal in order to survive [...] No one can deny the fact that the foremost ideal of all enslaved nations is to gain independence, and the foremost ideal of all independent nations is to liberate their enslaved brothers. [Following these two stages,] conquest and imperialism constitute the third phase in the process of realizing the national ideal.

This is quite a sketchy categorization. The phases can differ according to the life, realities, and the particular circumstances of each nation. For instance, it is not necessary for a nation to gather all its members within its national borders in order to start the conquest phase. Before World War I, Italy had nearly acquired her national unification, but there were a considerable number of Italians living under the authority of other nations, such as Austria, France, Malta, and Tunisia. However, Italy had already embarked on the third stage of the national ideal, namely conquest, as confirmed by the wars it waged against Ethiopia and Turkey. Thus, while the three stages of the na-

tional ideal are independence, national unification, and conquest, the boundaries may overlap. One can start before the other is completed.

We can find several examples in history of the existence of these three stages in the realization of the national ideal.

Ireland, liberating herself from English yoke after centuries of struggle, is now trying to annex Northern Ireland, thus attempting to establish her national unity.

Egypt, freed again from English enslavement, aims to conquer Sudan at first hand, and pursues the broader agenda of gathering all Arab countries around herself. [...]

The Bulgarians have always coveted Serbian and Greek Macedonia as well as Eastern and Western Thrace. The Greeks want Northern Epirus and Eastern Thrace. [...]

One wonders where the Turks stand as regards the three phases in question. A brief glance at the map of the region is sufficient to provide the answer. Following their great success in the first phase with the independence war in Anatolia, the Turks, as a natural and historical consequence, initiated the second phase of their ideal. Subsequent to the materialization of the first phase in 1923, Hatay [Antioch] was liberated in accordance with the second phase.¹ Later, our national claims on Cyprus have been officially revealed, although in conformity with certain [diplomatic] measures and restrictions.

National unity and, following that, *world domination*, form an ideal that dwells on a subconscious level for all nations. At times, this subliminal will surfaces at the level of consciousness. [This urge] will be followed by success if the time is right. If not, it can cause serious tribulations for the nation. Still, this very ideal is the true source of morality and dynamism for all nations. Nations make innumerable sacrifices for their national ideals, similar to a person who willfully endures pain in the fulfillment of a certain goal. Sacrifice makes people and nations alike noble and heroic. Nations striving to reach an ideal terrify other nations, at the same time gaining their admiration. A nation that pursues an ideal overcomes the sense of inferiority it had cultivated vis-à-vis other nations. With its self-confidence and absolute valor, the nation will not dread the size and the [superior] technology of its ene-

¹ Following the Ottoman defeat at the end of the First World War, Antakya, a town in the province of Aleppo, was turned into a French mandate. The town remained in French hands after the Turkish Independence War. After many diplomatic maneuvers undertaken by the Republican state, the Antakya mandate managed to declare its independence in 1938 as a separate state, the Hatay Republic, which was to join the Turkish Republic the following year.

mies. Life opens her arms to those nations that cherish death. And hence, there comes a day when the national ideal becomes a reality.

A number of times [in history] the Turks were able to unite and thereafter prosper. They are destined to unite again. The primary target of our national ideal, then, can be expressed as follows: “all Turks shall reunite.”

Translated by Ahmet Ersoy

IOANNIS METAXAS: SPEECH ON THE OCCASION OF THE INAUGURATION OF PUBLIC WORKS

Title: *Λόγος κατά τα εγκαίνια των έργων του Σελινούντος Αιγιαλείας*
(Speech on the occasion of the inauguration of the public works at Selinous, Egialia)

Originally published: Delivered at Selinous on 31 October 1937.

Language: Greek

The excerpts used are from Ioannis Metaxas, *Λόγοι και Ομιλίες* (Athens: Ερμής, 1992), pp. 247–255.

About the author

Ioannis Metaxas [1871, Ithaca (Ionian Islands) – 1941, Athens]: military officer and politician. He was born into a well-known aristocratic family. In 1890, he graduated from the Military Academy as a lieutenant of the Corps of Engineers. Between 1899 and 1903, he continued his studies at the Military Academy of Berlin. He participated in several military and diplomatic missions, the most important being the Greek delegation to the London conference in 1913. In 1915, he was appointed Head of the General Staff, but very soon had to resign, due to his support for the King during the latter's confrontation with Prime Minister **Eleftherios Venizelos**, known as the National Schism. As a result, Metaxas was deported to Corsica. When he returned to Greece, in 1920, he declined the offer to take over the Asia Minor Campaign as Head of the Army. In 1921, he founded the *Κόμμα των Έλευθεροφρόνων* [Party of Free Thinkers]. He abstained from any involvement in politics until August 1922, when the catastrophe in Asia Minor proved that his unwillingness to participate in what he considered a doomed operation was well founded (see **Alexandros Papanastasiou**, *The republican Manifesto*). With the promulgation of the Republic, in 1924, he resumed his military duties under the new regime. Soon, he quit the army to be involved in politics. In 1926, he participated for the first time in elections and his party gained 54 seats in the parliament. After his electoral defeat in 1928, he withdrew from politics until the 1935 elections, which enabled him to return to Parliament. The next year, on 4 August, after a period of parliamentary instability, he headed a coup and established a dictatorship, which would rule Greece until the Second World War. Scholars continue to debate the nature of Metaxas' regime. Despite the widely accepted claim that it was of a fascist type, it has also been argued that Metaxas was a radical reformer. The image he sought to cultivate was one of a fatherly figure protecting the Greek people. Therefore, he never used military attire or adopted an aggressive military discourse. His regime, though, is remembered as the

first military regime imposed by the royal court. A staunch anti-communist, he initiated a witch-hunt against the supporters of the Communist party as well as any form of democratic ideology. His decision, however, to resist the Italian attack, despite his pro-German sentiments, gained him wide respect and popularity. When he died in January 1941, he was mourned as a popular leader and later credited with the triumph in the Greek-Italian war. Despite the fact that Metaxas' political activity is well documented, only recently has his period been thoroughly studied.

Context

The involvement of the Greek military in politics between 1916 and 1924 resulted in the elimination of the main political actors of the National Schism period: King Constantine I and **Venizelos**. The latter departed in 1924, after coming into conflict with his most radical supporters. His successors, though, failed to maintain control over the military officers, who gradually became aware that they could use power for personal interests. Civilian authority was restored in 1928, when Venizelos returned to office. However, even Venizelos, during his last period in politics, used the military as a means of pressure against his conservative opponents. Eventually, the abortive coup he organized in 1933, led by general Nikolaos Plastiras, enabled the eldest son of Constantine to come to power as King George II.

At the same time, the Asia Minor Catastrophe and the massive influx of refugees who had fled to Greece marked the beginning of an arduous project of national integration. Despite initial successes, harsh social conditions, as well as mounting discontent among the refugees with the Liberals—when the latter abandoned, following the Friendship Pact between Greece and Turkey, any effort to secure compensation for the confiscated properties, according to the Lausanne Treaty of 1923—led to a significant growth of popular support for the Communist party. Political radicalism, as expressed in the communist ideology, was a new experience for Greek politicians, who exaggerated the threat it posed to the regime and Greek society. The restoration of the monarchy marked a shift towards autocratic rule. King George II, even if he was not as charismatic a leader as his father, was still determined to resume power. He despised Greek politicians for the suffering they had caused his family. The elections of January 1936 did not give a majority to either of the two major parties, the Liberals or the Populists. This enabled the small Communist party to become a crucial partner in Parliament. In July, the leaders of Liberal and Conservative parties came to an agreement about a coalition government. George II, however, tacitly consented to Metaxas' seizure of power. Metaxas' suppression of all opposition, combined with the politi-

cians' inability to organize an effective resistance, to a large extent explains the initial success of the new regime.

Metaxas' regime retained two principles from the traditional right-wing ideology: a contempt for parliamentarism and a concern with internationalist socialism. As an antidote to both, Metaxas concentrated on two positive objectives: the initiation of a National Regeneration project and an appeal for National Unity. He launched a campaign for a "new Hellas," one of the recurring themes of the regime, and he proceeded with the foundation of EON—*Εθνική Οργάνωσις Νέων* [National Youth Organization]. Such national mobilization was based on a return "to the roots and sources" of the "beautiful Hellenic tradition," coupled with a parallel rejection of foreign models. The new civilization was defined as the "Third Hellenic civilization" (following the Ancient and the Byzantine civilizations, which were perceived as earlier incarnations of the Hellenic spirit). Even if it was accompanied by references to the "Hellenic race" and the "Hellenic soul," its content was based on abstract references to the racial qualities of the nation and the moral duty to pursue its interests.

Another significant element of his regime ideology was its organic nationalism. Metaxas perceived the state as a "living organism," a force with independent life and interests. All social conflicts would be eliminated and the Nation would found its harmonious existence in a new "National State." Within this state, the individual should become one with the community, through which the will of the people would be expressed. This collective national body brought together not only living Greeks, but the whole history of the nation. According to Metaxas, only this fusion of state and nation could offer real freedom and self-fulfillment to the individual. Metaxas draws his inspiration both from the monarchist tradition and the failure of republican democracy to accommodate political radicalism. Most evidently, though, he is also fascinated by the fascist ideology that was on the rise in Europe during the same period.

In the speech presented here, a year after the establishment of his regime, Metaxas takes the opportunity to review his main achievements, while simultaneously offering a remedy for the nation's past misfortunes. He describes "parliamentarism" as the main source of evil for Greek society, the outcome of the oligarchy's unabashed imitation of a western system that did not fit local conditions. Thus, even if there were no real differences among the Greeks, "parliamentarism" led to the promotion of personal interests and ambitions in order to achieve the establishment of political parties. Moreover, the working class and the peasantry had nothing to gain from a system ma-

nipulated by the feudal and bourgeois elite which supported the previous parliamentary regime. Actually, he claims, since the establishment of the regime on the 4th of August, a truly “national state” came into being. From that moment on, there would be no conflict among the Greeks, since a new “Hellenic ideology” would be adopted. The program of this new corporatist State included faith in a “Leader” above partisan party politics; economic development; the consolidation of social order; and the promotion of the “Hellenic soul”; all necessary conditions for the nation to be able to create the “Third Hellenic Civilization.”

Metaxas’ speeches constitute his ideological legacy. However, this ideological vocabulary was rarely used by conservative governments after World War II, including the colonels’ junta (1967–1974), a regime notorious for its extreme nationalism.

VK

**Speech on the occasion of the inauguration of public works
at Selinous, Egialia**

[...] How many more things have you not desired, you, the people of Greece, for years on end, without ever seeing them realized? What was needed was the Government of August 4th in order to fulfill your wants. A supreme necessity and a great danger led us in August of last year to the decision to alter the political situation of the land and gather all powers in our hands. Those of you who, during your time of repose, follow in the newspapers [the events] taking place outside Greece’s boundaries today, and during all this time, see a terrible scheme being revealed by the Third International against European civilization. Those of you who follow these [events] will see how the dates of those [events] which were taking place in Spain¹ coincided with those which began to occur in May of last year in Greece.

One and the same enemy, emerging from the darkness, is attempting to smite both countries. They did not have the time to do this here. And today, in that country [the people] are writhing within the most fearsome of civil wars, and God knows for how long. We acted in time.

Yet, though that was the immediate cause, [i.e.,] the imminent danger [hanging] over our heads, the causes of August 4th were much deeper and go back to a distant time. One of the main causes was the collapse of par-

¹ He refers to the Spanish civil war.

liamentarism, the decline that had come on as a result throughout the country, the disillusionment of the Hellenic people. A system of government that was foreign to the country was introduced, by imitation. The strange thing was that parliamentarism was in constant contrast to the official Constitution. The Constitution acknowledges the rights of the King, while parliamentarism grants him nothing. The Constitution distinguishes among the [various] powers; parliamentarism confuses the powers and exchanges one for the other. And one asks: are both these things, the one being the opposite of the other, the will of the same people? That the Constitution represents the will of the people cannot be denied by anyone. What then did parliamentarism represent during so many decades? It represented the interests of a political oligarchy, it represented the interests of feudalism, which, by virtue of this system, came to weigh on the shoulders of the Greek people. And because it had a need for parties, while the Greek people were deeply united—and which one of you thinks of his land differently than the other?—because it had a need for parties and the country did not produce parties, because they did not come out of the natural need of the country, it created them artificially and gave them paradoxical names. And because those parties could not originate from various ideologies, because the ideology of the Hellenes is one and the same for all Hellenes, they created, as a way to produce parties, the individual rights of the citizens, enflaming the latter against the former.

And while nothing divided us Hellenes, while we should have been a unified people with a single, unified will, we found ourselves divided among ourselves, foaming at each other and, regrettably, slaughtering each other. Thanks to this system, for an entire century, Greece was never found prepared. [...]

And I cannot but wonder, if they did not know the reasons, how was it in April 1936, when the flow of things and the will of the King put me in power, how, instead of rising up in protest then and voting against me and forcing me to leave [the seat of] power, did they all bestow unanimous trust in the then existing Parliament? So well did they know that the situation could go no further and that they sought an end, from within their souls, without saying so, they sought a man who would bring about this end. And even then I could not decide [to do so]. And again I hesitated, until I saw the red menace at Greece's door and then I decided, I dared and I executed.

Since then, I have seen the sense of relief in all Hellenes, even in those who appeared supposedly to yearn for the past. The sense of relief was general. [...]

But do not think that all these measures were taken thoughtlessly and randomly, without a system. There was a central thought, there was a systematic intention that directed the State of August 4th. What was and what is the State of August 4th? A people now unified, not divided into parties and factions, a people constituting a whole, a solid body and a single will, having at its head the King, as the carrier of the national will.

A Government under a Leader who does not belong to any of the parties, which, in any case, no longer exist, but a Leader who belongs to the whole of the Nation and who deals with its needs as a unified whole, a Leader who is supported by the undivided and absolute trust of the people, which is expressed through every means and through all means, through which a people knows how to express its true trust, as you do today, and who holds concentrated in his hands all the power, in order to proceed in his work. [...]

So far I have told you what the major issues were with which we concerned ourselves during this first year. I would like to say now only a few words, to show you where we are heading during the second year we will be in power.

Firstly, we will continue to work intensely towards the full preparation of our military forces, a task that we shall never complete. For, the further we advance, the more it shall be increased. Secondly, we will organize the internal administration of this country, the self-government of the municipalities and communities and the administration of the decentralized prefectures, tasks the first foundations for which we have already set, in order for the people to feel even more fully the care provided by the Government and to have even closer to it the representatives of power, through which it will proceed to the resolution of its issues. We have already set the first foundations during the past year. This foundation will be supplemented this year.

Thirdly, we will reorganize the multitudinous corporations that exist in Greece and which serve no purpose, in order that they constitute an organic whole and, whether social or charitable, that they carry out the purpose for which they were established, if they are professional, that they respond to that need, with the responsibility for this lying with those who established them. We will not permit corporate anarchy, which was prevalent in Greece and which originates from the wrongful perception of those who establish corporations and at the same time often [do so] for perfidious purposes.

We will supplement the educational program in order to provide the sons and daughters of the Hellenes with the intellectual nourishment that corresponds to the purposes and the future of the Nation, as well as to the prosperity of themselves and of their children. We will pay particular attention to our

Universities, in which we will carry out, with circumspection, certainly, but nevertheless a radical reorganization, in order that they will no longer give us, as is the case now, regrettably, scientists who are unable to make a living, but, instead, become true temples of knowledge and create a Hellenic science.

Finally, we will organize the youth, not only by preserving the organizations which exist today, but by joining these to others, each one with its own peculiarity, whether it be an educational organization or a non-educational one, but demanding of all these organizations, however many they may be and however they may have been established, not only sports activities and the development of the body, not only the development of the soul and the spirit, but also faith to the principles of August 4th, from which, you boys and you girls, you will benefit one day and to the flag, which, when we are gone, for we are only human, you will take and carry further, as long as your life lasts, and then you will hand it over to the youth which will follow, and they too will take it further for ever and ever.

I inscribe these few lines, for it is neither the time nor the moment for lengthy expounding, which, in any case, do not do any good, because each man among you and each woman among you have clarified in your soul what you should do in every event.

Where are we headed? We are headed towards the creation of a third Hellenic civilization, which will not be created by the State, but by you as a whole and each one of you as an individual.

You must set a rule in your life: all of you, men and women, struggle for your life, for your family and for the prosperity of your home, for your individual needs. Do not restrict yourselves to that. Put aside a percentage of time and effort so that each of you, man or woman, works for the whole of the Nation. Seek inside your soul the moment during which you will be able to allocate time and toil and money in order to do what should be done for the general good, and you will find that which you must allot, because you are children of one and the same race, because a single language connects you all, men and women, because your origin is a common one, you will find all these, working the one next to the other and all together. Working in this way, you will set the foundation for the new Hellenic civilization.

Do not seek this civilization in foreign magazines and in what comes from abroad. Seek it in your soul. You can be sure that the present-day State, the State of August 4th, will be your guide, because this State is a State that creates civilization. Your guides will also be the intellectually superior Hellenes, your teachers, your professors, all those whom fortune has favored or whose

worthiness brought them to a higher intellectual development and who, from wherever they may hail, I hope will hear my voice. They should not think about how they will astonish people with oddities, nor how they will introduce into Greece foreign, unbalanced systems, but how they will create, from within their Hellenic soul, that which is fitting for the Hellenic people.

Translated by Mary Kitroeff

EMIL CIORAN: THE TRANSFIGURATION OF ROMANIA

Title: *Schimbarea la față a României* (The transfiguration of Romania)

Originally published: Bucharest: Vremea, 1936

Language: Romanian

The present excerpts are from Emil Cioran, *Schimbarea la față a României* (Bucharest: Humanitas, 1990), pp. 39–43, 59–60.

About the author

Emil Cioran [1911, Rășinari (*Hun.* Resinár; *Ger.* Städterdorf), (Transylvania) – 1995, Paris]: philosopher. His father was an Orthodox priest. After completing his secondary education in Sibiu in 1927, he went to Bucharest to study philosophy. He was one of the most original members of the “young generation” or “generation of 1927” (see **Mircea Eliade**, *Spiritual itinerary*). He also studied in Berlin between 1933 and 1935, benefiting from a Humboldt scholarship. With a German philosophical background and linguistic competence that he brought from the Transylvanian Saxon cultural context of his youth, Cioran was attracted by the German political changes of the 1930s. During this period, he contributed articles glorifying the “cultural mission” of National Socialism. After his return to Romania, he taught philosophy in a high school in Brașov for a year (1936), a period Cioran both abhorred and extolled as being the only time in his life that he had been employed. In 1934 Cioran published his first book, *Pe culmile disperării* [On the heights of despair], and was awarded a prize for young authors. This book contains those elements that later became identified with Cioran’s unique philosophical style: despair, cynicism, nihilism, ahistoricism, merciless self-analysis leading to self-destruction. In 1937 he went to Paris with a scholarship from the French government. Cioran claimed that he had intended, in fact, to go not to France, but to Spain, with the aim of studying with Ortega y Gasset. Apparently his choice had been influenced by his earlier reading of Miguel de Unamuno’s book on Don Quixote and his *The Tragic Sense of Life*. He spent the war years in Vichy France, for a short time employed also by the Romanian legionary government. In the late 1930s and early 1940s he wrote pro-Iron Guard articles, glorifying the leader Corneliu Zelea Codreanu and the totalitarian national revolution professed by the legionaries. At the same time, he was deeply traumatized by the death of his Jewish friend, Benjamin Fundoianu (Fondane), deported by the Germans from Paris. In 1945 Cioran settled in Paris and decided to abandon Romanian as the language of his philosophical self-exploration. His first book in French, *Précis de décomposition* appeared in 1949. He gained recognition as one of the most

influential French philosophers, systematically questioning the fashionable intellectual creeds (of democracy, humanism and progress) and cultivating an image of voluntary self-seclusion. Together with Eliade, Eugène Ionesco, and Constantin Noica, Cioran benefited from enormous attention after 1989. His first books were re-edited and his French texts were translated into Romanian. Considering the reputation Cioran enjoyed during the last years of his life, as well as the republication and translation of his early Romanian writings into English and French, one is perhaps not surprised that there are now a variety of conflicting opinions about, and struggles over, Cioran's legacy—as much in Bucharest as in Paris.

Main works: *Pe culmile disperării* [On the heights of despair] (1934); *Cartea amăgirilor* [The book of delusions] (1936); *Schimbarea la față a României* [The transfiguration of Romania] (1936); *Précis de décomposition* (1949); *La tentation d'exister* (1956); *Histoire et utopie* (1960); *Aveux et anathèmes* (1987).

Context

Among the diverse definitions of national identity, and solutions to the crises brought about by modernity proposed during the interwar period in Romania, Emil Cioran's stands out as one of the most excessive and, at the same time, most sophisticated. Both his philosophical and political arguments were highly appreciated by his contemporaries. His most controversial work, "The Transfiguration of Romania," articulates an essentialist picture of Romanian national identity. To Cioran, influenced by Nietzsche, vitalism, Spengler, and theories of cultural morphology, the ambiguities of self-definition and ethnic affinity represented the perfect way to explore the destiny of Romania, defined as "small culture" without a glorious past and luminous destiny. If kept at the present state of culture, Cioran claimed, Romania's future was going to be as unattractive and deplorable as her past. A profound transformation was necessary, a transfiguration that should project Romania "beyond good and evil," into the state of eternal beatification. This was the place where being a Romanian (a stigmatic ethnic attribute, according to Cioran) would need no further existential justifications. It should also be noted that in this book Cioran was equally intolerant toward ethnic minorities, principally Jews and Hungarians, which he characterized negatively. These descriptions were subsequently excised in the post-1989 editions of the book.

When Cioran questioned the positive traits of Romanian identity in the form of an "ontological scandal," he actually praised the Romanian nation and culture's negative qualities. Being exceptional in suffering, in self-destruction was, Cioran suggested, as great as being satisfied with one's glo-

rious achievements. In fact, Romanian origin, far from offering transcendence, was to Cioran a curse. It required a negative pride, the only sentiment that can reformulate in an epistemological insurrection the immobile nature of Romanian national history. Cioran believed there was something constantly negative in Romanian history. Romanians—a small culture—did not have the courage to overcome the burden of passivity, of being an immobile object of history. Escaping from the cursed realities of cultural passivity and historical anonymity must be, Cioran suggested, Romania's new historical mission.

Like **Mircea Eliade** and others, Cioran was fascinated by Nae Ionescu's existentialist aphorisms. Related to Ionescu's insistence on existence (*trăire*) as the ultimate philosophical category was an overriding sense of revolt as the prime attribute of intellectual creativity, and Cioran excelled in translating his revolts and frustrations into incisively formulated aphorisms and essays. But contrary to Ionescu, Cioran was not enthusiastic about Romanian spiritual achievements and Orthodoxy. And unlike Eliade, **Crainic**, and **Blaga**, Cioran did not believe in resurrecting traditional Romanian values, nor did he romanticize the role and existence of the peasantry and village life. In fact, he found rural life to be a serious impediment to national creativity, impeding its messianic "frenzy," an element he deemed important for Romania's future.

As the excerpts included here suggest, the result of this "voluntary self-ascription of negativity" transferred the construction of Romanian national identity onto new foundations. By denying the Romanians any historical achievements, Cioran seeks to get close to the very essence of the Romanian nation; so close that being a Romanian changes from an anemic post-historic condition into a cathartic, ultimate experience. One can detect in this advocacy for total transformation the magnetism of other totalitarian projects popular in Europe at the time. The new Romanian nationalism, Cioran suggested, ought to be "fanatical" and based on "a cult of irrational force," just like in Hitler's Germany, in order to succeed in transforming Romania from a country "without history" into a nation "making history."

But Cioran was as inconsistent in supporting the nationalist cause as he was in his philosophical statements. If initially he criticized his generation for its political nature, after his time in Germany, he urged Romanian youth to join the Legionary Movement in the political struggle for a new Romania. Moreover, his sharp criticism of the Orthodox Church was not well received by the leaders of the Legionary movement—Corneliu Zelea Codreanu included—who more or less equated Romanian nationalism with Orthodoxy. On other levels, however, Cioran's exultation of Romanian ethnicity and the

diatribe against other ethnic groups, like the Jews and the Hungarians, echoed many of the racial tropes that characterized Codreanu's nationalist discourse.

Next to Mircea Eliade and Eugène Ionesco, Cioran is one of the most read and discussed Romanian authors of the interwar period. Recent investigations into the history of his generation seem to confirm the contemporary view that there were as many similarities between their ideas and mainstream Romanian nationalism as there were differences. In contrast to Eliade, however, Cioran did publicly regret his youthful political sympathies and went as far as to censor the offensive portions of his book when republished in Romanian in 1990. Yet the fact remains that the interwar experience, both cultural and political, radicalized Cioran and turned him into a nihilistic thinker, unable to believe in Romania's national regeneration again. Even at the end of his life, Cioran could only see the Romanians as a nation unfulfilled, still searching for their historical destiny.

MT

The transfiguration of Romania

Romanian Adamism

Lord! What have we been doing for a thousand years? Our whole life for the last century has been the process through which we have come to realize that we have done nothing... The comparison with what has been done in other parts of the world has revealed the nothingness of our own past, and the non-existence of our culture. If Ortega y Gasset finds that Spain has been living a continuous decadence since its beginnings, then what can we say about Romania, which came to its historical life when others were beginning to die out? For a thousand years, history had happened without us: a thousand years of sub-history. When *conscience* was born in us, we did not record through it an unconscious process of creation, but a multi-secular spiritual sterility. [...] From a historical perspective we have lost a thousand years, and gained nothing from a biological point of view. Such a long time of vegetation, if it has not consumed the nation's vital substance, has not strengthened or enlivened it in any way either. Romania's past does not flatter me at all, and I am not proud of my ancestors' lack of vanity, for they were able to slumber for such a long time awaiting liberty. Romania has purpose because we start it. We must build it from the inside, so that we can be *re-born* in it. The making of this country should be our one and only obsession.

Any person who wants or is called upon to play the prophet's role in Romania's life must convince himself that in this country any gesture, any action, any attitude is an absolute beginning, that there are no continuities, repetitions, lines or directions. For what has to be done no one has prepared us, no one encourages us, and no one helps us. Other nations have lived their beginnings naively, unaware, and unreflectively, awakening from material slumber to historical life through an apathetic process, a natural evolution, with an imperceptible slide. We, on the contrary, know and must know that we are at the beginning; we are obliged to have the lucidity of the beginnings of life, the vivid and reflected consciousness of the aurora. [...]

Each of us is in Adam's situation. Or maybe our condition is even more unfortunate, because we have nothing that we could regret. Everything has to begin from scratch, absolutely everything. We only have to work with the future. Adamism in culture does not mean anything else other than that every spiritual, historical and political problem is tackled for the first time, that everything we do is determined by new values, in an incomparable order and manner. Romanian culture is an Adamic culture, because all that is born in it has no precedent (including in the pejorative sense). Each of us repeats Adam's destiny; only he was banished from paradise, whereas we were awakened from a great historical slumber.

Adamism can only paralyze weak souls, lacking in prophetic drive, without a fighting instinct and personal will of assertion. Not that [Adamism] cannot provoke crises and doubts, but the fact that we are petrified in front of it is revolting. We must endure the tragedy of our worthless culture with an aggressive enthusiasm, to offend through our own force the emptiness of the past, and to try to awaken, through an unexpectedly great initiative, all that vegetated in our historical slumber. Our vanity must be satisfied by the fact that all has to be made, that each of us can be the God of our history, that there is no path that we are forced to follow, that our path is this country's destiny. The existence of each of us should be a building block in Romania's foundation. That should be our calling. *Whatever is not prophecy in Romania is an attack against Romania.* [...]

However much we may want to comfort ourselves with the condition of our existence, the unfavorable circumstances of the time—the barbarians' rush, Turkish, and Hungarian occupations, the Phanariot domination ... we will not succeed. *History is an explanation, not an excuse.* Our ancestors did not love us enough considering they shed so little blood for liberty. We are a country of riots. A nation that has the instinct of liberty must prefer suicide to slavery. For a nation to make its way in the world, all means are justified.

Terror, crime, bestiality, perfidy are mean and immoral only in decadence, when a void of content is defended through them. As long as they assist the ascent, they are virtues. All triumphs are moral.

The rescue of Romania lies in her hidden possibilities and opportunities. What we *used to be* is merely an illusory support. We must not be so cowardly as to invent a past. I love the history of Romania with profound hate.

We will never be able to crown Romania with a historical nimbus unless each of us lives with a tempestuous and painful passion for all the humiliations that filled our mournful past. Unless we subjectively try to re-live [this nation's] disaster and tragedy, we are lost for the nation's future transfiguration, because the nation itself will be lost. I cannot understand how there are people who sleep peacefully after thinking of the underground existence of a persecuted people, of centuries of darkness, terror and yoke. When I look at Transylvania, I see a configuration of mute pain, of a closed and stifled drama, of time with no history. A thousand years in a sub-historic monotony, a thousand years like a monstrous replication of a moment, of one single moment! The invariable show of persecution gives me thrills; for a drama with a single motif frightens me. The same lack of liberty in the other provinces, too: only the variety of the landscape gives the impression of a historical game. [...]

He who is not painfully obsessed with Romania does not understand her problem. The lucid and bitter vision of its past must be lived to the last consequences, so that we can understand the significance of a grand destiny. Lost is he who does not feel the re-experiencing of our destiny as a turning point in his life and a source of tragedy. He who is not tormented to hallucination by the fact that we, Romanians, have not made any history so far, but have been *waiting for others to make it* for us, waiting for a transcendent torrent to enliven us, is no nationalist; he, who is not gnawed by the fatal confinement that locks Romania in the circle and fatality of small cultures, of those cultures that lack the courage to revolve around their own axes, is no nationalist; he who does not suffer because Romania does not have the historic mission of a great culture, political imperialism, the inherent megalomania and the unlimited will to power that characterize the great nations, is no nationalist; he, who does not fanatically wish for the transfiguring leap, is no nationalist. [...]

If it cannot be proved that Romanian spiritual resources are superior to those demonstrated in the past, and that the future will not expose the hidden faces of the Romanian soul, then any attempt to lay the foundation for tomorrow's Romania is useless. A country is not born and does not grow from the

outside, but through its inner conditions. Even if these conditions adhere to some formal clichés, the specific psychological determinants are no less able to impose a brand and individuality. [...] There is a *substantial vice* in the spiritual structure of the Romanian, an initial void that is the source of the long series of failures in our past. At the Romanians' beginning there did not exist a *formed* soul—because a nation exposes itself to itself and to the rest of the world in a long-term process—but only predisposition and possibilities, which together can show the meaning of a revolution and a destiny. There must be something inadequate in the psychological potential of the Romanian nation, something inappropriate in her sources, and which takes the shape of a substantial deficiency. When so many other nations had spontaneity in their origin, an active energy at the beginning, a tremendous explosion, the Romanian life form suffered from a lack of primordial dynamism.

Romania has an *original sin* of indefinite nature, but easy to identify in all the voids of the past. The necessity of a historical leap appears even more urgent as the overcoming of these original insufficiencies becomes the condition of our stepping into the world. What is positive and creative in Romania's primordial spirit will push us further ahead, no matter how many obstacles we will encounter. Everything that has been accomplished so far is the result of a dynamic impulse, which unfortunately did not measure up to our innate negativity, which kept us in our deep, thousand-year-old slumber.

Translated by Mária Kovács

LAZËR RADI: FASCISM AND THE ALBANIAN SPIRIT

Title: *Fashizmi dhe Fryma Shqiptare* (Fascism and the Albanian Spirit)

Originally published: Tiranë: Distapur, 1940

Language: Albanian

The excerpts used are from the original edition, pp. 19, 23–24, 45, 63, 90, 96, 105, 152, 154, and 171.

About the author

Lazër Radi [1916, Prizren, Kosovo – 1998, Tirana]: poet, translator, and political activist. He finished his primary education in his native town. In 1929, following reprisals from the Serbian authorities as a result of his brother's refusal to serve in the military, Radi left Prizren and moved to Albania. For a year, he attended the secondary school in Tirana, and in 1931 continued his secondary education in the public gymnasium of Shkodra. There he came in contact with young Albanian intellectuals who were attending the same school and who entered the Albanian literary scene in the 1930s. It was during this period that Radi published his first articles and translations. In 1938, he obtained a scholarship from the Italian government and began to study law at the University La Sapienza in Rome, where he graduated with distinction in 1942. Despite an invitation to pursue an academic career in Rome under the direction of Professor Vito Cesarini Sforza, Radi returned to Albania. He started practicing law in Durrës and Tirana and became an independent lawyer in 1944. During his studies and after his return to Albania, Radi continued to publish articles, notes and editorials, first for the daily *Tomorri* (named after a mountain near Berat), and after 1943 for *Bashkimi i Kombit* [Unity of the nation]. On 23 November 1944, Radi was arrested by the partisans in Tirana. In 1945, he was sentenced to 30 years in prison by the Special Tribunal set up by the communist authorities to judge "the collaborationists and traitors of the nation." He was released in 1954, only to be interned two weeks later first in Saver (central Albania), and then in several other remote places, where he worked as mechanic, painter, builder, and farmer. His wife and his three children suffered the same punishment, though separately from him. Even after his retirement in 1976, Radi was kept in internment and continually denounced as an enemy of the Albanian people. He was finally released in December 1990, after 46 years of prison and internment, and returned to Tirana. He marked his return to the post-communist Albanian literary scene by publishing a series of articles and interviews about the cultural life in Albania during the interwar period and his translations of Serbian poetry. He became involved in politics, campaigning for the rights of political prisoners and as an advocate of the national unification of Al-

bania and Kosovo. But he remained above all a prolific writer and translator, as evidenced by his memoirs, two collections of poetry, several large studies and a series of translations from Serbian and Italian. He died in 1998, just before the publication of his last book about his friendship with the modernist poet, **Millesh Gjergj Nikolla**, also known as Migjeni.

Main works: *Fashizmi dhe fryma shqiptare* [Fascism and the Albanian spirit] (1940); *Apollogjia e tretë e Sokratit në Tiranë* [The third apology of Socrates in Tirana] (1990); *Muret e muzgut* [The walls of the dusk] (1993); *Shqipëria në vitet 30. Kronikë e përjetuar* [Albania in the 1930s. A lived chronicle] (1993); *Rrëfim për Dinejt e Dibrës* [A tale about the Dine family from Dibra] (1993); *Misteret e një ministri: vitet e fundit të Mirash Ivanajt* [The mysteries of a minister: the last years of Mirash Ivanaj] (1994); *Njeriu i rrugës së gjatë: portret-biografi kushtuar luftëtarit Taf Previzit* [The man who took long roads: a portrait-biography of the fighter Taf Previzi] (1996); *E çmoj te shkuarën e vendit tim* [I appreciate the past of my country] (1996); *Shpresa vdes e fundit* [The last to die is hope] (1996); *Një verë me Migjenin: kujtime, shënime* [A summer with Migjeni: memories, notes] (1998).

Context

On 7 April 1939, Italy invaded Albania. The ruler of the country, King Zog I, left in a hurry. There was virtually no resistance put up by the Albanian army, which had been under the total control of its Italian instructors since the mid-1930s. Only a few units of the gendarmerie opposed the Italian forces in Durrës and Vlora. In about three days, the entire country was under complete Italian control. On 12 April, the National Assembly proclaimed the personal union between the two countries, offering the Albanian crown to the Italian King/Emperor Victor Emmanuel III. The invasion was condemned by Great Britain and France, but no military action followed. The Second World War had just started for Albania.

The general reaction to the establishment of the personal union with Italy and the installment of new authorities was rather passive, although many perceived this as the end of Albanian independence. The opposition intensified especially following the disastrous campaign of the Italian army against Greece in the autumn of 1940. Albanian units, under the command of Colonel Prenk Pervizi, were forcibly incorporated into Italian forces, but they deserted as soon as Italy attacked Greece. Large demonstrations against the Italian regime and the pro-Italian Albanian authorities took place on Independence Day, 28 November 1940. Another symbolic act was Vasil Laçi's attempt to assassinate Victor Emmanuel III, when he visited Albania in May 1940. In 1941, the resistance movement started to take shape, and by 1942, it had already moved to armed action. All these acts were highly praised and

mythologized by post-Second World War Albanian historiography as events that paved the way for the new communist regime.

However, not everyone in Albania perceived the events of April 1939 and their aftermath as an occupation. Although foreign affairs, customs and natural resources came under direct Italian control, there was still an acting Albanian government. There was an increase in the number of roads being built, and the economy in general was prosperous. The Albanian government had control of education matters and schooling. Scientific activity in the country intensified and became institutionalized with the creation in 1940 of the Institute of Albanian Sciences. The Institute brought together the most important Albanian intellectuals and scholars of that period. It was directed by the Minister of Education and eminent writer, Ernest Koliqi. Politically, Albania was a country with one ruling party, namely the Albanian Fascist Party, which was established in May 1939. In May 1940, the Party reportedly had 13,500 members. In the spring of 1941, following the surrender of Yugoslavia and Greece, the majority of the areas inhabited by Albanians in Kosovo and Macedonia were unified with the Kingdom of Albania. This act is often interpreted as an attempt undertaken by the Italian authorities in order to improve their image among the Albanians. Indeed, this was the case especially for the Albanians in Kosovo and Macedonia, who accepted the union with enthusiasm. The unification of Albanian-inhabited lands had been a priority of the Albanian national movement since the second half of the 19th century, and although less openly expressed in the interwar period, it continually appeared in the writings of many nationalist activists. The Albanian government took control over the newly acquired regions and established an acting administration. Intensive education policies and other state- and nation-building measures were implemented, which—as was often the case—did not take into account the ethnically mixed nature of these areas.

It was in this political, social and economic context that Lazër Radi's book, "Fascism and the Albanian Spirit," was published. In his memoirs and later interviews, apart from expressing his regrets, Radi does not give many details about the circumstances in which he wrote and published the book. One can only take into consideration that the author had already become a name in Albania, as a talented and sharp young journalist. But he was also studying law due to a scholarship from the Italian government. Moreover, his political mentor, Vangjo Koça, became one of the most ardent supporters of the fascist movement in Albania. It is important also to note that the book was published under the auspices of the Italian government, which speaks in favor of the propagandistic nature of this publica-

tion. It is also difficult to assess what its real effects were among Albanian intellectuals and politicians.

In the first chapter of his book, entitled "The Rays of the New Dawn," Radi criticized the regime of King Zog I, frequently describing him as a tyrant, surrounded by corrupt people, whose only aim was to exploit the nation and suppress the most active groups, like the nationalist youth. Already acquainted with fascist ideology while studying in Rome, Radi believed—as many did in Albania at the time—that a fascist regime would provide a strong political impulse for the modernization of the country. Next, Radi explained how this "historical-political-social endeavor" could be accomplished. Albania could become an advanced country only by following the example of the Italian fascist revolution. Looking at several important moments in the development of fascist movement, he sketched the main events after 1914, starting with the publication of the newspaper *Popolo d'Italia* and continuing to the "March on Rome" on 27 October 1922. In his understanding, Albania bore many similarities to pre-Fascist Italy, especially in terms of agrarian problems and political developments; hence Albania could be transformed following the Italian model. After analyzing in detail the structure and the main principles of Fascist Italy and paying tribute to Benito Mussolini's leadership, Radi turned his attention to Albanian issues. For him, the foremost duty of every citizen of the fascist state was work. For Albanians, Radi insisted, work should have a meaning akin to a sacred thing. According to him, Albanians were in the throes of moral and material poverty, which they inherited from the Ottomans. It was, therefore, the duty of the Albanian youth to change this situation and give a new shape to the moral life of the country. In schools, families, while writing, creating and working, only the young boys and girls were able to change the face of the country. But, Radi emphasized, they should be organized in a fascist way, and organizing them in such a way was the mission of the state, and of various state institutions.

The Italian invasion and the establishment of a fascist regime also led to new discussions regarding the "Albanian race." In July 1939, Italian racial experts "discovered" that Albanians were of Nordic stock, as were the Italians; and the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Galeazzo Ciano, noted in his diary that this "discovery" was as important as the invasion of Albania itself. Following the example of Italy, Jews were not allowed to join the Albanian Fascist Party. This concern with racial issues is also at the centre of Radi's book. To start with, he rejected Malthusian theories. For him, a strong race was a numerous one. He stressed that Fascism was concerned with demographic change and had a "demographic morality." And naturally,

Albania needed to follow this moral principle, which meant supporting the family, mothers, children, and encouraging childbirth. He identified as one of the most important Albanian virtues the particular concern for the upbringing of children and the specific care for the continuity of the family. Following Italian demographers, Radi saw in the family the condition for the implementation of the fascist policy of racial defense. However, some traditions, like the blood feud for instance, were perceived as anti-social. How should young Albanians respond to these traditions? Again Radi found the answer in the fascist doctrine and practices. Fascism did not refute tradition—on the contrary, the fascists cherished it. In their vision, ancient customs and traditions were to be preserved and passed on to the younger generations, whereas bad practices would be eliminated. In addition, some old customs and practices, such as the Albanian patriarchal family, were to be introduced as general principles of the new economic state policy.

But Radi was not a racist in the classical sense; nor did he openly demand the implementation of racial policies. The term “Albanian race” in his writings should be seen instead as an embodiment of physical and social characteristics of people belonging to Albanian nationality. He used the term “race” as a synonym for “ethnic group,” a terminology that was already present in the writings of other Albanian authors during the 1940s.

Radi’s nationalist project thus fused modernist and anti-modernist elements, as his advocacy of fascist measures was linked to the program of modernizing the country. This is one of the paradoxes, not only of Radi’s book, but more broadly of the entirety of political thought in Albania during the 1940s. Radi’s book represents a continuation of the discussions that took place during the 1920s and the 1930s regarding the modernization of Albania. In Radi’s argument, one can find traces of the Neo-Albanianism project as advocated by Branko Merxhani [see **Branko Merxhani**, *The organization of the chaos*]. Vangjo Koça, who also wrote an enthusiastic preface to Radi’s book, was a close friend and collaborator of Merxhani and many of the ideas present in Radi’s book bore the influence of the writings of Neo-Albanian authors.

The communist leadership in post-war Albania initially had a different approach to national issues, an approach that was based on revolutionary and proletarian internationalism. It was in the name of this approach, and also in order to secure their power, that led communists to label as “reactionaries” most of the well-known intellectuals of the 1930s and 1940s, who did not leave the country in 1945, and to carry out harsh repressions against those so-called “enemies of the people.” The fate of Lazër Radi is an extreme exam-

ple. However, along with the consecutive clashes first with Yugoslavia, then with the Soviet Union and finally with China, many of the nationalist ideas permeated communist rhetoric and soon became central themes in Albanian historiography, education policies and social organization. As in other countries in the Balkans, the modernization process launched by the communists eventually implemented many of the ideas that had been originally exposed by these “enemies of the people.”

RH

Fascism and the Albanian Spirit

This book is itself a foreword: a prologue to the historical-political-social endeavor that will have to take place here, in our country. [...] [W]armed up by the civilizing rays of Fascism, Albania will eventually succeed in her progress; it is a path that has been predestined for her by the vivid rhythm of present times and the strong torrent of her history. [...]

For a long time, our hopes for a rejuvenated Albania were permanently lost. We thought that all of the Albanian treasures, moral, and material, had fallen into the clutches of a few already bankrupted politicians, who seemed to own them eternally. [...] On a clear April morning, a glorious and fraternal army crossed the blue Adriatic and landed on the rough coasts of the Albanian lands, in order to bring new laws and justice, and a praiseworthy fate to our suffering nation. In a folk song, which was created following the events of 7 April, we see expressed a deep and strong belief in the general prosperity that Fascism will bring. Our nation believes in the civilizing spirit that will permeate our long forgotten land. [...] The Fascist breath will heal the plague that harms our spirits tormented by the four-and-a-half century long (Ottoman) yoke. As in Italy—with the same aim and spirit—Fascism will also be realized in Albania. [...]

If we want to become civilized we should work. Without work, we will achieve nothing! Without work there is no civilization. Only the savage, the people in African jungles, do not feel the need to work, because they live naked under the shadows of trees waiting for the fruits to fall, so that they can feed themselves. But we cannot live that way! We ought to clothe, feed, dwell in a house and fulfill many, many other needs; and all these needs cannot be fulfilled if we do not work. Work for Us, Albanians, it's a Social Duty! [...]

Fascism is not a dry doctrine! Fascism is a belief, the substance of the things one believes in and achieves. Fascism is a civilization: a set of feel-

ings, actions and thoughts—bigger than a philosophy, one can say it is a Religious Dogma. Fascism is based on strong spiritual foundations, and from them flow the rays of the will, which are hidden inside every man. Fascism is the advocate and the encourager of the healthiest virtues of the race and the sponsor of justice through social solidarity. As such, we will accept Fascism and I believe that through this act of acceptance our national pride is not being damaged. [...]

Albania will have to deal with two unresolved problems: the drainage of souls and the drainage of lands. We, under the flag of Fascist revival, will spend all our energy in the process of building up new souls. Albanian young people should be aware of the success of their mission, upon which lies the future of our country. [...]

The long-lasting Ottoman yoke was unable to change our race, but affected our souls. In general, the mentality of our people is deeply oriental. [...] Only in the remote corners of Albania, there in the mountains, where neither the foot of the Asian nor of any stranger could walk in, the virtues of the race were preserved and remained unspoiled. There lives the pure Albanian spirit. [...] The preservation of the race does not limit itself to the physical aspect, but also embraces intellectual and moral protection. [...]

The misconceptions that—due to political reasons—some foreigners have about us will soon disappear, and they themselves will be astonished by the beauty of the Albanian type. [...] The tempo of our times is very quick and crushing; generally the instincts of everyone seem highly sensitized. In these tumultuous times, we—without a culture that simply belongs to our race, without a culture that truly expresses our spirit—will not be able to achieve anything in any direction. [...] The new Albanian edifice ought to be founded on and built with one element—the Albanian Tradition; but this time, the building, the architecture will be new and appropriate to our times.

Translated by Rigels Halili

ŠTEFAN POLAKOVIČ: SLOVAK NATIONAL SOCIALISM

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About the author

Štefan Polakovič [1912, Čhtelnica near Piešťany (*Hun.* Pöstyén, *Ger.* Pistyan) – 1999, Buenos Aires]: philosopher and political activist. After receiving his secondary education at Trnava, he studied philosophy and theology at the Lateran University in Rome, where he was strongly influenced by Maurice Blondel's philosophy of intuitive-reflective cognition, which distinguished him from other Slovak Christian thinkers, who were embedded mostly in neo-Thomism. During the independent Slovak State (1939–1945) he worked for the Propaganda Office and taught philosophy at the Slovak University in Bratislava. In 1939, he founded the first Slovak philosophical journal, *Filozofický zborník* (Philosophical magazine), where he published an extensive introduction to Blondelism and organized the philosophical department of the *Matica slovenská* foundation. In the late 1930s, he was a very prolific political writer in the service of Hlinka's Slovak Peoples Party (HSPP), and during the war emerged as the most important theoretician of Slovak National Socialism. After 1945, Polakovič went into exile, living in Austria, Germany, and Italy and finally settling down in Argentina. He became an entrepreneur in electro-technology and continued teaching. Throughout the whole exile period, he remained very active as a political apologist of the Slovak war-time state, its ideology and its leader, **Jozef Tiso**. Furthermore, he continued his theoretical work in the field of "natiology" [*naciológia*], his own concept of the science of the nation. After the collapse of state socialism in Eastern Europe, he took an active part in the public discussion in Slovakia on the side of the outspoken nationalist forces advocating the break-up of Czechoslovakia and the establishment of an independent Slovak state, which he portrayed as a direct follow-up of its war-time predecessor. In today's Slovakia, Polakovič is respected as one of the major Slovak philosophers of the 20th century, while his political role and theories are viewed very critically.

Main works: *Il problema di destino* [The problem of destiny] (1939); *K základom slovenského štátu* [About the fundamentals of the Slovak state] (1939); *Slovenský národný socializmus* [Slovak National Socialism] (1941); *Tisova náuka* [The

teaching of Tiso] (1941); *Z Tisovho boja* [On Tiso's struggle] (1941); *Vývin základných myšlienok slovenskej politiky* [The development of the basic ideas of Slovak politics] (1944); *Začiatky slovenskej národnej filozofie* [The beginnings of Slovak national philosophy] (1944); *Na prelome dvoch období* [At the threshold of two periods] (1952); *Qué es una nación?* (1976); *La formación del ser nacional* (1978); *La clave para obra de Ernesto Sabato* (1981); *Teoría de la nación* (1982); *Vidiny o slovenskom národe* [Visions about the Slovak nation] (1982); *Čo je národné bytie?* [What is national existence?] (1982); *Za život národa—za trvanie štátu* [For the life of the nation—for the persistence of the state] (1985); *Pensando la nación* (1986); *Obnova národa duchom Štúra* [The regeneration of the nation through the spirit of Štúr] (1991); *Naše korene v základoch Európy* [Our roots at the foundations of Europe] (1994); *Eseje o národe* [Essays on the nation] (1998).

Context

The independent Slovak state was established on 14 March 1939. Its design was part of Hitler's "Eastern policy," seeking to destroy the post-Versailles order and create satellite states. Upon its formation, the Slovak state concluded a "protection treaty" with Berlin and its fate was thus linked to that of the Third Reich. Its political order was based on authoritarian, anti-democratic principles, with a single ruling Party (Hlinka's Slovak People's Party, HSPP) and national Leader (adopting the Nazi *Führerprinzip* to local conditions), **Jozef Tiso**. This does not mean that there were no internal rifts in the Party and its elite, or that the concrete form of the state was not an object of dispute. However, most of the conceptions seeking an alternative to the unconditional submission to the Nazi interests, such as the idea of "neutrality" in foreign affairs represented by Ferdinand Ďurčanský, or the implementation of the Italian fascist syndicalist model in economy—not to speak of the orientation toward Poland upheld by the once second-in-command in the Party, Karol Sidor (1901–1953)—were quickly suppressed. Especially after the Salzburg negotiations in July 1940 between Tiso and Hitler, foreign policy and, to some extent, also domestic issues came to be dictated by Berlin. Ďurčanský was replaced in the position of the Minister of Foreign Affairs by the Germanophile Vojtech Tuka (1880–1946). The Slovak republic became a part of the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo Axis and joined the Anti-Comintern Pact in November 1941.

During the war, Slovak political life was marked by the contest between two major political streams within the HSPP. The moderate camp was led by President Tiso and was based on the ideas of a corporate, authoritarian state with Christianity as its overarching principle. It did not question German supremacy but tried to meet German requirements only as far as needed. In

contrast, Slovak radicals openly preached the ideology of German National Socialism and tried to emulate the “German model” as much as possible. They were represented by Prime Minister Tuka and the Minister of the Interior and chief of the radical paramilitary troops, the so-called Hlinka Guards, Alexander Mach (1902–1980). This internal strife proved to be a useful tool of manipulation for Hitler. He insisted on keeping the radicals in high government and Party positions, while, at the same time, not allowing them to endanger Tiso’s position, as his main interest during the war was to keep Slovakia in order.

Immediately after the promulgation of “independent” Slovakia, the HSPP cast away its hitherto “lesser evil” politics concerning the existence of a Czechoslovak state, and started to work out a new ideology that portrayed the newly created state as the pinnacle of the “thousand years of Slovak endeavors for their own statehood.” Beyond that, however, a consensus about the new state doctrine was hardly possible, as the intra-party conflict naturally gave rise to different views of what such a doctrine should look like.

Polakovič’s propagandist work, exemplified here by the essay “Slovak national socialism,” was a unique example of the effort to formulate a state doctrine as a synthesis of the credos of both political camps within HSPP—that is, a declared Christian national heritage accommodated, but not totally subservient, to the German national socialist ideology. Polakovič maintained that the German version of National Socialism was a very specific phenomenon, derived from German history and traditions, and that, therefore, Slovaks had to create their own, modified version, drawing on the allegedly prevailing Slovak religious affiliation. Adapting to the current needs of the Slovak state and embedded in Blondel’s “integral realism” and philosophy of action, Polakovič formulated his own theory of the nation based on a strong authoritarian regime, embodying Christian values, nationalist credentials and Catholic social doctrine. This synthesis was, for him, the only possible salvation for the Slovak nation. Polakovič sharply criticized the alleged impotence and sickness of democracy and liberalism that, along with freethinking of all kinds, stood for a potential jeopardy of the God’s intention with each nation.

As a synthetic attempt, Polakovič’s conception of Slovak national socialism was generally accepted by the *ľudák* political camp; at the same time, it met with strong rejection from the radical pro-Nazi leader of the Germans in Slovakia, Franz Karmasin (1901–1970), who declared that national socialism was a unique German creation. From this perspective, Slovaks were supposed to be subordinated to the German interests in a Nazi-dominated “New Europe,” while the German minority in Slovakia was to achieve an extraterri-

torial status, becoming part of the German *Volkgemeinschaft*. Karmasin, nonetheless, was hardly in a position to push through his own radical conceptions, and was often obstructed in his actions by Berlin. Similarly, the ideological project of Polakovič was left unfulfilled as the German leadership was interested in relative stability and thus kept Tiso in power, as they considered him a more consensual figure, using the extreme nationalists as a pressure group to keep the regime on the right track.

After 1945, in his Argentinian exile Polakovič not only cultivated the historical memory of the Slovak state, but also continued to develop his primordialist theory of the Slovak nation. Drawing on his Blondelian philosophical standpoint and his conviction about the metaphysical character and spiritual essence of each nation, he sought to defend and reinforce the Slovak religious and cultural tradition. He lived to see the emergence of independent Slovakia, which did not mean, however, that his theories became once again central to the political discourse. For the populist-nationalist camp, strongly connected to the post-communist establishment, Polakovič's anti-communism was too radical and his links to the war-time collaborationist regime problematic, whereas the reemerging Christian Democratic political movement, while not completely unrelated to the interwar Catholic national conservative tradition, drew more on the canon of neo-Thomist social ethics and opted for the ideological model of post-Second World War Western European Christian Democracy.

PL-MK

Slovak National Socialism. Its necessity and character

The damage liberalism has brought to the Slovak nation, in addition to that already mentioned, included the loss of the fighting spirit within the nation and the weakening of its political performance, the lack of a higher spiritual orientation except for taking selfish advantage of each other, the decline of the idealism of older generations and the ridicule of the service this generation provided in the interest of spirituality.

The liberalized economy quickly gave birth to socialist efforts aiming to balance its ups and downs. Therefore, throughout the 19th century and up until today we see liberalism coupled with various shades of socialism.

Life called for socialization. However, Socialism did not have an adequate worldview and therefore could not bring it about. It was necessary to return to every man the right to a justly remunerated work, not the work accorded to them by the wishes of the exploiting capital, while also pointing out to those

who were not willing to work their duty to do so. It was necessary to renew pride in work and to return personal dignity to the working men. The common folk needed to see work as a means of ennobling the spirit, strengthening the body and improving the healthy self-confidence of the working people. Socialism, even though it had the nice goal of removing social differences, fell far short of satisfying the needs of such a revival. In the first place, its materialism contradicted real life and contributed to the gradual despiritualization of public and private life. Furthermore, socialism overlooked the spiritual reality of nations, which began to understand their autonomy and individuality at the end of the 18th century. National awareness was a strong force, which could not have been extracted from life. It worked miracles for the nation's heart through the force of the fruitful idealism of several generations. At the same time, it was also the manifestation of a lasting value, which could never again be avoided. Socialism underestimated this strong national awareness. Instead, it wanted to introduce colorless unnatural world-citizenship. In any case, socialism was slow in implementing social reform. It both wanted and did not want to realize it. It wanted to, because it saw its necessity. It did not want to, because its humanitarian appeal to capitalists was an empty voice and it lacked the courage for sharp methods, because it was the child of the calm, movement-hating bourgeois world and because the leaders of socialist parties were capitalists.

Communism wanted to solve the social question radically. However, Communism's worldview shared a common ground with Socialism. Communism only escalated what Socialism carefully preached due to its bourgeois character. Marx's dialectic materialism did not add much to the socialist materialistic understanding of the world and life. Furthermore, the resistance to demanding feelings was fully evident in Communism. Communism wanted to positively remove any national differences, which it considered as a creation of the bourgeois-capitalist world, and declared war against nationalism as such. It considered national differences the reason for the economic and social disorder of the world. In each nation, sufficient numbers were ready to cut all links to their forefathers and contribute to the creation of communist world-citizens, who would consider their homeland as the entire world, because homeland is only the land, where one feels material welfare. The difficult social situation of the work force, which was made worse by the 1930 economic crisis, forced intellectuals to take this desperate intellectual step. For a piece of bread, they would have been ready to expose their entire nation to the dangers of heavy internal shocks, which are always hard to overcome. They were convinced that internationalism would contribute to the welfare of mankind. [...]

Neither cosmopolitan and pro-capitalist liberalism, nor international socialism or communism was able to positively solve the relationship between nations and socialization. Europe needed a movement that respected the national community as a spiritually undeniable unit created by God's Providence to enable the development of mankind; a movement advocating the radical reward of social justice to all members of the community; a movement distributing the means of power to create an urgent social program through the eradication of unemployment and the introduction of just remuneration for work and protection of the sanctity of private ownership against the communist understanding, but also using a strong hand to give lessons to capitalism on the function of private ownership.

Such a movement, which implemented social reform within a nation, was established in Germany as National Socialism. Even though many ideologically different worldviews became attached to German National Socialism, it could only be understood on German soil and definitely could not be exported. This is because it is the manifestation of a specific German spiritual tradition, so diversely structured; the original National Socialist character is made manifest in the striving for complete national social justice. From this point of view, National Socialism may be considered the only world movement able to level socially disrupted Europe and save it from the destructive extremes of the capitalist economic structure and communism. On the one hand, National Socialism knocks down the idol of greedy capitalism; on the other it preaches the necessity of private capital and private enterprise for the best of social togetherness (social function of capital). Compared to the other extreme, it is against the removal of private ownership on the one hand, and on the other, it employs private ownership in the service of national unity. Nationalism and its socialization, carried out radically with fists, are the most significant features of National Socialism. Nowadays, National Socialism is the only possible social path between the two ravines threatening European culture today. [...]

Every member of the nation has to participate in this new social order, because it is the dictate of the epoch, which always asks for absolute adjustment in matters of natural rights and natural morality. Those who do not understand the epoch will be overturned and crushed in time. Fire is not a plaything, one cannot be indecisive so close to the fire. Fast action is required at the turning point of history. Action guided by natural law and morality. This respect for natural legal and moral standards protects against temerity, secures steadfastness of decisions and protects against catastrophes that infallibly follow when somebody issues standards without considering their moral basis.

By accepting National Socialism's social and economic programs, we are well aware of what we are doing. It is in fact a new designation for an old and ever current party program. We do not actually speak of an ideological change in Slovakia. It is rather an adjustment to resolute and sharp methods when the nation's welfare is at stake.

We have had and still have very good conditions for national-social thinking. The Slovak national community has not been differentiated into various castes, at least not since Slovak national awareness has existed. Our aristocracy was alienated from us (on the one hand fortunately, on the other unfortunately), when for that period adequate economic conditions ruled Europe, and when nations were not yet widely aware of their identities. So we entered the process of the rebirth of nations poorer and underestimated, but without the burden of social compartmentalization. Since that moment when the Slovak nation became aware of its individuality among European nations, we can boldly say it has formed a socially undifferentiated society of farmers, workers and craftsmen. There is nothing to regret now about the lack of Slovak counts' feudal concepts hindering the Slovak nation in its fast adjustment to the new social stream. This social stream finds us mentally prepared: a nation and its radical socialization in the scope of this country's possibilities. And these possibilities are not limited to their present-day use. The socialization of Slovakia will also bring a gradual opening of the heretofore unused economic opportunities in Svätopluk's homeland.¹

[...]

Finally, Hlinka's nationalism was also social. Hlinka's policies resulted from the needs of Slovak life, the most urgent being the need for bread. The aim of all his efforts was not only to protect his people's voice, but also to provide bread and culture to the Slovak national community. The slogan "Slovakia for the Slovaks" meant securing Slovak bread for Slovak children, who were losing their last slices to dangerous neighbors and brothers from behind the Danube and Morava. Hlinka did not overlook the social question. He used it to awaken Slovaks. He fought for the total solution of the then so-called social question, because he knew that only so would it be possible to energetically address the question of social justice screaming for a solution in Slovakia more than anywhere else.

[...] Our nationalism was inspired and nurtured by the Slovak social movement and focused on social revival, just as our social feelings were still

¹ Svätopluk was the last prince of Great Moravia at the end of the 9th century, who came to be considered as the precursor of Slovak statehood.

penetrated by a deep love of our roots and true Christian nationalism. The dual program of Slovak National Socialism, national and social, found its clearest expression in Slovakia in the leading party program and its devoted followers in the hearts of co-nationals and party members. Following a party's taking over of state power, it is clear that a state party has to use all of the power of the state to implement its old program in practice. The methods of German National Socialism in the social field are a model for us. It is necessary to apply them to socialize Slovak life as soon as possible. A steady will and ruthless energy against anonymous powers willing to slow down the implementation of this program will be needed. However, goal recognition has to be followed by action. The law of the Slovak nation's general welfare must not know a friend and stop in light of their often-ravenous interests. Words are clear; now what is needed is clear and definite action.

However, what connects a Slovak more to this National Socialism than its social program, is his Slovak world-view publicly guaranteed by Slovak governmental circles. The slight hesitation following the 30th of July 1940 was significant and was replaced by general satisfaction, when Prime Minister Dr. Tuka announced, that the essence of Slovak National Socialism was the fact that its spirit was Hlinka's, and that only the methods were Hitler's. However, Hlinka's spirit is Christian. This means that the Slovak community adjusts National Socialism to its spiritual theorems dictated especially by the Christian tradition of our nation. As a result, the Slovak National Socialist worldview is fed and maintained by the Christian worldview, namely by the spirit of the pure Gospel in its genuine form. The Christian worldview may be very well joined with the sharpest social justice demanded by National Socialism. "Securing elementary human needs for all Slovaks is a Christian idea and a program thesis of National Socialism."² There is not one thesis, nor one method of National Socialism's social work, that contradicts the pure Gospel. Any deviations of the National Socialism world-view from the Christian worldview in Germany are only German-specific, originating in German conditions, as Dr. Tuka admitted. Our Slovak worldview remains of a purely Christian character now and for the future, and therefore, our National Socialism has a backbone, its ideological workability of a positively Christian character. We emphasize the word *positive*, as Christianity is not and cannot be curtailed according to individual needs and private conscience, which would wear out in empty phrases on Christians like the behavior miss-

² President Dr. Tiso in Bratislava, September 2, 1940. *Slovák* (03/09/1940). [Author's footnote]

ing the true spirit of Christianity, or which would be some kind of external form without content designed to mislead the community. We do not have to be ashamed of our positively Christian worldview, as Mr. Mach, the Minister of Interior pointed out.³ It is our precious and dear tradition, which we cling to like to hard rock, which will not betray us and which will withstand stormy attacks.

Just as Prime Minister Dr. Tuka already pointed out, we join our National Socialism with a Christian worldview, because we consider our traditional heritage to be a pure belief in a personal God, a pure belief in Christ, the Messiah of nations, a pure belief in the Church, a pure belief in immortality, because we administer our opinion on nationalism, rights, morality, law, and the development of mankind according to the Christian spirit, because we occupy a Christian standpoint as far as the relationship between religion, Church and State is concerned. Everything is clear to us in this aspect, as our tradition is in no way muddy or turbid. Our worldview, which is cardinal for the nation's development, represents its ideological Code; we have nothing to hide and therefore play no games of hide-and-seek. It holds timeless, ever valid, and for our nation well-known truths, which may not be bypassed in public life, not even for tactical reasons, because no tactics are possible in the question of lasting and crucial truths. Temporizing in such cases causes more harm than benefit. Our worldview stands on old foundations introduced by Christianity. The fertilization of the Slovak spirit through these guidelines caused the Slovak spirit to form its specific Slovak ideology needing no foreign imports. Mr. Mach, the Minister of the Interior, reminded us of the need to stick to positive Christianity. [...]

With these prerequisites, Slovak National Socialism becomes uplifting and brings new development to everything that is Slovak, i.e., a new strengthening of national awareness and Slovak national pride, a new, robust expansion in Slovak culture, a stronger attachment to Slovak soil, deeper research and fuller enhancement of Slovak living space, the growth of Slovak population and higher living, spiritual and moral standards of our people.

Translated by Pavol Lukáč

³ "We would have been ungrateful and unreasonable to depart from what has saved us (i.e., Christianity). Nitra, August 25, 1940" *Slovák* (27/08/1940). [Author's footnote]

EMANUEL VAJTAUER: CZECH MYTH

Title: *Český mythus. Co nám lhaly dějiny* (Czech myth. How history deceived us)

Originally published: Prague: Orbis, 1943

Language: Czech

The excerpts are from the original edition, pp. 145–158.

About the author

Emanuel Vajtauer [1892, Tábor – unknown]: journalist and politician. He studied philosophy, foreign languages and later medicine in Vienna, Paris, and Prague. He began his political career writing for the anarchist journals *Nový kult* [New cult] and *Červen* [June]. As a result he was considered a “dangerous Bolshevik activist.” In the summer of 1920, he took part in the 2nd Congress of the Communist International and was one of the founding members of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in 1921. Working for the party’s newspapers, *Rudé právo* and *Rudý večerník*, he identified with the opposition branch led by Bohumil Jílek (1892–1963), which criticized **Bohumír Šmeral’s** leadership. Political controversies led to Vajtauer leaving for the US in 1923, where he joined local Czech leftist organizations. After a long detainment by and squabbling with the American authorities, he was sent back to Europe in 1927. An internal takeover and the ascendance of the Stalinist hardliners around Klement Gottwald (1896–1953) in 1929 led to the marginalization of Vajtauer and many other older Communist Party members. Taking advantage of his linguistic capabilities, he began translating authors such as Sinclair, Reed, Wells, Huxley, Hemingway, Gorky, and Tolstoy for the major publishing house Melantrich, which was close to the nationalist and reformist Czechoslovak National Socialist Party (founded in 1897). Later, Vajtauer enrolled in the party and became editor of its journal, *České slovo* [Czech word]. In the second Czecho-Slovak republic (September 1938 – March 1939), he took active part in the heated ideological debates. During the occupation, he became a prominent pro-Nazi journalist and ideologue and one of the leading members of the collaborationist intellectuals grouped around the Minister of Education in the Protectorate governments, Emanuel Moravec (1893–1945). Vajtauer became editor-in-chief of *Večerní české slovo* [Evening Czech word] and *Přítomnost* [Present]. He left Prague shortly before the May uprising in 1945 and disappeared, most probably in South America.

Main works: *Socialistický stát* [The socialist state] (1919); *Kališníky a českými bratry socialismu* [The Utraquists and the Czech brethren of socialism] (1920);

Revoluce a diktatura proletariátu [Revolution and dictatorship of the proletariat] (1920); *Ostrov slzí* [Island of tears] (1928); *Španělsko v ohni* [Spain in flames] (1937); *Jak po Mnichovu. Můžeme jít s Německem?* [What to do after Munich. Could we go together with Germany?] (1939); *Malé národy v Nové Evropě* [Small nations in the new Europe] (1941); *Vzpoura Evropy a základy nového evropského pořádku* [The revolt of Europe and the foundations of the new European order] (1941); *Český mythus. Co nám lhaly dějiny* [Czech myth. How history deceived us] (1943); *České dějiny ve věku strojovém* [Czech history in the age of machines] (1944).

Context

The 1938 Munich agreement between France, Germany, Great Britain, and Italy forced Czechoslovakia to surrender large territories to the Third Reich. Some political forces strove to retain the basic democratic procedures in the newly established Czecho-Slovakia ("Second Republic"), but radical right-wing forces soon achieved supremacy and pushed the state towards an authoritarian, corporatist regime under the protection of Nazi Germany. On 15 March 1939, Slovakia broke away and the Nazis occupied the rest of the Bohemian territory. The Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia was turned into a colony, whose main aim was to industrially and economically support the German war campaign. For that purpose, the *Endlösung* of the Czech question, that is the complete Germanization of the area, was put off until the supposed victorious end of the war, and a sort of dual system in administration and culture was established. On the one hand, any independent political activity was strictly forbidden and suppressed. On the other hand, the Nazis created a system of administration managed by the Czechs themselves (under severe German control) and in the first years of the war they tolerated a broad cultural autonomy in order to keep the Czechs (with the exception of the Jewish and Roma population) loyal, and the Czech industry in production for the German war machine. A part of the Protectorate administration staff played a double game with the Nazis. In the spirit of the "realist" strategy of the "minor evil" they were loyal on the surface, while at the same time they supported various kinds of resistance activities and kept in contact with the leadership in exile.

In the situation of war and occupation, culture generally gained new importance. Whereas during the interwar Czechoslovak Republic the sphere of art and culture emancipated itself from the "burden" of national politics, the Nazi occupation logically brought Czech culture and the question of national existence close together again. A patriotic tone became an inherent part of every cultural event, taking the form of overall historicization and

recurrent references to great national traditions and figures. However, the occupational power soon ran out of patience and tightened up its cultural policy, while at the same time forcing the activist part of the Czech cultural and political elite into open collaboration, which sometimes entailed reinterpretation of the Czech historical and national canon. This is not to say that these attempts at reinterpretation had no genuine foundations in Czech political thought. The short time of the Second Republic witnessed an intellectual clash over the nature of Czech and Czechoslovak statehood, and generally over the historical and political role of the Czechs within European history. Czech fascists, radical nationalists, Catholic integralists, and other rightists not only criticized the first Czechoslovak republic for its allegedly sham parliamentarism, liberal-democratic weakness, and for begetting moral decay and the disintegration of the nation. In many ways, they had made attempts to reformulate the prevalent constructions of national identity. The rightist political streams were by no means united, yet traditional conservative authoritarian thought successfully merged with Czech fascism (politically marginal during its whole existence) in a “new thinking” about a “new political order.” At the same time, all of these branches of anti-democratic thought had lost a crucial, if not the most important, part of their integral nationalist belief, namely the strong anti-German resentment that was logically expelled from the public space. Instead, an eternal and supposedly natural subordination of the Czechs to German supremacy in Central Europe was constructed and justified.

The occupation visibly polarized the sphere of ideology, with the thin group of collaborators on the one side and the majority of the Czechs, loyal but hostile to the Nazis, on the other. The anti-democratic offensive during the Second Republic had in many ways paved the way for the later wartime collaboration activism epitomized by the Minister of Education, Emanuel Moravec. The most important attempt to reformulate the Czech national ideology from the perspective of the Nazi “new order” was made by Emanuel Vajtauer. In his articles from the time of the Second Republic and the early years of the Protectorate, Vajtauer defended the “St Wenceslas” (the patron of Bohemia) tradition of Czech statehood within the structure of the German Reich and stressed the German civilizational role in Bohemia, employing arguments of historians such as **Josef Pekař**, Josef Šusta (1874–1945), and other members of the positivist Jaroslav Goll (1846–1929) school of historiography. He also pointed to a basic tenet of Czech political thought, from **František Palacký** to the early works of **Tomáš G. Masaryk**, which maintained that the Czech nation’s only possibility to sustain

its independence and existence was inclusion in a protecting greater empire or state.

In his “Czech myth,” written in 1943, Vajtauer strove to deconstruct the entire, supposedly mythological, narrative of Czech history, whose main architect was Palacký. The first myth was a strategic one, claiming that the Czech basin was a natural fortress. Instead, Vajtauer wrote, the Czech lands lay on the European crossroads. The second great myth concerned national character, namely that the Czechs were of a basically peaceful nature. Vajtauer, referring again to Pekař, demonstrated that in the Middle Ages the Czechs were as militant as any other nation. Further, against the myth of Czech independence and the autonomy of Czech culture, Vajtauer claimed that the Czechs had always been part of the German Reich and thus exposed to a prevalent German influence throughout their whole history. It was German culture and German colonization since the 13th century that had transformed the originally Slavic Czechs into a completely “new national substance”—as Vajtauer put it in his diatribe against the “myth of Slavic reciprocity,” drawing on the rebuttal of pan-Slavism by the famous liberal conservative journalist **Karel Havlíček Borovský**. In general, Vajtauer’s book was an attempt to combine historical realism with Nazi biological theories and visions about a new European geopolitical order. Vajtauer believed that, if the Czechs abandoned their historical illusions, they might get a chance to find their place in the German “New Europe” and thus find the solution to the old dilemma of small nation in-between two European great powers (see **Karel Kramář**, *In defense of Slavic politics*).

Vajtauer’s “Czech myth,” along with his other wartime books, has been understood as mere propaganda and hence was largely dismissed during the postwar period. Czech collaborationist ideology during the Protectorate remains largely under-researched. Still, the political history of the Protectorate and the biographies of its main actors, such as the chief quisling Emanuel Moravec or the controversial President Emil Hácha (1872–1945), attracted increasing attention in the broader public after the collapse of state socialism in 1989.

MK

Czech myth

With all love for our own language, we must nonetheless be aware that in two intellectual respects this love has always been a trap and will remain one, whenever we are insufficiently vigilant.

This is because our language deceives us into imagining a kinship long vanished and obscures a new, chosen kinship.

It is above all the fact that we have retained our language that prevents us from seeing that over the centuries we have been the subject of a great experiment on the part of Providence, which has created a *biologically new* nation out of us. Before the experiment there were Germans and Slavs in the Bohemian historical melting pot, but out of the successful experiment came a new historical material—a new nation that arose from the mixing of the two, but that like all syntheses is no longer either one or the other original element, but a third element. We are no longer either a German or a Slav nation, but something *sui generis*, something that did not exist a thousand years ago. Just as the English are a people formed from an original German and Romance mixture but still something historically new, so we are a new national substance in history [...].

Added to this, we have a cultural blood that affiliates us to western culture, even though we have stood close by the border between East and West. This cultural blood is just as powerful as racial blood. Every Czech who goes to a non-European country becomes aware of its power. Immediately, in customs, opinions on life and character, he finds that the German is of all other nations the closest to him. What in Europe he realizes only subconsciously, elsewhere he realizes consciously—that is to say, he sees that both Czech and German are woven of the same cultural fibers.

Every Czech has the opposite experience when staying for any length of time in a Slav country. While his language and upbringing seduce him into seeing Slavs as his brothers, to his own surprise he finds that they are fundamentally alien to him. [...]

A thousand years ago we were still Slavs. In German conditions we did not become Germans, but created a new national essence. Today we are nothing less than a *new, distinctive nation* known as Czech. Neither a Slav nor a German, a Czech, with West European culture. [...]

Hidden in our myth of Cyril and Methodius and of Great Moravia, and in the pan-Slavic myth derived from it, there is a kind of juvenile recklessness, as if we were saying: Yes, for a thousand years we have been encumbered by the German influence, the Western influence. We feel this influence to be

burdensome. Isn't it finally time to forget all that is past and give ourselves up to the opposite influence, the influence of our original other half, the Slav, Eastern influence?

For the whole 19th century to the present day we have been flirting with this idea. But only flirting. There is no real chance of escaping the land of our roots by climbing over the branches, and when the enterprise has proved impossible in the 19th century, the century of national struggle for independence, it is even less possible in the 20th century. In the Soviet Union a state has arisen which by its internationalism and free mixing of races means that sooner or later all the peoples living within it will be extinguished in one great state cosmopolitanism. To wish to belong to the East is to succumb to nationally suicidal tendencies. Like the United States of America with its liberalistic and capitalist internationalism, the Soviets with their Communist internationalism are a destructive corrosive agent in which any nation will dissolve. Naturally, moreover, the earlier culture of each nation will vanish with it. And remember—after all—that it is precisely now that we are just beginning to feel, in every fiber of our being, that these past thousand years of great cultural education have set us on our own feet and in every area we are developing a consciousness of our separate identity and a desire to assert our own distinctive nature. We have found our own national individuality, and for the first time we are creating from an estate nation a new one that embraces all classes. Nobody can erase his past, however much he wants to. The law of heredity is implacable. [...]

Yes, to grow in accordance with our own internal laws! This is precisely what we want—it might be objected. It is precisely this desire that has driven us to independence, including statehood. We simply regard ourselves as having grown up. We recognize in full, if you like, our debt to the Germans after a thousand years. We are even willing to thank them formally, like pupils who organize a celebration for their professors after their graduation examinations. We can assure them of our continued gratitude and love, but from now on we want to stand on our own feet and go our own way.

This attitude would be entirely praiseworthy, if there was not the question of our very existence. To stand on one's own feet means to have a basis for independent existence. And here we arrive at our most fundamental national problem.

Our basic fact and fate is that we are a small nation. Small in numbers. This has afflicted us from the very beginnings of our existence in the centre of Europe. [...]

Our smallness and our position at the crossroads limit our field of action. Several of our national thinkers have already sensed the problem, and it has given rise to the idea that the meaning of our history is not dependent on the field of action but on the field of spirit. Indeed, in the field of the spirit we have a much stronger record than in the field of action. It is only necessary to recall the names of St Wenceslas, St Adalbert, Hus, Chelčický, Comenius, Březina, Aleš, Smetana, Dvořák, and Myslbek.¹ By contrast, a field of action requiring the movement of great collectives in great matters is something we have been unable to find only in ourselves. For us the field of action merges with the field of Europe.

This book has tried to demonstrate the fact. Those five to six hundred years that we lived in the Middle Ages during the heroic period of the Empire gave us the opportunity for many great deeds. At that time, under the Přemyslids, we were able to be soldiers, who are essentially representatives of the field of action. At that time, we were enabled to enjoy not only a high field of action but also to cultivate a deep spiritual field, as the celebrated era of Romanesque and Gothic in our country indicates. Within the Empire we grew into a kingdom unrivalled in the Europe of its age. We took a major part in the Crusades and protected Europe from incursions from the East. Our hearts beat to a European pulse, the blood of European culture flowed through our organism, our brows were home to the spiritual currents of Europe, and our eyes flamed with the will of Europe. We were not numerous, but we were a great nation.

The reversal came as soon as European unity began to crack. The West gradually detached itself, turning its back on Central Europe and its face towards the mysterious and promising Oceanic distance. Each nation began to work simply in its own interests and not for the European collective. In the twilight of European unity, we too have been groping blindly for the roots of our national being, fencing them off from all disruptive elements, fighting for

¹ St. Wenceslas (Václav, c. 907–926 or 935), Přemyslid duke and patron of Bohemia; St. Adalbert (Vojtěch, c. 956–997), bishop of Prague and missionary; Jan Hus (c. 1369/70–1415), priest, university teacher and Church reformer; Petr Chelčický (c. 1390–c. 1460), religious thinker and radical social reformer; Comenius (Jan Amos Komenský 1592–1670), teacher, educator and the last bishop of the Unity of Brethren; Otakar Březina (1868–1929), major symbolist poet; Mikoláš Aleš (1852–1913), 19th-century painter and illustrator; Bedřich Smetana (1824–1884) and Antonín Dvořák (1841–1904), the two most well-known 19th-century Czech composers; Josef Václav Myslbek (1848–1922), major turn-of-the-century sculptor of the monumental-realist style.

them and over them. Under the Empire we were full of pride and will to action, but as Europe dissolved into nations we became pervaded by anxiety for ourselves and our dear language. This march of Europe on the road to clearly defined nationalities has taken centuries, and for all those centuries we have experienced a mutable, unstable existence, growing ever more aware of our smallness on the battleground of introverted nations into which Europe has fragmented [...].

The era of independent nations has only benefited large nations. Only large nations have been able to uphold and enforce their field of action, while the small nations have felt their own helplessness, and consumed the energy of their thought in fears for their own national existence.

The fate of small nations, however, also threatens to overtake large nations. International express trains across borders, aircraft that reduce continents to one continuous territory, the need for many and various raw materials that must be sought throughout the entire world—all these and many other circumstances are making what were once great states small. The advance of military technology can bring a great state to its knees in a few weeks, as we have seen in the case of France.

Moreover, we are seeing the emergence of great powers that may be termed continental. On the one hand, there is the almost self-sufficient continent of North America, more or less united in one political formation with a single powerful continental will, and on the other hand the Eurasian continent represented by the Soviet Union, likewise self-sufficient and likewise controlled by a single will. Between these two giants, every other formation is small. The former great European states are also feeling the unavoidable need to join together in one continent with the aim of ridding its inhabitants of a looming inferiority complex. Only such unification can avert the danger that one day these states too will lose their fields of action, just like the small states.

For us there are glimmers of a better future in this situation. We can only welcome the rebirth of the idea of a great European collective. We can only welcome the fact that once again people talk of the Reich as a great family of European nations, united by the idea of European cultural tradition and once again setting itself a great common purpose, worthy of the former glory of a dynamic continent.

Only this development can rid us of the anxiety we have never before been able to suppress. Only in this new European unity can we rediscover our lost field of national action.

The reason is that European unity is different from that of America or the Soviet Union. It is a unity that has nothing in common with American-Soviet

cosmopolitanism and internationalism. It is based on the nation as the entity cultivated by Providence for ends that until now have been intangible. The distinctive identity of the nation must be protected. Unification should strengthen nations, not dissolve them.

The New Europe, united in one will but nonetheless maintaining the unique character of nations, is the new and sufficiently spacious garden in which the pine tree of our national action and achievement, freed from the constriction of a small tub, will find enough soil for its roots and once again lift its crown gloriously into the heights.

Translated by Anna Bryson

SVETISLAV STEFANOVIĆ: THE BUILDING OF NEW SERBIA AS A PEASANT STATE

Title: *Izgrađivanje Nove Srbije kao seljačke države* (The building of New Serbia as a peasant state)

Originally published: *Srpski narod*, Christmas 1942

Language: Serbian

The excerpts are from Svetislav Stefanović, *Starim ili novim putevima. Odabrani politički spisi, 1899–1943* [Old ways or new ways? Selected political writings, 1899–1943], Novi Sad: Artpoint, 2006, pp. 81–84.

About the author

Svetislav Stefanović [1877, Novi Sad (*Hun.* Újvidék) – 1944, Belgrade]: physician, poet, translator, literary critic, and political theorist. He graduated from the Gymnasium in Novi Sad, and embarked on studies of polytechnics, philosophy, and eventually medicine in Vienna and Prague. He specialized in treating tuberculosis and at the same time completed his doctoral thesis on Shakespeare's *Hamlet*. Upon returning to Serbia in 1903, he worked as a physician. He participated in the two Balkan Wars and the First World War as an officer, serving in the medical corps. During the First World War, he retreated with the Serbian army to the island of Corfu in 1915, and took part in the restructuring of the military medical service. Being in the forefront of the epidemiological laboratory created in Thessaloniki by Ludwig Hirschfeld, he developed an interest in heredity, particularly experimenting in relations between human races and blood groups. After the Great War, he took an active part in the restructuring of healthcare in the new country, gaining prominence in a heated debate over the causes of the disastrous 1915 typhoid epidemics that seriously affected Serbia. An occasional translator from German, Italian, French, and Hungarian, he gained recognition by translating Shakespeare's works. He was also an accomplished poet, noted for his verses and essays written between 1910 and 1925. Stefanović started his political career as a leftist. After moving to Serbia he joined the People's Radical Party, only to switch to the Independent Radical Party in 1910. After the war, he was among the founders of the Republican Democratic Party. He left the party in 1922 and stayed out of party politics for more than a decade. During this time he developed an independent publishing activity and devoted himself to the popularization of eugenics. He gradually shifted to a vehemently anti-Marxist position, acknowledged the monarchy as a symbol of Yugoslav unity, and adopted allegiance to Christianity in place of his formerly militant atheism. In 1936, he joined the right-wing circle called *Jugoslovenska akcija* (Yugoslav Action), and

became an influential member of Dimitrije Ljotić's fascist movement *Zbor*. He translated Mussolini's book *On the Corporate State*, but parted ways with Ljotić in 1937. At the initiative of the former members of Yugoslav Action, who dominated the cultural scene of collaborationist Serbia during the German occupation, Stefanović was appointed to lead *Srpska književna zadruga* (the Serbian Literary Association) from 1942–1944. In 1943, as a medical expert, he took part in one of the Nazi-organized visits to the site of the NKVD mass killings in Vynnitsa, Ukraine. He wrote abundantly and fervently against communism, endorsing the collaborationist regime of General Milan Nedić, and promoting his vision of an organic New Serbia within the Nazi "Neuordnung Europas." He was arrested two days after the liberation of Belgrade and shot by the communist authorities on grounds of collaboration. His scattered writings, both political and literary, started to reappear in the mid-1990s, coming to public attention only after 2000, resulting in three monographic studies about his life and work, and culminating in a 2008 judicial rehabilitation.

Main works: *Pogledi i pokušaji* [Views and attempts] (1919); *Sabrana dela 1–4* [Collected works] (1931); *Nova antologija srpske lirike* [New anthology of Serbian poetry] (1943); *Starim ili novim putevima. Odabrani politički spisi, 1899–1943* [Old ways or new ways? Selected political writings, 1899–1943] (2006).

Context

Having been out of politics since 1922, Stefanović announced his comeback to the public arena through a series of contributions in the dailies *Vreme* (June – December 1934) and *Ideje* (November 1934 – June 1935). This was a politically volatile period marked by the crisis of royal dictatorship in Yugoslavia. The "personal regime" of King Alexander, proclaimed in 1929, was based on the disbanding of political parties, and on the staunch advancement of the so-called "integral Yugoslavism," which was seen as a necessary shortcut to the creation of a Yugoslav nationhood at the expense of other national and regional identities. Initially fairly popular, those measures soon lost momentum. The Constitution of 1931 allowed for bicameral representation, but the representatives were not to be elected as members of the parties. As this proved difficult to realize, the King created a party, *Jugoslovenska Nacionalna Stranka* [Yugoslav National Party], which was under his control, but failed to gain a stable constituency. By 1934, the King was wavering between the prospect of gradually lifting the ban on political parties and further reform in the direction of corporate representation. Any plans he might have had were cut short by his assassination in October 1934 in Marseilles.

Lacking the political muscle, popularity, and military power of his predecessor, the Regent, Prince Paul, was forced to gradually abolish the personal regime and to seek compromise with the leaders of the political parties, while entertaining other options. In this context, a number of intellectuals tried to

influence both the Crown and public opinion in order to implement their views on the re-organization of the country. Stefanović proposed a “renewal of Yugoslav nationalism,” the leitmotif of his texts published in 1934. The basis of this renewal lay in the strengthening of the Yugoslav national culture and its base in the peasantry, which was seen as the uncorrupted embodiment of the Yugoslav spirit. His vision of organic patriotism was marked by a complete rejection of liberal democracy and party politics in favor of a socially responsive Yugoslav nationalism, which was supposed to take its place in the “European neo-nationalist surrounding.” Not too original in his advocacy of the corporate system, Stefanović distinguished himself by giving it a firm racial edge. He acknowledged the existing religious and ethnic diversity of Yugoslavia, but he saw the common racial root as a unifying element of Yugoslav nationalism. These ideas brought him closer to the small but influential groups of intellectuals that advocated different brands of fascism as a solution for the future of Yugoslavia. Marginalized in the course of the revival of party politics during the Regency (1935–1941), and weakened by internal struggles and splits, they gained voice after the April 1941 *Blitzkrieg* and the ensuing occupation and partition of Yugoslavia.

In the chaos that followed, many prominent public figures fled the country, while others were arrested or withdrew into isolation. At the same time, the Nazis created a local quisling government to assist in the administration of (shrunk) Serbia. The so-called “Commissar government” (May – August 1941) did not live up to this task, and as a result General Milan Nedić was appointed as Prime Minister of the so-called “Government of National Salvation” (September 1941 – October 1944). Nedić’s government attempted to give a broad ideological basis for collaboration with Nazi Germany, as well as to secure support of both the general public and the *intelligentsia*. Its policies oscillated between extreme ethnic nationalism and conservative peasantism, and this attracted a number of intellectuals, including Stefanović, who assumed a visible role in restoring the cultural life of the country. His appointment in 1942 as the head of *Srpska književna zadruga* was meant to be a step towards rebuilding Serbian culture on a “healthy basis.”

Stefanović lent his professional and public voice to the collaborationist regime. His 1942 Christmas article, published in the regime’s weekly, represented the final stage of his intellectual trajectory. He blamed the organizers of the March 27, 1941 *coup d’état* (staged to prevent Yugoslav accession to the Axis), prewar party politics and the corrupt administration for the national defeat in 1941, and announced the beginning of a new era for the Serbian people. He stated that the Serbian people were finally free of the illu-

sions brought about by both the Yugoslav experiment and liberal individualism. He simultaneously criticized "capitalist egoism" and "alien Communism," and praised the social revolution that he saw as being under way in occupied Serbia. The essence of this revolution was a radical "return" to the organization of society around the concept of the organic unity of New Serbia, envisaged as a peasant state of corporate solidarity, based on the tradition of peasant communes (*zadruga*), ready to assume its place in the New European Order. In order to achieve this, however, he needed to distance himself from the Serbian populist ideological tenet originating with **Svetozar Marković** and developed further by **Nikola Pašić**, which stressed the identity of the Russian *mir* and the South-Slavic *zadruga*. In the context of the competition of totalitarian models, Stefanović made a radical, although somewhat artificial, distinction between the two: while *mir* was supposedly materialist, *zadruga* was based on a common spirituality, thus providing the social and ideological basis for an authentic Serbian national socialism.

VP

The building of New Serbia as a peasant state

The madness of 27 March and the national and military catastrophes that followed prevented the Serbian people from experiencing that deep internal transformation which was inevitable, unavoidable, practically at the door. It was clear even to ordinary people that our parliamentary regime and party system were at an end, so corrupted and used up that no radical or palliative measures could save or rescue them. Weakened by political formulae turned into completely empty phrases, they were less stable than a house of cards in the middle of a storm of social revolution, which has spread over the whole of Europe and has brought enormous social changes around it. As these changes spread outside European borders, they caused conflicts, which inevitably led into a new world war which, as I have pointed out in numerous articles, was the unavoidable consequence of this deep social revolution which certain European nations had already organized and experienced.

Our desperate attempts to cling to the old forms of organization of our state and our society were from the start condemned to failure. The only question which remains to be clarified by future historians is to what extent, in this struggle for power and over old political forms, our so-called politicians were, unconsciously or perhaps consciously, only tools in the hands of those powers which by now have become obvious to everyone, the powers of

the most brutal, the most inhumane and the most violent capitalistic egoism, thus far unrecorded in the history of humankind; the powers which have thrown both our nation and other nations, both friends and foes, into the whirlpool of world conflict and sure ruin, without giving them either time or possibility to accomplish the internal transformation that was at their doors.

However, if the Serbian people could not or did not manage to achieve this transformation within Yugoslavia, they are not relieved of their historical duty and necessity to realize this within the state in which they found themselves after the catastrophe. This task is so much more urgent because we can already not only glimpse the outlines of the new post-war European order, but we can see that the foundations of that new order are being created on the legacies and bases of this already organized European social revolution.

One faulty understanding

It is therefore wrong to think that the Serbian people can join this new European order—new in its state and social structures, created through this social revolution—while waiting for the end of the war in their own old and old-fashioned state and social structures and in rigid forms of the fake democratic parliamentarism, capitalism and liberal individualism. No. The Serbian people must actively prepare to participate in that new order, and must be equipped for that participation, if they are not to be definitely excluded and forever eliminated, as something dead and surpassed, something foreign and harmful to the new organism. The Serbian people will accomplish this much more easily because it will allow them to finish the process which was started when Serbian peasants, in the form of smallholders, were freed from the last vestiges of feudal laws, of [Turkish] aghas and beys, and when those freed peasants, smallholders, were set as the foundation and the base of the new Serbian nation-state.

The truth is that from the very beginning, from the very first hours of existence, that state encountered fatal difficulties because of the internal struggle of the two dynasties which often had the character of a civil war, and because it was pulled from the outside into the whirlpool of the conflict of interests of the great European powers who had their own goals in the Balkans and the Middle East. There were not enough wise and farsighted statesmen involved in the process of creating and organizing the joint state with the Croats and the Slovenes. Thus Yugoslavia was created according to the recipes of foreign and imposed fake democratic cabinet politics, without any relevance for

everyday reality, and therefore was given the most impossible form, doomed from the start to fall to pieces at the first serious crisis.

Even more serious is the sin of the Serbian politicians and statesmen, whatever their party colors. They imposed and dragged people into the dispute over political problems and programs, and thus we had liberalistic groups and programs, then progressive, then radical and finally social-democratic groups of all nuances, colors and factions, all according to the European model, and very far removed from the everyday reality of the Serbian national and social basis, which should have been expanded on the logical, natural and organic foundations on which it had been built, i.e., as a state of peasant smallholders with numerous communal elements which were preserved and already adapted to the modern way of life. While we were entangled in the mindless constitutional battle, whose biggest absurdity was the more than Quixotic struggle for the most liberal constitution in Europe (more liberal than the Belgian one—what an honor and pride!), we abandoned the basic needs and the first requirements of the most primitive cultural life, and the most urgent concerns for and engagement in the improvement of the villages and the standard of life in rural areas.

We had whole libraries of every possible, even the most modern, book on political, mostly democratic, doctrines, and almost not a single one about the problems of Serbian villages, their needs, their cultural conditions and their life tasks. And all of this in the country which was freed from 500 years of foreign feudal bondage by those same Serbian peasants, with the village commune as the key agency in the Serbian revolution. It is difficult to find a greater paradox and a more absurd situation in the recent history of Europe!

Communism is foreign to the Serbian people

This is why I have been advocating a radical reassessment and rejection of all this foreign unnatural and absurd political ballast, which has no relevance to the Serbian peasant nation and everyday reality. That is why I support an organic improvement and rebuilding of a New Serbia as a peasant state, a state of smallholders, with elements of communal (*zadruga*) organization. I stress here the smallholder type of Serbian village and the communal organization as characteristic for the Serbians in order to free the people from the comment that it leans in any shape or form towards any kind of communism, either as ideology or as a political program. The Serbian people have never in their history had a communist type of village ownership and life, and can therefore have no inclinations towards it. This is a fundamental difference

between the Serbian and e.g., Russian peasants, as well as between the *zadruga* and the Russian *mir* as forms of a village commune; within a *zadruga* a member organizes and gives shape to the ownership of land, in *mir* the land imposes the type of commune on people. At the end of the day, in *zadruga* it is work and spirit which organize the material aspects and the property, while in the other instance it is the material goods and the property which organize the spirit. This distinction is behind the active creative potential of the Serbian people on one side, and the passive, slavish mentality of the Russian masses, who are prepared to endure any slavery and tyranny, from the tsar's to the Bolsheviks', even without protests or revolts, together with that fatalistic Russian "nothing" (*nichevo*), perfectly foreign to the Serbian mentality.

The task of the Serbians can and has to have only one aim, that is to use their own forms of state and social structure to catch up with the European social revolution, whose biggest and most impressive success thus far has been the fact that it managed to support lower and middle-class man, small-holdings and medium-size farms; it gave them a secure and real basis and turned them into a real and secure basis of the state and nation. In order to promote this program it would be necessary to confirm that New Serbia is being built free of any traces of internationalist or communist ideologies and programs foreign, in their essence, to the mentality and habits of the Serbian people.

Family as a basic unit

In the same manner, New Serbia would have to reject and discard all remnants of democratic parliamentarism and liberalistic individualism, and would have to set the state and the national collectivity above any individual or any individual class interests, and to place not individual or class, but family as a basic cell of the foundations of its state and its social structure. New Serbia is aware of its ties to Europe and its culture as an extended homeland, and to Central Europe and its nearer neighbors as a space of its cultural and social development, in which, even until now, the Serbian people have performed not only an honorable role but also a mission defending Europe from the Asians, and contributing to the cultural and social development of the Balkans and the Danube basin.

As a logical consequence of these ideas, New Serbia will cancel and annul all privileges and so-called acquired rights of the former leaders of the parliamentary regimes and parties, and will organize the whole nation, in the spirit of the appeal of president Nedić, into a socialist party which will be the

foundation of the new internal order, and which will externally be the bridge to allow New Serbia to access the new European Order, which is being created in the fight of the united people of Europe against the Anglo-American and Judeo-Masonic international fake democracy; all of these, together with their puppets, it considers its enemies and adversaries.

Last but not the least, New Serbia should annul the citizenship, and all the rights tied to it, of all its present and former citizens who have joined the ranks of its enemies and adversaries. These, I think, are the preconditions for the renewal of the state and nation, possible only through the continuation and finalization of the historical task and mission of the Serbian people.

Translated by Anna Rebmann

EDVARD KOCBEK: COMRADESHIP

Title: *Tovarišija: dnevniški zapiski od 17. maja 1942 do 1. maja 1943* (Comradeship: Notes from the diary between 17th May 1942 to 1st May 1943)

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About the author

Edvard Kocbek [1904, Sveti Jurij ob Ščavnici, *Ger.* Sankt Georgen an der Stainz (Northeastern Slovenia) – 1981, Ljubljana]: poet, writer, essayist, and political activist. The son of a church organist, he joined the Catholic youth movement in high school. After a short period in the seminary in Maribor, he enrolled at the University of Ljubljana, graduating in Romance philology. As a student, he became a prominent member of the Catholic Leftist intellectual circle centered on the journal *Križ na gori* [The Cross on the Mountain]. Between 1928 and 1932, he studied in Berlin, Lyon, and Paris, where he became familiar with personalism and Marxism. Between 1932 and 1942, he worked as a high school teacher. In 1935, his first poetry collection, *Zemlja* [Earth], a modernist exaltation of rural life, gained him public acclaim. In 1937, his essay on the Spanish civil war (*Premišljevanje o Španiji*, Reflections on Spain), condemning the ultra-conservative stance of the Spanish clergy, triggered a wide controversy within the Slovenian Catholic movement. By the late 1930s, Kocbek became the main intellectual reference for the Slovene Catholic left. After the occupation of Yugoslavia by the Axis forces, he joined the anti-Fascist underground coalition, known as the Liberation Front of the Slovenian People; in spring of 1942, he joined the partisan guerrilla. In 1943, he officially recognized, together with representatives of other non-Communist groups, the authority of the Yugoslav Communist Party. In November 1943, he was a member of the Slovenian delegation at the second meeting of the Anti-Fascist Council of the National Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ) in Jajce (Bosnia). On this occasion, AVNOJ assumed supreme legislative powers and proclaimed the establishment of a new Yugoslav federation. He was appointed Minister of Culture in the Yugoslav provisional government (NKOJ) and remained in the Yugoslav partisan headquarters until the end of the war. Between 1944 and 1952, he served in several high-ranking political positions at the federal level and in Slovenia, but had very little effective power. In 1952, he was forced to resign following the publication of a collection of short stories entitled “Fear and

courage,” in which he approached the theme of partisan resistance from an existentialist perspective. In the early 1960s, after a decade of forced isolation, he was allowed to return to public life, but only as a writer; he nevertheless remained under constant surveillance. By the 1970s, he became a reference point for the young generations of Slovenian modernist authors. In 1975, the Trieste-based journal *Zaliv* [Bay] published an interview with Kocbek, in which he condemned the summary killings of the Slovenian collaborationist militiamen after WWII, provoking a massive campaign against him in the Yugoslav press. He died in 1981. He is considered one of the central Slovene intellectual figures of the 20th century, and one of the most important poets.

Main works: *Zemlja* [Earth] (1934); *Tovarišija* [Comradeship] (1949); *Strah in pogum* [Fear and courage] (1951); *Groza* [Dread] (1963); *Slovensko poslanstvo: dnevnik s poti v Jajce 1943* [The Slovenian mission: Diary from the journey to Jajce in 1943]; *Listina: dnevniški zapiski od 3. maja do 2. decembra 1943* [The Document: Notes from the Diary between 2 May and 2 December 1943] (1967); *Poročilo: pesmi* [Report: Poems] (1969); *Žerjavica* [Embers] (1974); *Svoboda in nujnost* [Freedom and necessity] (1974); *Krogi navznoter* [Inside circles] (1977); *Pred viharjem* [Before the storm] (1980); *Sodobni misleci* [Contemporary thinkers] (1981); *Dnevnik 1951–1952* [Diary, 1951–1952] (1987); *Dnevnik 1945* [Diary 1945] (1991); *Dnevnik 1946* [Diary, 1946] (1991); *Osvobodilni spisi I.* [Writings from the Resistance I] (1991); *Dnevnik 1947* [Diary, 1947] (1993); *Osvobodilni spisi II.* [Writings from the Resistance II] (1991); *Dnevnik 1948* [Diary 1948] (1995).

Context

The 1930s marked the height of the political power of the Slovene Catholic movement. The Slovene People's Party, as the main expression of political Catholicism in Slovenia, was part of the conservative coalition that ruled Yugoslavia; and as such it was delegated political power at the local level. Its roots in Slovene society enabled it to establish and maintain a virtually unchallenged social and political hegemony for almost half a century. However, from the early 1930s onward, the differences within Slovene political Catholicism deepened. On the one hand, an integralist movement, professing a corporatist and authoritarian worldview, grew in importance; on the other, the influence of Marxism increased among the Catholic left. By the late 1930s, there was already a profound internal fracture that would become evident after the outbreak of the war, when the left wing joined the Communist-led partisan resistance, while the right chose to collaborate with the occupying regimes (first Italian, then German).

This duality had been a constitutive trait of Slovene political Catholicism since its beginnings and, paradoxically, also a source of its strength. In the 1890s, it emerged as a convergence of three quite different elements: the

anti-liberal and pro-Habsburg ultramontanist of the church hierarchy; a new type of conservatism characterized by a charismatic leadership and radicalized nationalist rhetoric; and Christian Social associationism at the grassroots level. The latter became the main vehicle of mass mobilization. Its father figure, the priest and politician Janez Evangelist Krek (1865–1917), was inspired by German and Austrian cooperativism, and by the Viennese mayor Karl Lueger, the founder of the Austrian Christian Social movement; at the same time, Krek engaged in a dialogue with various socialist and civic radical currents and extended his activism from the peasantry to important segments of the industrial proletariat.

Acclaimed as the people's tribune, Krek became the champion of the Christian leftist youth and the main source of inspiration for the Slovene Catholic trade unionism and Christian Socialism of the 1920s and 1930s, while at the same time being considered one of the inspirers of the predominantly conservative Slovene People's Party. With the demise of Social Democracy in Yugoslavia in the early 1920s, Christian Socialism became the most influential political force among the growing class of industrial workers in Slovenia. In the intellectual sphere, the Slovene Catholic left expressed its opinions in the journal *Križ na gori*, published by a group of young authors and activists, inspired primarily by the teachings of the Italian-German theologian and philosopher Romano Guardini.

Edvard Kocbek soon emerged as the most charismatic member of this group; by the late 1930s, he was considered the main intellectual spokesman of Slovene Christian Socialism. His views were characterized by a highly idiosyncratic synthesis of different philosophical sources: Catholic social activism, Marxism, French personalism, Christian existentialism, and Claudelian modernist aesthetics, blended together with anti-Fascism and an emphasis on Slovene national individuality.

Kocbek has been mostly regarded as the heir and pinnacle of the progressive tradition of Slovene political Catholicism: first with his pro-Republican stand in the Spanish Civil War, and then with his active participation in the Slovene anti-Fascist resistance. This interpretation tends, however, to neglect the anti-modernist features of Kocbek's thought: his millenarism and palingenetic nationalism, his critique of modern technology, and so on. Although these features would become especially evident in his late poetic production, influenced by the reading of late Heidegger and Teilhard de Chardin, they are discernible already in what is probably his most important prose text: the first part of his wartime journal, entitled "Comradeship" (*Tovarišija*). Written during his first year in the partisan guerrilla and pub-

lished with minor changes after the war, it expresses the chiliastic exaltation of the armed resistance as the *kairos*, the supreme moment of national emancipation, in which the alienation of the nation brings about an epochal struggle for freedom and justice.

Observations on the daily life of the insurgency are intertwined with philosophical and political reflections, many of which deal with the question of how to bring together Communism and Christianity. Kočbek had no final answer, but his arguments were these: 1) both Christianity and Marxism (of which Communism is the most genuine expression) are concerned with the restoration of humanity's full potential; 2) both ideologies claim that this restoration can only happen collectively, by overcoming the alienating negativity of individualism; and finally 3) both Christianity and Marxism emphasize the temporal, i.e., concrete historical dynamics of this dialectical process. For Kočbek, these are not abstract arguments, but tangible phenomena: therefore, they are presented throughout the text in the form of anecdotes, parables, and poetic descriptions of the everyday experiences of the partisan units. "Comradeship" is thus primarily a testimony of the concrete historical moment, which sees the dialectical convergence of Christianity and Marxism, creating the embryo of an entirely new society. The Slovene nation therefore becomes both the agent and the witness of this epochal event. The text can also be read through a mystical, teleological key: the humiliated and suffering body of the nation, which, by actively assuming its destiny, re-emerges into a new collective entity, emancipates all the individuals who participate in this common endeavor.

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Comradeship: Notes from the diary between 17th May 1942 to 1st May 1943

26th September, 1941. My first time among the partisans. [...] In the evening, we returned to Ljubljana. [...] My mind was clear and peaceful; the secret in which we have participated has filled me with a devoted discipline. I thought of the struggles against the Avars and the Bavarians, of the Turkish wars, of the peasant uprisings, of the brigandage and military mutinies. The partisan movement has risen in its significance above all these struggles and rebellions. [...] On my desk lies the last book of *War and Peace*. [...] I felt the urge to fuse the two contradictory poles that interest and torment Tolstoy: to merge freedom and necessity. [...] I would like to go through the dread of the patriotic war like Pierre Bezukhov went through the horrors of Napoleon's Russian

campaign: with a need of both elementariness and reflection, with devotion and respect, bravely and loyally. [...] I want to plunge myself into authenticity, into reality, into the wilderness of life. I want to go to the forest as soon as possible. [...]

21st June, 1942. At the meeting of the Executive Committee [of the Liberation Front] we discussed the essence of the Slovene national revolution. [...] The Slovene nation can save itself from the current crisis only with a social-revolutionary endeavor, and by no means with exclusively democratic measures. [...]

3rd October, 1942. Europe is not facing the old dilemma: either the victory of Fascism or anti-Fascism, but a new, more important one: either the reformism of democracies or the revolution of Socialism. [...] It is our historical fault, as Christians, that we do not have a leading position in the contemporary social and political struggles. In accordance to social and vital laws, other forces have taken this position, and it is part of our greatness to admit it. [...] We have to collaborate with all those who stand on progressive standpoints, although they differ from us in their worldview. [...]

8th October, 1942. I am reading the speeches of the Fascist journalist Nicotera that have been broadcast lately on Radio Ljubljana. My attention was caught by the following passage: "... A small nation whose soul feels the flames of heroism, and lacks the necessary brakes that would prevent it from clashing with an enemy ten times stronger than itself, is doubtlessly a heroic nation: but also a deranged one!" [...] A small, heroic and deranged nation. Nobody before has ever written anything like this about the Slovenes. Only now, after this public admission, I feel that something indescribably new is happening within our people. Less than two years have passed since we have entered the war full of fear, and the enemy already recognizes in us the quality of heroism, which is, next to sainthood, man's most intensive stage. Moreover, this heroism is not recognized only in a few individuals that have been misled, as they think, into madness by the Communists: it is recognized in the whole people. When I think about this heroism, I discover that it is melded with a peculiar experience of the moral tenor in the contemporary Slovene, with a mixture of education, religious sensitivity, fanatic realism, and a perverted servility that has become aware of itself and wants to liberate its long suppressed vital and moral forces. [...]

14th October, 1942. Despite my faith in the guarantee of eternal justice, I find myself accepting with surprising ease the current relativization of the sense of justice and law. Positive law emerges, grows and dies like all other human expressions. [...] The concrete form of law which has been taking shape

in the last hundred years does not fit any more the demands of the new sense of justice which is setting the new age of history. [...] In other words: within these new changes, the revolutionary act represents the highest resort. [...] Revolutionary violence has the historical duty to destroy counter-revolutionary violence. Since the revolutionary violence of the people contains the will of liberation from all violence and power, [...] our current fight against Fascism and imperialism is also a fight against power and violence in general. That is why our current violence is in the true sense a moral one. [...]

20th October, 1942. I am aware of the extremely hard internal tribulations that await the Christian in the new era. I am not afraid of them. I want them to bring about the harmony between the natural and the supernatural order, to solve the question of the so-called alienation in the sociological and psychological sense, to loosen the antagonism between religion and humanism. Christianity is still rooted in the medieval atmosphere, when the absolute value of God darkened too much all temporal values. The Middle Ages were in an astonishing accordance with man's ultimate truth, but they forgot about the penultimate one. The modern Christian must achieve a full and emancipating relationship with this penultimate truth without forgetting about the ultimate one. This is the gigantic task of future Christianity.

10th November, 1942. Next to our camp, foxes dug up a grave [...] of a traitor. Tonight, we will cover it with a heavier layer. [...] We know that man is the highest, an almost royal being on our planet, maybe in the whole solar and cosmic system. However, we are now realizing that man protects his dignity and his progress with measures blemishing his greatness. I accept this contradiction as a fact, but this cannot appease me. [...] No, we cannot give up. In the midst of war, we have to rebel against war itself. This is the deepest sense of liberation. War must remain only a means, it must not take root and settle in man. True liberation begins when man starts fighting against generalizations, superficiality and relativism, against all dehumanizing forces, above all against fatalism. No, we cannot give up.

22nd December, 1942. Holy wrath is troubling my mind again. I have discovered that its opposite is not rational condemnation, but hatred. [...] Hatred is essentially anarchic, it crumbles man's spirituality and mechanizes his will. [...] Rage, fury, holy wrath: this is something else. [...] Wrath is a passion that knows what it wants, it is aimed and planned for a sanctioned fight against evil. [...] I find repulsive those Christians who see in Christ nothing but a mild deity, a rational being unable of affections. On the contrary, the deity of the Gospels is a wrathful, vexed being, beating enemies and punishing them horribly. Christ banished the merchants from the temple with a whip. [...] Social and

moral movements are merging into one single engine, and this engine can be called holy wrath. We can even say that holy wrath is the essence of the Slovene liberation movement. [...]

23rd December, 1942. A friend, whose brother-in-law was killed by our side, writes to me. [...] The lad was among those liberated by our troops from an Italian prisoner train. He had monarchist leanings, refusing to enter either in the partisan unit or in the working brigade. [...] If my children will ever read these notes, they will be unable to understand what I had to go through tonight. [...] Tonight, history has pressed on me and has caught me. Now I am one with its determinisms, my historical immaculateness is over. [...] Then, I ascended up from the dark cellar and sat among the comrades around the stove, like a passenger on a ship, casting his last sight on the old shore before returning inside the deck, already preparing in spirit to set foot in the new land. [...] I embraced two comrades around the shoulders. None of them noticed that I trembled. I will save myself, because I will save myself in comradeship.

26th December, 1942. Christianity and Communism cannot be compared on the same level, because they have a different nature and different aims. The aim of the Christian Gospel is to settle the soul, conveying the final and complete meaning to it, while the significance of Communism is to fulfill the historical man in a certain evolutionary phase, in order to create the necessary conditions for His incarnation. We cannot expect a political and social action from Christianity as a religion, [...] just as we cannot expect from Communism to fully and validly dedicate its efforts to man's spiritual aspirations and needs, which transcend time and space.

18th February, 1943. The peasants feel and act on the basis of a primitive sentiment, while we do it on the basis of a modernly understood national question. [...] Patriotism is attachment to the region, to fate, to ancestors, to customs and interests, while nationalism is attachment to the linguistic, racial and cultural unity, to the true moral ideals. [...] Patriotism is tradition, nationalism is Messianism. [...] We are still a homeland of mood and disposition, a decidedly patriotic reality. We are not yet [...] a national community pervaded by a unitary will. The goal of our liberation movement is to evolve from a traditionally understood homeland into statehood, into a sovereign and progressive homeland. [...] The liberation fight is not only an armed resistance against the occupiers, but also a struggle against a backward people itself. We are living in the political paradox of liberating the people almost against their own will. [...]

28th February, 1943. How many daring, pure and heroic deeds have happened in these two years in Slovenia! [...] Every hour witnesses the birth of new Slovenes, connecting themselves in an ever closer conspiracy. [...] The

aggressiveness and perspicacity of a people that has witnessed the hour of visitation is growing. [...] Under the gentle rebel sky we have parted completely from utilitarianism and the narrow conveniences of the daily life. Here we live in cosmic dimensions. Indeed, history is poetry.

5th April, 1943. Only now, I clearly see the depth of the modern gap between philosophical theory and the concrete living and thinking man. [...] The cardinal mistake of earlier philosophies was their exclusive focus on [...] systematic thought and generality, giving too little emphasis, or no emphasis at all, to the expression of vital, personal truths. This is the consequence of all kinds of rationalisms, especially the rationalism which applies systemic thought as the sole approach for the cognition of the real, factual world. This kind of thinking necessarily became automatized, utilitarian, and at the same time absolutist. This is how the fatal contraction occurred: all that is real is rational, all that is rational is real. From Kant and Hegel up to this day, rationalisms have forgotten not only man's concrete existence [...], but also that every truth is expressed through a specific condition, in a specific perspective and orientation. [...] Undoubtedly, the dialectical method brings progress in the unveiling of reality, especially of history, because in it, the human spirit comes to self-knowledge through self-realization in the course of its own contradictions. However, the dialectical method posits itself outside of the world and of man, presupposing only an external cognition. It renounces both its relationship with the Absolute, and its relation with the subject. [...] The question is to imagine such a system, which would positively vibrate from the tension between eternity and evolutionary historicity, between the tendency to systemization and the anarchy of existence.

1st May, 1943. I have started reading [my diary] for the first time. [...] Memories are rising from the stupefying well of cruel experiences and dreams. [...] Suddenly, I feel the presence of a new illumination. The victory of Man over the Beast is approaching. The victim is defeating the brute, pain is annihilating the vilifier, fear is fettering evil. Goodness is revealing itself, reassuringly and ultimately. [...] A restless energy raises new billions of heartbeats and miraculous germs of intelligence out of me. My mind interweaves with feelings, memory with premonition, dream with calculation. Yet everything I do is consistent, everything is the expression of an internal and external liberation. [...] Now I see with utter clarity what I have already hinted at in my diary before: there is more happiness in the path undertaken by humanity than in the goal. We have never been freer than today, as rebels against modern slavery.

Translated by Luka Lisjak Gabrijelčič

BASIC SECONDARY LITERATURE ON IDENTITY DISCOURSES IN CENTRAL AND SOUTHEAST EUROPE

The following bibliography gives a selection of fundamental studies pertaining to various aspects of identity discourses in East Central and Southeast Europe we have used when composing our contextualizations to the texts included in the volumes of the Reader. While we obviously could not aim at an exhaustive treatment, we sought to include the books that offer paradigmatic interpretations of individual authors or historical periods both in the local languages and in the main Western academic languages. It is also intended to reflect the richness and complexity of the available literature on these topics which we could draw on while putting together these volumes.

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GLOSSARY OF KEY TERMS USED FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF COLLECTIVE IDENTITY

The following glossary gives an orientation for the reader to trace the most important occurrences of notions, used for devising discourses of collective identity in the region, throughout the four volumes of our project. It contains the key cultural, political and institutional concepts and conceptual clusters, as well as the relevant ethnonyms. The abbreviations refer to the volume, the page and the original language of the excerpt [thus III/1/128–130 (Gre) refers to the occurrence of a term in an excerpt of a text originally written in Greek, which can be found in part 1 of vol. 3, on the pages indicated].

Alb – Albanian, Arm – Armenian, Bos – Bosnian, Bul – Bulgarian, Cro – Croatian, Cze – Czech, Eng – English, Fre – French, Ger – German, Gre – Greek, Hun – Hungarian, Ita – Italian, Mac – Macedonian, Pol – Polish, Rom – Romanian, Ser – Serbian, Ser-Cro – Serbo-Croatian, Slk – Slovak, Slv – Slovene, Tur – Turkish

Albania, Albanians, I/79 (Gre), I/121–124 (Alb), I/260–262 (Alb), I/322 (Ser), I/350–351 (Alb), II/77 (Gre), II/140–142 (Gre), II/170–173 (Alb), II/301–304 (Alb), II/326 (Cze), III/1/178–179 (Alb), III/1/237–240 (Fre), III/1/484 (Ser-Cro), III/2/228–229 (Alb), IV/97 (Tur), IV/368–369 (Alb)

alien, aliens, foreigners, enemies, I/121 (Alb), I/164–168 (Cze), I/109 (Rom), I/143–144 (Pol), I/200 (Ger), I/214, 216 (Gre), I/280 (Rom), I/292–293 (Pol), I/322 (Ser), I/330 (Rom), I/327–329 (Rom), I/400 (Gre), II/55 (Cze), II/67 (Cze), II/78 (Gre), II/ 313 (Gre), II/411–412 (Pol), II/432 (Ser), II/498 (Tur), III/1/41 (Ger), III/1/73 (Slo), III/1/103–107 (Ger), III/1/128–130 (Gre), III/1/184–185 (Eng), III/1/238 (Fre), III/I/263 (Gre), III/1/447, 449 (Gre), III/1/474 (Tur), III/1/484–485 (Ser-Cro), III/2/7 (Gre), III/2/31–32 (Hun), III/2/74 (Rom), III/2/91 (Rom), III/2/112 (Gre), III/2/142 (Gre), III/2/150 (Cze), III/2/158–160 (Alb), III/2/169–171 (Pol), III/2/187 (Gre), III/2/228–229 (Alb), III/2/247 (Pol), III/2/257 (Gre), III/2/328 (Gre), IV/113 (Hun), IV/239 (Hun), IV/312 (Tur), IV/351 (Gre), IV/395 (Ser)

- anarchy, anarchism, chaos, I/302 (Gre), II/295 (Tur), II/462 (Hun), III/1/179 (Alb), III/1/403–404 (Ser), III/2/80 (Pol), III/2/97 (Pol), III/2/158 (Alb), III/2/187 (Gre), IV/81 (Rom), IV/321 (Slk), IV/353 (Gre)
- ancestors, I/79 (Gre), I/102 (Cze), I/122 (Alb), I/144 (Gre), I/173–175 (Rom), I/206 (Cze), I/216 (Gre), I/222 (Ser), I/241 (Ger), I/323 (Ser), II/24–26 (Hun), II/124 (Hun), II/170–171 (Alb), II/182–187 (Bul), II/296 (Tur), II/301–302 (Alb), II/311–312 (Gre), II/401 (Gre), II/443 (Hun), II/447 (Slk), II/498 (Tur), III/1/114 (Tur), III/2/58–61 (Tur), III/2/45 (Rom), III/2/72–73 (Rom), III/2/131 (Cze), III/2/159–160 (Alb), III/2/169 (Pol), III/2/171 (Pol), III/2/195 (Tur), III/2/312 (Tur), III/2/327 (Gre), III/2/347–348 (Fre), III/1/454–455 (Hun), IV/75 (Rom), IV/98 (Tur), IV/141 (Tur), IV/224 (Ser), IV/303–305 (Rom), IV/327–328 (Slv), IV/359 (Rom)
- ancient (past, glory), antiquity, I/63 (Ita), I/79 (Gre), I/97–98 (Tur), I/121–124 (Alb), I/144–146 (Gre), I/153 (Hun), I/159 (Slk), I/205 (Cze), I/216 (Gre), I/310 (Gre), I/327 (Rom), II/22–24 (Bul), II/36 (Pol), II/55 (Cze), II/79 (Gre), II/121–122 (Hun), II/140 (Gre), II/164 (Rom), II/199 (Rom), II/202 (Rom), II/248 (Gre), II/302–303 (Alb), II/320 (Ger), II/383–384 (Bul), II/444 (Hun), II/447 (Slk), II/471 (Rom), III/1/317 (Ger), III/1/238 (Fre), III/2/7 (Gre), III/2/29–32 (Hun), III/2/58–61 (Tur), III/2/112 (Gre), III/2/143 (Gre), III/2/187 (Gre), III/2/228–229 (Alb), III/2/254–255, 258–259 (Gre), III/2/327–328 (Gre), III/2/347–348 (Fre), IV/179–180 (Gre), IV/229–231 (Bul), IV/296 (Bul), IV/340 (Bul)
- Armenians, III/1/336 (Tur), III/2/176, III/2/341–342 (Arm)
- assimilation (Magyarization, Bulgarization etc.), II/106–111 (Cze), II/199–200 (Rom), II/216–219 (Pol), II/267 (Ger), II/303 (Alb), II/350–353 (Ger), III/1/33 (Cze), III/1/380 (Pol), III/1/247 (Slv), III/1/284–290 (Slk), III/1/317 (Ger), III/1/346–352 (Cze), III/1/461–463 (Slk), III/2/31–32 (Hun), III/2/104–106 (Rom), III/2/118 (Slk), III/2/130 (Cze), III/2/350 (Fre), IV/131 (Rom), IV/254 (Hun), IV/303 (Rom)
- Austria, Austrians, I/78 (Gre), I/100–101 (Cze), I/166 (Cze), II/363 (Pol), II/106 (Cze), II/226–227 (Hun), II/251 (Cze), II/254 (Cze), II/260 (Cze), II/326–329 (Cze), II/333–336 (Hun), II/419 (Pol), II/450 (Slk), II/462 (Hun), III/1/28–33 (Cze), III/1/46 (Slk), III/1/54 (Hun), III/1/77–83 (Hun), III/1/191 (Eng), III/1/230 (Ser), III/1/244–246 (Slv), III/1/256–257 (Eng), III/1/309–311 (Cro), III/1/323–330 (Hun), III/1/346–352 (Cze), III/1/385–390 (Eng), III/1/415–418 (Cze), III/2/85 (Pol), III/2/130 (Cze), III/2/212–213 (Cze), III/2/350 (Fre), III/2/363 (Pol), IV/151 (Hun), IV/224 (Ser), IV/257 (Hun), IV/286 (Cze)

- backwardness, backward (nation, society), I/93–95 (Pol), II/62 (Hun), II/453 (Ser), III/1/32 (Cze), III/1/88 (Pol), III/1/124 (Ser), III/1/238 (Fre), III/1/295, 296 (Hun), III/1/424 (Rom), III/2/121–123 (Slk), III/2/159 (Pol), III/2/312 (Tur), IV/90 (Cro), IV/139 (Tur), IV/170 (Bul), IV/216 (Ser), IV/402 (Slv)
- Balkans, I/121–124 (Alb), II/61 (Hun), II/304 (Alb), II/474–476 (Bul), III/1/230–231 (Ser), III/1/238–240 (Fre), III/1/307 (Cro), III/1/335 (Tur), III/1/363 (Bul), III/1/423 (Rom), III/2/175–176 (Bul), III/2/196–197 (Tur), IV/114 (Hun), IV/216 (Ser), IV/257 (Hun), IV/280–281 (Cro), IV/392, 394 (Ser)
- blood, I/123 (Alb), I/322 (Ser), II/258 (Cze), II/302–304 (Alb), II/313–314 (Gre), II/401 (Gre), II/406 (Gre), II/470 (Rom), II/475–476 (Bul), II/498 (Tur), III/1/97, 98 (Ser), III/1/102 (Ger), III/1/114 (Tur), III/1/238–240 (Fre), III/1/485 (Ser-Cro), III/2/43 (Rom), III/2/61 (Tur), III/2/69 (Pol), III/2/72 (Rom), III/2/130 (Cze), III/2/197 (Tur), III/2/257 (Gre), III/2/312 (Tur), IV/75–76 (Rom), IV/146 (Ger), IV/218 (Ser), IV/280 (Cro), IV/317 (Slk), IV/328 (Slv), IV/383 (Cze)
- Bosnia, I/222 (Ser), I/322–323 (Ser), I/343–346 (Bos), II/344 (Cro), II/395 (Ser), III/1/92–93 (Bos), III/1/277 (Bos), III/1/403 (Ser), III/1/486 (Ser), IV/60 (Ger), IV/216–217 (Ser)
- bourgeoisie, capitalism, I/84 (Ger), II/179 (Fre), III/1/159 (Cro), III/1/279 (Bos), III/1/299 (Hun), III/1/323 (Hun), III/1/408, 411 (Pol), III/1/416–418 (Cze), III/1/424 (Rom), III/1/429–433 (Cro), III/1/440–443 (Ger), III/1/463 (Slk), III/2/111–113 (Gre), III/2/175–177 (Bul), III/2/265 (Cze), III/1/424 (Rom), IV/180 (Gre) IV/237 (Hun), IV/375 (Slk), IV/392 (Ser)
- Bulgaria, Bulgarians, I/116 (Ser), I/250 (Bul), I/256 (Mac), II/77 (Gre), II/90–3 (Bul), II/152 (Slk), II/191–3 (Mac), II/370–371 (Ser), II/473 (Bul), III/1/142–144 (Bul), III/1/230–231 (Ser), III/1/244 (Slv), III/1/264 (Gre), III/1/270–3 (Bul), III/1/364–366 (Bul), III/1/399 (Bul), III/2/23–25 (Bul), III/2/105 (Rom), III/2/176 (Bul), III/2/350 (Fre); III/2/355 (Mac), IV/53 (Ser), IV/169–171 (Bul), IV/224 (Ser), IV/287, 288 (Cze), IV/295–298 (Bul), IV/338–341 (Bul)
- Byzantium, Bzyantines, I/308 (Gre), II/98 (Tur), II/141–142 (Gre), II/310–314 (Gre), III/1/399 (Bul), III/2/112–113 (Gre), III/2/143 (Gre), III/2/187–188 (Gre), III/2/257, 259 (Gre), IV/51 (Ser), IV/179–180 (Gre), IV/296–8 (Bul)
- Catholicism I/70,71 (Gre) I/281 (Rom), I/288 (Pol), II/172 (Alb), II/303 (Alb), III/1/205 (Cze), III/1/209 (Cze), III/1/461 (Slk), III/2/120–21 (Slk), III/2/364 (Pol), III/2/389–390 (Bos), IV/51–52 (Ser), IV/105–107 (Slk),

- IV/154 (Hun), IV/186 (Cze), IV/270–271 (Ser), IV/280 (Cro), IV/333 (Pol)
- character (national), I/114–117 (Ser), I/121–124 (Alb), I/316–317 (Fre), II/157–158 (Ser), II/166 (Rom), II/172–173 (Alb), II/227 (Hun), II/311, 313–314 (Gre), II/200 (Rom), II/301–304 (Alb), II/401 (Gre), II/492 (Tur), III/1/40 (Ger), III/1/114–116 (Tur), III/1/237–240 (Fre), III/1/271 (Bul), III/1/284–290 (Slk), III/1/363–365 (Bul), III/1/398 (Bul), III/1/472–473 (Tur), III/2/7 (Gre), III/2/29–32 (Hun), III/2/47 (Rom), III/2/61 (Tur), III/2/99 (Pol), III/2/113 (Gre), III/2/174–177 (Bul), III/2/159–160 (Alb), III/2/228–229 (Alb), III/2/369–371 (Hun), III/2/263 (Cze), IV/60 (Ger), IV/81 (Ger), IV/111 (Hun), IV/160 (Pol), IV/217–218 (Ser), IV/368–369 (Alb), IV/387 (Cze), IV/400 (Slv)
- Christianity, I/213–217 (Gre), I/240 (Ger), I/279–280 (Rom), I/307–310 (Gre), I/343–345 (Bos), II/23–24 (Bul), II/53–56 (Cze), II/122 (Hun), II/311, 313 (Gre), II/433–435 (Ser), II/467 (Rom), III/1/93 (Bos), III/1/226 (Tur), III/1/350 (Cze), III/1/398 (Bul), III/1/460 (Slk), III/2/61 (Tur), III/2/112 (Gre), III/2/118 (Slk), III/2/120 (Slk), III/2/390 (Bos), IV/132 (Rom), IV/154 (Hun), IV/194 (Slv), IV/264 (Ger), IV/269 (Ser), IV/280 (Cro), IV/296 (Bul), IV/305 (Rom), IV/316 (Slk), IV/321 (Slk), IV/377–378 (Slk), IV/401–402 (Slv)
- church, clergy, I/70 (Gre), I/186 (Bul), I/216 (Gre), I/295 (Pol), I/279–281 (Rom), I/309 (Gre), II/304 (Alb), II/310, 313 (Gre), II/400 (Gre), III/1/105 (Ger), III/1/347 (Cze), III/1/350 (Cze), III/2/44 (Rom), III/2/112 (Gre), III/2/339–340 (Arm), IV/105 (Slk), IV/269–271 (Ser), IV/305 (Rom), IV/318 (Slk), IV/321 (Slk), IV/378 (Slk)
- citizen, citizenship, I/139–140 (Pol), I/213, 214 (Gre), I/239–245 (Ger), I/288–290 (Pol), I/295 (Pol), I/303 (Gre), I/310 (Gre), II/38–39 (Pol), II/401 (Gre), II 447–450 (Slk), III/1/149–150 (Ser), III/1/165 (Slv), III/1/265–266 (Gre), III/2/334 (Pol), III/2/340–341 (Arm), IV/352 (Gre), IV/395 (Ser)
- city, urban, I/95 (Pol), I/281 (Rom), I/307 (Gre), I/1/336 (Tur), II/121–122 (Hun), III/1/372 (Pol), III/1/378 (Pol) III/2/45 (Rom), IV/86–92 (Cro), IV/203 (Ger), IV/239 (Hun)
- civic, civility, I/242 (Ger), I/279–281 (Rom), I/293 (Pol), III/1/142–143 (Bul), III/1/149 (Ser), III/1/179 (Alb), III/2/99 (Pol)
- civilization, I/121–122 (Alb), I/144 (Gre), I/186 (Bul), I/192–193 (Tur), II/179 (Fre), II/185 (Bul), II/200–202 (Rom), II/311, 314 (Gre), II/320 (Ger), II/336–338 (Hun), III/1/53 (Hun), III/1/55 (Hun), III/1/88 (Pol), III/1/128 (Gre), III/1/239–240 (Fre), III/1/336 (Tur), III/1/342 (Gre),

- III/1/398 (Bul), III/1/404 (Ser), III/1/423–424 (Rom), III/2/43–47 (Rom), III/2/59–61 (Tur), III/2/72 (Rom), III/2/97 (Pol), III/2/113 (Gre), III/2/142 (Gre), III/2/159–160 (Alb), III/2/174–7 (Bul), III/2/188 (Gre), III/2/298 (Slk), IV/137, 138, 141 (Tur), IV/179, 181 (Gre), IV/197 (Slv), IV/218 (Ser), IV/229–231 (Bul), IV/281 (Cro), IV/311 (Tur), IV/351, 354 (Gre), IV/368–369 (Alb)
- community, I/107 (Rom), I/281 (Rom), I/239–245 (Ger), II/69 (Cze), II/179 (Tur), II/217 (Pol), II/353 (Ger), II/383–384 (Bul), III/1/105–107 (Ger), III/1/116 (Tur), III/1/224 (Tur), III/1/335–337 (Tur), III/1/358–359 (Slv), III/1/398 (Bul), III/1/443 (Ger) (*volksgemeinschaft*), III/2/187 (Gre), III/2/338–342 (Arm), III/2/371 (Hun), IV/140–141 (Tur), IV/248 (Ger), IV/296 (Bul), IV/305 (Rom), IV/316–21 (Slk), IV/340 (Bul), IV/375–377 (Slk), IV/393–394 (Ser)
- conservatism, I/299–300 (Pol), II/146 (Pol), III/2/117–123 (Slk), III/2/302 (Slk), IV/250 (Ger)
- constitution, I/121–124 (Alb), I/273–275 (Hun), I/288 (Pol), I/301 (Gre), II/77–83 (Hun), II/110 (Cze), II/166 (Rom), II/247–248, (Gre), II/257–261 (Cze), II/273–276 (Hun), II/296 (Tur), II/313 (Gre), II/334–338 (Hun), II/346 (Cro), II/360 (Hun), II/385 (Bul), II/466 (Rom), II/1/28–33 (Cze), III/1/38 (Ger), III/1/46–49 (Slk), III/1/77–83 (Hun), III/1/142–144 (Bul), III/1/216 (Ger), III/1/276–278 (Bos), III/1/316–318 (Ger), III/1/342–43 (Gre), III/1/415–418 (Cze), III/1/433 (Cro), III/2/92 (Rom), III/2/152 (Cze), III/2/338–342 (Arm), IV/96 (Tur), IV/138 (Tur), IV/263 (Ger), IV/270 (Ser), IV/352 (Gre), IV/393 (Ser)
- continuity, I/121–122 (Alb), I/176 (Rom), I/279 (Rom), I/336 (Tur), II/37 (Pol), II/83–85 (Ser), II/170–172 (Alb), II/182–7 (Bul), II/296 (Tur), II/301–302 (Alb), II/383–384 (Bul), III/2/80 (Pol), IV/141–141 (Tur), IV/229–231 (Bul) IV/279 (Cro), IV/340 (Bul), IV/360 (Rom)
- cosmopolitanism, II/128–131 (Pol), II/179 (Fre), II/252 (Cze), III/2/66 (Pol), III/2/188 (Gre), III/2/312 (Tur), IV/180 (Gre), IV/229 (Bul), IV/340 (Bul), IV/375 (Slk), IV/384, 387 (Cze)
- Croatia, Croatians, I/222 (Ser), I/227–229 (Lat), I/316 (Fre), II/111 (Cze), II/152 (Slk), II/235–237 (Cro), II/267 (Ger), II/273–274 (Hun), II/344–347 (Cro), II/351 (Ger), III/1/47–48 (Slk), III/1/61–66 (Cro), III/1/155–160 (Cro), III/1/165 (Slv), III/1/246–247, 249 (Slv), III/1/324–325 (Hun), III/1/357–359 (Slv), III/1/389 (Eng), III/1/417 (Cze), III/1/429–435 (Cro), III/1/484–486 (Ser-Cro), III/2/66 (Slv), III/2/293–294 (Cro), III/2/389, 390 (Bos), IV/51 (Ser), IV/60 (Ger), IV/86–92 (Cro), IV/195 (Slv), IV/277–281 (Cro), IV/ 288 (Cze)

- crown, II/39 (Pol), II/325 (Cze), II/385–386 (Bul), II/447–8 (Slk), III/1/47 (Slk), III/1/62 (Cro), III/1/103–106 (Ger), IV/59 (Ger)
- culture (national manners, customs), I/61–64 (Ita), I/214 (Gre), I/234–235 (Hun), II/301–304 (Alb), II/67–71 (Cze), II/121–123 (Hun), II/178 (Fre), II/227–229 (Hun), II/287–289 (Bul), II/311, 314 (Gre), III/1/29 (Cze), III/1/115–116 (Tur), III/1/129 (Gre), III/1/215 (Ger), III/1/247, 249 (Slv), III/1/277 (Bos), III/1/284–290 (Slk), III/1/329 (Hun), III/1/348, 351 (Cze), III/1/358–359 (Slv), III/1/363 (Bul), III/1/417–418 (Cze), III/1/425 (Ger), III/1/439 (Ger), III/1/458–467 (Slk), III/2/7 (Gre), III/2/22–24 (Bul), III/2/29–32 (Hun), III/2/44–45 (Rom), III/2/58–61 (Tur), III/2/74 (Rom), III/2/91–92 (Rom), III/2/104–107 (Rom), III/2/127–131 (Cze), III/2/158–160 (Alb), III/2/187, 189 (Gre), III/2/262–265 (Cze), III/2/290–291 (Cro), III/2/298–303 (Slk), III/2/327 (Gre), III/2/349 (Fre), III/2/363 (Pol), III/2/370–371 (Hun), III/2/383–386 (Ger), IV/59 (Ger), IV/75–76 (Rom), IV/88 (Cro), IV/98 (Tur), IV/105 (Slk), IV/140 (Tur), IV/145–147 (Ger), IV/159 (Pol), IV/181 (Gre), IV/229–231 (Bul), IV/238–241 (Hun), IV/254 (Hun), IV/340 (Bul), IV/360 (Rom)
- Czechs, Bohemia, I/100–103 (Cze), I/164–168 (Cze), I/205–209 (Cze), I/239–245 (Ger), II/53–56 (Cze), II/67–71 (Cze), II/106–111 (Cze), II/152 (Slk), II/251–254 (Cze), II/257–261 (Cze), II/265–267 (Ger), II/324–329 (Cze), II/439 (Ger), III/1/29 (Cze), III/1/38 (Ger), III/1/103–106 (Ger), III/1/202–209 (Cze), III/1/316 (Ger), III/1/325–327 (Hun), III/1/346–352 (Cze), III/1/416–418 (Cze), III/1/458–467 (Slk), III/2/117–123 (Slk), III/2/127–131 (Cze), III/2/149–153 (Cze), III/2/212–213 (Cze), III/2/262–265 (Cze), III/2/383–386 (Ger), IV/185–190 (Cze), IV/255–256 (Hun), IV/383 (Cze)
- democracy, I/288 (Pol), I/310 (Gre), II/38 (Pol), II/471 (Rom), III/1/136 (Pol), III/1/149–150 (Ser), III/1/156 (Cro), III/1/158 (Cro), III/1/186 (Tur), III/1/190–195 (Eng), III/1/276 (Bos), III/1/295–300 (Hun), III/1/328–329 (Hun), III/1/348 (Cze), III/1/389–390 (Eng), III/1/415, 418 (Cze), III/1/440 (Ger), III/2/80 (Pol), III/2/105 (Rom), III/2/113 (Gre), III/2/137–138 (Ser), III/2/149–150 (Cze), III/2/338 (Arm), III/2/341 (Arm), IV/80–82 (Rom), IV/111–114 (Hun), IV/160 (Pol), IV/263 (Ger), IV/287, 289–291 (Cze), IV/392–393, 395 (Ser), IV/400 (Slv)
- destiny (national), I/72 (Gre), I/260–262 (Alb), II/166 (Rom), II/296 (Tur), II/304 (Alb), II/413 (Pol), II/498 (Tur), III/1/216 (Ger), III/1/222–226 (Tur), III/1/237–240 (Fre), III/1/315 (Ger), III/2/61 (Tur), III/2/72–73 (Rom), III/2/158–160 (Alb), III/2/228–229 (Alb), III/2/284–285 (Bul), IV/112–113 (Hun), IV/141 (Tur), IV/197–198 (Slv), IV/210 (Rom),

- IV/265 (Ger), IV/345–347 (Tur), IV/368–369 (Alb), IV/360 (Rom), IV/402 (Slv)
- dualism (as political project), III/1/31–33 (Cze), III/1/316–318 (Ger), III/1/328 (Hun), III/1/365 (Bul), III/1/396–397 (Bul), III/2/85 (Pol)
- education, I/69 (Gre), I/144–145 (Gre), I/185 (Bul), I/213, 215, 216 (Gre), I/235 (Hun), I/239–245 (Ger), I/250 (Bul), I/260–262 (Alb), II/55 (Cze), II/70–71 (Cze), II/106–111 (Cze), II/141 (Gre), II/287–289 (Bul), II/304 (Alb), II/312 (Gre), II/346 (Cro), II 447–450 (Slk), III/1/71 (Slo), III/1/88 (Pol) III/1/115–116 (Tur), III/1/123–124 (Ser), III/1/128 (Gre), III/1/202 (Cze), III/1/215 (Ger), III/1/279 (Bos), III/1/288–9 (Slk), III/1/350 (Cze), III/1/417 (Cze), III/1/423 (Rom), III/1/465–466 (Slk), III/2/92 (Rom), III/2/264 (Cze), III/2/326–327 (Gre), III/2/361 (Ger), III/2/386 (Ger), IV/60 (Ger), IV/121–122 (Ger), IV/141 (Tur), IV/311 (Tur), IV/353–354 (Gre)
- emigration, II/171 (Alb), II/219 (Pol), II/418 (Pol), III/1/398 (Bul), III/2/83 (Pol), III/2/90 (Rom), III/2/119 (Slk)
- empire, imperialism, I/78,79 (Gre), I/100–103 (Cze), I/205 (Cze), I/308 (Gre), I/462 (Hun), II/79 (Gre), II/135–136 (Ger), II/158 (Ser), II/242–243 (Ser), II/296 (Tur), II/324–329 (Cze), II/384 (Bul), III/1/28–33 (Cze), III/1/81–82 (Hun), III/1/165 (Slv), III/1/184–186 (Eng), III/1/194 (Ger), III/1/215–216 (Ger), III/1/246–247 (Slv), III/1/265 (Gre), III/1/298 (Hun), III/1/310–311 (Cro), III/1/315–318 (Ger), III/1/386 (Eng), III/1/475 (Tur), III/2/13(Ger), III/2/194 (Tur), III/2/348–349 (Fre), IV/139 (Tur), IV/185–190 (Cze), IV/255–256 (Hun), IV/263 (Ger), IV/280–281 (Cro), IV/345 (Tur), IV/361 (Rom), IV/385–6 (Cze), IV/401 (Slv)
- Enlightenment, I/71, 72 (Gre), I/83–84 (Ger), I/144–145 (Gre), I/160–161 (Slk), I/185–186 (Bul), I/200–201 (Ger), I/221 (Ser), I/239–245 (Ger), II/68 (Cze), II/346–347 (Cro), III/1/203 (Cze), III/2/51 (Bul), III/2/159 (Alb), III/2/341 (Arm), III/2/362 (Pol)
- equality, I/109 (Rom), I/240 (Ger), I/302 (Gre), I/336–337 (Tur), I/344, 345 (Bos), I/350–351 (Alb), II/54–55 (Cze), II/260 (Cze), II/265–267 (Ger), II/295 (Tur), II 447–450 (Slk), II/467 (Rom), II/470–471 (Rom), III/1/28–33 (Cze), III/1/93 (Bos), III/1/103 (Ger), III/1/137 (Pol), III/1/142 (Bul), III/1/276 (Bos), III/1/342–343 (Gre), III/1/404 (Ser), III/1/415 (Cze), III/1/460 (Slk), III/1/485–486 (Ser), III/2/312 (Tur), III/2/340 (Arm)
- ethnos, ethnic substance, I/121–124 (Alb), I/260–262 (Alb), II/170–173 (Alb), II/182–187 (Bul), II/301–304 (Alb), II/353 (Ger), III/1/39 (Ger), III/1/114–116 (Tur), III/1/223–226 (Tur), III/1/238–240 (Fre), III/1/256 (Eng), III/1/270–273 (Bul), III/1/342–343 (Gre), III/2/7 (Gre), III/2/58–61

- (Tur), III/2/347–348 (Fre), IV/97–98 (Tur), IV/193–197 (Slv), IV/345–347 (Tur)
- Europe (Western, Eastern, Central), I/39–42 (Ger), I/69 (Gre), I/79 (Gre), I/108–110 (Rom), I/144–147 (Gre), I/308–309 (Gre), II/53–56 (Cze), II/67–71 (Cze), II/77–78 (Gre), II/122 (Hun), II/140, 142 (Gre), II/209 (Cze), II/236–237 (Cro), II/247 (Gre), II/251–254 (Cze), II/310, 312–313 (Gre), II/311, 314 (Gre), II/324–329 (Cze), II/334 (Hun), II/338 (Hun), II/346 (Cro), II/369–370 (Ser), II/377 (Rom), II/394 (Ser), II/399–400 (Gre), II/418 (Pol), III/1/53–54 (Cro), III/1/88 (Pol), III/1/128–130 (Gre), III/1/217 (Ger), III/1/229–232 (Ser), III/1/237–240 (Fre), III/1/244 (Slv), III/1/295–300 (Hun), III/1/307 (Cro), III/1/336 (Tur), III/1/346–352 (Cze), III/1/385–390 (Eng), III/2/112–113 (Gre), III/2/119 (Slk), III/2/127–131 (Cze), III/2/142–143 (Gre), III/2/150–151 (Cze), III/2/159–160 (Alb), III/2/175–177 (Bul), III/2/194–195 (Tur), III/2/255,257–258 (Gre), III/2/298–303 (Slk), III/2/327,329 (Gre), III/2/338, 342 (Arm), III/2/348–349 (Fre), III/2/369 (Hun), IV/50–51, 53–54 (Ser), IV/59–60 (Ger), IV/97 (Tur), IV/120, 121 (Ger), IV/138–141 (Tur), IV/159 (Pol), IV/168 (Bul), IV/180 (Gre), IV/189 (Cze), IV/197 (Slv), IV/216–218 (Ser), IV/230–232 (Bul), IV/236 (Hun), IV/240 (Hun), IV/263 (Ger), IV/286, 291 (Cze), IV/339–340 (Bul), IV/345–346 (Tur), IV/351 (Gre), IV/376 (Slo), IV/383–387 (Cze), IV/394–395 (Ser), IV/400 (Slv)
- fascism, III/2/303 (Slk), IV/400–401 (Slv), IV/368–369 (Alb)
- federation, confederation, federalisms, I/284–285 (Pol), II/324–325 (Cze), III/1/246 (Slv), III/1/347–348 (Cze), III/1/366 (Bul), III/1/385–390 (Eng), IV/270 (Ser)
- feudal(ism), II/62 (Hun), III/1/107 (Ger), III/1/295 (Hun), III/1/323 (Hun), III/1/423 (Rom), III/1/442 (Ger), III/2/127 (Cze), IV/312 (Tur), IV/392 (Ser)
- fraternity, brothers, I/78 (Gre), I/269 (Ger), I/301–302 (Gre), I/309 (Gre), I/322–323 (Ser), I/329 (Rom), II/78 (Gre), II/91–92 (Bul), II/208–210 (Cze), II/251–254 (Cze), II/259 (Cze), II/471–472 (Rom), II/294 (Tur), II/399 (Gre), II/435 (Ser), II/448 (Slk), II/450 (Slk), II/465 (Rom), II/476 (Bul), III/1/47–48 (Slk), III/1/98 (Ser), III/1/179 (Alb), III/1/248 (Slv), III/1/264 (Gre), III/1/337 (Tur), III/1/460 (Slk), III/1/474 (Tur), III/2/169 (Pol), III/2/312 (Tur), IV/74 (Rom)
- freedom, independence, I/79 (Gre), I/193 (Tur), I/201 (Ger), I/289 (Pol), I/294 (Pol), I/302–303 (Gre), I/308–310 (Gre), II/53–56 (Cze), II/62–63 (Hun), II/68 (Cze), II/91–93 (Bul), II/141 (Gre), II/158 (Ser), II/257–261 (Cze), II/273 (Hun), II/327 (Cze), II/369–370 (Ser), II/376 (Rom), II/385–

- 386 (Bul), II/399,401 (Gre), II/407 (Gre), II/427 (Pol), II/453–454 (Ser), II/470–471 (Rom), II/497–498 (Tur), III/1/71 (Slv), III/1/128 (Gre), III/134 (Pol), III/1/142 (Bul), III/1/184–186 (Eng), III/1/190–1 (Eng), III/1/277, 278 (Bos), III/1/326–327 (Hun), III/1/336–337 (Tur), III/1/367 (Bul), III/1/388 (Eng), III/1/404 (Ser), III/1/415 (Cze), III/1/474 (Tur), III/1/485 (Ser), III/2/61 (Tur), III/1/39 (Ger), III/2/145 (Gre), III/2/301 (Slk), III/2/307–308 (Alb), III/2/341 (Arm), III/2/348–350 (Fre), IV/81 (Rom), IV/121 (Ger), IV/155 (Hun), IV/180 (Gre), IV/229–230 (Bul), IV/287 (Cze), IV/321 (Slk), IV/340 (Bul), IV/403 (Slv)
- Germans, I/160 (Slk), I/164–168 (Cze), I/207–208 (Cze), I/239–245 (Ger), II/53–56 (Cze), II/67–71 (Cze), II/106–111 (Cze), II/165–167 (Rom), II/208–210 (Cze), II/324–329 (Cze), II/335 (Hun), II/377–378 (Rom) (German race), III/1/28–33, III/1/38–41 (Ger), III/1/103–106 (Ger), III/1/190–195 (Eng), III/1/214–218 (Ger), III/1/254–255 (Eng), III/1/257 (Eng), III/1/298 (Hun), III/1/308 (Cro), III/1/310 (Cro), III/1/346–352 (Cze), III/1/385–390 (Eng), III/1/417–418 (Cze), III/1/440–442 (Ger), III/2/104 (Rom), III/2/127–131 (Cze), III/2/149–153 (Cze), III/2/213 (Cze), III/2/247 (Pol), III/2/264 (Cze), III/2/383–386 (Ger), IV/121–122 (Ger), IV/154 (Hun), IV/237–241 (Hun), IV/258 (Hun), IV/264 (Ger), IV/286–291 (Cze), IV/375, 377 (Slk), IV/383–4 (Cze)
- Great (European) Powers, II/320–321 (Ger), III/1/171 (Gre), III/1/185 (Eng), III/1/225 (Tur), III/1/230–231 (Ser), III/1/237–240 (Fre), III/1/342 (Gre), III/1/407 (Pol), III/2/136 (Ser), III/2/194 (Tur), III/2/240 (Cro), IV/111 (Hun), IV/229 (Bul), IV/264 (Ger), IV/290 (Cze), IV/386 (Cze), IV/392 (Ser)
- Greeks, Hellenes, I/71–72 (Gre), I/77–79 (Gre), I/115 (Ser), I/121 (Alb), I/130 (Ger), I/144–147, I/159 (Slk), I/186 (Bul), I/200 (Ger), I/215–217 (Gre), I/302 (Gre), II/76–80 (Gre), II/120–122 (Hun), II/138–142 (Gre), II/170–172 (Alb), II/185–187 (Bul), II/191–3 (Mac), II/247–248 (Gre), II/282 (Bul), II/301–302, 304 (Alb), II/310–314 (Gre), II/321 (Ger), II/336–337 (Hun), II/370–372 (Ser), II/399–402 (Gre), II/406 (Gre), III/1/128–130 (Gre), III/1/171–174 (Gre), III/1/263–266 (Gre), III/1/307 (Cro), III/1/336 (Tur), III/1/342 (Gre), III/1/448 (Gre), III/2/7–8 (Gre), III/2/52 (Bul), III/2/104 (Rom), III/2/111–114 (Gre), III/2/142–143 (Gre), III/2/176 (Bul), III/2/187–188, III/2/196–197 (Tur), III/2/255–258, III/2/326–329, III/2/350 (Fre), IV/179–181 (Gre), IV/ 345–346 (Tur), IV/351–355 (Gre)

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hero, heroism, I/115 (Ser), I/122 (Alb), I/167 (Cze), I/179 (Rom), I/193 (Tur), II/90–93 (Bul), II/172 (Alb), II/303–304 (Alb), II/314 (Gre), II/401 (Gre), II/475–477 (Bul), II/492 (Tur), II/497–498 (Tur), III/1/130 (Gre), III/1/186 (Eng), III/1/484–485 (Ser-Cro), III/2/197 (Tur), III/2/269 (Pol), IV/123 (Ger), IV/147 (Ger), IV/224 (Ser), IV/304 (Rom), IV/346 (Tur), IV/399–400, 402–403 (Slv)

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- immigration, III/2/150 (Cze), III/2/383 (Ger)
- intelligentsia, I/261–262 (Alb), II/91 (Bul), II/459 (Hun), III/1/204 (Cze), III/1/464, 467 (Slk), III/2/91–93 (Rom), III/2/239–240 (Cro), IV/169 (Bul), IV/320 (Slk), IV/338–340 (Bul)
- interests (national), I/109 (Rom), I/216 (Gre), I/350–351 (Alb), II/79 (Gre), II/164 (Rom), II/198 (Rom), II/303–304 (Alb), III/1/41 (Ger), III/1/172, 174 (Gre), III/1/178–179 (Alb), III/1/215 (Ger), III/1/225–226 (Tur), III/1/230–232 (Ser), III/1/239 (Fre), III/1/263, 266 (Gre), III/1/290 (Slk), III/1/343 (Gre), III/2/7 (Gre), III/2/354–356 (Bul), IV/65 (Pol), IV/103 (Slk), IV/346–347 (Tur), IV/368–369 (Alb)
- internationalism, III/1/207 (Cze), III/1/348 (Eng–Cze), III/1/374 (Pol), III/1/410 (Pol), III/2/71 (Rom), III/2/194 (OttTur), III/2/290 (Cro), III/2/364 (Pol), IV/104 (Slk), IV/229 (Bul), IV/340 (Bul), IV/394 (Ser), IV/374 (Slk), IV/384, 387 (Cze)
- Islam, Muslims, I/121–124 (Alb), I/336–337 (Tur), II/79 (Gre), II/98–99 (Tur), II/301–304 (Alb), II/432 (Ser), II/498 (Tur), III/1/92 (Bos), III/1/115 (Tur), III/1/185 (Eng), III/1/222–226 (Tur), III/1/276–280 (Bos), III/2/312 (Tur), III/2/389 (Bos), IV/96–99 (Tur), IV/138 (Tur), IV/224 (Ser), IV/312 (Tur)
- Jews, I/95 (Pol), II/183–184 (Bul), II/216 (Pol), II/311 (Gre), II/351 (Ger), III/1/192 (Eng), III/1/365 (Bul), III/2/152 (Cze), III/2/176 (Bul), III/2/391 (Bos), IV/152 (Hun), IV/154 (Hun), IV/237–241 (Hun), IV/334 (Pol)
- Kurds, III/1/114 (Tur), III/2/347–350 (Fre), IV/96 (Tur)
- language (national, literary, vernacular), I/63–64 (Ita), I/77, 79 (Gre), I/102–103 (Cze), I/108 (Rom), I/121, 123 (Alb), I/144 (Gre), I/152–154 (Hun), I/160 (Slk), I/205–209 (Cze), I/214–217 (Gre), I/221–222 (Ser), I/227–230 (Lat), I/235 (Hun), I/239–245 (Ger), I/250 (Bul), I/256 (Bul), I/260–262 (Alb), I/351 (Alb), II/36 (Pol), II/53 (Cze), II/77 (Gre), II/106–111 (Cze), II/114–116 (Ser), II/128 (Pol), II/140–142 (Gre), II/151–153 (Slk), II/165 (Rom), II/170–172 (Alb), II/200–201 (Rom), II/208–209 (Cze), II/226–228 (Hun), II/235–237 (Cro), II/251–254 (Cze), II/301, 303–304 (Alb), II/312–313 (Gre), II/337 (Rom), II/344–345 (Cro), II/350–353 (Ger), II/358 (Hun), II/448 (Slk), III/1/30 (Cze), III/1/46 (Slk), III/1/71–72 (Slo), III/1/103 (Ger), III/1/129–130 (Gre), III/1/155 (Cro), III/1/164–165 (Slv), III/1/203–4 (Cze), III/1/358 (Slv), III/2/22–23 (Bul), III/2/65–67 (Slv), III/2/112 (Gre), III/1/115–116 (Tur), III/2/131 (Cze), III/2/137–139 (Tur), III/2/152–153 (Cze), III/2/188 (Gre), III/1/248–249 (Slv), III/2/254–255, 258 (Gre), III/2/326, 329 (Gre), III/2/349 (Fre), IV/76

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- liberalism, II/254 (Cze), III/1/47–48 (Slk), III/1/142 (Bul), III/1/174, III/1/208–209 (Cze), III/1/337 (Tur), III/1/423 (Rom), III/1/483–486 (Ser-Cro), III/2/106 (Rom), III/2/113 (Gre), III/2/349 (Fre), IV/81–82 (Rom), IV/146 (Ger), IV/152, 154 (Hun), IV/255 (Hun) IV/373, 375 (Slk), IV/393–395 (Ser)
- liberation, II/90–93 (Bul), II/369–372 (Ser), II/399 (Gre), II/443–444 (Hun), II/454 (Ser), II/475–477 (Bul), II/497–498 (Tur), III/1/128–129 (Gre), III/1/191(Eng), III/1/318 (Ger), III/1/335–337 (Tur), III/1/404 (Ser), III/1/483–484 (Ser-Cro), III/2/112 (Gre), III/2/307–308 (Alb), IV/345–346 (Tur), III/2/350 (Fre), IV/339 (Bul), IV/401–402 (Slv)
- liberties, rights, I/186 (Bul), I/193 (Tur), I/281 (Rom), I/288 (Pol), I/303 (Gre), I/310–311 (Gre), I/350–351 (Alb), II/53–56 (Cze), II/257–261 (Cze), II/ 313 (Gre), II/320–321 (Rom), II/327 (Cze), II/385–386 (Bul), II/401 (Gre), II/406–407 (Gre), II 447–450 (Slk), II/468–471 (Rom), III/1/28–33 (Cze), III/1/46–49 (Slk), III/1/71–72 (Slo), III/1/142–144 (Bul), III/1/149–150 (Ser), III/1/164–166 (Slv), III/1/185–186 (Eng), III/1/342 (Gre), III/2/112 (Gre), III/2/137 (Ser), III/2/340 (Arm), III/2/349–350 (Fre), III/2/389 (Bos), IV/74 (Rom), IV/81 (Rom), IV/352 (Gre)
- Lithuania, Lithuanians, II/214 (Pol), III/372 (Pol), III/378 (Pol)
- Macedonia, Macedonians, I, 78 (Gre), I/122 (Alb), I/256 (Mac), II/77–78 (Gre), II/170–171 (Alb), II/191–193 (Bul), II/302 (Alb), III/1/264 (Gre), III/1/270–273 (Bul), III/1/366 (Bul), III/1/484–486 (Ser-Cro), III/2/25 (Bul), III/2/143 (Gre), III/2/355 (Mac), IV/346 (Tur)
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- mission (national), I/260–262 (Alb), II/314 (Gre), II/365 (Pol), II/371 (Ser), II/438–439 (Ger), II/443–444 (Hun), III/1/186 (Eng), III/1/239–240 (Fre), III/1/317 (Ger), III/2/45 (Rom), III/2/73 (Rom), III/2/85 (Pol), III/2/100 (Pol), III/2/159 (Alb), III/2/321 (Pol), III/2/385 (Ger), IV/125 (Ger), IV/185, 190 (Cze), IV/197–198 (Slv), IV/265 (Ger), IV/345–347 (Tur), IV/361 (Rom), IV/402 (Slv)

- modernity, modernism, II/179 (Tur), III/1/33 (Cze), III/2/46 (Rom), III/2/90–91 (Rom), III/2/121 (Slk), III/2/137 (Ser), III/2/158–160 (Alb), III/2/187 (Gre), III/2/258 (Gre), III/2/262–265 (Cze), III/2/278 (Hun), III/2/307–308 (Alb), III/2/348–350 (Fre), IV/121–123 (Ger), IV/138–141 (Tur), IV/153 (Hun), IV/162 (Pol), IV/229–231 (Bul)
- Montenegro, Montenegrins, I/222 (Ser), I/322–323 (Ser), II/372 (Ser), II/395 (Ser), II/432 (Ser), III/1/245 (Slv), III/1/403 (Ser), III/1/485–486 (Ser-Cro), IV/224 (Ser)
- Moravia, Moravians, I/101 (Cze), II/53–56 (Cze), II/71 (Cze), II/111 (Cze), II/257–261 (Cze)
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- nation, national (attributes of the nation – pride, shame, past, character), I/69 (Gre), I/77, 79 (Gre), I/100–103 (Cze), I/114–117 (Ser), I/121–124 (Alb), I/131 (Ger), I/138 (Pol), I/144, 146–147 (Gre), I/152–4 (Hun), I/260–261 (Alb), I/329 (Rom), I/158–161 (Slk), I/164–168 (Cze), I/234 (Hun), I/213–216 (Gre), I/239–245 (Ger), II/35 (Pol), II/53–56 (Cze), II/61–63 (Hun), II/67–71 (Cze), II/76–79 (Gre), II/85–86 (Ser), II/90–93 (Bul), II/106–111 (Cze), II/116 (Rom), II/121–122 (Hun), II/141 (Gre), II/145 (Pol), II/151–153 (Slk), II/198–199 (Rom), II/247 (Gre), II/251–254 (Cze), II/289–290 (Bul), II/303–304 (Alb), II/312 (Gre), II/319–320 (Ger), II/324–329 (Cze), II/345 (Cro), II/350–353 (Ger), II/371 (Ser), II/393–395 (Ser), II/399–400 (Gre), II/423 (Pol), II/447–450 (Slk), II/458–462 (Hun), II/492 (Tur), II/497–498 (Tur), III/1/28–33 (Cze), III/1/41 (Ger), III/1/77–78 (Hun), III/1/102–108 (Ger), III/1/114–116 (Tur), III/1/128, 130 (Gre), III/1/165 (Slv), III/1/190–195 (Eng), III/1/205 (Cze), III/1/237–240 (Fre), III/1/263–266 (Gre), III/1/284–290 (Slk), III/1/318 (Ger), III/1/342–343 (Gre), III/1/351 (Cze), III/1/357–358 (Slv), III/1/363–364 (Bul), III/1/409 (Pol), III/1/434 (Cro), III/1/440–443 (Ger),

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- nationalism, III/1/114–115 (Tur), III/1/165 (Slv), III/1/223–226 (Tur), III/1/277 (Bos), III/1/296–297 (Hun), III/1/359 (Slv), III/1/381 (Pol), III/1/461–462, 466 (Slk), III/2/105 (Rom), III/2/129–130 (Cze), III/2/137 (Ser), III/2/150 (Cze), III/2/159 (Alb), III/2/264 (Cze), III/2/290–294 (Cro), III/2/356 (Mac), III/2/364 (Ger), IV/65–66 (Pol), IV/81–82 (Rom), IV/96–98 (Tur), IV/103–104 (Slk), IV/110–114 (Hun), IV/152 (Hun), IV/229 (Bul), IV/236 (Hun), IV/255 (Hun), IV/278, 280 (Cro), IV/340 (Bul), IV/376–377 (Slk), IV/402 (Slv)
- nationality, I/102 (Cze), I/121–124 (Alb)/ I/239–245 (Ger), I/281 (Rom), I/350–351 (Alb), II/251–254 (Cze), II/265–267 (Ger), II/273–276 (Hun), II/301–304 (Alb), II/318–319 (Ger), II/333–336 (Hun), II/351–353 (Ger), II/357–360 (Hun), II/364 (Pol), II/376–379 (Rom), II/425 (Pol), II/447–450 (Slk), II/497–498 (Tur), III/1/ 28–33 (Cze), III/1/46–49 (Slk), III/1/53–56 (Hun), III/1/103–107 (Ger), III/1/114–116 (Tur), III/1/137 (Pol), III/1/165 (Slv), III/1/184–186 (Eng), III/1/190–195 (Eng), III/1/203–204 (Cze), III/1/348 (Cze), III/1/415–418 (Cze), III/2/51–52 (Bul), III/2/91 (Rom), III/2/118,122 (Slk), III/2/159–160 (Alb), III/2/263, 265 (Cze), III/2/284–285 (Bul), III/2/339–342 (Arm), III/2/347–350 (Fre), IV/96–98 (Tur), IV/345–347 (Tur)
- native, autochthonous, I/77 (Gre), I/121–123 (Alb), I/351 (Alb), III/1/114 (Tur), III/1/222–226 (Tur), III/1/398 (Bul), III/2/22–24 (Bul), III/2/58–59 (Tur), III/2/257 (Gre), III/2/285 (Bul), III/2/347–348 (Fre), IV/82 (Rom), IV/248 (Ger), IV/302–305 (Ger), IV/327–328 (Slv)
- nobility, aristocracy, gentry, I/69 (Gre), I/108–109 (Rom), I/180 (Rom), I/274 (Hun), I/281 (Rom), II/40 (Pol), II/228 (Hun), II/359 (Hun), III/1/209 (Cze), III/1/296 (Hun), III/1/347, 351 (Cze), III/1/397 (Bul), III/2/99 (Pol), III/2/112 (Gre), III/2/118 (Slk), III/2/187 (Gre), III/2/326 (Gre), IV/82 (Rom), IV/145 (Ger), IV/312 (Tur)

- organicity, I/350–351 (Alb), II/145 (Pol), II/152 (Slk), III/1/39–41 (Ger), III/1/398 (Bul), III/2/46 (Rom), III/2/74 (Rom), III/2/84 (Pol), III/2/149–150 (Cze), IV/65, 68 (Pol), IV/193–194, 196 (Slv), IV/263 (Rom), IV/333 (Pol), IV/353 (Gre), IV/393 (Ser)
- Orthodoxy, I/70,71 (Gre), I/307–310 (Gre), II/302–304 (Alb), II/312–313 (Gre), II/400 (Gre), III/1/256 (Eng), III/2/24 (Bul), III/2/44 (Rom), III/2/123 (Slk), III/2/390 (Bos), IV/51–53 (Ser), IV/222–225 (Ser), IV/231 (Bul), IV/270–272 (Ser), IV/280–281 (Cro), IV/298 (Bul)
- patriot, patriotism, I/164–165 (Cze), I/200–201 (Ger), I/206 (Cze), I/260–262 (Alb), I/269 (Ger), I/275 (Hun), I/301–302 (Gre), I/316–317 (Fre), I/330–331 (Rom), II/70–71 (Cze), II/90–93 (Bul), II/107 (Cze), II/115 (Ser), II/199 (Rom), II/252 (Cze), II/319 (Ger), II/324 (Cze), II/400 (Gre), II/448 (Slk), II/458–460 (Hun), II/469 (Rom), II/488–493 (Tur), II/497–498 (Tur), III/1/123–124 (Ser), III/1/128–129 (Gre), III/1/179 (Alb), III/1/184–186 (Eng), III/1/214–215 (Ger), III/1/407 (Pol), III/1/463 (Slk), III/2/13–14 (Ger), III/2/188 (Gre), III/2/197 (Tur), III/2/240 (Cro), III/2/270 (Pol), III/2/292 (Cro), IV/64 (Pol), IV/76 (Rom), IV/81 (Rom), IV/328 (Slv), IV/402 (Slv)
- peasant, peasantry, I/93 (Pol), I/214 (Gre), I/294 (Pol), I/159–161 (Slk), I/174–175 (Rom), I/274 (Hun), I/268 (Ger), I/281 (Rom), II/109–110 (Cze), II/135–136 (Ger), II/359 (Hun), II/468–470 (Rom), II/492 (Tur), III/1/156–157 (Cro), III/1/277–278 (Bos), III/1/390 (Eng), III/1/398 (Bul), III/1/423–426 (Rom), III/2/92 (Rom), III/2/187 (Gre), III/2/265 (Cze), III/2/308 (Alb), IV/194–198 (Slv), IV/208–209 (Rom), IV/310–312 (Tur), IV/320 (Slk), IV/392–393 (Ser), IV/402 (Slv)
- people, I/78 (Gre), I/121–124 (Alb), I/145–146 (Gre), I/214, 216 (Gre), I/301–303 (Gre), I/309 (Gre), I/128 (Lat), I/331 (Rom), I/159 (Slk), I/239–245 (Ger), I/337 (Tur), I/350–351 (Alb), II/39 (Pol), II/77–78 (Gre), II/90–93 (Bul), II/115–116 (Ser), II/137 (Ger), II/140, 142 (Gre), II/166 (Ger), II/179 (Fre), II/310–313 (Gre), II/399–401 (Gre), II/406 (Gre), II/468–472 (Rom), III/1/104 (Ger), III/1/114–116 (Tur), III/1/129 (Gre), III/1/216 (Ger), III/1/336–337 (Tur), III/1/343 (Gre), III/1/363–365 (Bul), III/1/397 (Bul), III/1/403–404 (Ser), III/1/449 (Gre), III/1/472 (Tur), III/1/483–486 (Ser-Cro), III/2/7 (Gre), III/2/72–73 (Rom), III/2/93 (Rom), III/2/106 (Rom), III/2/112–113 (Gre), III/2/118–122 (Slk), III/2/143–144 (Gre), III/2/149–150 (Cze), III/2/235 (Cro), III/2/254–255, 257–259 (Gre), III/2/279 (Hun), III/2/307–308 (Alb), III/2/327 (Gre), III/2/338 (Arm), III/2/383 (Ger), IV/76 (Rom), IV/81–83 (Rom), IV/122

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- progress, I/185 (Bul), I/200 (Ger), I/260–262 (Alb), I/343–344 (Bos), I/350–351 (Alb), II/67–71 (Cze), II/85 (Ser), II/130 (Pol), II/152 (Slk), II/312 (Gre), II/377–378 (Rom), II/468 (Rom), III/1/28 (Cze), III/1/40 (Ger), III/1/88 (Pol), III/1/93 (Bos), III/1/190–195 (Eng), III/1/202–209 (Cze), III/1/351 (Cze), III/1/430 (Cro), III/1/460 (Slk), III/2/73 (Rom), III/2/106 (Rom), III/2/113 (Gre), III/2/119–121 (Slk), III/2/257 (Gre), III/2/265 (Cze), III/2/312 (Tur), III/2/341 (Arm), III/2/348–349 (Fre), III/2/385 (Ger), IV/82 (Rom), IV/138 (Tur), IV/369 (Alb), IV/400–403 (Slv)
- Protestantism, Reformation, I/71 (Gre), I/308 (Gre), II/267 (Ger), II/359 (Hun), III/1/205 (Cze), III/1/350 (Cze), III/1/461 (Slk), III/2/120–21 (Slk)
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- race, I/115 (Ser), II/77–79 (Gre), II/197 (Rom), II/248 (Gre), II/288–289 (Bul), II/312 (Gre), II/377–379 (Rom), II/497 (Tur), III/1/114–116 (Tur), III/1/216–217 (Ger), III/1/225 (Tur), III/1/256 (Eng), III/1/342 (Gre), III/2/7 (Gre), III/2/32 (Hun), III/2/43–47 (Rom), III/2/60–61 (Tur), III/2/73 (Rom), III/2/112 (Gre), III/2/327–328 (Gre), III/2/349–350 (Fre), IV/76 (Rom), IV/97 (Tur), IV/121 (Ger), IV/152 (Hun), IV/154 (Hun), IV/162 (Pol), IV/180 (Gre), IV/195–196 (Slv), IV/238 (Hun), IV/317, 318 (Slk), IV/345–346 (Tur), IV/354 (Gre)
- rebirth, renaissance, revival, awakening, I/95 (Pol), I/144–145 (Gre), I/281 (Rom), II/60–63 (Hun), II/67–71 (Cze), II/151–153 (Slk), II/210 (Cze), II/251 (Cze), II/296 (Tur), II/312 (Gre), II/447 (Slk), III/1/87 (Pol), III/1/202–209 (Cze), III/1/215–217 (Ger), III/1/351 (Cze), III/2/22–23 (Bul), III/2/50–53 (Bul), III/2/111–112 (Gre), III/2/127–130 (Cze), III/2/144 (Gre), III/2/257 (Gre), IV/74 (Rom), IV/112 (Hun), IV/250 (Ger), IV/304 (Rom), IV/340 (Bul), IV/347 (Tur), IV/386 (Cze), IV/400, 403 (Slv)
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- Romania, Romanians, I/107–111 (Rom), I/173–176 (Rom), I/179–181 (Rom), I/279–281 (Rom), I/327–331 (Rom), II/165–166 (Rom), II/198–200 (Rom), II/243 (Ser), II/267 (Ger), II/275 (Hun), II/370 (Ser), II/467 (Rom), III/1/31 (Cze), III/1/129 (Gre), III/1/230, 231 (Ser), III/1/423–424 (Rom), III/2/43–47 (Rom), III/2/73 (Rom), III/2/90–93 (Rom), III/2/104–107 (Rom), IV/73–76 (Rom), IV/209–210 (Rom), IV/224 (Ser), IV/256 (Hun), IV/303–304 (Rom), IV/359–362 (Rom)
- Romanticism, I/425 (Rom), II/180 (Fre), II/475–477 (Bul), III/1/458–467 (Slk), III/2/117–123 (Slk), III/2/135, 137 (Ser), IV/249 (Ger), IV/302–303 (Rom), IV/338–340 (Bul)
- Rome, Romans, I/213–215, 217 (Gre), I/308 (Gre), II/77, 79 (Gre), II/53–56 (Cze), II/140 (Gre), II/400 (Gre), III/2/143–144 (Gre)
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- Russia, Russians, I/78 (Gre), I/145 (Gre), II/37 (Pol), II/152 (Slk), II/243 (Ser), II/251–254 (Cze), II/319 (Ger), II/324–329 (Cze), II/333 (Hun), II/335–337 (Hun), II/365 (Pol), III/1/41 (Ger), III/1/129–130 (Gre), III/1/231 (Ser), III/1/308 (Cro), III/1/424 (Rom), III/2/44 (Rom), III/2/85 (Pol), III/2/104 (Rom), III/2/257 (Gre), III/2/293 (Cro), III/2/298, 301

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